All India Chess Federation Chennai Thru Honorary Secy. and Anr v. Addl. District Judge Court 9 Lucknow and Others

Court No. - 8 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 1001333 of 2015 Petitioner :- All India Chess Federation Chennai Thru Honorary Secy. And Anr Respondent :- Addl. District Judge Court 9 Lucknow And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Anurag Verma Counsel for Respondent :- U.N. Misra,Shesh Verma Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia,J.

¶1Heard learned counsel for the petitioners. No one appears for the respondents despite the matter being taken up in the revised list.

¶2The facts in brief are that a suit came to be filed for declaration in permanent injunction wherein, a prayer was made for declaring the order dated 20.07.2006, de-affiliating the plaintiff no1 by the defendant no.1 as bad in law, a further relief was sought seeking a declaration with regard to the order dated

20.07.2006, whereby the plaintiff no.2 was suspended from all activities of the defendant no.1.

¶3After the filing of the plaint, an amendment was filed seeking to add a new paragraph after para 20, being para 20A wherein the pleadings with regard to arising of cause of action was also raised, with regard to the prayer no.2, it was stated that as the order dated 23.06.2006 was communicated to the plaintiff no. 2 at Lucknow, the court at Lucknow had jurisdiction.

¶4The trial Court by means of an order dated 11.05.2010 passed an order holding that the main action against the plaintiff no.1 as well as the plaintiff no.2, took place at Chennai, by the defendant no.1, the cause of action would not lie in the court at Lucknow.

¶5Challenging the said order dated 11.05.2010, an appeal was preferred which appeal stood allowed by means of an order dated 14.11.2014 mainly on the ground that as one of the orders, in respect of which, the plaintiff no.2 had sought declaration was served to him at Lucknow, the court at Lucknow had jurisdiction.

¶6The contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned order passed by the appellate authority is contrary to the mandate of Section 20 of Code of Civil Procedure .

¶7Section 20 of Code of Civil Procedure is quoted hereinbelow:- "20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.—Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction— (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally works for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or

(c) The cause of action, wholly or in part, arises 1[* * *] 2 [Explanation].—A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in 3 [India] or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place. Illustrations (a) A is a tradesman in Calcutta, B carries on business in Delhi. B, by his agent in Calcutta, buys goods of A and requests A to deliver them to the East Indian Railway Company. A delivers the goods accordingly in Calcutta. A may sue B for the price of the goods either in Calcutta, where the cause of action has arisen, or in Delhi, where B carries on business. (b) A resides at Simla, B at Calcutta and C at Delhi. A, B and C being together at Benaras, B and C make a joint promissory note payable on demand, and deliver it to A. A may sue B and C at Benaras, where the cause of action arose. He may also sue them at Calcutta, where B resides, or at Delhi, where C resides but in each of these cases, if the non-resident defendant objects, the suit cannot proceed without the leave of the Court." COMMENTS

(i) Facts pleaded which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. For that fact pleaded must have relevance to the lis/dispute; Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 126.

(ii) Where the agreement stated that jurisdiction regarding all disputes is at Delhi where the agreement has been signed and executed while the agreement by parties was not signed at Delhi but at some other place, then the agreement cannot be said to be conferring exclusive jurisdiction to Civil Court at Delhi. Party can file a suit under section 20(c) at place where cause of action wholly or partly arose; Jabalpur Cable Network Pvt. Ltd. v. E.S.P.N. Software India Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1999 MP 271.

(iii) Where the agreement was an agreement for sale of movable property then sections 16 and 19 would not govern the cause of action in such case but section 20 of the Code would be attracted for determining jurisdiction of Court; Jabalpur Cable Network Pvt. Ltd. v. E.S.P.N. Software India Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1999 MP 271.

¶1Explanation I omitted by Act No. 104 of 1976, sec. 7 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

¶2Subs, by Act No. 104 of 1976, sec. 7, for "Explanation II" (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

¶3Subs. by Act 2 of 1951, sec. 3, for "the States" (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)"

¶8Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court passed in M/s. Deeptiman Logistics Pvt. Limited and another vs. Union of India and others wherein, this Court interpreted the phrase cause of action and held as under:- "9. The phrase "cause of action" came for consideration before the Apex Court in several judgments. The classic definition of the expression, which has been quoted with approval by the Apex Court in several judgments is the defi-nition given by Lord Brett in Cooke v. Gill, which is to the following effect:- "cause of action' means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court."

¶10The phrase "cause of action" has been considered in detail by the Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and another. Following was laid down in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10:- "8. Two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution on plain reading give clear indication that the High Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights con-ferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action wholly or in part had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. (See Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and others).

¶9By "cause of action" it is meant every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit. (See Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai and others).

¶10In a generic and wide sense (as in section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) cause of action" means every fact, which it is necessary to es-tablish to support a right to obtain a judgment. (See Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar)"

¶11From the above exposition of the phrase "cause of action", it is clear that cause of action means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right of the judgment. The peti-tioners claim that part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial ju-risdiction of this Court, is based on its pleading that communications were re-ceived at its head office at Allahabad. The issue, thus, boils down to the fact that whether in facts of the present case sending of communication at Allahabad by the Railway Board as well as by respondent No. 3 gives part of cause of action to the petitioner to invoke the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The question as to whether receipt of communication or notice furnishes a cause of action, has been considered by the Apex Court and this Court on several occasions. It is necessary to refer to some relevant cases on the above subject to determine the issue raised.

¶12In State of Rajasthan and others v. M/s. Swaika Properties and an-other, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the question as to whether the Calcutta High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a writ petition, which was filed with regard to acqui-sition of certain properties under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 at Jaipur. The proceedings for acquisition under the aforesaid Act were initi-ated by the State of Rajasthan. Notice under sub-section (2) of section 52 of the Act was received by the registered office of the respondent-company at Calcutta. The writ petition was filed at Calcutta challenging the validity of the notification issued by the State of Rajasthan under section 52 (1) of the Act for acquisition of certain land. The writ petition was issued by Calcutta High Court against which an appeal was filed by the State of Rajasthan. Before the Apex Court the submission was made that since notice was issued at head office at Calcutta, the part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial juris-diction of Calcutta High Court. Following was laid down in paragraph 8 of the said judgment:-

¶8The expression 'cause of action' is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure: "The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if tra-versed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. "In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law appli-cable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under section 52 (2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta ie. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an inte-gral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under section 52 (1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the im-pugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated 8.2.1984 issued by the State Government under section 52 (1) of the Act became effec-tive the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encum-brances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under sec-tion 52 (2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under section 52 (1) of the Act. If the respondents felt ag-grieved by the acquisition of their lands situated at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under section 52 (1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such re-lief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose."

¶13Again the Apex Court had considered the issue of part of cause of action in context of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and others. In the said case Oil and Natural Gas Commission had a gas processing plant at Hazira in the State of Gujarat. Engineers India Ltd., acting as consultants for Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) issued an advertisement in leading newspaper inviting tenders for set-ting up of a Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit at Hazira. According to the ad-vertisement, the tenders containing offers were to be communicated to EIL at New Delhi. A company NICCO, having its registered office in Calcutta read the notice in the Times of India and submitted its tender. The Tender Committee after examination rejected the bid of the NICCO at New Delhi. The NICCO submitted a representation which was also not favourably ac-cepted. The contract was awarded to some other company. A writ petition was filed at Calcutta for restraining from awarding the contract to any other party. The writ was issued by the Calcutta High Court against which Oil and Natural Gas Commission filed special leave petition before the Apex Court. In the Apex Court, the NICCO contended that Calcutta High Court had jurisdic-tion since it came to know about the tender from the publication in Times of India at Calcutta, it submitted its tender from the registered office within the jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court. It was also contended that a fax message sent in answer to the NICCO's fax message was also received at Calcutta office. The Apex Court considered the submissions and held that Calcutta High Court lacked jurisdiction. Following was laid down in paragraphs 8 and 11:- "8. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible, it sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27.1.1993. Therefore, broadly speak-ing, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the juris-diction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the adver-tisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejec-tion of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the con-tract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Haziara in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta, would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides, the fax message of 15.1.1993, cannot be construed as con-veying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27.1.1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court." "11. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the State of Raja Rajasthan case by the learned Counsel for ONGC. The facts of that case reveal that the respondent-company having its registered office at Calcutta owned a large chunk of land on the outskirts of Jaipur. The Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur at the instance of the Improvement Trust, Jaipur issued a notice intimating that the State Government proposed to acquire a large part of the said parcel of land for a public purpose, namely, implementation of a development scheme. The said notice was duly served on the respondents at their Calcutta office. The respondents thereafter participated in the inquiry and contended that they proposed to use the land for constructing a three star hotel. The Special Officer, however, felt that the alleged need of the respondents was just a pretence and the land was not needed bona fide by them, but the real object was to get the land released from acquisition. Consequently, the requisite final notification for the acquisition of the land was issued. Thereafter, an attempt was made to seek exemption in regard to the notified land under section 20 of the Urban Lands (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, but in vain. Having failed to get the land released from acquisition, the respon-dents filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the acquisition wherein rule nisi was issued and an ad interim ex parte prohibitory order was granted restraining tak-ing of possession of the acquired land, etc. The question which arose for con-sideration in the backdrop of the said facts was whether the High Court of Calcutta had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and grant ex parte ad in-terim relief. This Court observed that upon the said facts, the cause of ac-tion neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and, therefore, the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to issue rule nisi or to grant the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order. After extracting the definition of the expression "cause of action" from Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 223, para 8) "The mere service of notice under section 52 (2) of the Act on the respon-dents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under section 52 (1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench."

¶14In National Textile Corporation Ltd. and others v. Haribox Swalram and others, again the Apex Court examined the similar issue. It was contended in the said case that part of cause of action had accrued at Calcutta since the petitioners were carrying business at Calcutta, letters were sent by them at Calcutta and reply to the same has been received by them at Calcutta. The Apex Court held that receipt of reply to the correspondences made by the peti-tioners at Calcutta is not an integral part of cause of action. Following was laid down in paragraphs 9 and

12.1 of the said judgment:- "9. Shri Kirit N. Raval, learned Solicitor General appearing for the appellants, has strenuously urged that no part of cause of action had ac-crued in Calcutta as the Textile Mills were situate in Bombay and supply was to be made ex-factory at Bombay and the alleged payment by the writ petitioners was also made at the said place. It has, thus, been urged that it is not a case where even a part of cause of action may have accrued in the State of West Bengal which could enable the Calcutta High Court to enter tain the writ petition and to grant any relief to the writ petitioners. Shri G.C. Bharuka, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents herein (writ petitioners) has submitted that the writ petitioners were carrying on business at Calcutta, the letters were sent by them from Calcutta and replies to the same had also been received by them at Calcutta and, there-fore, part of cause of action had accrued in the State of West Bengal and consequently, the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court that it had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition was perfectly correct." "12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner car-ries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta, is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. However, in order to avoid any further harassment to the parties and to put an end to the litigation, we would examine the matter on merits as well."

¶15Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment in Om Prakash Srivastava's case (supra). In the said case a writ petition was filed before the Delhi High Court that the petitioner was being tried in sev-eral cases contrary to the extradition treaty. It was stated that petitioner was being kept in solitary confinement without proper medical aid in Central Jail in the State of U.P. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition taking the view that Delhi High Court may have jurisdiction but the issues relating to conditions of prisoners in the State of U.P. can be more effectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court. The judgment of the Delhi High Court was set-aside and it was held that Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction. In Om Prakash Srivastava's case (supra), the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi High Court was not even challenged, rather the Court while relegating the pe-titioner to Allahabad High Court, had itself observed that Delhi High Court may have jurisdiction but the issues relating to conditions of prisoners in U.P. can be more effectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court. The above judgment does not help the petitioner in any manner.

¶16The judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan and others v. M/s. Swaika Properties and another has also been relied by the petitioner, which has already been noted above. In the said case, it was held that service of no-tice under section 52 (2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 at Calcutta does not give any part of cause of action at Calcutta to file a writ peti-tion challenging the land acquisition proceedings at Jaipur.

¶17The next cause relied by the petitioner is in the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and others. In the said case, a writ peti-tion was filed at Maharashtra High Court against the State of Maharashtra, State of Meghalaya, the Special Superintendent of Police, CID, Shillong and Mr. Malerkode Subramanium Jayaram praying to quash the complaint lodged by M/s. J.B. Holdings Ltd. or in the alternative to issue a writ of mandamus di-recting the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation being conducted by the officers of the CID at Shillong to the Economic Offences Wing, General Bench of the CID, Mumbai. The issue whether part of cause of action had arisen at State of Maharashtra was examined by the Apex Court. The High Court in the said judgment held that Maharashtra High Court had jurisdiction. The Apex Court itself in the said judgment had noted that large number of events have taken place at Bombay in respect of allegations contained in the first information report registered at Shillong, hence part of cause of action had arisen within the State of Maharashtra and the writ petition was maintainable. Following was laid down in paragraph 44 of the said judgment:- "44. In the aforesaid situation, it is almost impossible to hold that not even a part of the cause of action has arisen at Bombay so as to deprive the High Court of Bombay of total jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the petitioner. Even the very fact that major portion of the investigation of the case under the FIR has to be conducted at Bombay itself shows that the cause of action cannot escape from the territorial limits of the Bombay High Court."

¶18Thus, the said judgment was on its own facts and has no relevance in facts of the present case. Another judgment relied by the petitioners is a judg-ment delivered by learned Single Judge (by one of us Justice Ashok Bhushan) in Writ Petition No. 12411 of 1986 (Phool Singh Chauhan v. The Chief of the Army Staff), decided on 14.9.2007. In the said writ petition, the petitioner had challenged the order dated 13.3.1980 of Summary Court Martial and the order dated 28.4.1980 by which sentence of three months of rigorous imprisonment was remitted but the punishment of dismissal was maintained and thirdly the order dated 20.5.1986 by which the petitioner's representation to take back him in service was rejected. At the relevant time the petitioner was posted in State of Gujarat. He took leave to go to his native place to District Kanpur Nagar, State of U.P. form where he sent telegram for extension of leave. Ultimately in Summary Court Martial proceedings, he was punished. Subsequently on application, the sentence was remitted but the dismissal was maintained. The petitioner sent an application to Chief of the Army Staff from Kanpur for taking him back in service by setting aside the Summary Court Mar-tial, which was refused and refusal was communicated vide letter dated

20.5.1986 at Kanpur. This Court held that although there was no part of cause of action for challenging the punishment awarded by Summary Court Martial in the State of Uttar Pradesh but insofar as prayer for refusal to reinstate in service is concerned, the Allahabad High Court had territorial jurisdiction since the application was submitted from Kanpur on the basis of certain which was refused by the Chief of the Army Staff and refusal was communi-cated to the petitioner at Kanpur. Following was laid down in paragraph 12 of the said judgment:- "In above view of the matter, it cannot be held that any part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the punishment awarded by Summary Court Martial dated 15.3.1980. However, the submission much pressed by Counsel for the petitioner is that since the petitioner has sent an application to the Chief of the Army Staff from District Kanpur for taking him back in service, which was rejected and communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 20.5.1986 at Kanpur (U.P.), the petitioner had cause of action to challenge the said decision of not taking him back in service before this Court. In the counter-affidavit"filed by the respondents the allegations made in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the writ petition, ie, representation of the petitioner to the Chief of the Army Staff for his reinstatement on

7.10.1985, rejection of the said request and communication at Kanpur vide letter dated 20.5.1986 has not been denied. Thus, insofar as the prayer of the petitioner to quash the order dated 20.5.1986 refusing reinstatement of the petitioner in service, it can be held that this Court has territorial jurisdiction since the representation was sent from Kanpur and the refusal of the same was also communicated at Kanpur. In support of the petitioner's prayer to quash the order dated 20.5.1986, same submission is pressed by the petitioner, i.e., the punishment of dismissal as well as imprisonment of six months was not permissible within the meaning of Army Act, 1950 and the said punishment being without jurisdiction, the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated."

¶19The above case was on its own facts. The above was a case of Army sol-dier who made an application on certain ground for taking him back in service from his native place, which was turned down by the Army Chief and the said refusal was communicated from where he made the application for reinstate-ment. The above case was on its own facts and does not help the petitioners in facts of the present case.

¶20Service of notice, communication of an order, when it forms integral part of cause of action, the territorial jurisdiction may be at the place where notice is served or communication is received but when the said communication is only by way of sending information at the registered head office, which is not integral part of cause of action, the writ petition cannot be entertained at the place where the communication is said to be received. In the present case, the challenge is to the decision of respondent No. 3 not to grant extension in the period of supply of wagons and further for not to accept the prayer for changing of loading station, which challenge cannot fall on non proving the fact of receiving the communication at head office at Allahabad. The decision of respondent No. 3 informing the petitioner 28.1.2010 that petitioners may approach the Railway Board was taken at Bilaspur and the decision became effective as soon as it was taken. Even if the petitioners were not communicated the decision or even if the decision was not communicated or received by the petitioners, their cause of action is complete to challenge the action of respondent No. 3. Thus, the receipt of communication at head office at Allahabad cannot be said to be an integral part of cause of action which furnished a cause of action to challenge the decision of South East Central Railway, Bilaspur at Allahabad.

¶9In the present case, the action of disaffiliation of the plaintiff no.1 was done at Chennai, the suspension of the plaintiff no.2 also took place at a meeting held at Chennai, the second relief was intricately linked with the first relief of the suit and thus, the trial court was right in returning the plaint for it being presented before an appropriate court. The appellate court has clearly erred in misinterpreting the scope of Section 20 C.P.C. As such, clearly the appellate court has erred in allowing the appeal. In view thereof, the appellate judgment dated

14.11.2014 is quashed. The order dated 11.05.2010 is upheld.

¶10The writ petition is allowed to that extent. Order Date :- 14.12.2023 Raj High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench