The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Rachna Hills

969[2023] 4 S.C.R. 969 THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. RACHNA HILLS & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 1882 of 2023) APRIL 27, 2023 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI AND PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.] Service Law: Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education A ct, 1921: ss. 16-E, 16-FF – Appointment of teachers in minority institutions – Procedure for selection and appointment – Initiation of the process of selection of teachers – Proposals forw arded to the District Inspector of Schools-DIOS for approval – However, before the grant of the requisite approval, Regn 17 was amended, prescribing a new selection procedure – Thereafter, DIOS returned the p roposal for compliance with the new procedure – Writ petitions c hallenging the decision of DIOS – High Court held that once the names are forwarded for approval of the DIOS, the selection process concludes and the proposed candidates acquire a vested right to be appoin ted; and that the vacancies that arise prior to the amendment of Rules have to be governed by the Rules that existed at th e time such vacancies arose – On appeal, held: Approval of DIOS is mandatory for appointment and that the Act injuncts the appointment of a teacher without such approval – Legal regime does not conte mplate any concept of deemed appointment if the DIOS does not d ecide upon the proposal within 15 days – Reliance on the principle th at Rules that existed at the time when vacancies arose will govern the appointments is misplaced – Candidate has a right to be con sidered in the light of existing Rules, which implies Rules in force as on the date of consideration – On facts, the process of appointme nt cannot be said to have been concluded without obtaining th e mandatory approval of the DIOS, and as such, there is no vested right of the candidate to be appointed before the amendment of Regu lation – Unless the approval contemplated u/s. 16-FF(3) is a ccorded, no appointment could take place – Thus, the appointmen t would be governed by the amended Regulations which is in force at th e time of consideration – High Court erred in holding that th e shortlisted candidates acquired a vested right to be appointed – Order pa ssed by the High Court is set aside – Regn 17, 18. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Sub-section (3) of section 16-FF of the U .P. Intermediate Education Act 1921 provides that no pe rson selected and proposed to be appointed as a teacher by the Management shall be appointed till the proposal is approved by the DIOS. If the expressions ‘no person’, ‘shall be appointed’, and ‘unless’ employed in sub-section (3) are given their ordinary meaning, which is the foremost of the linguistic ca nons of construction of legislation, there is no hesitation in holding that appointment is subject to the mandatory approval of DIOS. The process of appointment cannot be said to have been co ncluded without obtaining the mandatory approval of the DIOS, and as such, there is no right, much less a vested right, of t he candidate to be appointed. Thus, in view of the clear statutory mandate under Section 16-FF(3) of the Act, the High Court has co mmitted an error in coming to the conclusion that the Responden t nos. 1 to 3 have acquired a vested right to be appointed. [Paras 19, 21][979-D-E; 980-E]

1.2 The appointments are to be made under Section 16-E of the Act. Section 16-F of the Act provides for the cons titution and recommendation of Selection Committees and Sectio n 16-FF therein specifically relates to minority institutions. Re gulation 18(1) provides for the time within which an order of app ointment is to be issued by a Manager to the selected candidate. A ccording to which, where the recommendation is made by a Sel ection Committee constituted under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 16-F of the Act, an order of appointment is to be issued within 15 days of the receipt of the recommendation of the Se lection Committee. Whereas, in the case of an institution referr ed to in Section 16-FF of the Act, i.e., a minority institutio n, as in the instant case, it is to be issued within 15 days of the receipt of the approval of the authority specified therein. Neither Section 16-FF of the Act nor Regulation 18 provides the period withi n which approval is to be accorded. Further, neither of the two provi sions provide for deemed appointment in the event of delay in gr anting approval. Therefore, unless the approval contemplat ed under Section 16-FF(3) is accorded, no appointment could take p lace. [Para 23][981-E-G]

1.3 In any case, when the relevant statutory provision, i.e. Section 16-FF(3) itself makes approval by DIOS mandatory for appointment to the post of teacher, a Regulation made under the Act could not have provided for a ‘deemed appointment’ . Subordinate legislation cannot transcend the prescri ption of a statutory provision. Additionally, sub-section (4) of Section 16-FF of the Act has to be read in conjunction with Secti on 16-FF(2) therein, which provides that “[t]he procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee referred to in sub-section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed”. It is only in the cases where the selection procedure, as prescribed in the Regulations, is fol lowed, that there cannot be a disapproval unless there is a lack of r equisite eligibility and qualifications. Thus, the question of deemed appointment does not arise under section 16-FF(4) of the Act. [Paras 24, 25][981-H; 982-A-C]

1.4 If the statutory provisions read with relevant Regulations were to provide for ‘deemed appointment’, there would not have been a further remedy against an order of disapproval by the DIOS. Sub-section (5) of section 16-FF provides the remedy to the College Management in the event the DIOS does not grant an approval. As per this, the Management can within three weeks from the date of receipt of di sapproval, make a representation to the Regional Deputy Direct or of Education. In view of the legal provision as obtained under Section 16-FF of the Act, read with Regulation 18, the submiss ions of the respondents’ that there is a ‘deemed appointment’ of selection under Regulation 18 is rejected. [Paras 26, 27][982-C-E]

1.5 Approval of DIOS is mandatory and that the Act injuncts the appointment of a Teacher without such approval. The legal regime concerning the appointment of Teachers does not contemplate any concept of deemed appointment if the DIOS does not decide upon the proposal within 15 days. Under these circumstances, the reference to and reliance on the p rinciple that Rules that existed at the time when vacancies arose will gove rn the appointments is misplaced. [Para 29][982-G-H; 983-A] & ORS.

1.6 In any event, it is now a settled principle of law th at a candidate has a right to be considered in the light of existing Rules, which implies Rules in force as on the date of consideration. Thus, the submission by Respondents, that the vacan cies that existed prior to the amendment of Regulation 17 of Chapter II , must be governed by unamended rules is rejected. [Paras 30 and 33][983-B; 985-C] Smt. Rachna Hills case Special Appeal Defective No. 42 of 2019; Raj Kumari Cecil (Smt.) v. Managing Committee of Laxmi Narain Bhagwati Devi Vidya Mandir Girls’ High School (1998) 2 SCC 461 : [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 542; Deepak Agarwal and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2011) 6 SCC 725 : [2011] 4 SCR 149; Rajasthan State Sports Council and Anr. v. Uma Dadhich and Anr. (2019) 4 SCC 316 : [2019] 1 SCR 585; State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Raj Kumar and Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 680 – referred to. Case Law Reference [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 542 referred to Para 20 [2011] 4 SCR 149 referred to Para 30 [2019] 1 SCR 585 referred to Para 31 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1882 of 2023. From the Judgment and Order dated 16.01.2019 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in SAD No. 42 of 2019. With Civil Appeal Nos. 1883 and 1884 of 2023. Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, V. K. Shukla, Sr. Adv., Harish Pandey, Adv. for the Appellants. Shankey Agrawal, Vikash Singh, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Shreyans Raniwala, Gaurav Agarwal, Mrs. Shristi Gupta, Abhishek Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.

¶1Schools and intermediate educational institutions in the State of Uttar Pradesh are governed by the Uttar Pradesh I ntermediate Education Act, 1921 1, Rules and Regulations made thereunder. The procedure for the selection and appointment of Heads of Institu tions and Teachers in minority institutions is provided in Section 16-FF of the Act and Regulation 17 of the Regulations2. While the detailed procedure for selection is laid down in Regulation 17, sub-section (3) of Section 16-FF of the Act mandates that no person selected as a Teache r shall be appointed unless the proposal for appointment is approved by the District Inspector of Schools3.

¶2In the present case, two minority institutions initiated the process of selection of Teachers and forwarded their proposals to the DIOS for approval. Before the requisite approval was granted, the Governme nt amended Regulation 17, prescribing a new procedure for select ion. Consequently, the DIOS returned the proposal for compliance with the new procedure. The institutions challenged the DIOS’ decision requiring the Management to follow the new Rules by filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution.

¶3By the orders impugned before us, the High Court held that, once the Management forwards the names for approval of the DI OS, the selection process concludes and the proposed candidates acquire a vested right to be appointed. The High Court also referred to and relied on a principle that vacancies that arise prior to the amendment of Rules have to be governed by the Rules that existed at the time such vacancies arose. The State of U.P. is in appeal before us. Supporting the decisions of the High Court, the Respondents also argued before us that the Regulations contemplate a ‘deemed appointment’ if the DIOS does not confirm the appointment within 15 days of receiving the proposal. We have answered all the three questions.

¶4Allowing State’s appeals, we have held that the selection process concludes only after the mandatory approval of the DIOS is granted. 1 hereinafter ‘the Act’. 2 Regulations under the Intermediate Education Act 1 921, Chapter II, Regulation 17; hereinafter ‘Regulation 17’. 3 U.P. Intermediate Education Act 1921, section 16-F F(3) read with section 2(bb); hereinafter ‘DIOS’. & ORS. Having examined the statutory regime along with the s ubordinate legislation, we found that there is no place for a deemed appointment. We have also clarified that the principle relied on by the High Court for applying old rules for past vacancies is neither applicable to the facts of the present cases nor good law in view of recent decisions of this Court.

¶5We will now refer to the necessary facts before rec ording submissions of the parties, followed by reasons and our decision.

¶6Facts in Civil Appeal Nos. 1882 and 1883 of 2023 : Rakha Balika Inter College, Fatehgarh, Farrukabad, U.P., hereinafter referred to as the Respondent College, is a recognized aided minority institution, imparting education up to the level of intermediate. On 04.10.2017, the College issued an advertisement inviting applications for the selection and appointment to three posts of Assistant Teachers. The Sel ection Committee constituted by the College processed the applic ations and, by its proceedings dated 17.01.2018, shortlisted and recommended the names of Respondents nos. 1 to 3 to the College Management.

¶7The Management accepted the recommendation and by its letter dated 10.02.2018 sought the approval of the DIOS, Farrukabad, for the appointment of Respondent nos. 1 to 3 as Assistant Teachers. The DIOS, by his letter dated 08.03.2018, informed the Management that the proposal for approval is incomplete and therefore suggested tha t necessary information with supporting documents may be furnished for the grant of approval.

¶8Before the Respondent College could send the neces sary information, the Regulations prescribing the process of appointment were amended. The amended provisions came into force w.e.f. 12.03.2018. Consequently, the DIOS, by its letter dated 14.03.2018, returned the applications to the Respondent College with a request to proc ess the proposal as per the amended Regulations.

¶9The Respondent-candidates challenged the above-refer red decision of the DIOS by filing writ petition before the Hi gh Court of Judicature at Allahabad4. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated

07.05.2018, set aside the decision and directed the DIOS to reconsider the decision, on the ground that the amended Regulations would not apply as the selection process had attained finality. 4 Writ Appeal No. 11283 of 2018.

¶10Following the directions of the Single Judge, the DIOS reconsidered the matter and passed an order on 11.10.2018, stating that the selection process did not culminate in the grant of approval under Section 16-FF of the Act and as such the selection is not fi nal. The DIOS observed that before the appointment of Respondents coul d be approved, the Regulations stood amended, necessitating compliance with the new procedure for selection. This decision of the DIOS wa s again challenged by the Respondent-candidates in a writ petition5. The learned Single Judge held that the order of the DIOS dated 11.10.2018 was i n contravention of the earlier direction of the Court dated 07.05.2018 and therefore directed the personal presence of the DIOS, Farr ukabad. On a subsequent day, i.e., on 16.01.2019, the Single Judge directed the DIOS to comply with the original direction of the Court dated 07.05.2018.

¶11The State of Uttar Pradesh filed a writ appeal agains t the original order of the Single Judge dated 07.05.2018 6. By the order impugned herein, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeal on the ground of delay as well as on the merits of the dispute. On merits, the Division Bench held that the selection process with respect to vacancies which arose prior to the amendment of the Re gulations would be governed by the unamended Regulations. Accordingly, it noted that the amendment of Regulation 17 would have no bearing on the request for approval by the DIOS. It is against this order dated 16.01.2019 that the State of Uttar Pradesh filed the first Civil Appeal No. 1882 of 2023. The connected Civil Appeal No. 1883 of 2023 arises out of the subsequent order of the Single Judge dated 16.01.2019, directing the DIOS to comply with the original directions under o rder dated

07.05.20187.

¶12Facts in Civil Appeal No. 1884 of 2023 : M/s Farrukabad City Girls Inter College is a recognized aided minority institution. This College issued an advertisement on 04.12.2017 inviting applications for selection to the post of Assistant Teacher. In a similar tu rn of events, before the DIOS could consider granting approval, the amended Regulations came into force on 12.03.2018. Consequently, the DIOS, by an order dated 19.03.2018, directed the College to resend the proposal for approval after conducting the selection process in term s of the 5 Writ Appeal No. 27341 of 2018. 6 Special Appeal Defective No. 42 of 2019. 7 In Writ Appeal No. 27341 of 2018. amended Regulations. The recommended candidates filed a writ petition8, which was allowed by the Learned Single Judge of the High Court on

01.11.2018. State’s writ appeal9against the said order was dismissed by the Division Bench on 18.01.2019 by simply following the decision in the first case, Smt. Rachna Hills case10. The third Civil Appeal No. 1884 of 2023 is filed by the State against this decision of the Division Bench.

¶13Submissions by the Parties : Additional Solicitor General, Shri Vikramjit Banerjee and Shri VK Shukla, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Harish Pandey, AOR appeared for the State of U.P. They have submitted that the Single Judge, as well as the Div ision Bench, committed a serious error in assuming that the selection process was complete before the amendment dated 12.03.2018 had come into force. As the approval of DIOS was not granted, no vested right of appointment was created in favour of the Respondents. Consequently, they submitted that the selection process would have to be governed by the new amended Regulations. They have also contend ed that as the legality of amended Regulations dated 12.03.201 8 was not challenged by the Respondents, the orders of the DI OS dated

14.03.2018, 11.10.2018 and 19.03.2018 are in full compliance with the statute as well as the Regulations.

¶14On the other hand, Shri Shankey Agrawal, Shri Vikash Singh, Ms. Jaikriti S Jadeja, Shri Shreyans Raniwala, learne d Advocates, appearing on behalf of the Respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 1882 and 1883 of 2023 and Shri Gaurav Agarwal, Ms. Shristi Gupta, and Shri Abhishek Sharma, learned Advocates appearing on beh alf of the Respondents in Civil Appeal No. 1884 of 2023, supported the decisions of the High Court. They contended that the selection process should be deemed to have been completed the moment the Commit tee of Management proposed the names for approval to the DIOS. They further submitted that under sub-section (4) of Section 16-FF of the Act, the DIOS does not have the authority to withhold the approval except i n cases where the selected candidates do not possess minimum qualifications. They rely on Regulation 18 to contend that the authorities are duty bound to grant approval within 15 days of the receipt of the 8 Writ Appeal No. 19069 of 2018. 9 Special Appeal Defective No. 38 of 2019. 10 Special Appeal Defective No. 42 of 2019. recommendation of the Selection Committee, failing which there shall be a deemed appointment. They also relied on certain decisions of this Court to contend that Rules existing as on the date on which the vacancy arose will govern the selection process. They would, therefore, submit that amendment of the Regulations cannot adversely impact the appointment of the present Respondents.

¶15Issues: The following issues arise for consideration:

(i) Whether the selection process concluded, and the candidates acquired a vested right to be appointed before the amendment of the Regulations?

(ii) Whether the Act, read with the Rules and Regulations made thereunder, contemplates ‘deemed appointment’ if the approval of the DIOS is not given within a period of 15 days?

(iii) Whether the posts of teachers could be filled as per the Rules and Regulations that existed when the vacancies arose and not as per the amended Regulations?

¶16Educational institutions like the Respondent Coll eges are conducted through a Committee of Management, recognised under Section 16-A of the Act11. The Management is empowered to appoint Teachers as well as the Head of the Institution 12 as per the procedure prescribed in the Act, and the Regulations made ther eunder. In the case of institutions established and administered by m inorities, the Management constitutes a five-member Selection Com mittee to shortlist and recommend candidates for appointments to the Management13. After receiving the recommendations of the Selectio n Committee, the Management proposes the names to the DIOS for approval .

¶17On 12.03.2018, the Government of Uttar Pradesh notified amendments to Chapter II of the Regulations, including Regulation 17, which now prescribes a written examination for the selection of Teachers in minority institutions. 11 hereinafter ‘the Management’. 12 U.P. Intermediate Education Act 1921, section 16-E . 13 U.P. Intermediate Education Act 1921, section 16-E read with proviso to section 16-FF(1). Re issue no. 1 : Whether the selection process concluded, and the candidates acquired a vested right to be appointe d before the amendment of Regulations?

¶18To consider the submissions of the Respondents th at the candidates whose names are recommended by the Management for approval by the DIOS acquire a vested right to be appointed as Teachers, it is necessary to examine Section 16-FF: 16-FF. Savings as to minority institutions

(1) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section

(4) of section 16-E, and section 16-F, the Selection Committ ee for the appointment of a Head of Institution or a teache r of an institution established and administered by a mi nority referred to in clause (I) of Article 30 of the Constituti on shall consist of five members (including its Chairman), nominate d by the Committee of Management: Provided that one of the members of the Selection Committee shall —

(a) in the case of appointment of the Head of an Instituti on, be an expert selected by the Committee of Managemen t from a panel of experts prepared by the Director;

(b) in the case of appointment of a teacher be the Head of the Institution concerned.

(2) The procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee referred to in sub-section (1) shall be such as ma y be prescribed.

(3) No person selected under this section shall be appointed, unless —

(a) in the case of the Head of an Institution the propos al of appointment has been approved by the Regional Deputy Director of Education; and

(b) in the case of a teacher such proposal has been approved by the Inspector.

(4) The Regional Deputy Director of Education or th e Inspector, as the case may be, shall not withhold a pproval for the selection made under this section where the person selected possesses the minimum qualifications prescribe d and is otherwise eligible.

(5) Where the Regional Deputy Director of Education or t he Inspector, as the case may be, does not approve of a candida te selected under this section, the Committee of Manag ement may, within three weeks from the date of receipt of such disapproval, make a representation to the Director in the ca se of the Head of Institution, and to the Regional Deputy Director of Education in the case of a teacher.

(6) Every order passed by the Director or the Regional Deput y Director of Education on a representation under sub-sectio n

(5) shall be final. ” (emphasis supplied)

¶19Sub-section (3) of section 16-FF of the Act provides that no person selected and proposed to be appointed as a te acher by the Management shall be appointed till the proposal is approved by the DIOS. If the expressions ‘ no person’ , ‘shall be appointed’ , and ‘ unless’ employed in sub-section (3) are given their ordinary meaning, which is the foremost of the linguistic canons of construction of legislation, we have no hesitation in holding that appointment is subject to the mandatory approval of DIOS. The process of appointment cannot be said to have been concluded without obtaining the mandatory approval of the DIOS, and as such, there is no right, much less a vested right, of the candidate to be appointed.

¶20This Court had the occasion to examine the effect of approval by the DIOS in Raj Kumari Cecil (Smt.) v. Managing Committee of Laxmi Narain Bhagwati Devi Vidya Mandir Girls’ High School14, while holding that the appointment of the petitione r therein was unsustainable and incomplete, as the statutory pre-condition f or the appointment, i.e., approval from the DIOS, was not obtained, i t was observed: “4. There is no dispute that the appellant did not possess the qualifications for being appointed as a Principal of the Highe r Secondary School. It is also not disputed that the appointment 14 (1998) 2 SCC 461. is subject to approval of the competent authority under the Intermediate Education Act. It is correct that the competent authority has power to relax the qualification but then again it is not disputed that the competent authority did not relax the qualification for the appointment of the appellant as Principal of the Higher Secondary School of the respondent …. ....

¶13… The appellant ceased to be Headmistress on upgradation of school of the respondent to the Higher Secondary S chool as the post was upgraded. She did not possess qualifications to be appointed as Principal of the Higher Secondary School . Her qualifications were not relaxed . The competent authority under the Intermediate Education Act did not grant approval for her appointment as a Principal which is a precondition under the law. Since the appointment itself was not approved it was not necessary for the Managing Committee of the sc hool to get consent of the authority concerned for the terminati on of her services as a Principal.” (emphasis supplied)

¶21In view of the clear statutory mandate under Section 16-FF(3) of the Act, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the Respondent nos. 1 to 3 have acquired a vested right to be appointed. Re issue no. 2: Whether the Act, read with the Rules an d Regulations made thereunder, contemplates ‘deemed appointment’ if the approval of the DIOS is not given within a period of 15 days?

¶22Respondents have relied on Regulation 18 15 to argue that if the DIOS fails to grant his approval within 15 days of the proposal made by the Management, the proposed candidates shall be deemed to have been appointed. Regulation 18, is as under: “(1) Within fifteen days of the receipt of the recommendati on of the Selection Committee constituted under sub-sectio n (1) 15 Regulations under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, Chapter II, Regulation 18; hereinafter ‘Regulation 18’. or (2) of Section 16-F, and in case of an institution r eferred to in Section 16-FF, the approval of the authority s pecified therein, the Manager shall, on authorisation under resolution of the Committee of Management, issue an order of appointment by Registered Post to the candidate in the f orm given in Appendix ‘B’ requiring the candidate to jo in duty within ten days of the receipt of such order, failing w hich the appointment of the candidate will be liable to cancellation.

(2) In case of promotions and ad hoc appointments a lso a formal order of promotion or appointment in the form as n ear as possible to the form referred to in Clause

(1) shall be issued to the person concerned under the signature of the Manager.

(3) A copy of every order referred to in Clauses

(1) and (2) shall be sent to the Inspector and in c ase of appointment of the head of institution, a copy there of shall also be sent to the Regional Deputy Director of Educati on.”

¶23We have noticed that appointments are to be made und er Section 16-E of the Act. Section 16-F of the Act pro vides for the constitution and recommendation of Selection Committees and Section 16-FF therein specifically relates to minority institutions. Regulation 18(1) provides for the time within which an order of appointment is to be issued by a Manager to the selected candidate. According to whi ch, where the recommendation is made by a Selection Committee constituted under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 16-F of the Act, an order of appointment is to be issued within 15 days of the r eceipt of the recommendation of the Selection Committee. Whereas, in the ca se of an institution referred to in Section 16-FF of the Act, i.e., a minority institution, as in the instant case, it is to be issued within 15 days of the receipt of the approval of the authority specified therein. Neither Section 16-FF of the Act nor Regulation 18 provides the period within which approval is to be accorded. Further, neither of the two provisions provide for deemed appointment in the event of delay in granting approval. Therefore, unless the approval contemplated under Section 16-FF(3) is accorded, no appointment could take place.

¶24In any case, when the relevant statutory provision, i.e. Section 16-FF(3) itself makes approval by DIOS mandatory for appointment to the post of teacher, a Regulation made under the Act could not have provided for a ‘deemed appointment’. Subordinate legislation cannot transcend the prescription of a statutory provision.

¶25Additionally, sub-section (4) of Section 16-FF of the Act has to be read in conjunction with Section 16-FF(2) therein, which provides that “ [t]he procedure to be followed by the Selection Com mittee referred to in sub-section (1) shall be such as may be pr escribed”. It is only in the cases where the selection procedure, as prescribed in the Regulations, is followed, that there cannot be a disapproval unless there is a lack of requisite eligibility and qualifications. Thus, the question of deemed appointment does not arise under section 16-FF(4) of the Act.

¶26If the statutory provisions read with relevant Regulations were to provide for ‘ deemed appointment’ , there would not have been a further remedy against an order of disapproval by the DIOS. Sub-section

(5) of section 16-FF provides the remedy to the College Management in the event the DIOS does not grant an approval. As pe r this, the Management can within three weeks from the date of receipt of disapproval, make a representation to the Regional Deputy Director of Education.

¶27In view of the legal provision as obtained under Section 16-FF of the Act, read with Regulation 18, we reject the submissions of the Respondents’ that there is a ‘deemed appointment’ of selection under Regulation 18. Re issue no. 3 : Whether the posts of teachers could be filled as per the Rules and Regulations that existed when the vacancies arose and not as per the amended Regulations?

¶28The Division Bench, as well as the Single Judge of the High Court, accepted the submission of the selected candid ates that the vacancies to the post of teachers could be filled only as per the Rules and Regulations that operated when the vacancies arose and not as per the Regulations that came to be amended thereafter.

¶29We have already held that approval of DIOS is mandatory and that the Act injuncts the appointment of a Teacher wit hout such approval. We have also held that the legal regime concerning the appointment of Teachers does not contemplate any concept of deemed appointment if the DIOS does not decide upon the proposal w ithin 15 days. Under these circumstances, the reference to and relia nce on the principle that Rules that existed at the time when vacancies arose will govern the appointments is misplaced.

¶30In any event, it is now a settled principle of law that a candidate has a right to be considered in the light of existing Rules, which implies Rules in force as on the date of consideration. This principle is affirmed by this Court in Deepak Agarwal and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors.16, as below: “26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the exist ing rules, which implies the “rule in force” on the date the considerat ion took place. There is no rule of universal or absolu te application that vacancies are to be filled invariabl y by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. T he requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rule s is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considere d for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V.Rangaiah case lays down any particular time-fra me, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took plac e after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appe llants has been taken away by the amendment.”

¶31While reaffirming the above referred principle, in a subsequent case of Rajasthan State Sports Council and Anr. v. Uma Dadhich and Anr.17, (in which one of us was a member Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., as he then was). This Court noted: “5. There is merit in the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the respondent had no vested right to promotion but only a right to be considered in accordance with the rules as they existed on the date when the case for promotion was taken up . This principle has been reiterated in several decisions of this Court. (See H.S. Gre wal v. Union of India, Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., State of 16 (2011) 6 SCC 725. 17 (2019) 4 SCC 316. Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty and Union of India v. Krishna Kumar.” (emphasis supplied)

¶32In a recent decision, in State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Raj Kumar and Ors.18, after reviewing a number of decisions on the same subject, this Court formulated the following principles: “70. A review of the fifteen cases that have distinguish ed Rangaiah would demonstrate that this Court has been consistently carving out exceptions to the broad pro position formulated in Rangaiah. The findings in these judgments, that have a direct bearing on the proposition formulated by Rangaiah are as under:

¶1There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must be necessarily filled on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose, Rangaiah’s case must be understood in the context of the rules involved therein.

¶2It is now a settled proposition of law that a candid ate has a right to be considered in the light of the existed rules, which implies the “rule in force” as on the date consideration takes place . The right to be considered for promotion occurs on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates.

¶3The Government is entitled to take a conscious pol icy decision not to fill up the vacancies arising prior to the amendment of the rules. The employee does not acquire any vested right to being considered for promotion in accordance with the repealed rules in view of the polic y decision taken by the Government. There is no obligation for the Government to make appointments as per the ol d rules in the event of restructuring of the cadre is inte nded for efficient working of the unit. The only require ment is that the policy decisions of the Government must be fair and reasonable and must be justified on the touchstone of Article 14. 18 2022 SCC OnLine SC 680.

¶4The principle in Rangaiah need not be applied merel y because posts were created, as it is not obligatory for the appointing authority to fill up the posts immediately.

¶5When there is no statutory duty cast upon the State to consider appointments to vacancies that existed prior to the amendment, the State cannot be directed to consider the cases.” (emphasis supplied)

¶33In view of the clear enunciation of the law, we have no hesitation in rejecting the submission made by the learned coun sels for the Respondents, that the vacancies that existed prior to the amendment of Regulation 17 of Chapter II, must be governed by unamended rules.

¶34For the reasons stated above, Civil Appeal No. 1882 of 2023, Civil Appeal No. 1883 of 2023, and Civil Appeal No. 1884 of 2023 are allowed. Accordingly, the following judgments of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad are set aside: judgment dated 16.01.2019 in Special Appeal Defective No. 42 of 2019; judgment dated 16.01.2019 in Writ Appeal No. 27341 of 2018; judgment dated 18.01.2019 in Special Appeal Defective No. 38 of 2019.

¶35No order as to costs. Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed. (Assisted by : Surbhi Soni and Rakhi, LCRAs)