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Gurnam Singh v. Presiding Officer Industt. Tribunal Panipat

DISMISSED
Court
High Court of Punjab and Haryana
Decided
4 December 2023
Bench
Harsh Bungerauthor
Case no.
CWP 21928/2010

Judgment

INoTHEoHIGHoCOURToOFoPUNJABo&oHARYANAo AToCHANDIGARH **** CWP-21928-2010o(O&M) thDateoofoDecision:o4 oDecember,o2023 GurnamoSingh o.....oPetitioner Versus TheoPresidingoOfficer,oIndustrialoTribunal-cum-LabouroCourt,oPanipatoand another ooooo.....oRespondents CORAM:oHON'BLEoMR.oJUSTICEoHARSHoBUNGER Present: Ms.oAbhaoRathore,oAdvocate forotheopetitioner. Mr.oPraveenoChanderoGoyal,oAddl.oA.G.,oHaryana. ***** HARSHoBUNGERoJ.o(ORAL)

¶1Petitionero(GurnamoSingh)o hasofiledotheoinstantowritopetition underoArticleso226/227oofotheoConstitutionoofoIndiaoseekingoaowritoof certiorario forosettingoasideo ofoawardodatedo27.07.2009o(AnnexureoP-5) passedobyorespondentoNo.1o–otheoPresidingoOfficer,oIndustrialoTribunal-cum-LabouroCourt,oPanipato(hereinafteroreferredotooaso'theoTribunal'),owherebyothe referenceoregardingoterminationoofoservicesoofotheopetitioner-workmanohas beenodecidedoagainstohim.oAofurtheroprayerohasobeenomadeoforodirecting respondentoNo.2otooreinstateotheopetitionerowithocontinuityoinoserviceoandofull backowages.

¶2Briefly,otheopetitioner-workmanoraisedoanoindustrialodisputeowith regardotooterminationoofohisoservicesobyoservingodemandonoticeodated

03.06.1993.o Subsequently, otheo mattero was o referred o byotheo appropriate GovernmentounderoSectiono10(1)(c)oofotheoIndustrialoDisputesoAct,o1947 (hereinafteroreferredotooaso'theo1947oAct')otootheoTribunalobelow,ofor adjudication.

¶3Inotheoclaimostatement,otheopetitioner-workmanostatedothatohe wasoappointedowithorespondentoNo.2o–oHaryanaoRoadwayso(hereinafter referredotooaso'theoManagement')oasoLaboureroonodailyowageobasisoon

01.01.1986,oforoconstructionoofoBusoQueueoShelteroandoheocontinuously workedoupotoo20.11.1988.oHeoclaimedothatohisoservicesowereoterminatedoon account o of o his o involvement o in o a o criminal o case o (FIR o No.946 o dated

24.11.1988);oandothereafteroheofiledoaowritopetition,obeingoCWPoNo.10262oof 1988,obeforeothisoCourt,owhereinoheowasograntedotheoreliefoofointerim injunctionoandoheowasotakenobackoinoserviceow.e.f.o01.12.1988;oandohe worked o up o to o 26.12.1988. o Petitioner-workman o pleaded o that o he o had completedocontinuousoserviceoofomoreothano240odays,ohowever,onoonotice, payoinolieuoofonoticeoororetrenchmentocompensationowasograntedotoohim beforeoterminationoofohisoservices.oItowasofurtheroclaimedobyotheopetitioner-workmanothatojuniorsotoohim,onamelyoSultanoandoMahabir,ohadobeenoretained inoserviceoandotheoManagementohadoalsooappointedonewoworkersoinoplaceoof theopetitioner-workman,otherefore,oservicesoofotheopetitioner-workmanowere terminatedoinoviolationoofotheoprovisionsoofoSectionso25-F,o25-Goando25-Hoof theo1947oAct.oAccordingly,otheopetitioner-workmanoprayedofororeinstatement inoserviceoalongowithoallotheoconsequentialobenefits.

¶4Onotheootherohand,otheoaforesaidoclaimoofopetitioner-workman was o opposed o by o theo respondent-Management o on o the o groundo that o the petitioner-workmanohadonotocompletedocontinuousoserviceoofo240odaysoinoa calenderoyearoprecedingotheodateoofohisoallegedotermination,oi.e.o15.11.1988. Aocategoricostandowasotakenobyotheorespondent-Managementothatoservicesoof theopetitioner-workmanowereonototerminatedoonoaccountoofohisoinvolvement inotheocriminalocaseoratherohisotermowasonotorenewedoaftero15.11.1988odueoto lackoofoconstructionoactivities.oItowasoclarifiedothatothoughointerimoinjunction wasograntedoono28.11.1988obyothisoCourtoinotheowritopetitiono(CWP-10262-1988),ofiledobyotheopetitioner-workman,owhereinoaodirectionowasoissuedothat servicesoofotheopetitioner-workmanobeonototerminatedotillofurtheroorders, however,otheopetitioner-workmanowasonotoinoserviceoonotheosaidodate, accordingly,oheowasoneverotakenobackoinoserviceoandofinallyotheoaforesaid writopetitionowasodismissedoasowithdrawnoono30.10.1992.oItowasoalsoodenied byotheorespondent-Managementothatonoonewoworkerohadobeenorecruitedoin placeoofotheopetitioner-workman,oandotherefore,otheopetitionerowasonot entitledoforotheoprotectionounderotheo1947oAct.oAccordingly,oprayerowas madeobyotheorespondent-Managementoforodismissaloofoclaimostatementoofothe petitioner-workman.

¶5Fromotheopleadingsoofotheoparties,ofollowingoissuesowereoframed byotheoTribunal:- "1.oPerotermsooforeference?OPParties

2.oRelief"

¶6Thereafter,obothotheopartiesoledotheirorespectiveoevidenceobefore theoTribunalobelow.

¶7Itowouldobeoappositeotoostateohereothatoinitiallyotheoreferenceowas answeredoagainstotheopetitioner-workmanovideoawardodatedo14.11.2003, whichowasochallengedobyohimobyowayoofofilingoaowritopetitiono(CWP-5318-2004),ohowever,otheosameowasoalsoodismissedobyothisoCourtoono18.01.2008, whereuponotheopetitioneropreferredoanoIntraoCourtoAppealo(LPA)oNo.218oof 2008.oItoappearsothatotheosaidoLPAowasodisposedoofoono14.01.2009,owhereby orderodatedo18.01.2008opassedoinoCWP-5318-2004oasowelloasotheoinitial awardodatedo14.11.2003opassedobyotheoTribunalowasosetoasideoandotheomatter wasoremandedobackotootheoTribunalobelowoforofreshoadjudication. Onoremand,otheoTribunalobelowoconsideredotheomatteroafresh andoagainoansweredotheoreferenceoagainstotheopetitioner-workmanovide impugnedoawardodatedo27.07.2009o(AnnexureoP-5).oAccordingly,opetitioner filedotheoinstantowritopetitionobeforeothisoCourt.

¶8LearnedocounseloforotheopetitionerosubmitsothatotheoTribunal belowohasoerredoinolawoandofactoinorejectingotheoclaimoofopetitioner-workman andoansweringotheoreferenceoagainstohim.oItoisosubmittedothatotheopetitioner hadoworkedocontinuouslyofromo01.01.1986oupotoo20.11.1988oandoheoproved hisoclaim oquao violationoofoSectionso25-Foando25-Goofotheo1947oActoby makingohisoownostatementothatohisojuniors,onamelyoMahabiroandoSultan,owere stilloworkingoinotheoManagement.oItoisofurtherosubmittedothatotheoTribunal belowohasowronglyoheldothatotheopetitionerohadonotocompletedocontinuous serviceoofo240odays.oLearnedocounselostatesothatoforotheopurposesoofoSection 25-Goofotheo1947oAct,otheocomplianceoofoSectiono25-Foisonotorequired. Learnedocounseloforotheopetitionerocontendsothatotheorespondent-Management hadonotoproducedotheoseniorityolistoorotheoappointmentolettersoofothe petitioner'sojuniorsotoodisproveotheoallegationsolevelledobyotheopetitioneroand hisoclaimowasowronglyorejectedobyoholdingothatotheosameowasocoveredounder Sectiono2(oo)(bb)oofotheo1947oAct. With o the o aforesaid o submissions, o learned o counsel o for o the petitionerohasoprayedoforoallowingotheoinstantowritopetitionobyosettingoaside orderodatedo27.07.2009o(AnnexureoP-5)opassedobyotheoTribunaloandofurther directingorespondentoNo.2-Managementotooreinstateotheopetitioneroinoservice alongowithoallotheoconsequentialobenefits.

¶9Perocontra,olearnedoStateocounselohasoopposedotheoprayeromade byolearnedocounseloforotheopetitionerobyosubmittingothatotheoTribunalobelow hasopassedoaowelloreasonedoandojustifiedoorder,owhichodoesonotocalloforoany interferenceobyothisoCourtowhileoexercisingoitsowritojurisdiction.oLearned Stateocounselosubmitsothatotheopetitioner-workmanohadonotoledoanyoevidence inosupportoofohisoclaimoapartofromohisoselfoservingostatement.oItoisosubmitted thatotheopetitionerohadofailedotoodischargeotheoonusoofoprovingothatoheohad renderedocontinuousoserviceoofo240odaysoasoenvisagedounderoSectiono25-Boof theo1947oActoandohadofurtheroledonooevidenceotooproveothatotheoworkers, namelyoSultanoandoMahabir,owhoowereoallegedotoobeotheojuniorsoofopetitioner, hadobeenoretainedoinoservice.oItoisonextosubmittedothatoevenoanoapplication filedoonobehalfoofotheopetitioneroforoproductionoofocopiesoofoordersoorodatesoof appointmentoofosomeoemployeesowasorejectedobyotheoTribunal,oandono challengeowasoalsoomadeotootheosaidoorder.oAccordingly,oprayeroforodismissal ofotheoinstantowritopetitionohasobeenomade.

¶10Iohaveoheardolearnedocounseloforotheopartiesoandoperusedothe paperobookowithotheiroableoassistance.

¶11Itoisowellosettledothatotheoburdenoofoproofotooproveothatoa workmanohadoworkedoforo240odaysoinoaogivenoyearoisoonotheoworkman.oItois alsoowellosettledothatomereoaffidavitsooroself-servingostatementsomadeobyothe claimant/workmanowillonotosufficeoinotheomatteroofodischargeoofotheoburden placedobyolawoonotheoworkmanotooproveothatoheohadoworkedoforo240odays duringotheorelevantoperiod.oFurther,omereonon-productionoofomusterorollsoper seowithoutoanyopleaoofosuppressionobyotheoworkmanoisonotoaogroundoforothe TribunalotoodrawoanoadverseoinferenceoagainstotheoManagement. 5(. In the case of "Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani", 2002(3) SCT 382 (SC), Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- C..... It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot. Filling be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in an year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside."

¶13In the case of "Municipal Corpn. v. Siri Niwas", 2004(4) SCT 211, Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- C..... oThe retrenchment of the respondent took place on

17.5.1995. For the purpose of calculating as to whether he had worked for a period of 240 days within one year or not, it was, therefore, necessary for the Tribunal to arrive at a finding of fact that during the period between 5.8.1994 to 16.5.1995 he had worked for a period of more than 240 days. As noticed hereinbefore, the burden of proof was on the workman. From the Award it does not appear that the workman adduced any evidence whatsoever in support of his contention that he complied with the requirements of Section 25Boof the Industrial Disputes Act. Apart from examining himself in support of his contention he did not produce or call for any document from the office of the Appellant herein including the muster rolls. It is improbable that a person working in a Local Authority would not be in possession of any documentary evidence to support his claim before the Tribunal. Apart from muster rolls he could have shown the terms and conditions of his offer of appointment and the remuneration received by him for working during the aforementioned period. He even did not examine any other witness in support of his case.

¶14A Court of Law even in a case where provisions of the Indian Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration in the background of facts involved in the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production, other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference against the Appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the evidence adduced by the Respondent.

¶15No reason has been assigned by the High Court as to why the exercise of discretional jurisdiction of the Tribunal was bad in law. In a case of this nature, it is trite, the High Court exercising the power of judicial review, would not interfere with the discretion of a Tribunal unless the same is found to be illegal or irrational…"

¶14In "R.M. Yellatti v. The Asstt. Executive Engineer", 2005(4) SCT 695, it was held as follows: ".... Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rollsoperoseowithoutoanyopleaoofosuppressionobyotheoclaimant workmanowillonotobeotheogroundoforotheotribunalotoodrawoan adverseoinferenceoagainstotheomanagement.oLastly,otheoabove judgmentsolayodownotheobasicoprinciple,onamely,othatotheoHigh CourtounderoArticleo226oofotheoConstitutionowillonotointerfere withotheoconcurrentofindingsoofofactorecordedobyotheolabour Courtounlessotheyoareoperverse.oThisoexerciseowillodependoupon factsoofoeachocase."

¶15Comingotootheocaseoinohand,oaoperusaloofoimpugnedoawardodated

27.07.2009o(AnnexureoP-5)owouldorevealothatotheoTribunalobelowonon-suited theopetitioneroonotheogroundothatoheohadofailedotooproveoonorecordothatohe completedocontinuousoserviceoofo240odaysoasoenvisagedounderoSectiono25-B ofotheo1947oAct.oTheopetitionerohadoonlyoexaminedohimselfoinosupportoofohis claimoandonoootherocogentoevidenceowasoplacedoonotheofile.oItohasobeen observedobyolearnedoTribunalobelowothatotheopetitionerohadofailedotoospecify theoexactodateoandomonthoofoterminationoofohisoservicesoandohadonowhere specificallyodeposedothatoheohadoworkedocontinuouslyoforotheorelevanto240 days;oandotheopetitionerohadofurtheroshownoignoranceoregardingohisoworkoin theoyearso1986,o1987oando1988.oTheoTribunalofurtheroheldothatotheopetitioner-workmanowasoengagedoasoaodailyowageroandobyoreferringotootheojudgments withoregardotoodailyowageropassedoin o"HimanshuoKumaroVidyarthioand othersoVs.oStateoofoBiharoandoothers"oAIRo1997o(SC)o3657,o"ReserveoBank ofoIndiaoVs.oGopinathoSharmaoandoanother",o2006o(6)oSCCo221,o"HUDA Vs.oJagmaloSingh",o2006(5)oSCCo764oando"Secretary,oStateoofoKarnataka andoothersoVs.oUmaoDevioandoothers",o2006(4)oSCCo1,oitowasoheldothatosuch workmanocannotoclaimohisorightotootheopost.

¶16Asoregardsotheopleaoraisedobyotheopetitioner-workmanothatohis juniorsohadobeenoretainedoinoservice,oandotherefore,othereowasoviolationoof provisionsoofoSectiono25-Goofotheo1947oAct,otheoTribunalobelowohasoreturnedAPURVA theofollowingofindings:-"16.oAsoregardsotheopleaoofotheoworkmanoregardingothe allegedoviolationoofotheoprovisionsoofoSectiono25-Gobyothe respondentowhileoterminatingohisoservices,otheoworkman,oas WW-1.ohasostatedothatotheoworkers,ojuniorotoohim,onamely Mahabir o and o Sultan o Singh, o are o still o working o with o the department. o MW-1 o Shri o Yograj o has o also o admitted o the employmentoofotheoabove-saidopersonsobutoheohasoshownohis ignoranceoregardingotheofactumoofotheirobeingoqunioroorosenior tootheoworkman.oHowever,otheofactoremainsothatoinotheopresent Reference,oitoisotheoworkmanowhoohasosoughtoreliefoonothe basisoofotheoaforesaidopleaoandotherefore,oitowasoentirelyofor himotooproduceosomeospecific,opositiveoandocogentoevidenceoon theofileotoosubstantiateothisopleaobutoexceptohisoownoafore-discussedooraloandoself-servingodepositionsoasoWW-o1.oheohas failedotooleadoanyootherocogentoevidenceoonotheofile.oatotheotime of o leading o his o evidence, o to o prove o the o above-said plea/allegations.oWhileoleadingohisoevidence,oheocouldohave summoned o the o seniority o list o or o the o office-record o of o the respondentoregardingotheodatesoofoappointmentoofobothothe above-osaidoemployeesowhichowouldohaveoseto theoactual controversyobetweenotheoparties,oonotheoaforesaidopoint,oatorest effectively o and o precisely o and o it o could o have o been o easily availableotoohimobutoheohasofailedotoodoosooandohasoalsoonot comeoforwardowithoanyofair,ocandidoandoplausibleoexplanation forotheosame.oAgain,oitoisoexplicitothatoheohasowith-heldotheobest possibleoevidenceofromobeingoproducedoonotheofileowhich unequivocallyowarrantsotoodrawoanoadverseoinferenceoagainst him.oInotheseocircumstances,ohisoownooralodepositions,oasoWW-

1.ocannotobeotakenotoobeosufficientoatoallotoosubstantiateohis afore-saidoplea/allegation.

17.oEvenoifoforotheosakeoofoarguments,oheoisopresumedotoobe seniorotootheoafore-namedoMahabiroandoSultan,oevenothenothe factoremainsothatoasodiscussedoearlier,otheoworkmanowas engagedoasodailyowageroonly.oHeohasoalsoonotoledoanyoevidence onotheofileotooshowothatoheohadobeenoappointed/engagedobyothe respondentoagainstoanyosanctionedoororegularopostoandothat too,oafterofollowingotheoprescribedorulesoandoprocedure,oas laidodownoforosucholikeoappointments.oInotheseocircumstances, itoisoexplicitothatohisoappointmentocanosafelyobeotermedotoobeoa "backodooroentryoinotheojob.oItohasobeenoheldobyotheoDivision BenchoofoouroownoHon'bleoHighoCourtoino1998o(2)oRSJo449 BrijoBhushanoVersusoIndustrialoTribunal-cum-LabouroCourt, Panipatoandoanotherothato"whereotheoCourtofindsothatothe workman o is o a o back o door o appointee, o the o prayer o for reinstatementomayobeorefusedoevenothoughotheoterminationoof theoserviceoofosuchoanoemployeeomayohaveobeenobroughtoabout withoutocomplianceoofotheomandatoryoprovisionsocontainedoin Sectionso25-Foando25-GoofotheoAct."oItohasoalsoobeenoheldoby theoDivisionoBenchoofoouroownoHon'bleoHighoCourtoino2009o(1) CLR o 217 o Superintending o Engineer, o PWD o B&R, o Bhiwani VersusoSurendero&oanotherothato"whereoinoaoReferenceoover dischargeooforespondentoNo.1,odailyowager,otheoTribunal passedoAwardofororeinstatementowitho50%obackowages,othe reasoning o given o byo theo Labouro Court o thato thereo was o a violationoofoSectiono25-GoofotheoAct,ocannotobeosustainedoin caseoofoaodailyowageroandoevenoifothereoisoaoviolationoofoSection 25-FoofotheoAct,othenoalso,otheoworkmanoisonotoentitledoto reinstatement."oTheoobservations,oasomadeobyotheiroLordships inobothotheoabove-mentionedocases,oareofullyoapplicableotoothe present o case o because o as o discussed o above, o the o workman. admittedly,owasoengagedoasoaodailyowageroandothatotoo, withoutofollowingotheoprescribedorulesoandoprocedure,oasolaid down o for o such o like o appointments o in o the o respondent-department. o In o view o of o theseo observations,o theo workman cannotobeoheldotoobeoentitledotooanyoreliefoevenoifoheois presumedotoobeoseniorotoobothotheoabove-namedopersons.

18.oInotheolightoofotheofore-goingodiscussion,oitoisoheldothatothe workmanohasonotobeenoableotooleadoanyocogentoandosufficient evidenceoonotheofileotooestablishothatoheohadocompletedothe continuousoserviceoofo240odaysowithotheorespondentoduringotheAPURVA precedingo 12o calendaro monthso fromo theo dateo ofo alleged terminationoofohisoser icesoandothatotheoallegedoterminationoof his o ser ices o %& o the o respondent o is o illegal o and o in alid. Resultantl&'othisoissueostandsoansweredoagainstotheoworkman.E 5+. Itois,otherefore,oe$identothatotheopetitionerohadofailedotoopro$eohis pleadedocase.oTheoTribunalobelo-ohasodealto-ithoallotheocontentionsoraisedoon behalf o of o the o petitioner--or,man o in o detail o and o in o reference o to o the material*e$idenceoa$ailableoonorecord.oLearnedocounseloforotheopetitionerohas failedotoodislodgeotheofindingsoreturnedob%otheoTribunalobelo-. 5>. The parameters for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226oof the Constitution of India, in cases involving challenge to the award passed by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal and orders passed by other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, are well defined. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals. A writ can also be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or the Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, i.e. it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted by it is opposed to the principles of natural justice. However, it must be remembered that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and not appellate one. This necessarily means that the finding of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, as a result of the appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings except when the judgment, order or award suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. This is the abstract statement of law, but the vexed question is as to what is an error of law apparent on the face of the record and in what circumstances a finding of fact recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal or a quasi-judicial authority can be corrected. Broadly speaking, an error of law is one which can be discovered on a bare reading of the judgment, order or award under challenge along with the documents which have been relied upon by the inferior Court, Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. An error, the discovery of which is possible only after a detailed scrutiny of the evidence produced by the parties and lengthy debate at the bar cannot be regarded as an error of law for the purpose of a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal can be corrected only if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Court or the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence and the same has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, a finding of fact based on no evidence would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. However, sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferior Court or Tribunal or the quasi-judicial authority cannot be gone into by the High Court while considering the prayer for issue of a writ of certiorari. Likewise, the mere, possibility of forming a different opinion on re-appreciation of evidence by the parties is not sufficient for issue of a writ of certiorario"Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 477"; "Shaikh Mahammad Umarsaheb v. Kadalaskar Hasham Karimsab and others, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 61"; "Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Sh. Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. and another, AIR 1984 Supreme Court 976"; "R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others, 1999(4) RCR (Civil) 253 (SC) : J.T. 1999(6) S.C. 507"o and "Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar and another v. Ist A.D.J. Varanasi and others, J.T. 2002(8)oS.C.o69".

¶19Consideringotheototalityoofocircumstancesoinotheolightoofolegal principlesoreferredoabove;othereoisonooscopeoforoanyointerferenceoinothe impugnedoAwardoasotheolearnedoTribunalohasoreturnedotheofindingsoby correctlyoappreciatingotheomaterial/evidenceoavailableoonorecordoandoinono way,otheoimpugnedoawardoinoquestionocanobeoheldoasoperverseooroagainstothe evidence.oAccordingly,oIodoonotofindoanyomeritoinotheoinstantowritopetition andotheosameoisodismissed.

¶20Allopendingoapplication(s),oifoany,oshalloalsoostandoclosed. th4 oDecember,o2023 o(HARSHoBUNGER) Apurva oooooooooooJUDGE

1.oWhetherospeaking/reasoned : Yes/No

2.oWhetheroreportable : Yes/No

Source: High Court of Punjab and Haryana, through the eCourts High Court services, via the Indian High Court Judgments open dataset by Dattam Labs (CC BY 4.0). Text was extracted from the official PDF and may contain conversion errors. Check the official PDF before relying on it.