Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi and Others

Sastri C. J, reasonably be taken to mean, that the petitioner was

organizing tbe movement by enrolling volunteers from the 4th to 10th March in the area known as Bara Hindu Rao. This interpretation is plausible, but the petitioner, who is a layman not experienced iu the interpretation of documents, can hardly be expected without legal aid, which is denied to him, to interpret the ground in the sense explained by the Attorney-Geueral. Surely, it is up to the detaining authority to make his me:i.ning clear beyond doubt, without leaving the person deta,iued to his own resource for interpreting the grounds. We must, therefore, hold that the the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 is vague in the sense explained above.

Ou the second question, there is uo considered pronouncement by this Court, though in some cases it would appear to have been assumed, iu the absence of any argument, that one or two vague grounds could not affect the validity of the detention where there are other sufficiently clear and defini~e grounds 1io support the detention. Mr. Veda Vyas now argues that even though the petitioner might succeed in rebutting the other grounds to the satisfaction of the Advisory Board, his represe1itation might fail to carry conviction so far as the ground mentioned in 8Ub-paragraph (e) was concerned in tbe absence of parti-culars which he could rebut and the Advisory Board might, therefore, recommend the continuance of his detention. The argument is not without force, as the possibility suggested cannot altogether be ruled out. 'rhe Attorney-General drew attention to the recent amendment of section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act as a result of which the petitioner would be entitled to be heard in person before the Advisory Board if he so desires aud, it was said, that he would Dr. Ram thus have the opportunity of getting tbe necessary Krishan Bhardwaj particulars through the Board who could call upon v. the appropriate Government to furnish particulars if The State of the Board thought that the demand for them was in Delhi the circumstances just and reasonable. The petitioner ana Others. would thus suffer no hardship or prejudice by reason Patanjali of sufficient particulars not having been already Sa;:;fri 0. J. furnished to him. 'rhe question however is not whether the petitioner will in fact be prejudicially affected in the matter of securing his release by his representation, but whether his coustitutional safeguard has been infringed. v'Preventive detention is a serious invasiou of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Comt. In this case, the petitioner has tho right, under article 22(5), as interpreted by this Court by a majority, to be furnished with parti-culars of the grounds of his detention "sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him." We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of article 22. 'l'J'hat not ha viug beer1 done in regard to the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the statement of ground,;, the petillioner's detention cannot be held to be il1 accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of article 21. 'l'he petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.

Petition allowed.

Agent for t.he petitioner: Ganpat Rai.

Agent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.

0RIG1NAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 67 of 1958. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.

Veda Vyas (V. N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with him) for the petitioner

M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N. Joshi, with him) for the respondents,

1953. April 16. The Judgment of the Court was ms delivered by Dr. Ram PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-This is a petition under Krishan article 32 of the Constitution tor th~ issue of a writ Bhardwaj v. in the nature of habeas corpus directing the release of The State of the petitioner Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj who is a Delhi medical practitioner iu Delhi and is now said to ·be a.nd Other a. under unlawful detention.

Patanjali The petitioner was arrested on the 10th March, 811st?-i 0. J. 1953, under an order of the District :Y1agistrate of Delhi made under section 3 of the Preventive Deten-tion Act as amended. The grounds of detention were communicated to the petitioner on the 15th March, 1953. 'rhe first paragrap<l of that communi-cation states that " the Jan t:iangh, the Hindu Maha-sabha and the l:tam Rajya Parishad have started :n1 unlawful campaign in sympathy with the Praja Parishad movement of Kashmir for defiance of the law, involving violence and threat to the mainten-ance of public order" as evidenced by the sub-paragraphs which folluw. '!'he incidents referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (l) are said to have ranged from the 4th to the 10th March, 1953, the date on which the petitioner was arrested, but they do not directly implicate the petitioner. '!.'hey merely give particu-lars of the alleged unlawful activities of the three political organizations referred to above. Sub-paragraph (m) is important, as on it is founded the first contention of Mr. Veda Vyas, the learned counsel for the petitioner. It runs as follows:-

"(m) On the evening of 11th March, 1953, there was very heavy brick-batting indulged in by or at the instance of Jan l:langh and Mahasabha workers in t:iabzimandt when the police dispersed a Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha procession and several persons including policemen, journalists and other non-ofticials were injured. An assault was made on Miss Mridula 8arabhai and Sri Dan Dayal one of her associates received a stab injury."

1958 It will be noticed that the incidents related in the

sub-paragraph are alleged to have taken place on the Dr. Ra1n 11th March, the day after the petitioner was arrested Krishan Bhardwaj and detained. Mr. Veda Vyas relies upon it as showing

v. that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind The State of to the alleged necessity for the detention of the peti-

Delhi tioner as, if he had done so, he could not possibly and Others. have referred to what bappened on the 11th March Patanjali as a ground of justification for what he did on the Sastri 0. J. 10th. The so called grounds on which the deten-

tion is said to have been based must, it was suggested, have been prepared by some clerk or subordinate in the District Magistrate's office and mechanically signed by him. The learned Attorney-General ex-plained that the incidents of the 11th March were referred to not as a ground for the arrest and detention of the petitioner, but merely as evidencing the unlawful activities of the movement organized by the Jan Sangh and the other political bodies of which the petitioner was an active member. The explana-tion is hardly convincing and we cannot but regard this lapse in chronology as a mark of carelessness. Notwithstanding repeated admonition by this Court that due care and attention must be bestowed upon matters involving the liberty of the individual, it is distressing to find that such matters are dealt with in a careless and casual manner. In view, however, of the statements in the affidavit filed by the District Magistrate before us that he carefully perused and considered the reports and materials placed before him by responsible Intelligence Officers and that he was fully satisfied that the petitioner was assisting the movement and agitation started by the Jan Sangh1 etc., we are not prepared to hold that the District Magistrate failed to apply his mind to the relevant considerations before he made the detention order as suggested for the petitioner.

The second contention raised by Mr. Veda Vyas is more formida.ble. As already stated, the first para.- graph of the statement of grounds, while it sets out the unlawful activities of the three political bodies, does not directly implicate the petitioner in any of 1968 them. The second paragraph shows how the peti-tioner was concerned in those activities. It begins Dr.Ram by stating " The following facts show that you are Krishan Bha1·dwaj personally helping and actively participating in the v. above mentioned movement which has resulted in Th• Stat• of violence and threat to maintenance of public order". D•lhi Then follow four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) which and Others. refer to private meetings of the Working Committee PatanjaU of the Jan Sangh in January and February, 1953, Sastri O. J. where, it is alleged, it was decided to launch and in-tensify the campaign and the petitioner made inflam-matory speeches. Sub-paragraph (e) on which this contention is based runs thus:

"(e) You have been organising the movement by enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your capacity as President of the Refugee Association of the Bara Hindu Rao,"

a local area in Delhi. It is argued by Mr. Veda Vyas that this ground is extremely vague and gives no particulars to enable the petitioner to make an ade-quate representation against the order of detention and thus infringes the constitutional safeguard pro-vided in article 22 (5). Learned counsel relies on the decision in Atma Rani Vaidya's case(') where this Court held by a majority that the person detained is entitled, in addition to the right to have the grounds of his detention communicated to him, to a further right to have particulars "as full and adequate as the circumstances permit " furnished to him so as to enable him to make a representation against the order of dete,ution. It was further held that the sufficiency of the particulars conveyed in the "second communication" is a justiciable issue, the test being whether it is sufficient to enable the de-tained person to make a representation "which, on being considered, may give relief to the detained person". On this interpretation of article 2<l (5) two questions arise for consideratiGn : first, whether the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph {e) is so vague

712 SUPREME COUR'l 1 REPORTS [1953]

1953 as to render it difficult, if not impossible, for the peti-

tioner to make an adequate representation to the Dr. Bllmi appropriate authorities, and second, if it is vague, K1·ishan whether on vague ground among others, which are lJhfJ.rdwaj clear and definite, would infringe the constitutional

v.

The State of safeguard provided in article 22(5).

Delhi On the first question, the Attorney-General argued and Other&. that the grounds must be read as a whole and so read, Patanjali the ground. mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) could