Parkash Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr

RSA-1909-2016 2024:PHHC:047588  1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

(212) RSA-1909-2016 Date o" Dec$%$o& : AA/$1 08, 2024 Pa/=a%9 5a4/    .. AAAe11a&t Ve/%4% State o" P4&jab a&2 a&ot9e/   .. Re%Ao&2e&t% CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARSIMRAN SINGH SETHI Present: Mr. Rohit Kataria, Advocate, for Mr. Manu K. Bhandari, Advocate, for the appellant. Mr. Rohit Ahuja, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab. HARSIMRAN SINGH SETHI J. (ORAL)

¶1In the present regular second appeal, the challenge is to the judgments and decrees of the Courts below by which, the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff so   as   to   seek   declaration   that   the   husband   of   the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to continue upto the age of 60 years and the office order dated 02.05.1990, retiring him at the age of 58 years, is null and void.

¶2Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff argues that the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are perverse and the same are contrary to the principle of law settled by this Court while passing order in ��������������������������������������������������������������������� �! ��"��������������������Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff submits that the question of limitation will not come into play in the present case RSA-1909-2016 2024:PHHC:047588  2 especially when it is a conceded position that the late husband of the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to continue upto the age of 60 years.

¶3Learned counsel for the respondents submits that once the order dated 02.05.1990 was passed retiring the husband of the appellant-plaintiff, the said order could only be challenged within a period of three years and as the husband of the appellant-plaintiff remained alive upto the year 1998, he did not challenge the said order during his lifetime and as the appellant-plaintiff has only stepped into the shoes of her  deceased husband, qua the said order, the said order could not have been challenged especially when the late husband of the appellant-plaintiff failed to challenge the said order within   the   period   of   limitation   provided.     Learned   counsel   for   the respondents further submits that as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in #������$$���������%������&�&������������������� ��������������� ������'� �������(����������)�*�+� !���"������� �������&&�!�even the void orders are to be challenged within a period of three years.

¶4I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record with their able assistance.

¶5The argument of the learned counsel that retiring the late husband of the appellant-plaintiff on attaining the age of 58 years and not allowing him to continue in service till the age of 60 years, is recurring cause.

¶6The said argument needs to be noticed keeping in view the facts and evidence which has come on record.  It is a conceded position that by a specific order dated 02.05.1990, the late husband of the appellant-plaintiff was retired from the post of Constable.  Once a specific order was passed and the said order was causing prejudice to the late husband of the RSA-1909-2016 2024:PHHC:047588 3 appellant$plaintiff, the said order "as re-uired to !e challenged "ithin a period of limitation provided i.e. three #ears.   It ma# !e noticed that the hus!and of the appellant$plaintiff remained alive during the said period of limitation and onl# e5pired in the #ear 1**+.  3he judgment of the /onti!le 1upreme  ourt of India in '� �������(�,��"����-��$ �.!�is applica!le in the present case.   3he relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are as under:$ " 4. First of all, to say that the suit is not governed by the law of Limitation runs afoul of our Limitation Act. The statute of limitation was intended to provide a time limit for all suits conceivable. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit, appeal or application instituted after the prescribed "period of limitation" must subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 be dismissed although limita% tion has not been set up as a defence, Section%2(J) defines the expression "period of limitation" to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suit, appeal or application. Section 2(J) also defines, "prescribed period" to mean the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Court's function on the presentation of plaint is simply to examine whether, on the assumed facts the plaintiff is within time. The Court has to find out when the "right to sue" accrued to the plaintiff. If a suit is not covered by any of the specific articles prescribing a period of limitation, it must fail within the residuary article. The purpose of the residuary article is to provide for cases which could not be covered by any other provision in the Limitation Act. The residuary article is applicable to every variety of suits not otherwise provided for.  Article 113 (corresponding to Article 120  of the Act 1908) is a residu% ary article for cases not covered by any other provisions in the Act. It prescribes a period of three years when the right to sue accrues. Under Article 120 it was six years which has been reduced to three years under Article

113. According to the third column in Article 113, time commences to run when the right to sue accrues. The words RSA-1909-2016 2024:PHHC:047588 4 "right to sue" ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when the 'cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is insti% tuted (See: (i) Mt. Bole v. Mt. Koklam and Ors., AIR 1930 PC 270 and (ii) Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. The Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1433).

¶8It will be clear from these principles, the party ag% grieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the Court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limit expires the Court cannot give the declaration sought for.

¶11The Allahabad High Court in Jagdish Prasad Mathur and Ors. v. United Provinces Government, AIR 1956 All 114 has taken the view that a suit for declaration by a dismissed employee on the ground that his dismissal is void, is gov% erned by Article 120 of the Limitation Act. A similar view has been taken by Oudh Chief Court in Abdul Vakil v. Secre% tary of State and Anr., AIR 1943 Oudh 368. That in our opinion is the correct view to be taken. A suit for declara% tion that an order of dismissal or termination from service passed against the plaintiff is wrongful, illegal or ultra vires is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act The decision to the contrary taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in. these and other cases ((i)State of Punjab v. Ajit Singh,. [1988] 1 SLR 96 and (ii) State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, [1986] 2 SLR 379 is not correct and stands overruled."

¶67ot onl# this, !# placing reliance upon the judgment of the '� �������(�,��"����-��$ �.!�the /onti!le 1upreme  ourt of India in  #���� �$$�����������/&�����&&%�������������������������0������ �����*�+� ! RSA-1909-2016 2024:PHHC:047588  5 ��"���������������&&%�as well as in   �1�-#.������&�������&&����������� �����������������0����������� ����(�!���"���������%��2��&&/!�passed order again reiterating that the period of limitation to challenge an order is three years.

¶8Keeping in view the settled principle of law, the order dated

02.05.1990 was required to be challenged within a period of three years, which has not been done by the appellant-plaintiff as the suit was filed only in the year 2005 after 15 years of the retirement, which is impermissible.

¶9?ua the argument that the claim of the appellant-plaintiff is covered by the judgment in ����������,��"����-��$ �., it may be noticed that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in '� �������(�,� "����-��$ �.!�������� ����(�,��"����-��$ �.������� �����*�+� ,��"��� -��$ �.!�have not been noticed.  Once the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that even the void orders needs to be challenged within the time framed of limitation of three years, no benefit of the judgment in ����������,��"��� -��$ �.�can be extended to the appellant-plaintiff.

¶10No other argument was raised.

¶11Keeping in view the above, no ground is made out for any interference by this Court in the present appeal.

¶12Dismissed. AA/$1 08,2024 (HARSIMRAN SINGH SETHI) harsha ������JUDGE