R. C. Sharma v. Union of India & Ors.

BEG, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and ,orde,· of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court given by it on 17th November, 1 \169, dismissing a plaintiff's first appeal arising out of an original11uit for a declaration that the order passed by the Commis-sioner of Income-tax, Lucknow, on 2nd April, 1956, reducing the appellant in rank from the post of an Income-tax Officer to that of an Income-tax Inspector, was void and inoperative. It appears that the appellant was in service upto 30th April 1958, when he was prematurely retired. The appellant also claimed Rs. 20,904/- as arrears of salary, but he reduced this claim to Rs. 16,561.29.

The appellant was originally appointed on 22nd November 1922, as Lower Division Clerk, and, thereafter, promoted as Income-tax Inspector in 1942. He was promoted to the post of Income-tax Officer in 1945. H;s case was that he had worked to the entire satisfaction of his immediate superior officers and higher authorities and had earned a number of certificates highly appreciative of his work. He was con-firmed early in 1952 as an Income-tax Officer. He was, however, placed under >Uspension on 30th September, 1953, by the Commissioner of Income-Tax, U.P., Lucknow, on the basis of 8i preliminary enquiry on allegations involving rorruption and violation of service rules. ·Charges were framed on 30th December, 1953, by Shri A. K. Bose,

Deputy Director of Investigations, who was appointed by the Commis-sioner of Income-tax as the Inquiring Officer. The preliminary enquiry had been conducted by Shri G. S. Srivastava, Inspecting Assistant Com-missioner of Income-tax, Meerut.

That first charge was that the appellant had entered into partnership with others, under the name of Gautam Cycle Mart, Meerut, in 1939, in contravention of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules. The secoud charge was that he bad made various investments in the name of various members of his family far in excess of and disproportionate to the known sources of his income. His high standard of Jiving and expenditure were also mentioned there. The third and the last charge gave particulars of thirteen assessment cases in, which the appellaint was alleged to be either "grossly negligent, careless, fuefficient, and/ or cor-rupt in the performance of his duties as Incometax Officer".

The appellant's defences included alleged confused nature of charges characterized by him as "vague, over-lapping, intermingled" and wrong" ly joined together. He also pleaded that there had been an enquiry in 1949, by Shri A. R. Sachdeva, Asstt. Inspecting Commissioner, into some of the matters mentioned in the charges, and about others in 1952 by Shri R. N. Srivastava, another Inspecting Commissioner, and that the appellant had been exonerated of the allegations and imputations made against him on each occasion. One of his defences was that a fresh enquiry into the sam.e charges was not permissible under the Departmental rules and was also barred by rules of natural justice. He also complained of failure to give him opportunity to produce nine wit-nesses in his defence with some documents.

It is evident that the questions raised by the appellant depended on findings of fact. All relevant facts had been examined by the officer who held the enquiry and by the punishing authority. No malafides against either the Inquiring Officer, Shri A. K. Bose, Deputy Director Investigation, or against the punishing authority was alleged. Taere are, however, suggestions that Shri G. S. Srivastava and Shri R. N. Srivastava, Inspecting Assistant Commissioners, were pursuing the appellant for some unknown reason which we do not find stated anywhere. We fail to see how these two officers, who neither conducted the actual depart-mental trial nor could have any influence over the punishing authority, could cause any miscarriage of justice or do anything to vitiate the departmental trial merely because they hefd preliminary inquiries before framing charges. The defence of the appellant seemed something similar to the much too common a defence of the accused in criminal trials attributing all their misfortunes to the hostility of the police.

The question whether the appellant was given a reasonable opportu-nity to lead evidence and to be heard or not is largely a question of fact. It is only when an opportunity denied is of such a nature that the denial contravenes a mandatory provision of law or a rule of natural justice that it could vitiate the whole departmental trial. Prejudice to the government servant resulting from an alleged violation of a rule must be proved.

The plea that the appellant has been subjected to trial ou allegations which had been the subject matter of previous enquiries overlooks that no charge was framed as a result of any previous enquiry. Therefore, the two authorities cited : The State of Assam & Anr. v. 1. N. Roy Biswas('), and R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State('), do not help the appellant. If an inquiry is held, at a particular stage, possibly to determine whether regular proceedings should be drawn up or started. it does not debar a departmental trial. That was the naturq of the pre-vious enquiries. It appears that it is only after the appellant's activities had become more notorious that further enquiry was undertaken and regular charges framed. It is possible that the appellant may have been emboldened by the failure of officers to report earlier that charges should be framed and tried. In any case, this could not stand in the way of the first regular enquiry in the course of which charges were actually framed and fully enquired into by Officers whose integrity and sense of justice is not challenged.

As for the denial of the opportunity to produce nine witnesses in de-fence, all that is suggested is that these witnesses could only state what opinions they had formed about the work, efficiency, and integrity of the appellant. They could not say anything about the particular instan-ces which formed the subject matter of the charges against the appellant. It is not uncommon for astute Govt. servants, facing such enquiries, to give long lists of witnesses and documents so as to either prolong an enquiry or to prepare grounds for future litigation. Unless the exclu-sion 0f evidence is of a kind which amounts to a denial of natural jus-tice or would have affected the final decision it could not be material. In the case before us, it has not even been shown how the witnesses I whose production was said to have been disallowed could help the ap-

pellant's case on specific charges. Indeed, we do not know whether any evidence which the appellant tr"ted to produce was really wrongly excluded and at what stage and for what reasons. All these are ques-tions of fact which should be, initially, raised in the departmental trial. After that, if there was any patent error a writ petition lay. Finally, the

(I l A. I. R. [1975] SC 2277.

(2) A. l. R. 1937 PC 27.

trial Court and the High Court had coc<idered at some length all rele-vant questions raised.

Learned Counsel for the appellant has handed over a very carefully and laboriously prepared statement of facts of the case to show us that the evidence did not support the charges levelled against the appellant. II It was also submitted that, apart from the charges relating t0 partner-

ship in the Gautam Cycle Mart, no other charge was found substantiated. Furthermore, it was submitted that, after the inquiring officer had found that the Gautam Cycle Mart was started in 1942 and not in 1939, the appellant should have been given a further opportunity to meet a new case. No rule was cited in support of such a technical objection to the nature of the charge which would cover the starting cf the Gautam Cycle Mart at any lime subsequent to 1939 also. In any case, it was for the appellant to satisfy the Departmental authorities, which had looked into the case upto its final stages, that he had suffered some injustice which had to be set right. He had been given a second opportunity by the punishing authority before it inflicted the punishment of demotion. Nothing further was required by law. And, it was probably because the appellant was absolved of charges involving corruption in the dis-charge of his duties that he was given the lesser punishment of demotion and neither d!srnissed nor removed fro1n service.

A suit chaJlenging the validity of departmental proceedings cannet be treated as an appeal from the findings in the dcpannental proceedings or the punishment inflicted upon the Govt. servant even if these are c:·- roneous. A question which could affect the result in a civil suit has to be of such a nature that it goes to the root of th~ jurisdiction and the conduct of the departmenal trial and vitiates the result. It is only ii the departmental proceeding in null and void tl1at a plaintiff in such a suit could obtain the reliefs he had asked for. We are unable to see what point had been raised by the appellant which could have had that effect upon the departmental proceedings.

In Smt. Ujiam Bai vs. State of U.P. & Anr.('), this Court said (at p. 835) :

"A tribunal may lac.k jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential prelimi-naries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its jurisdic-tion by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required (i.e.) has jurisdiction to determine".

After citing a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 11, page 59, this Court held (at p. 836)

"The characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether it be right or wrong. An error ol law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. These princi-ples govern not only the findings . of inferior courts stricto sensu but also the findings of administrative bodies which .are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction; and provided that they keep within those limits, their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal".

Learned Counsel for the appellant said all that could possibly be said on behalf of his client. He pointed out that the High Court had ,given its judgment eight months after it had heard arguments. He .urged that the result was that the High Court did not deal with a number of submissions made because they had, apparently, been for- :gotten. The Civil Procedure Code does not provide a time limit for the period between the hearing of arguments and the tlelivcry of a judgment. Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of a jucjgment, unless explained by .exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is )lighly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers importani may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is that litigants must have com-plete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments. Justice, as we have often observecl, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done.

On 4th March, 1971, however, the High Court refusing the certi-ficate of fitness of the case for appeal to this Court observed that ques-tions had been attempted to be raised before it in asking for certifica-tion which had not been argued at the time when the first appeal was heard by the High Court. We find that one of the learned Judges who dismissed the application for a certificate of fitness ot the case had also heard the arguments in the first appeal. There is no affidavit before us that any particular points argued before the Division Bench had not been referred to or dealt with by the Bench. Moreover, the Division Bench had probably not dealt with all arguments on ques-tions of fact because it did not consider it necessary to do so. After all, it was not hearing an appeal against the findings of the department-al authorities. It pointed this out. Furthermore. after hcarin g the argu-m.ents of the learned Counsel for the appellant, we are ourselves unable to see any point which could be raised on behalf of the appellant capa-ble of vitiating the departmental proceedings. Unless such a point could be raised, there could be no declaration that the departmental proceedings were null and void.

There is also an application before us for revocation of grant of special leave to appeal by this Court on the ground that some material facts were suppressed or misrepresented for the purpose of obtaining special leave. Although the _special leave petition does not state that all the points sought to be raised by it were not argued before the Di-vision Bench, this is not enough to n:erit cancc11aCon of the special leave to appeal which was granted by this Court. At the time of grant of special leave, the order refusing grant of certificate of fitness of the case for appeal to this Court must have been before this Court. We are unable now to see the point on whic_h special leave was granted. But, that too would not, by itself, merit a revocation of special leave at this stage after hearing arguments.

We, therefore, dismiss both the appeal and the application for re-vocation of special leave. Parties will bear their own costs.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1155 of 1971. (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 17-11-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 178/61).

S. C. Manchanda, Sadhu Singh, R. N. Kapoor, Mrs. Nirmala Gupta, Uu.al Singh and J. M. Khanna for the appellant.

Gobind Das, P. P. Rao, Girish Chandra and S. P. Nayar for the xespondents.