P.L. Lakhanpal v. The Union of India and Another

Shelat, J. The petitioner was arrested by an order dated December 10, 1965 under Rule 30\l)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and was detained in Central Jail, Tebar, New Delhi. On the 24th December, 1965, he filed writ petition No. 47 of 1966 in this Court challenging his detention, inter a/ia; on the grounds that (1) Rule 30(I)(b) was ultra vires s. 3(2)(15)(i) of the Defence of India Act, (2) that rule 23 of the Defence of India (Delhi Detenues) Rules, 1964 gave him a right to .make a representation by providing review of the said detention order and that his said right was disregarded by his having been pre-vented from making such representation, ( 3) that the said order was in breach of s. 44 of the Act, and ( 4) was that it was made in ma/a fide exercise of power. That petition dismissed on April 19, 1966. The petitioner was thereafter served with an order dated June 11, 1966 passed by the Central Government under Rule 30A(9) of the said Rules. The said order, inter alia, stated that "the said detention order has been reviewed by the Central Government-and upon such review the Central Government hereby decides that Shri P. L. Lakhanpal-should continue to be detained .wi~h. a view to preventing hi~ from acting in any manner pre-1ud1c1al to the Defence of India and Civil Defence". The p~ti~ioner filed ~rit .Petition No. 137 of 1966 challenging II the validity of the said angina! order of detention and the order

dated June II, 1966. Rule 30A(9) provides as follows:-

"Every detention order made by the Central Gov-ernment or the State Government shall be reviewed at

intervals of not more than six months by the Govern· ment who made the order and upon such review that Government shall decide whether the order should be continued or cancelled".

That petition also was dismissed by judgment dated September .21, 1966. It appears that the petitioner thereafter addressed cer-tain letters and sent representations to the Home Ministry stating therein that he was now clearly of the opinion that the demand for plebiscite in Kashmir by Pakistan had become untenable as a result of certain events having taken place, that the Tashkent declaration had altered relations between Pakistan and India, that the said declaration and other events which had since taken place had completely changed the complexion of Pakistan's stand 011 Kashmir and that he was also now of the opinion that the appli-cation of some of the provisions of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir was correct. He also represented that there were more pressing problems in the country requiring his attention than the question of Kashmir and the relations between the two countries on that question. By an order dated the 2nd December, 1966, the Government of India directed the further detention of the peti· tioner stating therein that "the said detention order has been further reviewed by the Central Government and upon such review the Central Government hereby decides that ,the order for the detention of the said Shri P. L. Lakhanpal shou1d be con-tinued". The present petition challenges the validity of this order.

The petitioner contended :- ( i) that the said order is a mechanical and casual order passed without taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances relevant under Rule 30 (1) (b) and Rule 30A(9).

(ii) That it is passed in utter disregard of the duty of the Government to act judicially, implicit in the power conferred on it under Rule 30A ( 9) to continue detention, both the function to review and the decision thereon being judicial or quasi-judicial.

(iii) That the said order is ultra vires s. 44 of the Act whereunder the Government is required to decide whether detention is the minimum action necessary on the facts and circumstances of the case.

(iv) That the said order is ma/a fide and illegal being contrary to the policy statements made on behalf of the Government in Parliament from time to time to restrict the operation of the Act and the Rules :

(a) for purposes of defence only, and ( b) in border States; and

( v) That the said order is ma/a fide as it is moti-vated by punitive rather than preventive considerations. In reply to these contentions the counter-affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs states that bet-ween the 10th of December, 1965 and the 2nd of December, 1966, the petitioner had made representations either di!~tly ~r through certain persons and had addressed l~tters explarnmg his position, that on the basis of those representations and letters and the report about his past activities called for from the police and after considering those materials the Central Government felt satisfied that it the petitioner were to be released, he was likely to resume his prejudicial activities and, therefore, his detention should be continued. The affidavit further alleged that at the time of the review of his case on Decemfier 2, 1966 "the said letters, papers, representations and the report from the police were placed before the Minister who had considered the same and he was satisfied that it was necessary to continue the detention of the petitioner''. It also stated that it was not possible to disclose to the detenu the material on the basis of which the Central Govern-ment came to the said conclusion, that the order of detention was to prevent the petitioner from indulging in prejudicial activi-ties mentioned in Rule 30(1 )(b) and that the apprehension of his indulging in such activities would have to be judged and was judged from representations made by him. It is thus clear from the counter-affidavit that the detaining authority considered ( 1) the representations and letters made and written by the petitioner, ( 2) the report of the police authorities in regard to the past activities of the petitioner (there being no question of any present activities as he was in jail since the 2nd of December, 1965) and ( 3) the events which had since his detention taken place. Accor-ding to the Central Government, it came to the decision that continuation of his detention was necessary as it was satisfied that if he were to be released he would continue the same anti-national activities for which he was detained and that his pro-fessions that there was a change in his view was only a ruse to get himself released from detention.

Now, there is no doubt that under the Act as also under the s~id Ru_les tl~e Government is the special forum on whose subjec-uve sat1sfact10n an order of detention for the considerations set out in Rule 30(l)(b) can be made and on whose decision arrived at on the considerations and in the manner prescribed by Rule 30A(9) such detention can be continued. However, as held in P. L. Lakhanpal v. The Union of India and Anr .. (') there is a 111 SUPUMll COUJ.T RJIPOltTS [f967J 3 S.C.K. <lifference in the power to detain and the power to continue such <letention beyond a period of six months in that whereas the former depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, the latter has in express terms been made dependent on the existence of facts and circumstances necessitating such continuance. This Court held in that petition :

"It follows that where the exercise of power is not conditioned on a mere opinion or satisfaction but on the existence of a set of facts or circumstances that power can be exercised where they exist. The .authority in such a case is required to exercise the power in the man-ner and within the limits authorised by the Legislature. The existence of such facts which is the determinant for the exercise of the power is demonstrable''.

The Court further observed :- "Unlike Rule 30(1 )(b) the power to continue the detention after review is not dependent on the satisfac-tion of the Government. Rule 30A postulates that ordi· narily detention should not be for more than six months unless found necessary. It is for that reason that under the Rules when the period of six months expires the Government is enjoined upon to decide whether it should be continued or cancelled. Though the legisla-ture has made the Government the exclusive forum for such a decision, its decision has to be founded on facts and circumstances which· make the continuation neces-sary in order to prevent the detenu acting in a manner prejudicial to the matters set out therein. The substitution of decision instead of satisfaction is a clear indication that the criterion for continuing the detention is the existence of those facts and circumstances which neces-sitate it. It is not unreasonable to think that the legisla-ture decided to confer power the exercise of which was made dependent upon the subjective satisfaction at the initial stage but where continuation of detention was concerned, ·it thought that there should be different con-siderations. At that stage there would be ample time and opportunity for the Government to scrutinise the case fully and ascertain whether facts and circumstances exist demanding continuation and therefore deliherately used the word 'decide' instead of the words 'is satisfied'. Therefore, where such circumstan~es do not exist there would be no necessity for contimiation and yet if the Government decides to continue the detention, such a decision would be beyond the scope of Rule 30A and would not be a decision within the meaning of or under

that Rule. Cases may arise where circumstances exist leading to the authonty's satisfaction that a particular person should be detained but those circumstances may not exist at the time when the review is made. In the latter case it is impossible to say that the Government can still decide to cont.inue the detention nor is it pos-sible to say that it is the Government's opinion or satis-faction that such facts and circumstances exist which is the criterion. The decision on a review has to be arriv-ed at from the factS and circumstances which actually subsisted at the time when the original order was made in the light of subsequent developments and not merely those existing at the time when the order was made. In such a· case the decision can be challenged as one not within the scope of or under the Rule and therefore un-authorised or as one based on considerations irrelevant to the power".

The position reslllting from this decision is that the decision to continue detention has to be arrived at not su;jectively but on an objective standard, i.e. on a decision on materials relevant to the purposes under Rule 30(1)(b) and R•le 30A(9) gathered by or placed before the detaining authority which, according to that authority, necessitates continuation. Though it is the detain-in& authority which has. to decide and its order is not subject to appeal or revision by a .. court of law such ·an order is liable to a challenge where either such facts and circumstances do not exist or where it is made on the basis of facts or circumstances not relevant or extraneous to the said purposes.

On the contentions raised by the petitioner, the question that falls for determination is whether the function entrusted by Rule 30A(9) to the Government and its decision thereunder are judi- ~ial or qu~si-judicial. This question was le~ open in the. earlier Judgment m P .. L. Lakhanpal v. The Union of India and Anothtr(1 ) as the petitioner had then not raised it.

As ta what is a quasi-judicial as against an administrative or ministerial function, it is no longer necessary to go in any detailed search for the principles governing the distinction b11tween the two. Lord Loreburn, L. C. in Board of Education v. Rice(2 ) stated, "Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of Stall:: the duty of deciding or determining the questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in maay others, what comes for determination is sbmetimes a matter to be settled by discretioa, involving no law. It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve a matter of law as well as a matter of fact, or even depend upon a matter of law alone. In such cases the Board of Education will have to as-certain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I do not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying up0n every one who decides any-thing. But I do not think that they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial .... They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contra-dicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view". Similar sentiments were also expressed by Lord Haldane in Local Gcwern-ment Board v. ArUdge('). The Lord Chancellor there stated, "When the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, . and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal wilose duty it is tq mete out justice". The principles distinguishing a quasi-judicial function from one which is ministeral were more precisely set out by Das, J. (as he then was) in the Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani(2 ). He observed (1) where is a Us, there is prima facie in the absence of anything in the st(l.tute to the con-trary the duty of the authority to act judicially _and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (2) even if there is no Us inter-parties and the contest between the party proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the autho-rity is required by the statute to act judicially. "In other words, while the presence of two parties besides the deciding authority will prima facie and in the absence of any otqer factor impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially". These principles have since been acted upon by this Court in subsequent decisions such as Nagendra Nath Bora, v. The Commissioner of Hills Division(•) Radheshyam Khare v. The State of Madhya Pradesh('), Gullapal/i Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Cor-poration("), and Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India ('). In Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. v. Ghanshyam (1) the question again was whether the power entrusted to the Examination Committee under s. 15 of U.P. It Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and Chapter VI, r. ( 1) of the

Regulations made thereunder was a quasi-judicial power. Wanchoo, J., who spoke for the court said at page 43 as follows:-

"Now it may be mentioned that the statute is not likely to provide in ~ many words that the authority II passing the order is required to act judicially; that can

only be inferred from the express provisions of the statute in the first instance in each case and no one circumstance alone will be determinative of the question whether the authority set up by the statute has the duty to act judici-ally or not. The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judi-cially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the person affected and other in die fa afforded by the statute". The Coun there held that it was obvious that the Committee when it proceeded to decide matters covered by r. 1 ( 1) will have to depend upon materials placed before it and before it decided to award any penalty it had to come to an objective determination on certain facts and this was the only manner in which it could carry out the duties imposed on it. Even though there was no /is in the present case in the sense that there were not two contend-11: ing parties before it the Committee should hear the examinees

whose lives might be seriously affected by its decision even sub-jecting them in some cases to criminal prosecution on charges of impersonation, fraud and perjury. Though, therefore, there was nothing express one way or other in the act or the Regulation easting a durv on the Committee to act judicially, the manner of II the disposal anli the serious effects of the decision of the Com-

mittee would li:ad to the conclusion that a duty to act judicially was cast on the Committee and the Committee when it acted under r. 1 ( 1) was acting quasi-judicially and the principles of natural justice would apply to its proceedings.

Let us now proceed to consider the nature of the function of review and the decision thereon in the light of the principles laid down in these decisions. There can hardly be any doubt that in ~ case of the lcind y;e have before us there must always occur a dilemma or a conflict between the claims on the one hand of personal liberty of an individual and these of national interests on the other. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that in such cases, the only remedy that a person detained has lies in the pro-cedural safeguards that the legislature deliberately lays down. Wher~ suii~ procedural safeguards have been fully and properly complied with, the Coun would have no power or would in any UllupCI/67-9 .

event be reluctant, even if it has, to interfere. That is because of the consideration that national interest and security should hliVe a prior claim than even the personal liberty of an individual who has acted or is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to them. In such cases, however, utmost care has to be taken to comply with such few safeguards which the law justifying the loss of liberty provides. That the impugned decision involves the right of personal liberty, a more cherished right than that one cannot con-ceive in our democratic State is obvious. It is equally obvious that the manner in which the question of continuation of dete~­ tion enjoined upon by Rule 30A(9) has to be determined is by applying the objective standard as against the subjective opinion or the belief of the detaining authority i.e. by weighing evidence brought before or collected by such authority relevant to the pur-poses under Rule 30(l)(b) and Rule 30A(9) and then coming to a decision whether the order of detention needs continuation or not. ijow can such an authority come to its decision honestly and properly unless it is certain that the materials before it are true and dependable. How is that certainty to be derived unless the person concerned is given an opportunity to correct or con-tradict such evidence· either by explanation or through other mate-rials which he can place before the authority. Keeping in mind the five factors laid down in the case of The Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P.( 1), the conclusion that we must come to is that the function entrusted to the authority under Rule 30A(9) as dintinguished from the power under Rule 30(l)(b) is quasi,judicial and the decision which it has to arrive at cannot be anything other than a quasi-judicial decision.

Mr. Dhebar, however, relied on the judgment of Shah, J. in Sadhu Singh v. Delhi Administration(') and especially the obser-vations therein that "if the order of detention is purely executive and not open to review by .the court, a review of those very cir-cumstances on which the order was made in the light of circums-tances since the date of the order cannot but be regarded as an executive order". The question is: Does it follow that because the first order is purely executive, the subsequent order is neces-sarily also exec,utive? While making the subsequent order, the authority is called upon to decide whether further detention is necessary for the purposes set out in the Rules. That decision has to be arrived at, firstly, on the assessment of the evidence placed before the authority and not on its subjective satisfaction and secondly, in the light of the facts which existed at the date of the original order and the facts and circumstances which have occur-red or developed since then. It. is well-recognised that a function or power which in its inception is purely ministerial may some-times become quasi-judicial at a latte. r or some intermediate stage during the course of its exercise. At the stage at which it. attains the nature of a quasi-judicial function, the authority entrusted with that function has to comply with the rules of natural justice and give an opportunity to the party. concerned of representing his case. An illustration can be found in R. Johnson & Co. (Builders) Ltd.· v. Minister of Health('), where Lord Greene, M.R. at. p. 401 of the Report points out that the function en-trusted to the Minister there was of such a composite character. It started as an administrative function but at the second stage it was quasi-judicial where he had to consider the objections of parties, that is, the objectors and the local authority and then ended as an administrative function when the Minister decided whether to confirm or not to confirm the report of the local autho-rity. Regarding the second stage, he characterised that as a quasi-lis and the parties i.e. objectors and the local authority as quasi-parties and said that while that stage was pending statements made by or obtained through either of the quasi-parties would have to be disclosed to the other quasi-party.

To say therefore that because a function is in its inception executive in character, it retains the executive character through-out would not, with ·respect; be correct. Besides, the function under Rule 30(1)(b) and that under Rule 30A(9) is net one and the same. The former is completed as soon as an order of detention is made; the latter is independent of the former and is to be exercised after detention has gone on for a period of six months. . In our view, whereas the function under Rille 30( l )(b) is executive, the one under Rule 30A ( 9) is quasi-judicial and therefore in exercising it the rules of natural justice have to be complied with.

. It is admitt~ that. the petitioner was not given any opportu-ruty of representing his case or to correct or contradict the evi- ~ence ~n which !he Government was going to rely on and which !£ !t admittedly rehed on. But Mr. Dhebar's contention was that

~~ poy;er of decision under Rule 30A(9) were held to be quasi· J.ud1c1al m character a person detained would be entitled to dis-closure of the materials in possession of the Government and on the basis of which the order would be made that such disclosure would not only be prejudicial to the very puiJ,oses of the Act and the Rules but also to national interest and, therefore, the legisla-ture co~d ~ot ~ve intended such disclosure. The answer to this contention 1s ~le. In some cases, though such cases would b~ few, such dis7losure would perhaps be embarrassing and, we will assume, detrimental to, the larger interests of the country. But the proper remedy agamst such a consequence is not to deny

(I) [1947] 2 All E. R. 39S.

124 SUPllBMB COU.T llBPOl.TS [1967] 3 s.c. the elemental right of representing his case to the person whose liberty is being deprived but by providing a rule wherellllder the authority in suitable cases can claim privilege against such dis-closure. Such a provision is in Jact provided for under Art. 22 of the Constitution under the Prevention of Detention Act. There does not appear . to be any reason why such a rule ca)lnot be made under the Defence of India Act or the Rules made there-under.

It may be that in the present case the Government had materials before it which might justify the petitioner's detention. We do not know whether it had or not for the only thing that was .said in the counter-affidavit was that there were materials on the consideration of which the Minister based his decision. If that be so, the proper thing to do was tG give a chance to the petitioner to explain them. This not having been done the order of con-tinuation of detention wai; illegal, it being in breach of the prin-dples of natural justice and has, therefore, to be quashed.

In this view, it is not necessary to deal with the rest cf the contentions raised by the petitioner. The petition is ·allowed. The order dated December 2, 1966 is quashed and the petitioner ;s directed to be set free forthwith.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 258 of 1966. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights.

The petitioner appeared in person.

R. H. Dhebar, R. N. Sachthey, and S. S. Javali, for the res-pondent.

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