Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh and Others v. The Collector and Deputy Commis Sioner of Hazaribagh and Others.

IMAM J.-The pet1t1oners have .filed this applica-tion under article 32 of the Constitution claiming that the buildings and lands as set out in the Schedule annexed to the petition and marked "A" . (hereinafter referred to as the disputed properties) did not vest in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the

1955 Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred Raja Bahat!ur to as the Act). Petitioner No. 1 in his individual Kamakshya capacity was at one time the owner of the disputed Narain Singh properties which lie within Touzi No. 28 of the Col-

and others

v. lectorate of Hazaribagh. On the 29th of December, The Collector and 1947 petitioner No. 1 as owner leased out the dis-Depu'.'Ji Commis-sioner 1f Hazari-puted properties to a Company known as Mineral baglt anc? others Deveiopment Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the

lmam]. Company). The company took possession of the dis-

puted properties and has been paying rent. On the 7th of April, 1949 petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity executed a deed of settlement whereby he transferred the disputed properties to three trustees, namely, himself and petitioners 2 and 3. The Com-pany has been paying rent to the trustees since then. The Act came into force on the 25th of September, 1950. On the 3rd of November, 1951 the State Gov-ernment issued a notification under section 3(1) of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity specified therein had passed to and become vested in the State. On the 26th of October, 1953 a notice under section 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to the Com-pany, and on the 4th of March, 1954 the State Gov-ernment issued a notification under section 3(1) of the Act purporting to vest in the State the propc:·ties covered by the above-mentioned deed of settlement and anothe~ deed of settlement with which we are not concerned. The Company instituted a title suit No. 33 of 1951 aga;nst the State of Bihar in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh basing its claim on a mining lease executed by petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity the genuineness of which was challenged by the State. Petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity was made a party to this suit. The Company also instituted a title suit No. 9 of 1954 against the State of Bihar to which petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity was made a party challenging the legality of the issue of notice dated 25-10-1953 under section 4 (h) of the Act. On the 11th of November, 1954 the State of Bihar filed title suit No. 53 of 1954 to which the Company, petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity, the three 1955 trustees and others were made part!·cs. By this suit Raja Bahadur the State of Bihar challenged the genuineness of K amllkslrJa the lease in favour of the Company and the deed of Narain Singh and .... otMrs settlement in favour of the trustees.

The real question for deternfr:iation it, what vested The Collector and Depu!Y Ccmmis-in the State on the publication of the notifcation sioner nf Hazari-under section 3 and by virtue of the provisions of hagh '!!'~ _ot/v.rs section 4(a) of the Act? According to Mr. Chatterjee Imam]. the disputed properties did not vest in the State, whatever else may have. Having regard to the defi-nition of "estate" in the Act, if anything vested in the State on the publication of a notification it was the land comprised in the notified estate. Although the disputed properties stood on the land in the noti-fied estate, they did not vest in the State, because the definition of "estate" speaks of land only and not of any building on it. The notification under section 3 was a mere declaration and actual vesting took place under section 4(a). On the date of vesting the disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. 1, who had parted with his right, title and iHterest therein long before the Act was enacted and the publication of the notification under section 3. Mr. Sinha on behalf of the State of Bihar, on. the other hand, contended that on a perusal of the provi-sions of sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Act, it would appear that the Act contemplated something more than the land in an estate vesting in the State and the disputed properties could and did vest in the State on the pub-lication of the notification under section 3.

In our opinion, it is of little consequence in the present case whether the notified estate vested in the State by reason of the public:ition of the notification under section 3 or by virtue of the provisions of sec-tion 4 of the Act, becau~e in either case a vesting did t:ike place. Although the word land is used in the definition of "estate'', the provisions of sections 4, 5 and 7 show the necessary intentio)l to include something more than the land when an estate vests in the State. Under section 4(a) it is not only the

1955 estate but also buildings of a certain description and Raja Bahadur other things which vest in the State absolutely on K amllkshya the publication of a notification under section 3. }{ arain Sinth Under sections 5 and 7 the buildings mentioned there-and others

v. in also vest in the State, because the buildings in T/1' Ccl11etor and question are deemed to be settled by the State with Inpuiy Ccm>nis-sioner of H~ari­ the intermediary in possession. This could only be l11igh and others on the supposition that these buildings vested in the

Imam]. .State and the person in possession held the same as

settlee under the State.

In the present case on the date of the publication of the notification under section 3 the disputed pro-perties were said to be in the possession of the Com-pany as lessee and the petitioner No. 1 had no right, title or interest therein as he had transferred his lessor's reversion to trustees by a deed of settlement. We may assume, therefore, that on the date of publi-cation of the notification tl1e disputed properties were not used primarily as office or cutchery for the collec-tion of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. 1. It becomes, therefore, necessary to interpret the word "used" occurring in section 4(a). It is to be noticed that this clause of section 4 does not expressly state that a building used primarily as office or cut-chery for the collection of rent must be so used at the date of the publication of the notification. In this clause the words "used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate" must be read in the light of the provisions of section 4(h) where similar words are employed. Under section 4(h) the Collector has the power to make inquiries in respect of any transfer of any kind of interest in any build-ing used primarily as office or cutchery for the collec-tion of rent of such estate, if the transfer had been made at any time after the first day of January, 1946. If on due inquiry the Collector is satisfied that such transfer was made with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act or causing loss to the State or obtaining higher compensation, then the Collector may, after giving notice to the parties concerned and hearing them and with the previous sanction of the State Government, annul the transfer and dis- ~sess the person claiming under it. These pro-1955 v1s1ons clearly indicate that if any building was used Rqja Bahadur primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of Kamaksh"a rent and such building had been transferred after Narain Singh ; and others the first day of January, 1946, the transfer could be v. annulled if the circumstances mentioned in sec-The Collector and Depu{Y Commis-tion 4(h) had been established. That is to say, under sioner of Hazari-these provisions the use to which the building was bagh and others put previous to its transfer after the first day of Imam]. January, 1946 and not thereafter was what the Collector was concerned with and not to what use it had been put after its transfer after the first day of January, 1946. To hold otherwise would be to make the provisions of section 4(h) meaningless. When a proprietor transfers any such building, it necessarily follows that the building thereafter was not .used by him as office or cutcherv for the collection of rent of his estate. If the transf~r was made before the first day of January, 1946 the provisions of section 4(h) would not apply and such a transfer would not be liable to be annulled and the building so transferred would not vest in the State on the date of the publi-cation of the notification covering the estate on which such building stands. If, on the other hand, this transfer was made after the first day of January, 1946, a building comprised in a notified estate, which was used immediately previous to the date of the transfer primarily as office or cutchery for the collec-tion of rent of such estate the transfer would be liable to be annulled under section 4(h) and it would vest absolutely in the State on the publication of the notification and the provisions of section 4(a) must be read accordingly. It would be unreasonable to construe the provisions of section 4(a) in the way suggested by Mr. Chatterjee. The scheme of the Act has to be borne in mind and the provisions of sections 4(a) and 4(h) have to be read together. The peti-tioners had not asserted in their petition that the disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of peti-tioner No. 1 before the first of January, 1946 or be-fore the lease in favour of the Company. On behalf

1955 of the State, on affidavit, it has been stated that the Raja Bafiadur disputed properties were all along used as cutchcry

Kamaks4Ja before the creation of .the lease and that they were Narain Sing!i not being used in connection with any mining opera-

and otitrs

v tion. In our opinion, if as a re.suit of the inquiry The r;,.,fleetor arid under section 4(h) the transfer of the disputed pro-Deputy CJmmis-sioatr of Hazari-perties by the petitioner No. 1 is annulled the dis-bagll '-- and :)t.1.ers puted properties must be regarded as having vested

Imam]. in the State, because they were used as office or cut-

chery for the collection of rent previous to the transfers made by the petitioner 1'1o. 1.

It was next contended that section 4(h) is ultra vires the Constitution, because it imposed an unrea-sonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitio11ers to realize rent trom the Company, as the transfer in its favour was imperilled by the notice issued to it under section. 4(h). No appeal or review was provided in the Act against the order of the Collector issuing notice or an order of annulment made by him. The Collector was left with absolute power to annul a transfer and to dispossess a person in possession thereunder. Section 4(h), however, does direct' the Collector to give reason.able notice to the parties concerned and to hear them. Such annul-ment or dispossession which he may order, must be with the previous sanction of the State Governrrient and he is compelled to do so on terms which may ap-pear to him fair and equitable. The power is, there-fore, not quite so absolute or arbitrary as suggested. Assuming, however, that the Collector has very wide powers, it ·is to• be remembered that section 4(h) is a part of the law of acquisition of estates as enacted by the Act and is an integral part of the machinery by which acquisition of an estate takes place. The Act is a valid lavr of acquisition and its v1hole purpose may be defeated unless there was some such provision as contain~d in section 4(h). The Act being a law for acquisition of estate the question of it or section 4(h) of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the petitioners does not arise. In any c\·e11t the Act including sect!on 4(h) is . protect~d by · ;irticle 31-A of the Constitution.

The petition is accordingly dismissed with cqsts.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ; Petition No· 217 of 1955.

Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

N. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Ganpat Rai, with him), for the petitioners.

Lal Narain Sinha, (Bajrang Sahai and S. P.

Verma, with him), for respondent No. 2.

1955. October 28. The Judgment of the Court was deJ.ivered by