Pramod Singla v. Union of India & Ors.

793[2023] 2 S.C.R. 793 PRAMOD SINGLA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. (Criminal Appeal No. 1051 of 2023) APRIL 10, 2023 [KRISHNA MURARI AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.] Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 – Preventive Detenti on – Representation by detenue to the Central Government, the detaini ng authority and the Advisory Board – Central Govt. if bound t o wait for the decision of the Advisory Board before decid ing the representation – Whether there exists an incongruit y between the Pankaj Kumar case and the Abdullah Kunhi case – Held: No – Since these two judgments exist symbiotically and apply to t wo separate authorities within the COFEPOSA Act, there exists n o friction between the judgments – The mandate to wait for the dec ision of the Advisory Board, as per the Pankaj Kumar Judgment would apply to the Central Govt., however, the detaining author ity, being independent of the Govt., can pass its decision without the de cision of the Advisory Board – In the present case, the appellant -detenue sent a representation to both, the specially empowe red officer and the Govt. – Detaining authority decided on the repr esentation expeditiously without waiting for the decision of the Advi sory Board, and hence, did not violate the Pankaj Kumar Judgment – The Govt. waited for the decision of the Advisory Board – Thi s was also in accordance with the decision of the Abdullah Kunhi case, since the Govt., being a separate authority, is bound to wait for the decision of the Advisory Board – Thus, both, the detaining authority and the Govt. worked within the procedure established by law – H ence, the impugned detention order is not liable to be struck down on the ground of 60 days delay on the part of the Govt. in co nsideration of the representation made by the appellant – However, in the present case, the appellant was supplied with illegible doc uments in a foreign language – Also, the principle of parity is squarely applicable in this case, as the detention order was quashed against a similarly placed co-detenue – Impugned detention order liable to be set aside – Appellant was however, already released on grounds of expiry of the detention period – Constitution of India – Arts . 21, 22(5) – Preventive Detention Act, 1950 – s.3. Constitution of India – Article 21, 22(5) – Held: I n cases where illegible documents have been supplied to the detenue, a grave prejudice is caused to the him in availing his righ t to send a representation to the relevant authorities – Thus, the r elief u/Article 22(5) and the relevant statutory provisions allowing for su bmitting a representation are vitiated – In cases of preventive det ention, every procedural irregularity, keeping in mind the princip les of Article 21 and 22(5), must be accrued in favour of the detenue. Criminal Law – Preventive detention laws – Abuse/misuse of – Held: Such laws must be very critically examined and must be used only in the rarest of rare cases. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Preventive detention laws in India are a coloni al legacy, and have a great potential to be abused and misused. Laws that have the ability to confer arbitrary powers to the s tate, must in all circumstances, be very critically examined, and must be used only in the rarest of rare cases. In cases of preventive detention, where the detenue is held in arrest not for a crime he has committed, but for a potential crime he may comm it, the Courts must always give every benefit of doubt in favour of the detenue, and even the slightest of errors in proced ural compliances must result in favour of the detenue. The detenue, in cases of preventive detention under the COFEPOSA A ct, has the right to submit a representation to the detaining a uthority, the Government, and the Advisory Board. These representatio ns then, as per Article 22(5) of the Constitution of In dia, must be decided at the earliest opportunity possible. If the r epresentation is accepted either by the Government or the detaini ng officer, the detenue is released, however, if the representation is rejected, then the detention period is continued. [Paras 21, 22][802-E-G; 803-A-B]

¶2Whether there exists an incongruity between the Pankaj Kumar case and the Abdullah Kunhi Case and if such a friction exists should the point of law be referred to a Larger B ench? The Pankaj Kumar Case judgment was passed in the context of the Preventive Detention Act, 1960, and the Abdullah Kunhi Case was passed in the context of the COFEPOSA Act. Section 3 of the two acts provides for preventive detention. The det ention order under both laws can be passed either by the Govern ment, or by the specially empowered officer. However, under Sect ion 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, the specially empower ed officer, within 12 days of the detention, has to seek for an approval f rom the Government for continued detention, and only if the Government approves the same can the detention be continu ed. This process of seeking an approval from the Govern ment is essentially a transfer of power from the empowered office r to the Government, making the Government the detaining aut hority after the initial lapse of 12 days. In the COFEPOSA Ac t however, no such approval is required from the Government, and hence the detaining authority and the Government remain to be two separate bodies independent of each other. This dif ference between the COFEPOSA Act and the other preventive deten tion laws has been upheld by this Court in the case of Kamlesh Kumar Ishwardas Patel vs Union Of India & Ors. If the Pankaj Kumar judgment is read in light of this distinction between the specially empowered officer and the Government in the COFEPOSA A ct, it is found that there exists no friction between the Pankaj Kumar Judgment and the Abdullah Kunhi Judgement, since the Pankaj Kumar Judgement, while mandating the central Government to not wait for the decision of the Advisory Board, on ly does so because the central Government is the detaining offic er in the Preventive Detention Act. In simpler terms, this wo uld mean that the mandate to not wait for the decision of the Advisory Board is effectively not for the central Government, but o nly for the detaining officer. In the COFEPOSA Act, since the d etaining authority is separate from the Government, both, th e Pankaj Kumar Judgment and the Abdullah Kunhi Judgment would apply, but in different spheres. The Pankaj Kumar Judgment, since it was rendered in the context of the Government being the detaining authority, would be applicable only to the d etaining authority/specially empowered officer under the COFEPOSA Act. The Abdullah Kunhi Judgment however, since it was rendered in the context of the COFEPOSA Act, the mandate thereunder would squarely apply only to the Government, and not the detaining authority. In simpler terms, this would mean that the mandate to not wait for the Advisory Board would be applicable only to t he detaining authority. The Government, however, as per the Abdullah Kunhi Case, must wait for the decision of the Advisory Board. Since these two judgments exist symbiotically and apply to two separate authorities within the COFEPOSA Act , there exists no friction between the judgments, and hence th ere is no necessity for this point of law to be referred to a Large r Bench since the same is already settled. Any apparent con flict, as contended by the appellant, stands resolved, and bo th sets of judgments operate symbiotically and harmoniously within the said Act, without there existing any tension between the m. The mandate to wait for the decision of the Advisory Board, as per the Pankaj Kumar Judgment, would apply to the central Government, however, the detaining authority, being independent of the Government, can pass its decision without the d ecision of he Advisory Board. Since no conflict exists, the need to refer the point of law to a Larger Bench also ceases. [Paras 31, 33-35][811-G-H; 813-F-G; 814-A-D; 815-B-D] Pankaj Kumar Chakraborty And Ors. v. State of West Bengal (1969) 3 SCC 400 : [1970] 1 SCR 543; K.M. Abdulla Kunhi & B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union Of India & Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 476 : [1991] 1 SCR 102 – discussed.

¶3If there exists no friction between the two Constitu tional judgments of this Court, can the impugned detention o rder be quashed on grounds of the 60-day delay in consideration o f the representation made by the appellant? In the present case at hand, the appellant-detenue, av ailing his rights sent a representation to both, the speciall y empowered officer and the Government. The detaining authority in the present case decided on the representation expediti ously and without waiting for the decision of the Advisory Board, and hence, did not violate the Pankaj Kumar Judgment. The Government in the present case at hand, did decide to wait for the de cision of the Advisory Board. This was also done in accordance wit h the decision of the Abdullah Kunhi case, since the Government, being a separate authority, is bound to wait for the deci sion of the Advisory Board. both, the detaining authority, and the Government, have worked precisely within the proced ure established by law, and hence the impugned detention o rder is not liable to be struck down on this ground. [Paras 36-38][815-D-H]

¶4Whether the illegible documents written in Chine se submitted to the appellant herein are grounds enoug h for quashing the impugned detention order? In cases where illegible documents have been supplied to the detenue, a grave prejudice is caused to the detenue in availing his right to send a representation to the relevant authorities, because the detenue, while submitting his represent ation, does not have clarity on the grounds of his or her detention. I n such a circumstance, the relief under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and the relevant statutory provisions allo wing for submitting a representation are vitiated, since no man can de fend himself against an unknown threat. In cases of prev entive detention, every procedural irregularity, keeping i n mind the principles of Article 21 and Article 22(5) of the Constitu tion of India, must be accrued in favour of the detenue. In the pr esent case at hand, the appellant detenue herein has been supplied with illegible documents in a foreign language. The se are the very same documents that the authorities have relied upon to detain the appellant herein. Further, the principle of parity is squarely applicable in this case, since another co-d etenue with identical circumstances, has already been granted t he relief of quashing the detention order against him. While the ap pellant has already been released on grounds of expiry of the detenti on period, for the sake of clarity on the point of law, it is he ld that the impugned detention order is liable to be set aside. [Paras 39, 42, 43 and 45][816-B-C; 817-A-C; 818-A] Kamlesh Kumar Ishwardas Patel vs Union Of India & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 51 : [1995] 3 SCR 279; Harikisan v. The State Of Maharashtra & Ors. (1962) Supp. 2 SCR 918; Gian Chand v. Union Of India & Anr . (Crl.) 39 of 2011 – relied on. Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. [1975] 1 SCR 778; Ankit Ashok Jalan vs Union of India & Ors. (2020) 16 SCC 127 : [2020] 2 SCR 1047; Jayanarayan Sukul v. State Of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 219 : [1970] 3 SCR 225; Francis Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra & Ors.

(1980) 2 SCC 275 : [1980] 2 SCR 1095 – referred to. Case Law Reference 1975] 1 SCR 778 referred to Para 27 [1991] 1 SCR 102 discussed Para 18 (iii) [2020] 2 SCR 1047 referred to Para 18 (iii) [1970] 1 SCR 543 discussed Para 18 (iii) [1970] 3 SCR 225 referred to Para 18 (iii) [1980] 2 SCR 1095 referred to Para 28 [1995] 3 SCR 279 relied on Para 32 [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 918 relied on Para 40 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1051 of 2023. From the Judgment and Order dated 03.11.2022 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in WPCRL No. 1205 of 2022. Vikram Chaudhri, Sr. Adv., Nikhil Jain, Rishi Sehgal, Keshavam Chaudhri, Ms. Hargun Sandhu, Ms. Arveen Sekhon, Ms. Prabhneer Swani, Ms. Divya Jain, Sagar Juneja, Advs. for the Appellant. K.M. Nataraj, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Divyanshu Kumar Srivastava, Akshit Pradhan, Ms. Aakansha Kaul, Nakul Chengappa K.K., Sharath Nambiar, Anuj Srinivas Udupa, Chitransh Sharma, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA MURARI, J. Leave Granted.

¶2The present Appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and final order dated 03.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, (hereinafter referred to as “High Court”) in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1205 of 2022 whereby the appellant’s plea to qua sh the detention order against him on grounds of delay in considering hi s representation was denied. FACTS

¶3Briefly, the facts relevant to the present appeal are that an Intelligence was received by the Respondent that a syndicate comprising of certain Chinese, Taiwanese, and South Korean nationals in association with some Indian Nationals were in the practice of smuggling gold into India through Air Cargo by concealing gold in trans formers of electroplating/ reworking machines etc..

¶4One such cargo was being imported to India in the name of one M/s Healthy Future Leaders Pvt. Ltd. and was likely to arrive at Delhi Cargo Complex in the New Delhi Airport.

¶5On 18.11.2021 and 19.11.2021, acting on the said intelligence, the purported consignment was examined by the officers of Respondent No.4 and 80.126 kgs of 24 carat foreign origin gold was recovered from the said consignment in the form of ‘E’ and ‘I’ shaped plate s with a market value of Rs.39,31,38,219/-.

¶6The appellant being a suspect, his shop was checked by DR I officials and 7 pieces of gold weighing 5.409 KGs with a market value of Rs.2,64,44,680/-was recovered from his premises.

¶7The Respondent authority also conducted searches at four different places of the abovementioned syndicate and arrested 4 foreign nationals on grounds of finding incriminating evidence against them.

¶8On 20.11.2021, the appellant along with other members of the syndicate was arrested by the officers of respondent no.4 authori ty, whereupon they were produced before the Ld. CMM, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi and were subsequently remanded to judicial custody.

¶9The appellant then sought for bail before the learned CMM , and vide order dated 13.12.2021 he was granted bail.

¶10Vide four separate order dated 21.12.2021, all four foreign nationals accused in the said crime were also granted ba il by the Ld. CMM, and further, vide order dated 21.12.2021, the CMM also granted bail to the co-accused Neeraj Varshney of Indian Origin.

¶11Subsequent to the appellant’s release on bail, DRI file d an application in the High Court for incorporating an additional condition in the bail order directing the appellant to appear in the office of DRI every Monday at 11:00 am, and the same was granted.

¶12On 19.01.2022, the DRI sent a proposal to respondent No.2 to issue an order of detention under the COFEPOSA Act against t he appellant, and subsequently respondent No.2 detaining authority passed the impugned detention order as against the appellant on 01.02.2022. The appellant was then arrested on 04.02.2022 by the DRI.

¶13On 24.02.2022 a reference was made to the Central Advisory Board, Delhi High Court, and subsequently, a representation was sent by the appellant to the Respondent No.2 detaining authority on 02.03.2022 which came to be rejected on 15.03.2022.

¶14In the meanwhile, on 10.03.2022, the appellant sent a representation letter to the Central Government, and subsequen tly on

04.04.2022, he made another representation to the Advisory Board.

¶15The hearing before the Advisory board was concluded on

18.04.2022, and on 09.05.2022, the Central Government, on advice from the advisory board after a delay of 60 days rejected the representation.

¶16The appellant then filed a writ in the High Court seeking to quash the detention order against him, which came to be dismissed vide impugned order dated 03.11.2022.

¶17This Court subsequently, vide order dated 05.01.2023, released the appellant from custody as interim relief due to the demis e of his father, and later, due to the expiry of the impugned detention order against the appellant, he was released from detention. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANT

¶18The Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that: I. As per Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India , a representation made by the detenue in cases of preventive detention must be considered at the earliest, and a n inordinate delay in considering the representation is grounds enough for the detention order to be set aside. II. While relying on a catena of judgments rendered by thi s Court, it was argued that the Central Government is not under any compulsion to wait for the recommendation of the Advisory Board and must act independently and without delay in deciding the representation of the detenue. III. Further, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant contends that the decisions of this Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi & B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union Of India & Ors . 1 and Ankit Ashok Jalan vs Union Of India & Ors.2 Judgment, both of which are Constitution Bench judgments, which state that the central Government must wait for the decision of the Advisory Board, are in direct contravention with Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Pankaj Kumar Chakraborty And Ors. v. State of West Bengal 3 and the Jayanarayan Sukul v State Of West Bengal 4, and due to the apparent conflict, the issue needs to be referred to a Larger Bench. IV. It was also contended that the documents supplied to the appellant herein as grounds for his preventive detention were illegible and in Chinese language, and hence on this ground also the impugned detention order as against the appellant must be quashed. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENTS

¶19Learned ASG, Mr. K.M Natraj appearing on behalf of the respondents contends that: I. There is no incongruity between the Pankaj case (supra)and the Ashok Jalan case (supra) as contended by the appellant. The decisions relied upon by the appellant are in context of the Preventive Detention Act, whereas, the Ashok Jalan case (supra) and Adullah Kuni case (supra) are in context of the COFEPOSA Act, and if the Pankaj case (supra) is seen in the context of COFEPOSA Act, due to their being a distinction between the detaining authority and the central Government in the COFEPOSA Act, there exists no friction between the two Constitutional Bench judgments. II. As per the Ashok Jalan Case (supra), due to the detaining authority and the central Government being independent of 1 (1991) 1 SCC 476 2 (2020) 16 SCC 127 3 (1969) 3 SCC 400 4 (1970) 1 SCC 219 each other under COFEPOSA Act, the mandate to wait for the decision of the Advisory Board exists on the central Government, and hence the delay of 60 days is not grounds enough for the detention order to be quashed. ISSUES

¶20In light of the abovementioned arguments raised by the Learned Counsels for the parties, following three issues arise for our consideration. I. Whether there exists an incongruity between the Pankaj Kumar case (supra) and the Abdullah Kunhi Case (supra), and if such a friction exists should the point of law be referred to a Larger Bench? II. If there exists no friction between the two Constituti onal judgments of this Court, can the impugned detention order be quashed on grounds of the 60-day delay in consideration of the representation made by the appellant? III. Whether the illegible documents written in Chin ese submitted to the appellant herein are grounds enough for quashing the impugned detention order? ANALYSIS

¶21Before we deal with the issues framed, we find it important to note that preventive detention laws in India are a colonial l egacy, and have a great potential to be abused and misused. Laws tha t have the ability to confer arbitrary powers to the state, must in all circumstances, be very critically examined, and must be used only in the rarest of rare cases. In cases of preventive detention, where the detenue is held in arrest not for a crime he has committed, but for a potential crime he may commit, the Courts must always give every benefit of doubt in favour of the detenue, and even the slightest of errors in procedural compliances must result in favour of the detenue. ISSUE 1-Whether there exists an incongruity between th e Pankaj Kumar case and the Abdullah Kunhi Case and if su ch a friction exists should the point of law be referred to a Larger Bench?

¶22For the purpose of deciding this question, we must first elaborate on the rights accrued to a detenue against his preventive detention in terms of his representation. The deten ue, in cases of preventive detention under the COFEPOSA Act, has the right to submit a representation to the detaining authority, the Government, a nd the Advisory Board. These representations then, as per Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, must be decided at the earliest opportunity possible. If the representation is accepted either by the Government or the detaining officer, the detenue is released, however, if the representation is rejected, then the detention period is continued.

¶23In the case at hand, the appellant herein, who is under preventive detention, submitted a representation to the Central Gover nment, the detaining authority and the Advisory Board. It is the case of the appellant that while the detaining authority considered the representati on of the appellant authority in an expeditious manner, however, the Government took 60 days to consider the same. This delay of 60 days, as per the appellant, is fatal to the case of the prosecution, and constitutes sufficient grounds for quashing the impugned detention order.

¶24The Government, however, claims that the delay of 60 days is completely fair, as the same was caused because the Central Government was waiting for the advice of the Advisory Board before deciding on the resolution. In light of this conflict, the overarching issue that needs to be answered is whether the central Government is bound to wait f or the decision of the Advisory Board before coming to its decision or not. To answer this, we must look at the relevant case laws that define the rights and duties of the Government, the detaining authority and t he detenue in such circumstance.

¶25In the Pankaj Kumar case (Supra) , the petitioners therein filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court seeking for a quashing of a detention order passed against them under the Preventive D etention Act,1950, on grounds that the Government failed to c onsider the representation made by them and merely passed it on to the Advisory Board. After careful consideration, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the Government must act Independently from the Adviso ry Board, and that there exists no mandate on the Government to wait for the decision of the Advisory Board. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being extracted herein: “It is true that clause (5) does not in positive language pr ovide as to whom the representation is to be made and by w hom, when made, it is to be considered. But the expressi ons “as soon as may be” and “the earliest opportunity” in that clause clearly indicate that the grounds are to be served and the opportunity to make a representation are provided f or to enable the detenu to show that his detention is unwarrant ed and since no other authority who should consider su ch representation is mentioned it can only be the deta ining authority to whom it is to be made which has to consider it . Though clause (5) does not in express terms say so it follow s from its provisions that it is the detaining authority which has to give to the detenu the earliest opportunity to m ake a representation and to consider it when so made whethe r its order is wrongful or contrary to the law enabling it to detain him. The illustrations given in Abdul Karim case [A bdul Karim v. State of W.B., (1969) 1 SCC 433] show that c lause

(5) of Article 22 not only contains the obligation of the appropriate Government to furnish the grounds and to give the earliest opportunity to make a representation but also by necessary implication the obligation to consider th at representation. Such an obligation is evidently prov ided for to give an opportunity to the detenu to show and a corresponding opportunity to the appropriate Government t o consider any objections against the order which the de tenu may raise so that no person is, through error or oth erwise, wrongly arrested and detained. If it was intended that such a representation need not be considered by the Govern ment where an Advisory Board is constituted and that representation in such cases is to be considered by the Board and not by the appropriate Government, clause (5) would not have direct ed the detaining authority to afford the earliest oppo rtunity to the detenu. In that case the words would more appropriately have been that the authority should obtain the opinion of the Board after giving an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and communicate the same to the Board. But what would happen in cases where the detention is for less than 3 months and there is no necessity of having the opinion of the Board? If counsel’s contention were to be ri ght the representation in such cases would not have to be considered either by the appropriate Government or by the Board and the right of representation and the corresponding obli gation of the appropriate Government to give the earliest opportuni ty to make such representation would be rendered nugato ry. In imposing the obligation to afford the opportunity to make a representation, clause (5) does not make any distin ction between orders of detention for only 3 months or le ss and those for a longer duration. The obligation applies to both kinds of orders. The clause does not say that the representation is to be considered by the appropriate Government i n the former class of cases and by the Board in the latter clas s of cases. In our view it is clear from clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22 that there is a dual obligation on the appropria te Government and a dual right in favour of the detenu, namely,

(1) to have his representation irrespective of the length of detention considered by the appropriate Government and (2) to have once again that representation in the light of the circumstances of the case considered by the Board befo re it gives its opinion. If in the light of that representation the Board finds that there is no sufficient cause for detenti on the Government has to revoke the order of detention and set at liberty the detenu. Thus, whereas the Government cons iders the representation to ascertain whether the order i s in conformity with its power under the relevant law, the B oard considers such representation from the point of vie w of arriving at its opinion whether there is sufficient cause for detention. The obligation of the appropriate Governmen t to afford to the detenu the opportunity to make a representation and to consider that representation is distinct fro m the Government’s obligation to constitute a Board and t o communicate the representation amongst other materials to the Board to enable it to form its opinion and to obtain such opinion. This conclusion is strengthened by the other provisions of t he Act. In conformity with clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22, Section 7 of the Act enjoins upon the detaining authority to f urnish to the detenu grounds of detention within five days from the date of his detention and to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity to make his representation to the appro priate Government. Sections 8 and 9 enjoin upon the approp riate Government to constitute an Advisory Board and to p lace within 30 days from the date of the detention the grounds for detention, the detenu’s representation and also the re port of the officer where the order of detention is made by an offi cer and not by the Government. The obligation under Secti on 7 is quite distinct from that under Sections 8 and 9. If the representation was for the consideration not by the Government but by the Board only as contended, ther e was no necessity to provide that it should be addressed to the Government and not directly to the Board. The Governme nt could not have been intended to be only a transmitt ing authority nor could it have been contemplated that it shoul d sit tight on that representation and remit it to the Board aft er it is constituted. The peremptory language in claus e (5) of Article 22 and Section 7 of the Act would not have been necessary if the Board and not the Government had t o consider the representation. Section 13 also furnis hes an answer to the argument of the counsel for the State . Under that section the State Government and the Central Government are empowered to revoke or modify an order of deten tion. That power is evidently provided for to enable the Government to take appropriate action where on a representation made to it, it finds that the order in question should be modif ied or even revoked. Obviously, the intention of Parliament could not have been that the appropriate Government should pa ss an order under Section 13 without considering the representation which has under Section 7 been addressed to it. For the reasons aforesaid we are in agreement with the decision in Abdul Karim case [Abdul Karim v. State of W .B.,

(1969) 1 SCC 433] . Consequently, the petitioners h ad a Constitutional right and there was on the State Government a corresponding Constitutional obligation to consider their representations irrespective of whether they were made be fore or after their cases were referred to the Advisory Boa rd and that not having been done the order of detention against them cannot be sustained. In this view it is not necessary for us t o examine the other objections raised against these orders. The petition is therefore allowed, the orders of detention against Petitioners 15 and 36 are set aside and we direct tha t they should be set at liberty forthwith.”

¶26Further, in the Jayanarayan Sukul Case (Supra), the same issue was considered by another Constitution Bench of this Court, wherein it went on to reiterate the principles in the Pankaj Kumar Case (Supra), and held that the central Government must act independently of the Advisory Board, and can decide the representation made by the detenue without hearing from the Advisory Board. For the purpose of convenience, the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being reproduced herein: “In the present case, the State of West Bengal is g uilty of infraction of the Constitutional provisions not onl y by inordinate delay of the consideration of the repres entation but also by putting of the consideration till after t he receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board. As we have al ready observed there is no explanation for this inordinat e delay. The Superintendent who made the enquiry did not affir m an affidavit. The State has given no information as to why this long delay occurred. The inescapable conclusion in the present case is that the appropriate authority fail ed to discharge its Constitutional obligation by inactivity and la ck of independent judgment.”

¶27In the Harardhan Saha Case (Supra), yet another Constitution Bench of this Court considered the distinction between the consideration of the representation made by the detenue i n cases of preventive detention, and it was stated that if the repres entation was made before the matter is referred to the Advisory Board, the detaining authority must consider such representation, but if the representation is made after the matter is referred to the Advisory Board, t he detaining authority would first consider it and then send it to the Advisory Board. The relevant paragraph from the said judgment is being reproduce d hereunder: “The representation of a detenu is to be considered. There is an obligation on the State to consider the representation. The Advisory Board has adequate power to examine the en tire material. The Board can also call for more material s. The Board may call the detenu at his request. The Constitution of the Board shows that it is to consist of Judges or persons qualified to be Judges of the High Court. The Constitution of the Board observes the fundamental of fair play and principl es of natural justice. It is not the requirement of prin ciples of natural justice that there must be an oral hearing. Section 8 of the Act which casts an obligation on the State to con sider the representation affords the detenu all the rights whic h are guaranteed by Article 22(5). The Government conside rs the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in conformity with the power under the law. The Board, on the other hand, considers whether in the light of the representation there is sufficient cause for detent ion. Principles of natural justice are an element in con sidering the reasonableness of a restriction where Article 1 9 is applicable. At the stage of consideration of repres entation by the State Government, the obligation of the Stat e Government is such as Article 22(5) implies. Section 8 of the Act is in complete conformity with Article 22(5) because this section follows the provisions of the Constitution. If the representation of the detenu is received before the matter is referred to the Advisory Board, the detaining autho rity considers the representation. If a representation is made af ter the matter has been referred to the Advisory Board, the detaining authority will consider it before it will send representation to the Advisory Board.”

¶28Subsequently, in the case of Francis Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra & Ors. 5, a Division Bench of this Court considered the principles laid down in the judgment of Jayanarayan Sukul (Supra), and while it agreed with the principles of the above mentioned case, it however made an observation stating that when it was said th at the Government must decide on the representation before forwarding it to the advisory board, the emphasis was not on time, but on the onus of the Government to decide the representation Independently. This essentially meant that the Government must act independently of the Advisory Board, the relevant paragraphs from the said judgment are being extracted herein: “We have no doubt in our minds about the role of the Court in cases of preventive detention : it has to be one o f eternal vigilance. No freedom is higher than personal freed om and no duty higher than to maintain it unimpaired. The C ourt’s 5 (1980) 2 SCC 275 writ is the ultimate insurance against illegal detent ion. The Constitution enjoins conformance with the provision s of Article 22 and the Court exacts compliance. Article 22(5) vests in the detenu the right to be provided with an opportunity to make a representation. Here the Law Reports tell a story and teach a lesson. It is that the principal enemy of t he detenu and his right to make a representation is neither h igh-handedness nor mean-mindedness but the casual indifference, the mindless insensibility, the routine and the red t ape of the bureaucratic machine. The four principles enunciated by t he Court in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of W.B. [Jayanar ayan Sukul v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 219 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 92] as well as other principles enunciated in other cases, an analysis will show, are aimed at shielding personal f reedom against indifference, insensibility, routine and red tape and thus to secure to the detenu the right to make an e ffective representation. We agree : (1) the detaining author ity must provide the detenu a very early opportunity to make a representation, (2) the detaining authority must consi der the representation as soon as possible, and this, preferably, m ust be before the representation is forwarded to the Ad visory Board, (3) the representation must be forwarded to the Advisory Board before the Board makes its report, a nd (4) the consideration by the detaining authority of the representation must be entirely independent of the hearing by the Board or its report, expedition being essential at every stage. We, however, hasten to add that the time-imp erative can never be absolute or obsessive. The Court’s observations are not to be so understood. There has to be lee-way, depending on the necessities (we refrain from using the word “circumstances”) of the case. One may well imagine a case where a detenu does not make a representation befor e the Board makes its report making it impossible for the detainin g authority either to consider it or to forward it to the B oard in time or a case where a detenu makes a representation to the detaining authority so shortly before the Advisory Board takes up the reference that the detaining authority cannot consider the representation before then but may merely forward it to the Board without himself considering it. Several s uch situations may arise compelling departure from the time-imperative. But no allowance can be made for lethar gic indifference. No allowance can be made for needless procrastination. But, allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved. The burden of explainin g the necessity for the slightest departure from the time-imp erative is on the detaining authority. We have already expressed our agreement with the fo ur principles enunciated in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of W.B. [Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 219 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 92] We would make one observation. When it was said there that the Government should come t o its decision on the representation before the Governmen t forwarded the representation to the Advisory Board, the emphasis was not on the point of time but on the requirement that the Government should consider the representat ion independently of the Board.”

¶29However, in the case of Abdulla Kunhi (Supra), where the preventive detention of the petitioner therein under the COFEPO SA Act was challenged on the same disputed ground, a Constitutional Bench of this Court, while considering both the issues of when the representation is submitted before the matter is referred to the Advisor y Board and after the mater has been referred to the advisory board, for both the circumstances, had held that the Government must wait for the decision of the Advisory Board before making its decision on the representation. The relevant paragraph of the abovementioned judgment i s being extracted hereunder: “We agree with the observations in Frances Coralie M ullin case [(1980) 2 SCC 275 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 419] . The time imperative for consideration of representation can n ever be absolute or obsessive. It depends upon the necessit ies and the time at which the representation is made. The representation may be received before the case is referred to the A dvisory Board, but there may not be time to dispose of the representation before referring the case to the Advisory Board. In that situation the representation must also be forwarded t o the Advisory Board along with the case of the deten u. The representation may be received after the case of the dete nu is referred to the Board. Even in this situation the representation should be forwarded to the Advisory Board provided the Board has not concluded the proceedings. In both the situ ations there is no question of consideration of the repres entation before the receipt of report of the Advisory Board. Nor it could be said that the Government has delayed considerati on of the representation, unnecessarily awaiting the repor t of the Board. It is proper for the Government in such situation s to await the report of the Board. If the Board finds no material for detention on the merits and reports accordingly , the Government is bound to revoke the order of detentio n. Secondly, even if the Board expresses the view that there is sufficient cause for detention, the Government afte r considering the representation could revoke the det ention. The Board has to submit its report within eleven weeks from the date of detention. The Advisory Board may hear the detenu at his request. The Constitution of the Board shows that it consists of eminent persons who are Judges or perso ns qualified to be Judges of the High Court. It is therefor e, proper that the Government considers the representation in the aforesaid two situations only after the receipt of the report of the Board. If the representation is received by the Governm ent after the Advisory Board has made its report, there could th en of course be no question of sending the representation to the Advisory Board. It will have to be dealt with and disposed of by the Government as early as possible.”

¶30While at a first glance, it may seem like there is friction between the two sets of judgments, however, a deeper inspection would p rove otherwise. To understand the two sets of judgments, we must first look at the relevant provisions under which these judgments were passed.

¶31The Pankaj Kumar Case (Supra) judgment was passed in the context of the Preventive Detention Act, 1960, and the Abdullah Kunhi Case (Supra) was passed in the context of the COFEPOSA Act. Section 3 of the two acts providing for preventive detention, for a ready reference, are being reproduced hereunder in a table chart :

¶32As can be seen from the provisions of the abovementioned Acts, the detention order under both laws can be passed either by the Government, or by the specially empowered officer. However, unde r Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, the specially empowered officer, within 12 days of the detention, has to seek for an approval from the Government for continued detention, and only if the Governm ent approves the same can the detention be continued. This proce ss of seeking an approval from the Government is essentially a tra nsfer of power from the empowered officer to the Government, making the Government the detaining authority after the initial lapse of 12 days. In the COFEPOSA Act however, no such approval is required from t he Government, and hence the detaining authority and the Government remain to be two separate bodies independent of each other. This difference between the COFEPOSA Act and the other p reventive detention laws has been upheld by this Court in the case of Kamlesh Kumar Ishwardas Patel vs Union Of India & Ors. 6, the relevant extract of the abovesaid judgment is being reproduced hereunder: “The second premise that the Central Government becom es the detaining authority since there is deemed approval by t he Government of the order made by the officer special ly empowered in that regard from the time of its issue , runs counter to the scheme of the COFEPOSA Act and the P IT NDPS Act which differs from that of other preventive detention laws, namely, the National Security Act, 1980, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, and the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.”

¶33If we read the Pankaj Kumar judgment (Supra) in light of this distinction between the specially empowered of ficer and the Government in the COFEPOSA Act, we find that there exists no friction between the Pankaj Kumar Judgment (Supra) and the Abdullah Kunhi Judgement (Supra), since the Pankaj Kumar Judgement, while mandating the central Government to not wait for the decisi on of the Advisory Board, only does so because the central Government is the detaining officer in the Preventive Detention Act. In simpler terms, this would mean that the mandate to not wait for the decision of the Advisory Board is effectively not for the central Government, but only for the detaining officer. 6 (1995) 4 SCC 51

¶34In the COFEPOSA Act, since the detaining author ity is separate from the Government, both, the Pankaj Kumar Judgment (supra) and the Abdullah Kunhi Judgment (supra) would apply, but in different spheres. The Pankaj Kumar Judgment (supra) , since it was rendered in the context of the Government being the detaini ng authority, would be applicable only to the detaining authority/specially empowered officer under the COFEPOSA Act. The Abdullah Kunhi Judgment (supra) however, since it was rendered in the context of the COFEPOSA Act, the mandate thereunder would squarely apply only to the Government, and not the detaining authority. In simpler terms, this would mean that the mandate to not wait for the Advisory Board would be applicable only to the detaining authority. The Government, however, as per the Abdullah Kunhi Case (supra), must wait for the decision of the Advisory Board. Since these two judgments exist symbiotically and apply to two separate authorities within the COFEPOSA Act, there exists no friction between the judgments, and hence there is no necessity for this point of law to be referred to a Larger Bench since the same is already settled. This application of both the judgments in two separate spheres within the same act has been clarified in the Ashok Jalan Judgment (supra), the relevant extract from the said judgment is being extracted hereunder: “We are conscious that the view that we are taking, may lead to some incongruity and there could be clear dichotomy when the representations are made simultaneously to such specially empowered officer who had passed the order of deten tion and to the appropriate Government. If we go by the principle in para 16 in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi [K.M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 476 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 613] it would be proper for the appropriate Governmen t to wait till the report was received from the Advisory Board, while at the same time the specially empowered officer wh o had acted as the detaining authority would be obliged to consider the representation with utmost expedition. At times a single representation is prepared with copies to the detai ning authority, namely, the specially empowered officer and to the appropriate Government as well as to the Advisory Board. In such situations there will be incongruity as stated above, which may be required to be corrected at some stage. However, suc h difficulty or inconsistency cannot be the basis for holding that a specially empowered officer while acting as a de taining authority would also be governed by the same principles as laid down in para 16 of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi [K.M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 476 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 613] .”

¶35In light of the abovementioned discussions, it can be clearly seen that any apparent conflict, as contended by the appellant, stands resolved, and both sets of judgments operate symbio tically and harmoniously within the said Act, without there existing any t ension between them. The mandate to wait for the decision of the Adv isory Board, as per the Pankaj Kumar Judgment (Supra) , would apply to the central Government, however, the detaining autho rity, being independent of the Government, can pass its decision without the decision of he Advisory Board. Since no conflict exists, the need to re fer the point of law to a Larger Bench also ceases, and hence we hol d issue No.1 in favour of the Respondents. ISSUE II-If there exists no friction between the two Constitutional judgments of this Court, can the imp ugned detention order be quashed on grounds of the 60-day delay in consideration of the representation made by the app ellant?

¶36In the present case at hand, the appellant-detenue, availing his rights sent a representation to both, the specially empowered officer and the Government. The detaining authority in the present case decided on the representation expeditiously and without waiting for the decision of the Advisory Board, and hence, did not violate the Pankaj Kumar Judgment (supra) .

¶37The Government in the present case at hand, did decide to wait for the decision of the Advisory Board. This was also done i n accordance with the decision of the Abdullah Kunhi case (supra) , since the Government, being a separate authority, is bound to wa it for the decision of the Advisory Board.

¶38In light of the abovementioned discussions, it can be seen that both, the detaining authority, and the Government, have worked precisely within the procedure established by law, and hence the impugned detention order is not liable to be struck down on this ground. We therefore hold Issue II in favour of the respondent. ISSUE III-Whether the illegible documents written in Chinese submitted to the appellant herein are grounds enough for quashing the impugned detention order?

¶39In cases where illegible documents have been supplied to the detenue, a grave prejudice is caused to the detenue in availing his right to send a representation to the relevant authorities, because the detenue, while submitting his representation, does not have clarity on the grounds of his or her detention. In such a circumstance, the relief under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and the relevant statutory provisions allowing for submitting a representation are vitiated, since no man can defend himself against an unknown threat.

¶40In the case of Harikisan v. The State Of Maharashtra & Ors.7, this Court held that in cases of preventive detention, as pe r the principles enshrined under Article 22(5) of the Constitution Of India, the detaining authority must explain the grounds of detention to the detenue, and must provide the material in support of the same and in the language understood by the detenue. The relevant Paragraph of the said judgment is being reproduced herein: “…The grounds in support of the order served on the appellant ran into fourteen typed pages and referre d to his activities over a period of thirteen years, beside ref erring to a large number of Court proceedings concerning him and other persons who were alleged to be his associates . Mere oral explanation of a complicated order of the nature made against the appellant without supplying him the tra nslation in script and language which he understood would, i n our judgment, amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making a representation against the order…”

¶41It has been brought to our notice that a co-detenue, one Mr. Neeraj Varshney has already been granted relief, and his detention order has been quashed by the High Court on grounds of illegible Chinese documents supplied to him as his grounds for detention. It is important to note that the circumstances of the appellant herein, as far as the present detention is concerned, is identical to the case of the co-detenue who’s detention order was quashed. 7 (1962) Supp. 2 SCR 918

¶42At the sake of repetition, we find it important to state that in cases of preventive detention, every procedural irregularity, keeping in mind the principles of Article 21 and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, must be accrued in favour of the detenue. In the present case at hand, the appellant detenue herein has been supplied with illegible documents in a foreign language. It is also important to note that these are the very same documents that the authorities have reli ed upon to detain the appellant herein.

¶43Further, the principle of parity is squarely applica ble in this case, since another co-detenue with identical circumstances, has already been granted the relief of quashing the detention order against him. I n the case of Gian Chand v. Union Of India & Anr. 8, this Court while deciding on a quashing of a detention order, categorically held t hat in cases where a similarly placed co-detenue has already been granted the relief of a quashing of the detention order, the principle of parity must apply, and the same relief should be extended to other similarly placed detenues. In light of the abovementioned discussion, we hold Issue III in favour of the appellant. CONCLUSION

¶44As has been mentioned above, preventive detention law s in India are a colonial legacy, and as such, are extremely pow erful laws that have the ability to confer arbitrary power to the state. In such a circumstance, where there is a possibility of an unfettered discretion of power by the Government, this Court must analyze case s arising from such laws with extreme caution and excruciating detail, to ensure that there are checks and balances on the power of th e Government. Every procedural rigidity, must be followed in enti rety by the Government in cases of preventive detention, and ev ery lapse in procedure must give rise to a benefit to the case of th e detenue. The Courts, in circumstances of preventive detention, are conferred with the duty that has been given the utmost importance by the Constitution, which is the protection of individual and civil liberti es. This act of protecting civil liberties, is not just the saving of rights of individuals in person and the society at large, but is also an act o f preserving our Constitutional ethos, which is a product of a series of struggles against the arbitrary power of the British state. 8 (Crl.) 39 of 2011

¶45In light of the abovementioned discussion, while the appellant has already been released on grounds of expiry of the detention period, for the sake of clarity on the point of law, we hold that t he impugned detention order is liable to be set aside, and the p resent appeal is accordingly allowed. Divya Pandey Appeal allowed. (Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)