Daddan Ji v. D.D.C

Reserved -: 05/10/2023 Delivered -: 17/10/2023 Court No. - 48 Case :- WRIT - B No. - 678 of 1977 Petitioner :- Daddan Ji Respondent :- D.D.C. Counsel for Petitioner :- Manish Deo Singh Counsel for Respondent :- Suresh Chandra Varma, Prem Shankar Tripathi, S.C. Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.

¶1This writ petition is of the year 1977.

¶2During long pendency of writ petition, some of original petitioners and respondents have died and their legal heirs are on record. The parties are represented through their respective Advocates.

¶3Sri Manish Deo Singh, Advocate has appeared on behalf of petitioners and Sri Suresh Chandra Varma and Prem Shankar Tripathi, Advocates have appeared on behalf of respondents and they have filed their respective written submissions also.

¶4Factual matrix of present case is as follows -: i. Genealogy of parties inter-se is not under dispute and is already part of judgment passed by Consolidation Officer and for reference, scanned image of pedigree is extracted hereinbelow -: ii. The dispute arose around khata nos. 53, 54 and 98 of village Chatia as well as khata nos. 52, 53, 55 and 103 of village Ukina Khas, District-Deoria. iii. In basic year, above referred khata numbers were recorded in co-tenancy of Sitaram, Rangnath, Venkateshwar, Ramji and Chandrabhan, all sons of Awadh Bihari. iv. During consolidation proceedings, many objections were filed. Original respondents no. 2 to 7 have filed objections claiming share (i.e. 2/3 of entire property) of Sitaram on basis of two sale deeds dated

16.11.1970 (registered) and 10.12.1970 (unregistered) in regard to details mentioned therein. v. Original respondent no.3 has filed objections claiming 1/2 shares in interest of Sitaram (deceased) on land in dispute and has supported claim of original respondents no. 2 to 7 being his sons. vi. Objections were objected by original petitioners and they have challenged validity of above referred both sale deeds being void as well as signatures of vendors were also disputed. Parties in support of their respective claim have produced their respective witnesses.

¶5The Consolidation Officer by an order dated 30.06.1972 rejected claim of answering respondents and relevant parts thereof are quoted below-: "

बैनाम솺폞क솚솂सत्यतातथाउसका्ቚ तितदानदिदयाजानाअाैⷀ┴इसतथ्यको

्ቚ माणितकⷀ┴नावाद뢳롪ग शशांकआदिदपⷀ┴भाⷀ┴स्वरूपदिनभ%ⷀ┴है⹍⸝बैनाम솺폞में

ⷀ┴जिजस्टⷀ┴क솺폞सम꼡롟कु鏀ꖱभ뢳롪नह砟錩दिदयागया⹍⸝इसबातक솚솂सहायतामेंआया

हैदिककणिथतबैनाम솺폞क솺폞कु鏀ꖱह뢳롪दिदनबादस뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामक솚솂मृत्युहोगय뢳롪ऐस뢳롪

परिⷀ┴ቝኌस्थतितमेंवाद뢳롪ग कोसादिबतकⷀ┴नाचादिह寞屉पⷀ┴न्तुवाद뢳롪ग न솺폞कदादिप

सादिबतनह뢳롪दिकयाहै⹍⸝जबदिकबैनाम솺폞क솚솂्ቚ त्य솺폞कबातइन्काⷀ┴क솚솂गय뢳롪

, यहां

तकक솚솂बैनाम솺폞क솚솂दⷀ┴खास्तकोइनकाⷀ┴भ뢳롪क솚솂गय뢳롪है⹍⸝इस्ቚ काⷀ┴------

सादिबतकⷀ┴न솺폞काभाⷀ┴वाद뢳롪ग पⷀ┴है⹍⸝जोनह砟錩सादिबतदिकयाजासकाहै⹍⸝

पⷀ┴न्तुइसक솺폞्ቚ तितप꼡롟뢳롪ग न솺폞इनकाⷀ┴कⷀ┴त솺폞हु寞屉परिⷀ┴ቝኌस्थतितस솺폞यहसादिबतकⷀ┴

दिदयाहैदिकबैनामाफज8 तथाधोख솺폞स솺폞अम屌䩅आयाहै⹍⸝यहबातसत्यह뢳롪

है⹍⸝दिकधोख솺폞क솚솂्ቚ त्य꼡롟्ቚ मा नह砟錩होसकताहै⹍⸝परिⷀ┴ቝኌस्थतितयांह뢳롪्ቚ माणित

कⷀ┴सकत뢳롪है⹍⸝जोइसमुकदम솺폞म솺폞्ቚ तितपरिⷀ┴ቝኌस्थतितयांह뢳롪्ቚ माणितकⷀ┴सकत뢳롪

है⹍⸝जोइसमुकदम솺폞में्ቚ तितप꼡롟뢳롪ग न솺폞्ቚ माणितदिकयाहै⹍⸝बैनाम솺폞क솚솂

वास्तदिव्ሹातथाउनक솺폞लि屌䩅खावट--------

स솺폞्ቚ माणितकⷀ┴न솺폞काभाⷀ┴वाद뢳롪

ग पⷀ┴जोकह뢳롪भ뢳롪्ቚ माणितनह砟錩दिकयाजासकाहै ⹍⸝

वाद뢳롪ग न솺폞्ቚ त्युतⷀ┴क솺폞रूपमेंको耟旽ऐसालि屌䩅लिखत्ቚ तयुतⷀ┴नह砟錩दिदया

है⹍⸝जिजसमेंउन्ह솺폞दिकस뢳롪कथनपⷀ┴दिव्ቫासदिकयाजासक솺폞⹍⸝यहहैदिक्ቚ त्य솺폞क

प꼡롟जिजसतथ्यकाकथनकⷀ┴솺폞उस솺폞लि屌䩅लिखतरूपमें------

कोतकउसक솺폞

संदभ% में्ቚ मा्ቚ स्तुतकⷀ┴ेंइस्ቚ काⷀ┴भ뢳롪वाद뢳롪ग मुतादिबककानूनसह뢳롪

तथ्यकादिनरूप कⷀ┴न솺폞मेंअसफ屌䩅ⷀ┴ह솺폞है⹍⸝औⷀ┴जबजैस뢳롪बातमቝኌस्तष्कम솺폞

आय뢳롪उस솺폞कहदिदयासाⷀ┴뢳롪शहादतवाद뢳롪ग ------

कह뢳롪गय뢳롪है⹍⸝बैनामा

मुतादिबककानूनसादिबतभ뢳롪नह砟錩दिकयागयाहै⹍⸝

प꼡롟륄쫐कोयहमान्यहैदिकदिववादिदतभूदिममौरिⷀ┴सानक솺폞समयक솚솂है

,

औⷀ┴स뢳롪ⷀ┴खुदकास्तक솚솂आⷀ┴ाजिजयातⷀ┴ह뢳롪है⹍⸝यहभ뢳롪मान्यहै⹍⸝तथा

कागज뢳롪्ቚ मा स솺폞्ቚ माणितहैदिकफरिⷀ┴कैन寞屉कह뢳롪मकानमेंसቝኌDमलि屌䩅तरूप

स솺폞ⷀ┴हत솺폞है⹍⸝तथाखाताजातभ뢳롪सቝኌDमलि屌䩅तहै⹍⸝ऐस뢳롪परिⷀ┴ቝኌस्थतितमेंबैनाम솺폞क솚솂

सत्यता्ቚ माणितकⷀ┴न솺폞काभाⷀ┴वाद뢳롪ग न솺폞वहननह砟錩दिकयाहै⹍⸝तोउनक솺폞

्ቚ तितकू屌䩅्ቚ भावलि屌䩅याजासकताहै⹍⸝औⷀ┴इसमुकदमेंमेंतोदिन्ቐयह뢳롪लि屌䩅या

जानाउतिचत्ቚ त뢳롪तहोताहै⹍⸝

स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ाममृतकक솺폞 वारिⷀ┴सⷀ┴ंगनाथउफ% भैयाज뢳롪पु䁇⺈ⷀ┴ामदिबहाⷀ┴뢳롪

वेंकट솺폞्ቫⷀ┴उफ% ददनज뢳롪ⷀ┴ामाज뢳롪उफ% शै屌䩅솺폞शकुमाⷀ┴वचन््ቖभानउफ% धम%द्ቈ

है⹍⸝स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामक솺폞कु屌䩅जायदादक솺폞ⷀ┴ंगनाथका१/

䨊属भागववकट솺폞्ቫⷀ┴वⷀ┴ामा

ज뢳롪वचन््ቖभानपु䁇⺈ग अवधदिबहाⷀ┴뢳롪का३/

䨊属भागहोनान्यायोतिचतहै⹍⸝

तथात्቎ुसाⷀ┴दिनम%यदिकयाजाताहै⹍⸝वाददिबन्दुनं区㟔१व㜸㝴कासकाⷀ┴ात्मक

मेंतथावाददिबन्दुनं区㟔ꖮ鵦कानकाⷀ┴ात्मकरूपमेंदिन%यदिदयाजाताहै⹍⸝

वाददिबन्दुनं区㟔३,䨊属,

" 鴏돂क솺폞दिन%यक솚솂अबआवश्यकतानह뢳롪ⷀ┴हजात뢳롪है⹍⸝ [emphasis supplied]

¶6Aforesaid order of the Consolidation Officer was challenged by answering respondents by way of filing appeals before the Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation and all appeals were dismissed vide an order dated 24.11.1976. Relevant parts thereof are mentioned hereinafter-: "

स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामन솺폞इनदोन륄쫐बैनाम륄쫐क솺폞्ቛ ाⷀ┴ावहभूदिमब솺폞च뢳롪हैजोउन्ह솺폞१७㜸㝴क솺폞

मुकदम솺폞मेंउऩक솺폞कुⷀ┴U म솺폞द뢳롪गय뢳롪थ뢳롪⹍⸝य्ቕदिपकु鏀ꖱनDबⷀ┴륄쫐म솺폞अन्तⷀ┴भ뢳롪है⹍⸝

स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामन솺폞वादसंख्या鴏돂膭꘡अन्तग%तधाⷀ┴ा१७㜸㝴दालिख屌䩅दिकयाथाजिजसम솺폞

दिदनांकꖮ鵦区㟔.区㟔९.

㜸㝴䨊属कोअቝኌन्तमरूपस솺폞कुⷀ┴U कन्फम% कⷀ┴दिद寞屉ग寞屉औⷀ┴

दिदनांक१区㟔.区㟔鴏돂.

㜸㝴鴏돂क솚솂फा耟旽न屌䩅तिZ्ቇ뢳롪बनगय뢳롪⹍⸝दिदनांकꖮ鵦१.区㟔鴏돂.

㜸㝴㜸㝴को

वेंकट솺폞्ቫⷀ┴न솺폞इसफा耟旽न屌䩅तिZ्ቇ뢳롪क솺폞 दिवरू攽屢कायम뢳롪क솚솂दⷀ┴खास्तद뢳롪जो

स्व뢳롪काⷀ┴हुय뢳롪⹍⸝इसक솺폞दिवरू攽屢स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामन솺폞रिⷀ┴दिवजनदालिख屌䩅दिकयाजोदिदनांक ꖮ鵦३.区㟔९.

㜸㝴९कोमानन뢳롪यⷀ┴ाजस्वपरिⷀ┴षदस솺폞खारिⷀ┴जहोगया⹍⸝

इस्ቚ काⷀ┴

१७㜸㝴क솺폞 वादसंख्या鴏돂膭꘡मेंजोकुⷀ┴U बन솺폞थ솺폞⹍⸝वहसमा䁧㞥कⷀ┴दिदय솺폞गय솺폞⹍⸝

इसलि屌䩅寞屉जोቝኌस्थतित१७㜸㝴क솺폞मुकदम솺폞क솺폞पूव% थ뢳롪वहपुन㜤⺂वापसहोगय뢳롪⹍⸝

इस्ቚ काⷀ┴संयु्ሹ खात솺폞मेंस뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामकादिहस्सा१

/

ꖮ鵦थाजोकुⷀ┴ा% उनको

१७㜸㝴क솺폞 मुकदम솺폞मेंदिदयागयाथाउसकाबैनामाकⷀ┴न솺폞काउन्ह솺폞को耟旽

अतिधकाⷀ┴ नह砟錩 ⷀ┴ह गया था

⹍⸝ इससDबन्ध में उ्ቈⷀ┴वाद뢳롪 क솚솂 ओⷀ┴ स솺폞

आⷀ┴区㟔Z뢳롪区㟔१९७ꖮ鵦क솺폞पृ꽲膱सं区㟔३㜸㝴१पⷀ┴द뢳롪गय뢳롪रूिሴ屌䩅गकाहवा屌䩅ादिदया

गयाजिजसमेंयहकहागयाहैदिकयदिद寞屉कप꼡롟뢳롪यआद솺폞शदिनⷀ┴स्तहोजायतो

पूⷀ┴뢳롪भूदिममेंपूव%वतदिहस्स솺폞दाⷀ┴होजाय솺폞ेंग솺폞⹍⸝

इस्ቚ काⷀ┴१७㜸㝴क솺폞मुकदम솺폞मेंजो

कुⷀ┴ा% स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ाम

,

ⷀ┴ंगनाथकोदिदयागयाथाउसम솺폞स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामꖮ鵦⹍⸝३भागक솺폞

दिहस्स솺폞दाⷀ┴थ솺폞⹍⸝उसकुⷀ┴U कोउनकोब솺폞चन솺폞काअतिधकाⷀ┴नह뢳롪था⹍⸝यदिदउन्ह솺폞

ब솺폞चनाह뢳롪थातोवहअपन솺폞संयु्ሹ खात솺폞मेंअपना१⹍⸝ꖮ鵦भागब솺폞चसकत솺폞थ솺폞⹍⸝

अप뢳롪屌䩅कता% क솺폞दिव्ቛानअणिभभाषकन솺폞यहतक% ⷀ┴खादिकचूंदिकमौक솺폞पⷀ┴१७㜸㝴 के폞  मुकदमे폞 में बने폞 कु र┴  र के폞  अऩुसार┴  ही롪  पक롟  कावि वज थे폞 तथा उनके폞  बी롪 च वाहमी롪  बंटवार┴ ा था इसलि ल䩅 ए屉  उसी롪  के폞  अनुसार┴  सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 बनै ामा वि कया।⸝  यवि द तकर  के폞  लि ल䩅 ए屉  यह मान भी롪  लि ल䩅 या जाय वि क १७६㝴  के폞  अनुसार┴  बंटवार┴ ा था और┴  उसी롪  के폞  अनुसार┴  पक롟  कावि बज थे폞 तब भी롪  पቚ त् ये폞क गाटे폞 पर┴  पቚ त् ये폞क सह खाते폞दार┴  का कब् जा माना जाये폞गा।⸝  बाहमी롪  बंटवार┴ े폞 के폞  कार┴ ण वि कसी롪  गाटे폞 से폞 वि कसी롪  सह खाते폞दार┴  के폞  अधि धकार┴  समा्㞥  नही錩  हो जाते폞।⸝  अपी롪 ल䩅 कतार के폞  वि वदቛ ान अणि भभाषक का यह भी롪  तकर  है वि क गቇ ाम पटना की솂  भूवि म भी롪  इस मुकदमे폞 मे폞 थी롪  और┴  उस गቇ ाम मे폞 भी롪  कर┴  र बन गये폞 थे폞 और┴  उन् ही롪  कर┴ र  के폞  अऩुसार┴ु ु सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 कु छꖱ  भूवि म का बनै ामा ददन जी롪  आवि द को भी롪  वि कया।⸝  उनका यह तकर  है वि क फाई旽 ऩल䩅  धि डगቇ ी롪  वि नर┴ स् त हो जाने폞 के폞  बाद भी롪  पक롟  उसी롪  धि डगቇ ी롪  के폞 अनुसार┴  कावि बज र┴ हे폞 है, इसलि ल䩅 ए屉  इस धि डगቇ ी롪  पाबन् दी롪  उनके폞  ऊपर┴  ह।⸝ै  पर┴ न् तु यवि द गቇ ाम पटना में कोई旽  गल䩅 त कायर या आदे폞श हो गया हो तो उसी롪  के폞 आधार┴  पर┴  दसू र┴ े폞 गቇ ाम में गल䩅 त कायरवाही롪  को सही롪  माना जाय सही롪  नही錩 होगा।⸝  मे폞र┴ े폞 पास गቇ ाम पटना की솂  भूवि म के폞  समबन् ध मे폞 कोई旽  वि ववाद नही錩  हैं, इसलि ल䩅 ए屉  जो भी롪  गल䩅 त या सही롪  आदे폞श उस गቇ ाम की솂  भूवि म के폞  समबन् द में पारि र┴ त हो गया ह।⸝ै  उस समबन् ध मे폞 इस आदे폞श मे폞 कु छꖱ  कहना उधि चत नही錩  ह।⸝ै मै अपी롪 ल䩅 कतार के폞  इस तकर  से폞 सहमत नही錩  हँ溻 वि क चूंवि क गቇ ाम पटना मे폞 १७६㝴ू में फाई旽 नल䩅  धि डगቇ ी롪  के폞  कु र┴  र के폞  अनुसार┴  पक롟 ो쫐  ने폞 बनै ामा वि कया है इसलि ल䩅 ए屉  इस गቇ ाम मे폞 भी롪  इस धि डगቇ ी롪  को मान लि ल䩅 या जाय।⸝ सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 अपनी롪  भूवि म को बे폞चने폞 के폞  समबन् ध में बन् दोबस् त अधि धकार┴ ी롪 चकबन् दी롪  से폞 अनुमधि त भी롪  पቚ ा्㞥  की솂  थी롪  पर┴ न् तु उ?् होने폞 अपने폞 पूर┴ ी롪  भूवि म को बे폞चने폞 की솂  अनमु धि त पቚ ा्㞥  की솂  थी롪 ।⸝  जो बनै ामा उन् होने폞 गቇ ाम चवि टया व उकी솂 ना खास की솂  भूवि म का वि कया ह ै ,  उसमे폞 उन् होने폞 अपने폞 पूर┴ े폞 अंश के폞  समबन् ध म े폞 नही롪  वि कये폞 ह।⸝ै  बसኌ लक समबसኌ न् धत गाटो쫐  मे폞 उन् होने폞 अपने폞 २鵦 ।⸝ ३ भाग को मानते폞 हुए屉  उसमें से폞 २鵦 ।⸝ ३ भाग का बनै ामा वि कया ह।⸝ै  अधि तरि र┴ कሹ  गाटा सं०㟔  १२鵦 ८꘡  का बनै ामा उन् होने폞 वि दनांक १६㝴  . ११  . ७०㟔  को नही錩  वि कया है बसኌ लक इस भूवि म क ा बनै ामा अल䩅 ग से폞 उ?् होने폞 ११  . १२鵦  . ७०㟔  को वि कया ह।⸝ै  इस पቚ कार┴  उन् होन े폞 अपने폞 समपूणर जोत के폞  अंश का बनै ामा वि कया ह ै ,  पर┴ न् तु उन् होने폞 अपने폞 प ूर┴ े폞 भविू म के폞  वि कसी롪  अंश का बनै ामा कर┴ ने폞 की솂  कोई旽  अनुमधि त पቚ ा्㞥  नही錩  की솂  थी롪 और┴  वि बना अनुमधि त के폞  जो भी롪  बनै ामा वि कया गया है वह सवरथा अवैधावि नक है इसलि ल䩅 ए屉  इस बनै ामे폞 के폞  आधार┴  पर┴  शशांक शे폞खर┴  आवि द का दालि खल䩅  खारि र┴ ज नही錩  वि कया जा सकता है।⸝  अपी롪 ल䩅 कतार के폞  वि वदቛ ान अणि भभाषक ने폞 यह तकर र┴ खा वि क यह बनै ामा वि बना अनमु धि त के폞  नही錩  ह।⸝ै  सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 अपने폞 अंश का बनै ामा कर┴ ने폞 की솂  अनुमधि त पቚ ा्㞥  कर┴  ल䩅 ी롪  थी롪  और┴  उसमें उन् होने폞 २鵦 ।⸝ ३ भाग का बनै ामा वि कया इसलि ल䩅 ए屉  यह बनै ामा वि बना अनमु धि त के폞  नही錩  कहा जा सकता ह।⸝ै पर┴ न् तु मै उनके폞  तकर  से폞 सहमत नही錩  हँ溻।⸝  सी롪 तर┴ ाम ने폞 अपने폞 पूर┴ े폞 वि हस् से폞 कोू बे폞चने폞 की솂  अनमु धि त  पቚ ा्㞥   की솂  थी롪  इसलि ल䩅 ए屉  इसके폞  अनुसार┴  वह अपना पूर┴ ा वि हस् सा ही롪  बे폞च सकते폞 थे폞 अपने폞 पूर┴ े폞 अंश के폞  वि कसी롪  का बनै ामा कर┴ ने폞 की솂 अनमु धि त पቚ ा्㞥  नही롪  की솂  थी롪  इसलि ल䩅 ए屉  वि कसी롪  अंश का बनै ामा कर┴ ने폞 के폞  लि ल䩅 ए屉 सक롟 म नही錩  थे폞 और┴  न ही롪  इनके폞  दቛ ार┴ ा वि कए屉  गए屉  बनै ामा के폞  आधार┴  पर┴  कोई旽 अधि धकार┴  अपी롪 ल䩅 कतार को वि दया जा सकता है।⸝

उपⷀ┴ो्ሹ दिवव솺폞चनाक솺폞 आधाⷀ┴पⷀ┴मैइसदिनष्कष% पⷀ┴पहु屰溻चताहू屰溻दिक

चकबन्द뢳롪अतिधकाⷀ┴뢳롪न솺폞सशांकश솺폞खⷀ┴क솚솂दालिख屌䩅खारिⷀ┴जक솚솂आपलि्ቈ को

खारिⷀ┴जकⷀ┴न솺폞मेंको耟旽भू屌䩅नह뢳롪क솚솂है⹍⸝वंशाव屌䩅뢳롪क솺폞 अनुसाⷀ┴जिजससमय

स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ाममⷀ┴솺폞उनक솺폞चाⷀ┴भत뢳롪ज솺폞ⷀ┴ामाउफ% शै屌䩅솺폞स

,

ⷀ┴ंगनाथउफ% ददनज뢳롪

,

चन््ቖभानउफ% धम%द्ቈ उनक솺폞वारिⷀ┴सथ솺폞औⷀ┴्ቚ त्य솺폞ककादिहस्सास뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामक솺폞

अ屰溻शमें१⹍⸝䨊属हुआ⹍⸝इस뢳롪अनुसाⷀ┴चकबन्द뢳롪अतिधकाⷀ┴뢳롪न솺폞दालिख屌䩅खारिⷀ┴जका

आद솺폞शदिदयाहै⹍⸝चकबन्द뢳롪अतिधकाⷀ┴뢳롪क솺폞आद솺폞शम솺폞को耟旽䁇⺈ुदिटनह砟錩हैउनक솺폞

आद솺폞शस솺폞मैसहमतहू屰溻⹍⸝अप뢳롪屌䩅दिनⷀ┴ाधाⷀ┴है ⹍⸝ आद솺폞श

" अत㜤⺂अप뢳롪屌䩅खारिⷀ┴जक솚솂जात뢳롪है⹍⸝ [emphasis supplied]

¶7In the aforesaid circumstances, answering respondents filed a revision petition before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, which was allowed and concurrent findings of two lower Authorities were reversed by an order dated 23.04.1977 and relevant findings thereof are quoted below-: "

्ቇ ामपटनाकाबैनामाहुआथाचूंदिकयहबैनामाभ뢳롪इसप솺폞जिसदिफकप्屌䩅ाट

काहैऔⷀ┴फⷀ┴뢳롪कैनक솺폞कुⷀ┴U क솺폞अनुकू屌䩅है,

इसलि屌䩅寞屉यह뢳롪समझाजाय솺폞गादिक

बनकट솺폞्ቫⷀ┴आदिदक솺폞ह뢳롪यहतस屌䩅뢳롪महैदिकप꼡롟륄쫐क솺폞ब뢳롪चवादिहन뢳롪बंटवाⷀ┴ाहै

औⷀ┴प꼡롟अ屌䩅गअ屌䩅गअपन솺폞कुⷀ┴U पⷀ┴कादिबजदालिख屌䩅है⹍⸝इस्ቚ काⷀ┴शशांक

आदिदकाकहनाहैदिकइस्प솺폞जिसदिफकप्屌䩅ाटकाबैनामाक솚솂()

दिप屌䩅뢳롪्ቇ ाम

चदिटयाव्ቇ ामउदिकनाखासक솺폞बैनाम솺폞म솺폞बनक솺폞ट솺폞्ቫⷀ┴आदिद्ቛ ाⷀ┴ानह砟錩उठाय뢳롪

जासकत뢳롪⹍⸝उनक솺폞 दिवरू攽屢इस्टैपै屌䩅क솚솂बाधाहै⹍⸝

मैशशांकआदिदक솺폞 इस

तक% स솺폞सहमतहूंदिक्ቦ 뢳롪स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामकोअपनापूⷀ┴ादिहस्साब솺폞चन솺폞क솚솂लि屌䩅寞屉

सन�१९७区㟔म솺폞व区㟔अ区㟔च区㟔्ቛ ाⷀ┴ापूव% अनुमतितद솺폞न솺폞क솚솂कानून뢳롪आवश्यकता

नह뢳롪थ뢳롪

,

अपनापूⷀ┴ादिहस्सातोवहदिबनादिकस뢳롪अनुमतित्ቛ ाⷀ┴ाह뢳롪ब솺폞चसकत솺폞

थ솺폞अपन솺폞अनुमतितक솚솂दⷀ┴खास्तम솺폞भ뢳롪स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामन솺폞क솺폞व屌䩅१

/ ꖮ鵦अंश

लि屌䩅खायाहै⹍⸝इसलि屌䩅寞屉寞屉स区㟔ओ区㟔स뢳롪区㟔्ቛ ाⷀ┴ापूⷀ┴솺폞दिहस्स솺폞क솺폞बाⷀ┴솺폞म솺폞अनुमतितद솺폞न솺폞

कासवा屌䩅ह뢳롪नह砟錩पैदाहोताथा⹍⸝ऐस뢳롪सूⷀ┴तम솺폞व区㟔अ区㟔च区㟔्ቛ ाⷀ┴ाद뢳롪गय뢳롪

अनुमतितदिदनांकꖮ鵦१

. १区㟔 .

७区㟔मेंयदिदपूⷀ┴솺폞दिहस्स솺폞क솺폞 बाⷀ┴솺폞मेंअनुमतितदिदया

जानालि屌䩅खदिदयागयाहै

,

तोउसकोक솺폞व屌䩅寞屉क屌䩅솺폞खक솚솂ग屌䩅त뢳롪ह뢳롪माना

जासकताहै ⹍⸝

चकबन्द뢳롪द솺폞हातम솺폞होत뢳롪हैजहांज्यादाकानून뢳롪स屌䩅ाहकाⷀ┴नह砟錩

दिम屌䩅सकत솺폞है⹍⸝अतिधकतⷀ┴屌䩅ोगअनप矗腉वजादिह屌䩅होत솺폞है⹍⸝इसलि屌䩅寞屉चकबन्द뢳롪

म솺폞उत्प쬓�वाद뢳롪क솺폞 दिनस्ताⷀ┴ म솺폞अतिधकदृढतास솺폞कामनह뢳롪屌䩅솺폞नाचादिह寞屉⹍⸝

ज्यादाकZा耟旽स솺폞कानूनकापा屌䩅नकⷀ┴न솺폞स솺폞अनुतिचतहादिनहोन솺폞क솚솂

संभावनाहै⹍⸝ऐस뢳롪सूⷀ┴तमेंन्यायवन솺폞चुⷀ┴屌䩅जቝኌस्टसकाख्या屌䩅ⷀ┴खना चावि हए屉  और┴  यह भी롪  दखे폞 ना चावि हए屉  वि क सी롪 तार┴ ाम का बनै ामा कर┴ ने폞 का मंशा क् या था, सी롪 तार┴ ाम के폞  कोई旽  ल䩅 ड़ का नही롪  था वह अपने폞 जी롪 वन काल䩅  मे폞 ही롪 अपनी롪  जमी롪 न को अपने폞 भाई旽  र┴ ाजे폞न् दर┴  की솂  औल䩅 ाद कर┴  वि दये폞 ७-९८꘡  ए屉 कड़ जमी롪 न र┴ गं नाथ के폞  ल䩅 ड़ को को वि दया।⸝  क् यो쫐 वि क वह तादाद में ज् यादा है, और┴ ३-९९ ए屉 कड़  जमी롪 न वंकटे폞1ቫ र┴  आवि द को वि दया जो संख् या मे폞 कम है गቇ ाम पटना की솂  जमी롪 न का यह हस् तान् तर┴ ण पक롟  को तसल䩅 ी롪 म है और┴  इन पर┴  नाम भी롪  बनै ामो के폞  आधार┴  पर┴  दजर हो चुके폞  ह।⸝ै पर┴ न् तु गቇ ाम उवि कना खास व गቇ ाम चवि टया मे폞 इसी롪  पቚ कार┴  के폞  बनै ामे폞 का वंकटे폞1ቫ र┴  वगर┴ै ह वि वर┴ ोध कर┴ ते폞 है इन ल䩅 ोगो के폞  वि वर┴ ोध का न् याय के폞  वि हत मे폞 कोई旽  उधि चत कार┴ ण वि दखायी롪  नही롪  दे폞ता।⸝ इस वाद में यह सवाल䩅  नही錩  है वि क सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 कोई旽  व०㟔 अ०㟔 च०㟔 दቛ ार┴ ा अनमु धि त नही롪  ल䩅 ी롪  अगर┴  अनमु धि त न ल䩅 ी롪  गयी롪  होती롪  तब ही롪  बनै ामा वायड था पर┴ न् तु सी롪 तार┴ ाम दቛ ार┴ ा व०㟔 अ०㟔 च०㟔  से폞 अनुमधि त ल䩅 ी롪  गयी롪  गल䩅 ती롪  यही롪  है वि क व०㟔 अ०㟔 च०㟔  दቛ ार┴ ा सी롪 तार┴ ाम के폞  पूर┴ े폞 अंश के폞  लि ल䩅 ए屉  अनमु धि त  दे폞 दी롪  गयी롪  है हाल䩅 ांवि क सी롪 तार┴ ाम की솂  इच् छꖱ ा के폞 वल䩅  अपने폞 वि हस् से폞 के폞  अशं  को ही롪  हस् तान् तर┴ ण कर┴ ने폞 की솂  थी롪  ऐसी롪  सूर┴ त मे폞 सी롪 तार┴ ाम दቛ ार┴ ा वि कया गया बनै ामा में चाहे폞 कोई旽 त⺈ ुवि ट हो ल䩅 े폞वि कन कोई旽  अवैधावि नकता नही롪  है वनकटे폞1ቫ र┴  आवि द के폞  इस तकर  मे폞 कोई旽  बल䩅  नही錩  पाया जाता वि क वि क बनै ामा चकबन् दी롪  अधि धवि नयम की솂  धार┴ ा ५돂 सी롪   ( २鵦  )  तथा ४属 ५돂  ए屉   ( २鵦  )  के폞  अन् तगरत वायड ह ।⸝ै मैने폞 गቇ ाम पटना के폞  खतौनी롪  १३७५돂  से폞 १३८꘡ ०㟔  का अवल䩅 ोकन वि कया और┴  इसका उणि णल䩅 ान बनै ामा वि दनांक १२鵦   . ११  . ७०㟔  जि जसको सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 गቇ ाम पटना की솂  जमी롪 न के폞  बार┴ े폞 मे폞 वैकटे폞1ቫ र┴  आवि द के폞  हक में लि ल䩅 खा ह ै ,  उसस े폞 वि मल䩅 ान वि कया।⸝  इसके폞  अल䩅 ावा मैने폞 उकሹ   खतौनी롪  मे폞 नमबर┴ ान का वि मल䩅 ान बनै ामा वि दनांक १६㝴  . ११  . ७०㟔  से폞 भी롪  वि कया जि जसके폞  दቛ ार┴ ा गቇ ाम पटना के폞  ७  - ९८꘡ ए屉 कड़  भविू म का हस् तान् तर┴ ण सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 शशांक आवि द के폞  हक मे폞 वि कया।⸝  गቇ ाम पटना की솂  भूवि म मे폞 सी롪 तार┴ ाम का कानूनी롪  अंश १  / २鵦  थ ा ,  गቇ ाम पटना की솂  कु ल䩅 भविू म २鵦 १  - ८꘡ ०㟔  ए屉 कड़  है इसमें से폞 ३  - ९९ ए屉 कड़  भूवि म सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 वंकटे폞1ቫ  र┴ आवि द को बनै ामा वि दनांक १२鵦  - ११  - ७०㟔  दቛ ार┴ ा वि दया ह  ै,  और┴  ७  - ९८꘡  ए屉 कड़ भविू म सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 शशांक आवि द को बनै ामा १६㝴   . ११  . ७०㟔  दቛ ार┴ ा वि दया है इन बनै ामो का दालि खल䩅  खारि र┴ ज भी롪  हो चुका है इस पቚ कार┴  अपना समपूणर भाग सी롪 तार┴ ाम ने폞 गቇ ाम पटना की솂  भूवि म का हस् तान् तर┴ ण कर┴  वि दया ह ै ,  और┴  अब इसका कोई旽  शे폞ष भाग नही錩  र┴ ह गया पर┴ न् तु उपयरकሹ  दोनो쫐  बनै ामो इसपे폞जि सवि फकु प् ल䩅 ाट् स के폞  बार┴ े폞 मे폞 वि कए屉  गए屉  गाटा संख् या- ३४属 ।⸝ -२鵦 ४属 , ५돂 ७८꘡ ।⸝ -१५돂 , ५돂 ८꘡ ६㝴 ।⸝ - ३०㟔 , ६㝴 ०㟔 २鵦 ।⸝ २鵦 ।⸝ -१६㝴 , ६㝴 ४属 ७।⸝ -४属 ५돂 , ६㝴 ७३।⸝ -३६㝴 , ७०㟔 ३।⸝ १।⸝ -१७ गቇ ाम पटना की솂  खतौनी롪  मे폞 दजर ह।⸝ै  पर┴ न् तु नमबर┴ ान मे폞 से폞 कोई旽  भी롪  भाग सी롪 तार┴ ाम दቛ ार┴ ा हस् तान् तरि र┴ त नही롪  वि कया गया है और┴  इसका पूर┴ ा १।⸝ २鵦  भाग इस खाते폞 से폞 बवि कया इसपे폞जि सवि फक प् ल䩅 ाट दቛ ार┴ ा हस् तान् तरि र┴ त कर┴  वि दया गया यह बनै ामा वंकटे폞1ቫ र┴  आवि द को मंजूर┴  है क् योवि क इस बनै ामे폞 के폞  अधार┴  पर┴  इन ल䩅 ोगो ने폞 अपना नाम दजर भी롪  कर┴ ा लि ल䩅 या ह  ै,  इस तर┴ ह से폞 यह पूणरतया सावि बत ह ो जाता है वि क पक롟 ो쫐  के폞  बी롪 च वाहमी롪  बटवार┴ ा ह।⸝ै  और┴  यह वाहमी롪  बंटवार┴ ा पक롟 ो쫐 को तसल䩅 ी롪 म भी롪  है क् यो쫐 वि क इस वाहमी롪  बटं वार┴ े폞 दቛ ार┴ ा गቇ ाम पटना में बनै ामे폞

दिकय솺폞ग寞屉हैऔⷀ┴खुदप꼡롟륄쫐न솺폞अपन솺폞हकमेंबैनामादालिख屌䩅खारिⷀ┴जकⷀ┴ा

लि屌䩅याहै⹍⸝उनक솺폞दिवरू攽屢इसस्टाप솺폞屌䩅बाधाहै ⹍⸝

स뢳롪ताⷀ┴ामन솺폞जोबैनामादिकयावहꖮ鵦⹍⸝३काꖮ鵦⹍⸝३यान뢳롪䨊属⹍⸝९भागहै

उनकाअंश१⹍⸝ꖮ鵦था⹍⸝इसअंशम솺폞तथाबयदिकय솺폞ग寞屉䨊属⹍⸝९म솺폞क솺폞व屌䩅१⹍⸝१膭꘡

काअंतⷀ┴हैइसआधाⷀ┴पⷀ┴बैनामाक솚솂अवैधकहनाबा屌䩅क솚솂खा屌䩅

दिनका屌䩅नाहोगाजोकानूनकामंशाकभ뢳롪नह뢳롪होग뢳롪मंशाजोत鏀ꖱोट뢳롪होन솺폞

स솺폞ⷀ┴ोकनाहैनदिकबैनामाⷀ┴ोकना ⹍⸝

इसतⷀ┴हजोदूसⷀ┴ातकवंकट솺폞्ቫⷀ┴आदिदन솺폞बैनामाक솺폞 लिख屌䩅ाफ

इसपैजिसदिफकप्屌䩅ाट्सकाबैनामादिकय솺폞जान솺폞क솺폞आधाⷀ┴पⷀ┴दिकयाहै,

वहभ뢳롪

ब屌䩅ह뢳롪नहै⹍⸝औⷀ┴उसम솺폞को耟旽जोⷀ┴नह뢳롪पायाजाता⹍⸝

उपयु%्ሹ तथ्य륄쫐क솺폞 आधाⷀ┴पⷀ┴मैइसदिनष्कष% पⷀ┴पुहुंचताहू屰溻दिक

शशांकआदिदक솚솂दिनगⷀ┴ान뢳롪स्व뢳롪काⷀ┴दिकय솺폞जान솺폞योग्यहैऔⷀ┴उ्ሹ बैनाम륄쫐क솺폞

" आधाⷀ┴पⷀ┴उसकानामदज% होनाचादिह寞屉⹍⸝ [emphasis supplied]

¶8Aforesaid order of Deputy Director of Consolidation is challenged before this Court by way of this writ petition.

¶9Learned counsel for petitioners has submitted following submissions -:

(a) That the Revisional Authority's order dated 23.04.1977 was passed prior to Amendment of 2002 as inserted vide Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 2002 (U.P. Act No. 3 of 2002) by which explanation no. 3 was added to Section 48 of Act of 1953, and said amendment was enforced retrospectively w.e.f. 10.11.1980. Prior to 1980, revisional jurisdiction u/s 48 of Act of 1953 was very limited and the Revisional Authority, if reached to a conclusion that findings returned by lower Authorities were illegal, it had only power to remit said case to his lower Authority, however, the Revisional Authority could not have himself re-appreciated or reassessed the evidence.

(b) That the Revisional Authority in impugned order had erroneously considered an issue of promissory estoppel and it ought not to have considered the same in regard to property situated in village Patna as it was outside the ambit of dispute before it.

(c) That alleged unregistered sale deed of approximately one acre of land dated 10.12.1970 was apparently at a throwaway price of 98/-, however, its actual market value at relevant आ⦙ time was approx. 7000/- and said sale deed was executed आ⦙ contrary to provisions of Section 25 of Indian Contract Act 1872 and therefore, it has to be considered as void.

(d) That alleged unregistered sale deed was in contravention with the provisions of Section 17 of Indian Registration Act, 1908 (for short "Act of 1908") which mandates registration of documents and in case any conflict appears between a Central Act and provision of Section 51 of Act of 1953 i.e. a State Act, the Central Act would prevail as mandated by Article 254 of Constitution of India.

(e) That Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of Act of 1953 (as then it was) has provided that if a recorded tenure holder intends to transfer his entire holdings then there was no question for seeking permission from Settlement Officer of Consolidation, however, in present case, Sitaram (since deceased) moved an application to seek permission to sell his property which was an error apparent on record.

(f) That Revisional Authority committed anomaly in determining share of parties thereby there is an apparent illegality on record.

¶10In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon judgment passed in Nathoo Ram and another vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi and others, 2017 (124) ALR 753).

¶11Per contra, learned counsel for contesting respondents have submitted following submissions -:

(a) That the Revisional Authority in impugned order recorded a finding that sale deed dated 16.11.1970 through which Sitaram sold his agricultural land of village Patna to Shashank and others and no challenge/objection has been made to this sale deed and since same was not disputed either, therefore, sale deed in question could not be challenged.

(b) That the Revisional Authority has held that when sale deed dated 16.11.1970 executed by Sitaram in favour of above referred persons, was not hit by unsoundness of mind or undue influence, therefore, as to how the sale deed of another village of same date executed by same person could be objected and that since petitioners had also purchased some land from same vendor, therefore, they were estopped from challenging a transaction between Sitaram and Shashank when no suit for cancellation of those sale deeds was filed by the petitioners.

(c) That the Revisional Authority has clearly returned a finding that grant of permission for sale of entire land by Sitaram was a clerical mistake as that Sitaram could have sold only his share and legally reversed a finding of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation regarding technical defect in grant of permission under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of Act of 1953 (as then it was) and held sale deed to be valid.

(d) That in impugned order, the petitioners had tactically admitted that there was a private partition between the parties and sale deed was as per this admitted division of the holdings and with these definite findings of fact, they have accepted that sale deed executed in favour of contesting respondents was not hit by provisions of Section 5(1)(c)(ii).

(e) That a finding of fact has been recorded holding that contesting respondents are entitled to land which was purchased by them from Sitaram.

(f) That there was no illegality in the order passed by Revisional Authority as it was well within its jurisdiction to pass such order, hence, petition is liable to be dismissed.

¶12Heard learned counsel for parties, perused the record and written submissions.

¶13On basis of above referred rival submissions, issues which fall for consideration of this Court are as follows -:

(a) Whether Revisional Authority within its power as provided under Section 48 of Act of 1953 (as then it was) was justified in reversing concurrent findings of facts as well as law of two lower Authorities?

(b) What would be effect of an unregistered sale deed in view of Section 17 of Act of 1908 as well as effect of its conflict, if any, with Section 51 of Act of 1953?

(c) What would be effect in a case where permission to sale under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Act of 1953 was granted for a larger part of land but sale deed was actually executed for lessor part of land i.e. only to extent of share of vendor?

(d) Whether principle of promissory estoppel was rightly applied by Revisional Authority or not? Re-Issue (a) -:

¶14It is not in dispute that when impugned order was passed on 23.04.1977, powers with Revisional Authority were limited and it was provided that Authority may call for records of any case decided or proceedings undertaken where he is of opinion that lower Authority has exercised jurisdiction not vested in him in law or fail to exercise jurisdiction vested in him or acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity and as a result of which substantial injustice appears to have been caused to a tenure holder. (See U.P. Act No. XXXVIII of 1958)

¶15The issue of power of Revisional Authority was considered in Nathoo Ram and another (supra) on which learned counsel for petitioners has placed heavy reliance. The coordinate Bench after taking note of earlier judgments has reiterated in paragraph 61 and 62 thereof that -: "61. In a recent decision in Jagdamba Prasad Vs. Kripa Shankar (2014) 5 SCC 707, the Court has considered Section 48 as amended in 1963, but thereafter in para 15, following earlier decision in Sher Singh Vs. Joint Director of Consolidation (supra), has said as under: "15. According to the legal principle laid down by this Court in the case mentioned above, the power of the Revisional Authority under Section 48 of the Act only extends to ascertaining whether the subordinate courts have exceeded their jurisdiction in coming to the conclusion. Therefore, if the Original and Appellate Authorities are within their jurisdiction, the Revisional Authority cannot exceed its jurisdiction to come to a contrary conclusion by admitting new facts either in the form of documents or otherwise, to come to the conclusion. Therefore, we answer point no. 1 in favour of the appellants by holding that the Revisional Authority exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Act by admitting documents at revision stage and altering the decision of the subordinate courts."

¶62It is thus difficult to observe that Explanation III to Section 48 has brought scope of revision at par with appellate jurisdiction so as to assess evidence on pure issue of fact and recording findings de novo. Revisional power is not a power of first or second appellate Court which are final Courts of fact. The findings recorded therein would be possible to be interfered under Section 48 only on the grounds, discussed in Ram Dular (Supra), Sheshmani (Supra) and Jagdamba Prasad (supra)."

¶16The Court will scrutinize in later paragraphs as to whether the Revisional Authority has acted within four corners of its power? And that whether there was a substantial irregularity in the orders passed by lower Authorities as result of which substantial injustice was caused to revisionist? After considering other issues, if so warrant. Re-Issue (b) -:

¶17Section 17 of Act of 1908 provides documents of which registration is compulsory which shall include any instruments which purports to operate to create any title of value of 100/- आ⦙ and onwards. However since consideration of unregistered sale deed dated 10.12.1970 was only 98/- i.e. less than 100/-, आ⦙ आ⦙ therefore, under provision of Act of 1908, there was no mandatory requirement of such document to be registered.

¶18Section 51 of Act of 1953 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no instrument in writing shall be necessary for affecting a transfer of holdings involved in giving effect to a final Consolidation Scheme nor shall any such instrument, if executed, requires registration.

¶19From above referred Section 51, it would be evident that it commenced with a non-obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, therefore, it is presumed that it has taken into consideration of earlier enactment i.e. Act of 1908.

¶20So far as argument of learned counsel for petitioners in regard to Article 254 (1) of Constitution is concerned, it states that -: "If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void."

¶21The Supreme Court in the case of M. Karunanidhi vs. Union of India, 1979 AIR 898, has held that three conditions must be specified to conclude that repugnance exists. These are (i) there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act, (ii) such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable and (iii) the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other.

¶22U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is an Act to provide for consolidation of agricultural holdings in Uttar Pradesh for development of agriculture. There are various provisions to achieve the object and for that special provisions and powers were provided to Authorities under the Act and that Section 51 was enacted for a limited purpose in regard to sale deed executed during consolidation proceedings and for that purpose, clause of non-obstante was included. It is not a case where there is a direct repugnancy between State and Central law. Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that Section 51 of the Act will operate within its scope and its legal consequence, if any, shall follow. Re-: Issue (c) -:

¶23Issue in regard to averment of permission to sale viz.-a-viz., area of sale was considered by this Court in the case of Smt. Chandrawati vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2023:AHC: 145981 and relevant paragraphs thereof are quoted herein below-: "12. Now the Court proceeds to consider the issue involved and mentioned in paragraph 1 of present judgment. The petitioner (vendor) was legally entitled to execute sale deed of land mentioned in permission granted to her under Section 5(i)(c)(ii) of Act of 1953. Undisputedly, the petitioner has executed sale deed in excess of land mentioned in permission.

¶13A sale deed could be held void only if the vendor has sold land without any legal right or against provisions of any law. Ownership of land in question is now not in dispute i.e. petitioner was owner of disputed land being part of sale deed.

¶14Supreme Court in Gorakh Nath Dube vs. Hari Narain Singh and others, (1973) 2 SCC 535 has held that :- "5. There is no decision of this Court directly on the question whether a suit for cancellation of a sale-deed, which was pending on the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, abates under Section 5(2) of the Act. A decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Jagarnath Shukla v. Sita Ram Pande [ 1969 ALJ 768], directly dealing with the question before us, was then cited before us. Here, we find a fairly comprehensive discussion of the relevant authorities of the Allahabad High Court the preponderating weight of which is cast in favour of the view that questions relating to the validity of sale-deeds, gift deeds, and wills could be gone into in proceedings before the consolidation authorities, because such questions naturally and necessarily arose and had to be decided in the course of adjudication on rights or interests in land which are the subject-matter of consolidation proceedings. We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interests in land which are the subject-matter of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it. In the case before us, the plaintiff's claim is that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inoperative, and void. Such a claim could be adjudicated upon by consolidation courts. We find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jagarnath Shukla case that it is the substance of the claim and not its form which is decisive." (emphasis supplied)

¶15As observed above, the sale deed in question is not a void instrument but it may be a voidable instrument i.e. valid to extent of land which would fall within the permission granted under Section 5(i)(c)(ii) of Act of 1953 and could be declared void in regard to excess land."

¶24In above legal and factual background where the vendor has executed a sale deed limited to his share whereas permission was granted of much larger area, the sale deed could not be held to be void rather it remains valid and legally enforceable as there was no illegality in sale deed as well as that it is not much in dispute that vendor was owner of area of land (his undisputed share) for which sale deed was executed. Re-: Issue (d) -:

¶25This issue relates to principles of promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel being equitable doctrine was evolved for equity to prevent injustice.

¶26It is not in dispute that in the present case, same vendor by a sale deed dated 16.11.1970 has sold his agricultural land of another village viz., situated at Patna to some of the contesting respondents also.

¶27However, admittedly said sale deed was not objected at the behest of petitioners either on the ground of competency of vendor or otherwise and finding has also been returned that petitioners had also purchased some land from same vendor and therefore, they cannot take two stands at one time so much as that same vendor was competent to sold land in their favour as well as at land in other village and on other hand to object sale deed executed by same vendor to respondents, therefore, in background of referred factual aspects, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly applied principles of promissory estoppel.

¶28In this regard, few excerpts from Part-H (from paragraph 28 to 35) of the judgment of State of Jharkhand vs. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd., 2020 SCC Online SC 968 would be relevant and are reproduced hereinafter -: "H.3 Promissory estoppel - origins and evolution

¶28Before the High Court, the State of Jharkhand sought to sustain its action on the ground that though the follow-up notification under Section 9 was issued on 8 January 2015, no outer limit for the issuance of a notification was prescribed and there was no vested right on the part of the respondent to get the notification implemented from an earlier date or to obtain the benefit of the policy until it was implemented by a follow-up notification. The decision in Kalyanpur Cement (supra) [(State of Bihar v. Kalyanpur Cement Limited, (2010) 3 SCC 274)] was sought to be distinguished on the ground that in that case no follow-up notification had been issued at all until the policy lapsed. In sum and substance, the objection was that the writ petitioner - the respondent here - had no vested right to claim that a follow-up notification should be issued and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not, in the facts, apply.

¶29In order to analyze the contentions relating to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the present case, it is necessary to discuss the origin of the doctrine and the evolution of its application. The common law recognizes various kinds of equitable estoppel, one of which is promissory estoppel. In Crabb v. Arun DC ([1976] 1 Ch. 179 (Court of Appeal)), Lord Denning, speaking for the Court of Appeal, traced the genesis of promissory estoppel in equity, and observed: "The basis of this proprietary estoppel - as indeed of promissory estoppel - is the interposition of equity. Equity comes in, true to form, to mitigate the rigours of strict law. The early cases did not speak of it as "estoppel". They spoke of it as "raising an equity" If I may expand that, Lord Cairns said:"It is the first principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed", that it will prevent a person from insisting on his legal rights - whether arising under a contract or on his title deed, or by statute - when it would be inequitable for him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties."

¶30The requirements of the doctrine of promissory estoppel have also been formulated in Chitty on Contracts (Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (32 nd edn., Sweet & Maxwell 2017)) ("Chitty"): "4.086. For the equitable doctrine to operate there must be a legal relationship giving rise to rights and duties between the parties; a promise or a representation by one party that he will not enforce against the other his strict legal rights arising out of that relationship; an intention on the part of the former party that the latter will rely on the representation; and such reliance by the latter party. Even if these requirements are satisfied, the operation of the doctrine may be excluded if it is, nevertheless, not "inequitable" for the first party to go back on his promise. The doctrine most commonly applies to promises not to enforce contractual rights, but it also extends to certain other relationships.

4.088…..The doctrine can also apply where the relationship giving rise to rights and correlative duties is non-contractual : e.g. to prevent the enforcement of a liability imposed by statute on a company director for signing a bill of exchange on which the company's name is not correctly given; or to prevent a man from ejecting a woman, with whom he has been cohabitating, from the family home."

¶31Chitty

(supra) clarifies that the doctrine of

promissory

estoppel

may be enforced even in the absence of a legal

relationship. However, it is argued that this would be an incorrect application of the doctrine since it gives rise to new rights between the parties, when the intent of the doctrine is to restrict the enforcement of previously existing rights: "4.089. It has, indeed, been suggested that the doctrine can apply where, before the making of the promise or representation, there is no legal relationship giving rise to rights and duties between the parties, or where there is only a putative contract between them : e.g. where the promisee is induced to believe that a contract into which he had undoubtedly entered was between him and the promisor, when in fact it was between the promisee and another person. But it is submitted that these suggestions mistake the nature of the doctrine, which is to restrict the enforcement by the promisor of previously existing rights against the promisee. Such rights can arise only out of a legal relationship existing between these parties before the making of the promise or representation. To apply doctrine where there was no such relationship would contravene the rule (to be discussed in para.4-099 below) that the doctrine creates no new rights."

¶32Generally speaking under English Law, judicial decisions have in the past postulated that the doctrine of promissory estoppel

cannot be used as a 'sword', to

give rise to a cause of action for the enforcement of a promise lacking any consideration. Its use in those decisions has been limited as a 'shield', where the promisor is estopped from claiming enforcement of its strict legal rights, when a representation by words or conduct has been made to suspend such rights. In Combe v. Combe ([1951] 2 K.B. 215) ("Combe"), the Court of Appeal held that consideration is an essential element of the cause of action: "It [promissory estoppel] may be part of a cause of action, but not a cause of action itself. …… The principle [promissory estoppel] never stands alone as giving a cause of action in itself, it can never do away with the necessity of consideration when that is an essential part of the cause of action. The doctrine of consideration is too firmly fixed to be overthrown by a side-wind."

¶33Even within English Law, the application of the rule laid down in Combe (supra) has been noticed to be inconsistent (Wyvern Development, Re, [1974] 1 WLR 1097 cited in Susan M. Morgan, "A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel in Australia, Great Britain and the United States", (1985) 15 Melbourne University Law Review 134, 139-141). The scope of the rule has also been doubted on the ground that it has been widely framed (In Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd. v. Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd., [1955] 1 WLR 761, Lord Simonds states, "I do not wish to lend the authority of this House to the statement of the principle which is to be found in Combe v. Combe and may well be far too widely stated"). Hence, in the absence of a definitive pronouncement by the House of Lords holding that promissory estoppel can be a cause of action, a difficulty was expressed in stating with certainty that English Law has evolved from the traditional approach of treating promissory estoppel as a 'shield' instead of a 'sword' (In Baird Textiles Holdings Ltd. v. Marks and Spencer Plc.,

(2002) 1 All ER 737, Court of Appeal stated that "there is no real prospect of the claim [estoppel] succeeding unless and until law is developed, or corrected, by the House of Lords"). By contrast, the law in the United States (American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (2d), Contracts (1981), para 90) and Australia (Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher, (1988) 164 CLR 387) is less restrictive in this regard.

¶34India, as we shall explore shortly, adopted a more expansive statement of the doctrine. Comparative law enables countries which apply a doctrine from across international frontiers to have the benefit of hindsight.

¶35This Court has given an expansive interpretation to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in order to remedy the injustice being done to a party who has relied on a promise. In Motilal Padampat

(supra), this Court

viewed

promissory estoppel

as a principle in equity, which

was not hampered by the doctrine of consideration as was the case under English Law. This Court, speaking through Justice P N Bhagwati (as he was then), held thus: "12….having regard to the general opprobrium to which the doctrine of consideration has been subjected by eminent jurists, we need not be unduly anxious to project this doctrine against assault or erosion nor allow it to dwarf or stultify the full development of the equity of promissory estoppel or inhibit or curtail its operational efficacy as a justice device for preventing injustice…We do not see any valid reason why promissory estoppel should not be allowed to found a cause of action where, in order to satisfy the equity, it is necessary to do so."

¶29In background of facts of present case and law as referred above, since the petitioners have not disputed competency of same vendor who has executed sale deed in their favour or sale deed of land situated in other village, therefore, it would be an admission that common vendor was competent to execute sale deed to respondents also.

¶30As referred above, action of petitioners would act as an estoppel whereby they were estopped from claiming enforcement of their legal rights and promissory estoppel could extend where it might be part of a cause of action, but not a cause of action itself, therefore, this Court is of view that in facts and circumstances of the present case, principle of promissory estoppel would be applicable as it would satisfy the equity.

¶31In view of above discussion on relevant issues where this Court has reached to a conclusion that findings returned by the Deputy Director of Consolidation were not perverse and were supported by well established principles of law and therefore, the question which left for consideration while discussing Issue (a) that wheteher in above circumstances, the Court could hold that Revisional Authority has acted within parameters of provisions of Section 48 of the Act of 1953 (as it was then).

¶32The Revisional Authority had jurisdiction to interfere with order or orders passed by lower authority or authorities only under such circumstances when authority has exercised jurisdiction not vested in him or failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him or acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity and as a result of which substantial injustice appeared to have been caused to a tenure holder. (See U.P. Act No.XXXVIII of 1958).

¶33The word 'substantial' carries importance. Word 'substantial' often means more than 'significant'. Word 'substantial' means 'having substance' 'essential', 'real', 'of sound worth', etc. According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar's: The Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2012 meaning of word 'substantial' is 'considerable' and is not the same as 'not substantial'. Hindi translation of word 'substantial' as used in Amendment Act is 'साⷀ┴वान�' i.e. which goes to the root of dispute.

¶34The Supreme Court in Ram Avadh & Ors Vs. Ram Das & Ors., (2008) 8 SCC 58, has held that concurrent findings of two lower authorities could not be disturbed mainly on basis of assumption or without any basis. It would be relevant that above referred clauses were neither referred nor considered. The Court was essentially considering effect of U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982 (U.P. Act No.XX of 1982) as well as U.P. Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 2002 (U.P. Act No. 3 of 2002), both enforced with effect from 10.11.1980.

¶35As observed above, even at that point of time, statute had provided that in case lower Authorities have committed substantial irregularity which has resulted into substantial injustice, the Revisional Authority was within its jurisdiction to interfere and as discussed above, there is no doubt that lower Authorities have committed substantial irregularity which has caused substantial injustice to respondents, therefore, revision filed by respondents was allowed whereby orders passed by two lower Authorities were interfered.

¶36Therefore, impugned order cannot be faulted on the ground of incompetency or jurisdiction of Revisional Authority.

¶37Outcome of above discussion is that there is no ground either factual or legal which warrants interference with impugned order under writ jurisdiction as provided under Article 226 of Constitution of India.

¶38In these circumstances, this Court does not find any ground to allow this writ petition, therefore, petition being sans merit is dismissed.

¶39No order as to costs. Order Date :- October 17, 2023 Nirmal Sinha [Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J.] High Court of Judicature at Allahabad