VoxJuris
Home › High Courts › Madras High Court 2024 › High Court of Madras

M.Paulpandi v. State of Tamilnadu

DISPOSED OF
Court
High Court of Madras
Decided
3 June 2024
Bench
D.Bharatha Chakravarthyauthor
Case no.
WP 10380/2024

Judgment

O R D E R

This writ petition is filed challenging the notice dated 20.02.2024 issued by the respondent. By the said notice, the respondent being the Disciplinary Authority, had considered the findings of the Commissioner for Disciplinary Proceedings, Madurai(the Enquiry Authority), and disagreed with the findings and holds the charges as proved for the reasons stated in the annexure to the impugned notice. Therefore, the petitioner is called upon to submit further representation regarding the same within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice.

¶2The petitioner's case is that he is working as Assistant Inspector General of Registration (Zonal) Madurai. A surprise check was held on

12.01.2018 jointly by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption and the District Deputy Inspector Cell Officer when the petitioner was working as District Registrar, Madurai South. Thereafter, a charge memorandum dated 26.06.2019 containing two charges was issued against the petitioner. The said charges read as follows: " C h a rge-1 You T hiru. P. P aulpandi, A c c used O f ficer-1 w ere habitually c ollecting illegal gratification fro m sub ordinates during the m eetings c onducted by you, and that o n 1 2.0 1.20 1 8 also, at 1 8.30 hrs,you had c ollected illegal gratification of R s.3,00 0/-fro m your sub ordinate officer T hiru. N. R a m esh B a b u, Su b-R e gistrar, P e r aiyur, and o n 1 2.01.20 1 8 at 1 8.40 hrs, you w ere ab out to c ollect illegal gratification fro m three of your sub ordinate officer viz., (1) R s.3,000/-fro m T hiru.S. B ala m urugan, Sub-R e gistrar, K allikudi (2) R s.5,00 0/-

fro m

T hiru. P.S. H aja

M o hideen,

Sub-R e gistrar, T hiruparankundra m and (3) R s.18,00 0/- fro m T hiru. A. K aruppasa my, A ssistant, A r asaradi Sub-R e gisgrar O f fice. C h a rge-2 You T hiru. M. P a ulpandi ( Ac cused O f ficer 1), T hiru.S. Arun M a h esh ( Ac cused O f ficer 2), T mt.T. R ajathilaga m ( Ac cused O fficer 3) and T hiru. A. M a heb o o b B atcha ( Ac cused O f ficer 4) w ere found in p ossession of unacc ounted cash presu m ably ill-g otten m o ney of R s.4,10 0/-, Rs.1,510/-, R s.1,50 0/- and R s.3,79 0/- respectively o n 1 2.01.20 1 8 between 1 8.4 0 hrs and 2 3.00 hrs. H e n ce the A c c used O f ficers 1 to 4 have failed to m aintain abs olute integrity and devotion of duty, and c ontravened R ule 2 0(1) of the Ta milnadu G o v ern m ent Servants C o n d u ct R ules, 1 9 7 3. "

¶3The petitioner denied the charges against him. The petitioner's explanation was not accepted and the matter was referred for enquiry to the Commissioner of Departmental Enquiries, Madurai. After a detailed oral enquiry, the Enquiry Officer found that on appreciation of evidence of PWs 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 and Investigating Officer PW17, the charges against the petitioner as not proved. Two years after the report, now the present show-cause notice is issued.

¶4The petitioner contends that there is a huge unexplained delay of two years from the date of submission of the report by the Enquiry Officer and the present show-cause notice. The said delay vitiates the entire proceedings; therefore, at this belated point, the respondent cannot be permitted to differ from the findings of the Enquiry Officer and proceed in the matter further. It is the further contention of the petitioner that in any event, when the enquiry report is in favour of the petitioner, the petitioner ought to have been allowed to make a further representation to the respondent to persuade him to accept the report, but no such opportunity whatsoever was granted. The impugned show-cause notice is straight away issued. It can be seen from the impugned show-cause notice that already the respondent has come to the conclusion that the Enquiry Officer's findings have to be disagreed and the charges are proved. Therefore, the further opportunity, which is now granted to submit an explanation within 15 days, is only a post-facto hearing and as such, is not an opportunity at all. Thus, the impugned show-cause notice is violative of the principles of natural justice.

¶5Given the legal grounds raised, notice was issued to the respondents and the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent contested the legal submissions based on the impugned show-cause notice and by placing the communications dated

28.02.2022 and 11.01.2023 by which it is submitted that there was some mistake in the Annexures and pages, when the enquiry report was initially submitted. It came to light when the report was scrutinized. Thereafter, once again corrected report was received on 23.11.2022. A communication was sent on 11.01.2023 and thereafter, the matter was taken up for scrutiny and the impugned show-cause notice was issued, therefore, there is no unexplained delay in the matter. In any event, in the absence of any prejudice which is caused to the petitioner, mere delay alone would not vitiate the proceedings. The learned counsel would submit that the wordings of the show-cause notice are made, according to the format which is circulated and the conclusion reached by the Disciplinary Authority is only a tentative conclusion to be put across to the petitioner to elicit his explanation and only upon considering the explanation, the final finding will be reached. Therefore, there is no infirmity whatsoever in the impugned show-cause notice.

¶6M r. N a vaneetha K rishnan, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would submit that when the enquiry report was submitted in February 2022 itself, the impugned show-cause notice is now issued in the year 2024. The delay is huge, unexplained and therefore, causes grave prejudice to the petitioner. The learned Senior counsel would further submit that when the respondent has chosen to disagree with the Enquiry Officer, the same should have been done only after granting of an opportunity to the petitioner. From a reading of the show-cause notice and the reasons annexed thereto, it would be clear that the respondent has come to a final conclusion regarding disagreement with the enquiry report and therefore, any opportunity of making a representation is only a post decisional opportunity and thus, the petitioner is not granted a fair opportunity to represent his case.

¶7The learned Senior counsel would submit that even from the reasons which are mentioned in the Annexure it would be clear that it relies upon the statement of Ramesh Babu, which is a very weak piece of evidence and from a reading of his statement it would be clear that he has not categorically deposed about any demand for bribe. Similarly, placing reliance of the submission of one Karuppasamy is also uncalled for since he has not stated that he has brought the money to pay any illegal gratification. In view thereof, the reasons which are mentioned in the Annexure are also perverse.

¶8The learned Senior counsel would take this Court through the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in S t a t e o f U t t a r P r a d e s h a n d A n o t h e r V s . M a n M o h a n N a t h S i n h a a n d A n o t h e r [ ( 2 0 0 9 ) 8 S C C 3 1 0 ] to delineate the nature of the power of judicial review by placing reliance on paragraph 15 of the said judgment. The learned Senior counsel would further place reliance on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in M a n a g i n g D i r e c t o r, E C I L , H y d e r a b a d a n d O t h e r s V s . B . K a r u n a k a r a n d O t h e r s reported in ( 1 9 9 3 ) 4 S C C 7 2 7 , more specifically paragraphs 54 to 57, to contend that an opportunity ought to have been given to be petitioner at the time of consideration of the report of the Enquiry Officer. In the absence of the same, when the Disciplinary Authority has come to a final conclusion to disagree with the Enquiry Officer, then the opportunity which is now proposed to be granted, is only a post-decisional opportunity and as such is violative of principles of natural justice.

¶9The learned Senior counsel would rely upon the judgment of this Court in S . M a t h e s w a r a n V s . T h e S t a t e o f T a m i l N a d u [W.P.No.6810 of 2023], more specifically upon paragraph 8 to contend that the delay on the part of the respondent in further issuing the show cause notice after the submission of the enquiry report is inordinate and the Court should interfere with the same.

¶10The learned Senior counsel would rely upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in G o v e r n m e n t o f I n d i a V s . C i t e d a l F i n e P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s , M a d r a s a n d O t h e r s reported in [( 1 9 8 9 ) 3 S C C 4 8 3 ], more particularly paragraph 6 to contend that even in the absence of any period of limitation prescribed for conduct of Disciplinary proceedings, the authorities should complete the same within a reasonable period. For the same proposition, the learned Senior counsel would rely upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in S t a t e o f G u j a r a t V s . P a t e l R a g h a v N a t h a a n d O t h e r s reported in ( 1 9 6 9 ) 2 S C C 1 8 7 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in M o h a m a d K a v i M o h a m e d A m i n V s . F a t m a b a i I b r a h i m reported in ( 1 9 9 7 ) 6 S C C 7 1 to contend that disciplinary proceedings should be completed within a reasonable time. The learned Senior counsel also relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in P r e m N a t h B a l i V s . R e g i s t r a r, H i g h C o u r t o f D e l h i a n d A n o t h e r reported in ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 6 S C C 4 1 5 by placing reliance on Paragraphs 24 and 28 whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed that the disciplinary proceedings as far as possible should be completed within six months. Based on the directives, even the Government of India has issued a circular for expeditious completion of the disciplinary enquiry. The learned Senior counsel would also rely upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in U n i o n o f I n d i a V s . P. G u n a s e k a r a n reported in A I R 2 0 1 5 S C 5 4 5 to contend that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is not the duty of the Court to re-appreciate the entire evidence but will go only into the question as to whether the enquiry is held by the Competent Authority following the procedure and ensure that there is no violation of principles of natural justice in conducting the enquiry. When the show-cause notice impugned in the present writ petition enters a final finding, then this Court has to interfere. No liberty needs to be given to the respondent as there is a huge delay in the matter.

¶11Per contra, M r B . Vijay, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent, would rely upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in S t a t e o f M a d h y a P r a d e s h a n d a n o t h e r V s . A k h i l e s h J h a a n d a n o t h e r in Civil Appeal No.5153 of 2021, more specifically on paragraph 13 to contend that mere delay alone is not a ground for interference. The petitioner should demonstrate before the Court that prejudice is caused to him on account of the delay. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U n i o n o f I n d i a a n d a n o t h e r V s . K u n i s e t t y S a t y a n a r a y a n a reported in ( 2 0 0 6 ) 1 2 S C C 2 8 to contend that normally writ petition need not be entertained against a show-cause notice and no extraordinary circumstances are made out in the present case to interfere with the show-cause notice. He would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in J . A . N a i l s a t a m V s . P r o t h o n o t a r y a n d S e n i o r M a s t e r. H i g h C o u r t o f B o m b a y a n d O t h e r s reported in ( 2 0 0 4 ) 8 S C C 6 5 3 to contend that the enquiry report has to be acted upon by the Disciplinary Authority and the Disciplinary Authority has to apply its mind and if it prima facie feels that the conclusion reached by the Enquiry Authority is not acceptable, such reasons have to be recorded and with that reasons, opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to put forth his version of the matter. Reliance is placed on paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the said judgment. Therefore, the learned counsel would submit that the impugned show-cause notice should only be construed as coming to a tentative conclusion as the Disciplinary Authority will come to a final conclusion to differ from the Enquiry Officer only after considering the further submission/ explanation made by the petitioner in that regard.

¶12I have considered the rival submissions made on either side and perused the material records of the case.

¶13The disciplinary proceedings in the instant case is conducted as per the Ta mil N a d u C ivil S ervices ( D iscipline and A p peal) R ules. As per the same, if the Disciplinary Authority prima facie concludes that a member of the service under the State had committed a misconduct entailing any of the major penalties mentioned in sub-rule (iv) to (viii) of Rule 8 of said Rules, then a charge memorandum shall be drawn up and the delinquent employee has to be given a reasonable time to put in his written statement of defence. Thereafter, an oral enquiry shall be held in which the delinquent employee has to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Enquiry Officer shall finally submit a report which shall be based on the evidence so recorded. Rule 17b(ii) deals with the procedure to be adopted by the Disciplinary Authority upon receipt of the enquiry report. The same is extracted hereunder: " 1 7(b)(ii) A fter the inquiry or personal hearing referred to in clause (i) has been c o m pleted, the authority c o m petent to imp ose the penalty specified in that clause, is of the o pinion, o n the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, that any of the penalties specified in rule 8 should be imp osed on the person charged, it shall, before m aking an order imp osing such penalty, furnish to him a c opy of the rep ort of the inquiry or personal hearing or b oth, as the case m ay be, and call upon him to sub mit his further representation, if any, within a reasonable time, n ot exceeding fifteen days. A ny representation received in this behalf within the period shall be taken into c onsideration before m aking any order imp osing the penalty, provided that such representation shall be based o n the evidence adduced during the inquiry only. It shall not be necessary to give the person charged any o pp ortunity of m aking representation o n the penalty prop osed to be imp osed ; P r ovided that in every case w h ere it is necessary to c onsult the Ta mil N a d u P u blic Service C o m mission, the disciplinary authority shall c onsult the Ta mil N a d u P u blic Service C o m m ission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into c onsideration before m aking an order imp osing any such penalty: P r ovided further that in the case of a person app ointed to a p ost in a temp orary department by transfer fro m any other class or by recruitment by transfer fro m any other service, the State G o v ern m ent m ay, at any time before the app ointment of such person as a full m e m b er to the said p ost, revert him to such other class or service, either for w ant of vacancy or in the event of his bec o ming surplus to requirements or if the State G o v ern m ent are satisfied that he has n ot g ot the necessary aptitude for w o rk in the said p ost, without o bserving the for m alities prescribed in this sub-rule."

¶14It can be seen that the disciplinary authority should form an opinion based on the evidence adduced during the enquiry as to whether any of the penalties specified in Rule 8 should be imposed or not. If it concludes any penalty should be imposed, then an opportunity shall be granted to the delinquent employee to submit his further representation on the enquiry report and such report is to be considered by the Disciplinary Authority. The Rule does not expressly deal with the situation where the Disciplinary Authority proposes to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Authority. In that case, the matter would be governed by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in P u n j a b N a t i o n a l B a n k V s . K u n j B e h a r i M i s r a ( 1 9 9 8 ) 7 S C C 8 4 . It is relevant to extract paragraph 19, which reads as follows: "19. T he result of the aforesaid discussion w o uld be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into R e g ulation 7(2). A s a result thereof, w henever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its o w n findings o n such charge, it m ust record its tentative reasons for such disagree m ent and give to the delinquent officer an o pp ortunity to represent before it records its findings. T he report of the enquiry officer c ontaining its findings will have to be c onveyed and the delinquent officer will have an o p p ortunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to a ccept the favourable c on clusion of the enquiry officer. T he principles of natural justice, as w e have already o bserved, require the authority w hich has to take a final decision and can imp ose a penalty, to give an o pp ortunity to the officer charged of misc ondu ct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority rec ords its findings o n the charges fra m ed against the officer." ( E m p hasis S upplied)

¶15Similarly in Y o g i n a t h D . B a g d e v s. S t a t e o f M a h a r a s h t r a ( 1 9 9 9 ) 7 S C C 7 3 9 the Supreme Court of India held in paragraph 31 as follows: " 3 1. In view of the ab ove, a delinquent e m ployee has the right of hearing not o nly during the enquiry proceedings c ondu cted by the enquiry officer into the charges levelled a gainst hi m but also at the stage at w hich those findings are c onsidered by the disciplinary authority and the latter, na mely, the disciplinary authority for ms a tentative o pinion that it d oes n ot agree with the findings rec ords by the enquiry officer. If the findings rec orded by the enquiry officer are in favour of the delinquent and it has been held that the charges are n ot proved, it is all the m ore necessary to give an o p p ortunity of hearing to the delinquent e m ployee before reversing those findings. T h e for m ation of o pinion should be tentative and not final. It is at this stage that the delinquent e m ployee should be given an o pp ortunity of hearing after he is infor med of the reasons o n the basis of w hich the disciplinary authority has prop osed to disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer T his is in c ons onance with the requirem ent of A rticle 311(2) of the C o n stitution as it provides that a person shall n ot be dis missed or rem oved or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in w hich he has been infor m ed of the charges a gainst him and given a reasonable o p p ortunity of being heard in respect of those charges. S o long as a final decision is n ot taken in the m atter, the enquiry shall be dee m ed to be pending. M e r e sub mission of findings to the disciplinary authority d oes n ot bring ab out the closure of the enquiry pro ceedings. T he enquiry proceedings w o uld c o m e to an end o nly w hen the findings have been c onsidered by the disciplinary authority and the charges are either held to be not proved or found to be proved and in that event punish ment is inflicted up on the delinquent. T hat being so, the "right to be heard" w o uld be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. T his right being a c onstitutional right of the e m ployee cann ot be taken a w ay by any legislative enactment or service rule including rules m a d e under A rticle 3 0 9 of the C o n stitution."

¶16Thus, it is clear that even though the Rules say that based on the evidence adduced during the enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority can decide to punish after issuing a show-cause notice, further principles of natural justice have to be read into Rule 17b (ii) that if the Enquiry Officer's report is in favour of the delinquent and if the Disciplinary Authority proposes to disagree, such reasons have to be specifically communicated to the delinquent employee and only after granting him an opportunity to submit further explanation on such reasons to disagree and only after considering the same, punishment can be imposed. Needless to state such communication of the reasons by the Disciplinary Authority can only be tentative and without hearing the delinquent employee, the Disciplinary Authority cannot render any final finding as to the disagreement with the enquiry report and impose a punishment.

¶17In this case, the impugned show-cause notice in paragraphs 2 and 3 states as follows: " 2. A fter careful c onsideration of the report of the Tribunal for D i s ciplinary P r o ceedings, C h e n n ai in T D P C a s e N o. 5/20 1 8 m entioned in the reference cited, the G o v ern ment disagree with the findings of the C o m missioner for D i s ciplinary P r o c eedings, M a d urai and h olds the charge as " pr oved " for the reasons stated in the A n nexure to this letter.

¶3T hiru. M. P alpandi, D i strict R e gistrar (in the cadre of A ssistant Inspector G e n eral of R e gistration) M a d urai ( Z o ne) is hereby given an o p p ortunity for m aking further develop ment in this regard."

¶18The reasons for disagreement are given as Annexure. It is the contention of the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the disagreement is not tentative but it is final. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Senior counsel merely because the word "tentative", which should have been ideally used expressly, is not found in the show cause notice, it would not by itself mean that the Disciplinary Authority has come to a final conclusion that he is in disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Authority and that the charges are proved. Obviously from fact that the show-cause notice is issued it is clear that the findings are tentative and would be subject to the consideration of the further representation which would be made by the petitioner in this regard. In an identical facts situation in J . A . N a i k s a t a m V s . P r o t h o n o t a r y & S e n i o r M a s t e r, H i g h C o u r t o f B o m b a y a n d O t h e r s (cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 7 as follows: " 7. T h e c ounsel further c ontended that fro m the tentative decision it c ould be spelt o ut that the disciplinary authority had already taken a final decision in the m atter and the details have been given therein and the o pp ortunity w hich w as given to the appellants w as o nly an exercise in futility. We are n ot inclined to a ccept this c o ntention. It is true that the disciplinary authority gave its reasons for disagree ment with the rep ort of the E n q uiry O f ficer and the appellants had given their fullfledged explanation and if at all the disciplinary authority gave detailed tentative decision before seeking explanation fro m the appellants, it enabled them to give an effective representation and the principles of natural justice were fully c o m plied with and it cann ot be said that the appellants w ere not being heard in the m atter." (emphasis supplied)

¶19Therefore, I hold that the disagreement mentioned in the impugned show-cause notice is only tentative and it would be open for the petitioner to put forth such submission before the Disciplinary Authority to persuade him to accept the report of the Enquiry Officer by making such arguments/submissions dissuading him from his reasons to disagree with the enquiry report and also pointing out such evidence which are let out in the enquiry that he is not guilty of the misconduct complained against him.

¶20The next question, which has to be considered, is that whether the impugned show cause notice is to be quashed on the ground of delay. It is trite that both delay in initiation as well as conduct of disciplinary proceedings would entitle the delinquent employee to question the same at any stage of the proceedings. But, however it must be seen that it is not mere delay alone but the delay should cause prejudice to the delinquent employee. Such prejudice should be demonstrated that he is unable to remember or recollect the happenings or that he is unable to muster such evidence in his support by efflux of time and thus, demonstrate that there would be no fair opportunity to defend himself. Useful reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of A. P. v. N . R a d hakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 and paragraph 19 is reproduced hereunder : "19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."

¶21The legal position is also delineated in the latest judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S t a t e o f M a d h y a P r a d e s h a n d a n o t h e r (cited supra) and it is essential to quote the relevant portion of paragraph 13, which reads as under: " 1 3.............. E v ery delay in c onducting a disciplinary enquiry d o es n ot, ipso facto lead to the enquiry being vitiated. W h ether prejudice is c aused to the officer w h o is being enquired into is a m atter w hich has to be decided o n the basis of the circu mstances of each case. P r ejudice m ust be de m o nstrated to have been caused and cann ot be a m atter of sur mise. A p art fro m sub mitting that the first resp ondent w as unable to pro ceed o n deputation or to seek pro m otion, there is n o basis o n w hich it c ould be c on cluded that his right to defend hi mself stands prejudicially affected by a delay of two years in c oncluding the m atter."

¶22Thus, it can be seen in the instant case firstly the surprise check by the Vigilance and Anti-corruption took place on 12.01.2018. After receipt of the report, the charge memorandum was issued on

26.06.2019 and since four delinquent officials were involved and several witnesses, namely PWs 1 to 17 were examined and after detailed consideration, the enquiry report was submitted on 28.02.2022. It can be seen that thereafter, the matter was taken up for consideration and there have been inter-office communications in the month of November 2022 [23.11.2022], December 2022 [26.12.2022], January 2023 [11.01.2023] and the delay upto January 2023 is explained. It is true that there is a delay after January 2023 up to February 2024 for about a period of eleven months. It can be seen that the detailed Oral Inquiry/trial is already over. Even the submissions which are made by learned Senior counsel are on the basis of evidence already recorded. There can be absolutely no prejudice whatsoever for the petitioner on account of the said delay. Considering the volume of evidence on record and nature of charges, the delay is not huge. Secondly, no prejudice whatsoever is demonstrated. Therefore, in that view of the matter, for the mere delay of about one year, the proceedings cannot be quashed. Therefore, I reject the contention of learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned show-cause notice is to be quashed on the ground of delay in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings.

¶23The other contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel relate to the appreciation of the evidence of the concerned witnesses and as to the factual correctness of the reasons which are mentioned by the Disciplinary Authority to tentatively disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Even the learned Senior counsel has argued extensively as to the scope of enquiry of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When the matter is at the show-cause notice stage, appraisal of evidence by this Court and entering into a finding one way or the other will prejudice both sides and is certainly not within the scope of enquiry in the second show-cause notice stage. Therefore, once this Court finds that there is no violation of principles of natural justice and the proceedings need not be quashed on the ground of delay, then it would not be appropriate to consider the arguments on merits relating to the nature of evidence on record etc., which the petitioner can raise in his further explanation and before the Disciplinary Authority and it is for the Disciplinary Authority to consider the same dispassionately. Therefore, this Court refrains from making any finding regarding the argument of the learned counsel relating to the version of witnesses Ramesh Babu or Karuppasamy, leaving it open for the petitioner to raise the same before Disciplinary Authority.

¶24In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of on the following terms:

i) The prayer of the petitioner to quash the letter bearing reference No.3026620/H1/2022-5, dated 20.02.2024 shall stand rejected and it would be open for the petitioner to make a further representation to the respondent Authority within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order if he has already not made a further representation and it would be open for the petitioner to canvass all the points relating to the merits of the charges, adequacy of the evidence etc., before the Disciplinary Authority;

ii) It is made clear that the findings of the Disciplinary Authority in paragraph 2 of the impugned show-cause notice dated

20.02.2024 shall only be tentative and the Disciplinary Authority shall dispassionately consider such further representation that would be made by the petitioner on the merits of the charges and come to a conclusion in accordance with law;

iii) The Disciplinary Authority shall complete the exercise and pass final orders within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.

0 3 . 0 6 . 2 0 2 4 Index:Yes Speaking Order gpa To The Secretary to the Government Commercial Taxes and Registration (H1) Department Secretariat, Chennai – 9 D . B H A R A T H A C H A K R A V A R T H Y . , J gpa W r i t P e t iti o n N o . 1 0 3 8 0 o f 2 0 2 4

Case details

Parties and counsel

2024:MHC:2137 I N T H E H I G H C O U R T O F J U D I C A T U R E A T M A D R A S D a t e d : 0 3 . 0 6 . 2 0 2 4 C o r a m THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D . B H A R A T H A C H A K R A V A R T H Y W r i t P e t i ti o n N o . 1 0 3 8 0 o f 2 0 2 4 & W. M . P. N o . 1 1 3 7 6 o f 2 0 2 4 M.Paulpandi S/o.Mokkaraju .. Petitioner vs. State of Tamil Nadu Rep. By Secretary to the Government Commercial Taxes and Registration (H1) Department Secretariat, Chennai – 9 .. Respondent Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records of the respondent in Letter No.3026620/H1/2022-5, dated 20.02.2024 with annexure and quash the same being it is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair, unconstitutional, illegal, unjust, has no sanction of law, without jurisdiction, not sustainable under law, null and void and nullity and direct the respondent to accept the report of the Commissioner for Disciplinary proceedings, Madurai in TDP Case No.5/2018 consequently to pass appropriate orders. For Petitioner : Mr.Navaneetha Krishnan Senior counsel for Mr.R.Naveen For Respondent : Mr.B.Vijay Additional Government Pleader *****

Source: High Court of Madras, through the eCourts High Court services, via the Indian High Court Judgments open dataset by Dattam Labs (CC BY 4.0). Text was extracted from the official PDF and may contain conversion errors. Check the official PDF before relying on it.