Vipul Gupta v. State of Haryana and Another

S  UMEET GOEL  , J .

¶1Present petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is filed by the Petitioner – accused, seeking setting aside of the order dated 20.05.2023 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court for the offences under P.O.C.S.O. Act, 2012.  The Petitioner has further sought a direction to the Learned Trial Court to expeditiously decide the trial in the case.

¶2Facts germane to the decision of the present case, shorn of unnecessary details, are encapsulated as under: i. The petitioner alleging long standing matrimonial dispute with his wife, resulting in multifarious litigations between them, CRM-M-35754-2023 2 lodged an FIR bearing No.218 (hereinafter First FIR) dated

20.07.2020, at 9.00 PM, under sections 323 and 506 of the IPC, registered   at   Police  Station   Badshahpur,   District   Gurugram, Haryana,   against   his   wife   and   her   daughter   from   previous marriage. The essence of the said FIR is the allegation that the petitioner was beaten by his wife and her daughter. ii. Sometime thereafter, at about 10.45 PM, a cross-case bearing FIR No.220   (hereinafter   Second   FIR)   dated   20.07.2020,   under sections 323, 509 of IPC and section 8 of POCSO Act, was got lodged   by   the   wife   of   the   petitioner,   at   Police   Station Badshahpur, District Gurugram against the Petitioner.  In the said FIR it was alleged by the complainant that, while she was not at home, the petitioner, was shouting on her son.  When her minor daughter aged 17 years, intervened and asked the petitioner to not shout on her brother, he pushed her on her shoulder and private part. iii. The   trial   proceedings   in   the   second   FIR   i.e.   FIR   No.220 proceeded in the Special POCSO Court.  The final report by the police   under   section   173(2)   of   the   Cr.P.C.   was   filed   on

15.01.2021.  Thereafter, the charges against the petitioner were framed under section 10 of POCSO Act, 2012 (in the alternative under section 354 of IPC) and under sections 323, 509 of the IPC. After leading the entire prosecution evidence, the evidence on behalf of the State was closed by the Learned Special Public Prosecutor on 12.04.2023.  Thereafter the statement of petitioner, CRM-M-35754-2023 3 under section 313 of the Cr.P.C., was recorded.  After closing the defense evidence the case was adjourned for final arguments by the Learned Special POCSO Court. Part arguments were heard on

16.05.2023   whereinafter   hearing   in   trial   was   deferred   to

20.05.2023 for further arguments. iv. At this stage of further arguments on 20.05.2023; it was brought to the knowledge of the Learned Trial Court in POCSO Case that the trial in the cross-case i.e. first FIR No.218 is pending in the st Class, Gurugram.  TheCourt of Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1 Learned Special POCSO Court / Trial Court in the second FIR case (which was pending at the stage of further arguments), vide impugned order dated 20.05.2023, held that in view of the pendency of the cross-case the POCSO case cannot be disposed of. While holding so, the Learned Special POCSO Court observed that the case File in the First FIR bearing No.218 is since pending in the Court of Learned JMIC and is not committed to the Special Court.  The learned Special Court adjourned the case in Second FIR for awaiting the File of First FIR. v. It is pleaded on behalf of the petitioner that the trial in the First FIR No.218 is stand still, as the complainant in the Second FIR who happens to be accused in the First FIR has approached this Court seeking quashing of that FIR by filing CRM-M-24476 of 2020, which is pending adjudication before this Court, and the CRM-M-35754-2023 4 proceedings in the that FIR before the learned trial court are stayed.

¶3In this factual backdrop; the petitioner has impugned the order dated 20.05.2023 passed by the learned Fast Track Special Court, Gurugram, while seeking a direction for early decision of the trial which is pending at the stage of final arguments for last about 10 months.

¶4Despite having given ample opportunity(s), the Respondent-Complainant in the FIR, which is subject-matter of present case, has not filed reply to the petition, accordingly, her right to file reply was foreclosed vide order dated 01.04.2024.

¶5The moot question, which has arisen before this Court in the present proceedings is, whether the approach of learned Fast Track Special Court of staying the proceedings in the Second FIR case at the final stage of the trial, is justified in law, just because of the reason of the pendency of cross-case (in the shape of First FIR in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate), the proceedings wherein are stayed by this Court?

¶6The   Learned   Fast   Track   Special   Court   while   passing   the impugned order has placed reliance on the following judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

¶1Nathi Lal and Others versus State of UP & Another, 1990 (Supp) SCC 145

¶2State of MP Vs. Mishri Lal, SCC 426 2003(9);

¶3Sudhir Vs. State of MP, decided on 02.02.2001 (2001(2) ALT Criminal 79). CRM-M-35754-2023 5

¶7In the case of Nathi Lal (Supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court directed that if a situation arises wherein, there is a police case and a cross-case instituted by the respondent by way of a private complaint, the court must record the evidence in both the case separately, hear the arguments in both the cases separately and then decide the cases by passing separate judgments.  But while doing so the Court cannot look into the evidence recorded in the cross-case and each case shall be decided only on the evidence led in that particular case.  However, the perusal of the Judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, shows that the proceedings before the Learned Trial Court in that case must have been at very initial stage as the trial court was directed to take evidence in both the cases i.e. the police case as well as complaint case.

¶8In the case of State of MP vs. Mishri Lal (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while relying upon the Judgment in case of Nathi Lal (supra) , reiterated that in the case where two FIRs have been lodged with respect to the same incident, and challans have been filed in both the cases, both the cases shall be tried by the same Court, irrespective of the nature of offences involved.   However, the said judgment was passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition arising out the Judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court in an appeal against the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial court.  In the peculiar facts of that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in cross-cases both the complaints cannot be said to be right.  Either of them must be false.  In such a situation legal obligation is cast upon the investigating officer to make an endeavour to find out the truth and CRM-M-35754-2023 6 to seperate the grain from chaff.  It was in this factual background, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the failure on part of the investigating  officer to discharge  this  obligation,  results  in  grave miscarriage of justice.

¶9In the case of Sudhir vs State of MP (Supra) the question posed for adjudication before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was, whether in cross-cases, where one case is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, but another not exclusively triable by Court of Sessions, both the cases could be tried by the Court of Sessions. While answering the said question the Hon'ble Supreme Court, relying upon the case of Nathi (supra),  held that the Court of Sessions Judge has all the power to try any offence under the IPC.  As such it was held that cross-cases shall be tried and disposed of by the same court by pronouncing judgments on the same day.

¶10It is worthwhile to mention that the proposition of law laid down in all the three judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as relied upon by the learned trial court has also been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Amrik Singh versus State of Punjab, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 420.

¶11The factual situation in all the above mentioned judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is altogether different from the factual status of the present case.  In none of the cases decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the status of trial in one case being at the fag end stage of hearing the final arguments was pitted against the status of another cross-case being at initial stage of trial, without even start of CRM-M-35754-2023 7 recordin! of evidence, 4ith the proceedin!s havin! been stayed by the Hi!h )o%rt. $(. 5t is trite la4 that a sli!htest of difference in fact%al scenario of any t4o cases can ma+e a sea of difference 4hile ad?%dicatin! the same. 1he HonDble S%preme )o%rt 4hile dealin! 4ith this aspect of the la4 in case of G"5!4(;!(  "# <a4(a a=a 5) -; ) G">4a;;ati 2008 AIR 7-684!;! C"64 9 863 has held as %nder: "9. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well( settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates ( (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of CRM-M-35754-2023 8 the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See : State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors., ( AIR 1968 Supreme Court 647) and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors., (1996(6) SCC 44). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.

¶10Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to CRM-M-35754-2023 9 explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed : "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."

¶11In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (1970(2) All England Reporter 294) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971)1 WLR 1062 observed : "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972(2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said : "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." CRM-M-35754-2023 10

¶12Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

¶13The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus : "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." *** *** *** "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.F $". 5n vie4 of the above mentioned star+ fact%al difference in the sta!e of proceedin!s in the present case and the /%d!ments passed by the HonDble S%preme )o%rt, and applyin! the ratio of la4 laid do4n by the HonDble S%preme )o%rt in the case of Government of Garnata+a 7s%pra8, it 4o%ld be hi!hly impr%dent in the present case, to +eep the proceedin!s in the case 056 CRM-M-35754-2023 11 No. No.220 dated 20.07.2020 i.e. the second FIR pending just to await the decision in First FIR.

¶14A co-ordinate bench of this Court in case titled Tejpal and Others versus State of Haryana and Another, in CRM-M 3847 of 2019, in dispute involving circumstances similar to the present case, has held as under: "Although it goes without saying that cases arising out of the cross-versions should be tried together as has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Nathi Lal's case (supra) but the present case is distinct in as much as the trial in respect of the cross-version has not commenced yet as no charges have been framed so far and the matter is pending in the High Court, wherein summoning order itself has been challenged.  In these circumstances, when the case arising out of FIR is at its fag end, while in the cross-version, on the basis of private complaint, the summoning order itself is under challenge and the trial has not commenced in the cross-version at all, staying the proceedings in the FIR case would not advance the cause of justice in any manner."

¶15There is yet another aspect of the matter.  The accused in the present case i.e. Second FIR No.220 dated 20.07.2020, after going through the vagaries of the entire criminal trial, at the stage of hearing of the final arguments in the case, after partial hearing of arguments is already over, cannot be made to sit and await the decision of his case indefinitely.  The trial in the First FIR i.e. the cross-version is not likely to be over in near future in view of the fact that the proceedings in that case before trial court are yet to begin.  Moreover, since the proceedings in that case are already stayed by this Court, on the instance of the CRM-M-35754-2023 12 complainant 7herein8, in a petition see+in! B%ashin! of that 056, the pro!ress of trial in that case, predominantly depends %pon the decision of this )o%rt in B%ashin! petition.   1he o%tcome of said B%ashin! petition at this sta!e cannot be predicted, in case the cross=056 is B%ashed by this )o%rt, there 4o%ld be no p%rpose served by +eepin! the proceedin!s before trial co%rt in the present case pendin!. $;. 6i!ht to speedy trial bein! a cherished ri!ht of the acc%sed cannot be fr%strated in a c%rsory manner 4itho%t a definite le!al and valid ca%se.  A f%ll bench of the HonDble S%preme )o%rt of 5ndia in case of  Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.Nayak, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1701 has held as %nder: H54. In vie  o! the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are :

¶1Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also does not make it any(the(less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the CRM-M-35754-2023 13

¶2Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re(trial. That is how this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.

¶3The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are :

(a) the period of remand and pre(conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;

(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and

(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non(availability of witnesses or otherwise.I $9. 5n vie4 of the above findin!s it is neither feasible nor desirable to +eep the trial in Second )ase bearin! 056  o.((, dated (,.,9.(,(,, re!istered at Police Station <adshahp%r, G%r%!ram pendin!, for the p%rpose of its decision 4ith the cross=case i.e. 056  o.($' dated (,.,9.(,(, re!istered at Police Station <adshahp%r, G%r%!ram.  1he CRM-M-35754-2023 14 petitioner being accused in the case has right to seek the culmination of his trial at an early date.  With the uncertainty of pending trial looming large, the petitioner cannot be held hostage to pendency of trial, by keeping the Damocles Sword hanging over his head.  Accordingly, the present petition deserves to be allowed. Decision:

¶18The impugned order dated 20.05.2023 passed by Learned Fast Track Special Court, Gurugram is quashed. The trial court is directed to proceed further with the trial and make an earnest endeavour for expeditious disposal thereof, preferably within six weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order.

¶19Needless to state herein that the observations made hereinabove shall not be construed as opinion on merits of the case. (SUMEET GOEL) JUDGE April  08, 2024

CRM-M-35754-2023 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-35754-2023 Date of decision: 08.04.2024 VIPUL GUPTA . . . PETITIONER V/s STATE OF HARYANA & OTHERS . . . RESPONDENTS CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL Present: Mr. Manish Soni, Advocate for petitioner. Ms. Mahima Yashpal, DAG, Haryana. Mr. Vaibhav Narang, Advocate for respondent No.3. *****