Municipal Council Raipur & Ahr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh

Sikri, J. This appeal by si;ecial leave arises out of the fol· lowing facts. Inspector Ahuja inspected the Municipal Council, Raipur, under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961-hcrein· after referred to as the Act-and found that 50 transport workers, including drivers, conductors, mechanics, etc., had been employed by the Council I.Jut the Council had not be~n registered as requir-ed under s. 3(1) of the Act. He filed a complaint before the Special Magistrate and Presiding Officer, Labour Court, who issued summons to the accused, namely, the Municipal Council and the Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Raipur. The accused appeared by counsel and filed preliminary objections. Be· fore the Magistrate two points were taken: (!) that the Municipal Council was not a 'motor transpnrt undertaking' within s. 2(g) ~f the Act, and (2) that the Council was exempt under s. 38 of the Act insofar as it uses the vehicles for transporting sick or in· jured persons and for maintenance of public order, i.e., for trans-porting night soil and refuse of the town free of charges. The Magistrate accepted these contentions and dismissed the com-plaint and discharged the accused p·ersons.

The State of Madhya Pradesh tiled a revision before the Sessions Judge, Raipur, who agreeing with the findings of the Magistrate, dismissed the revision. The State then filed a revision under s. 439, Cr. P.C. Three points were deb~ted before the High Court : (I) whether a revision lay under s. 439, Cr. P.C. The contention was that the accused had been acquitted and not discharged and, therefore, only an appeal under s. 417. Cr. P.C., lay; (2) that the Municipal Council does not fall within the definition of the expre1sion "motor transport undertaking" in s. 2(g); an<] (3) that the transport vehicles owned by the Muni-cipal Council are exempt under s. 38 ( 1) of the Act.

The High Court overruled the preliminary objection and held that a revision lay under s. 439, Cr. P.C., because the order passed by the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal. On the second point the High Court held that the Municipai Council fell within the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking". On the third point the High Court held that the vehicles of the Municipal Council did not come within the exemption under s. 3 8 of the Act.

The same points have been debated before us by the learned counsel. Coming to tlie first point, we agree with the High Court that the order of the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal. It is true that it is a summons case and no formal charge is necessary to be framed under s. 242, Cr. P.C., but even so here when the accused appeared, before any-thing was done the. accused filed a preliminary objection and no particulars of the offence of. which the accused was charged were even stated to him.

Coming to the second point, it seems to us that the High Court was rig11t .in holding that the Municipal Council is a motor transport undertaking as defined in the Act. It is necessary to set out the relevant definition in s. 2 of the Act.

"2(g) 'motor transport undertaking' means a motor transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward, and in-cludes a private carrier;

(n) all other words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act."

The expression "private carrier" is defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to mean "an owner of a transport vehicle other than a public carrier who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is neces-sary for the purposes of his business not being a business of providing transport, or who uses the vehicle for any of the pur-poses specified in sub-section (2) of section 42." A "transport vehicle" is defined in t)le Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to mean "a public servjce vehicle or a goods vehicle," and a "goods vehicle" is defined to mean "any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use fdr the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods solely or in addition to passengers." "Goods" is defined as follows:

"Goods" includes Jive-stock, and anything (other than equipment ordinarily used with the vehicle) car-

ried by a vehicle except living persons, but does nut in-clude luggage or personal effects c'1rried in a motor car or in a tr'1ikr 'ltlached to a tn0l<>r car or the per,onal luggage of pJsseng~rs travelling in the vehicle."

It seems to us that the accused fell willtin the definition of a "private carrier"' inasmuch as the Council owned transport vehicles and used these vehicles solely for the carriage of goods which arc its property. In thb case we are nol concerned with the second limb of the definition. and the authority cited by the learned counsel for the accused fMolzamed Zarfu/ /slam v. Birendra Lall(') which dealt with the second limb, is of no assistance to us.

The main argument which th,· karncd counsel urges is that the word "includes"' in the definition nf the expression "mote; transport undertaking·· helps him because this shows that it is only an undertaking of a commercial nature which was intended to be included wit:iin the definition of "motor transport under-taking··. He says that a Municipal Council is not carrying on any business but is carrying on statutory obligations imposed upon it and, therefore, a Municipal Council cannot he called an undertaking.

We arc unable to accept this contention. First, the Act pro-vides for the welfore of motor transport workers and rcgllldcs the conditions of their work. Such beneficial acts are not, as a rule, construed strictlv. Secondlv, the words of the dcfin;tion are plain and not su'.sccptibk of any reasonable limi!ation. It seems to us that by u;ing the IHlfll ··inclu<ks" the Legislature undoubtedly intended to enlarge the meaning of the expression "motor transport und~rtaking··. The words "priva:: carcier·· have been given a specific meaning in the \1otor Vehicles Act. 1939, and it is difficult to limit this specific meaning on any reasonable basis. Further. s. 38 of the Act, which exempt> certain tr~1nsport vehicle~. abo prl)c~cds on the b~isis thJt a pri·;at~ carrier who is carrying on activities which :ire not commercial would be included within the expression "nhitor tramport under-taking".

Relying on the decision of the House of Lords in Diiworrh v. The Commissioner of Stamps(') and the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mother Superior Co11re11t Sc/1M/('). the learned counsel contends that son1etin1cs the legislature uses the \vord "includes" to r.1cc1n "means and includes". This is undouhtedly so but we <>re 1111ablc to appreciate how this would help the apri<:llants. II

(1) A.LR. 1965 Rom. 1~0. , .. , [''\'.'I-I] \ i t<1 (3) A.LR. 195X \LP .. iti~.

The learned counsel also suggests tlut we shouk !imit the meaning of-the words "private carriee~ in the same manner as the l\fadhya Pradesh High Court limited the meaning of the word "church" occurring in s. 2( 4) of the Madhya Pradesh Pub-lic Trust Act. We are unable to see any analogy between the two definitions. The definition there is quite different and the High Court was of the view that the scheme of the Act itself shows that what was intended was to regulate, not religious insti· tutions but religious institutions impressed with the character or a public trust."

Coming to the last point, we agree with the High Court that the words "public order" ins. 38(1)(ii) do not include the mainte-nance of public health. Section 3 8 reads :

"38. Exemptions.-(!) Nothing contained in this Act shall ...apply to or in relation to any transport vehicle-

(i) used for the transport of sick or injured persons; (ii) used for any purpose connected with the security

of India, or the· security of a State, or the main-tenance of public order .. : ... ".

The learned counsel relies on the decision of this Court · in Ramesh Thappar v. The State of Madras\'). In Ramesh Thappar's case the question before this Court was "whether the impugned Act (Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949) in so far as it purports: by· section 9(1-A) to authorise the Provincial Gov-ernment 'for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance ef public order, to prohibit or regulate the entry into ·or the circulation, sale or distribution in the Province of Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of documents' is a law relating to any matter which undermines the security of or tends to overthrow the State." Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, observed :

"Now ·rublic Order' is an expression of wide con-notation anti signifies that state of tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of' internal regulations enforced by the govern-ment which they have established."

Later he observed :

" 'Publiq safety' ordinarily means security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that sense, anything which tends to prevent danger to public health may also be regarded as securing public safety."·

The learned counsel urges that "public order'' includes "pub-lie safety'' and the latter comprises "public health". We see no force in this contention and Ramesh Thappar's case(') does not say so. In our view "Public Order" in this context means public peace and tranquillity. We agree with the High Court that the functions of the Municipal Council in carrying night soil and in <listributing water do not fall within "maintenance of public order:'

Ju the result the appeal fails and is dism i>s< :.