Deepak v. State of Haryana and Anr

SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1.    The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the petitioner-husband for quashing of FIR No.584  dated  23.06.2018  (Annexure  P-1)  registered  for  the  offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323 and 406 of IPC at Police Station City Sirsa, District Sirsa which was got lodged by respondent No.2 (herein)-wife as  also  all  subsequent  proceedings  emanating  therefrom  on  the  basis  of mutual  agreement/settlement  dated  06.07.2022  entered  into  between  the petitioner-husband and respondent No.2-wife.  The allegations in the FIR primarily relate to the allegations of harassment on account of dowry and Istridhan related criminal breach of trust. The  relevant  part  of  compromise/settlement  deed  dated

06.07.2022  entered  into  between  the  petitioner-husband  and  respondent No.2-wife  (copy  whereof  has  been  appended  as  Annexure  P-2)  reads  as under:- "1. That the First Party is the complainant in the above stated FIR, who is the  aggrieved  party  in  the  above  said  case  and  the  second  party  is CRM-M-40359-2022             2

accused, who have admittedly settled the matter amongst themselves pertaining to the abovesaid FIR.

¶2That the First party (complainant, who is the signee of this compromise deed) shall have no objection if the above said FIR is quashed in this case. For this purpose, the first party is ready to give statement and also ready to appear as and when directed by the Hon'ble High Court.

3.That the First Party will cooperate the 2nd party in all the manners, for the above mentioned purpose by way of signing all kinds of application/petition/affidavits/compromise deeds or by way of coming present in person in the Hon'ble High court or before the court as per the directions of the Hon'ble High court for giving of statement to the above effect & to do all kinds of necessary paper work & requisite for the purpose.

¶4That both the parties are /shall be bound with this compromise deed & further undertakes to abide by the terms and conditions of this deed.

¶5That the compromise has been affected with the intervention of Panchayat and both the parties have amicably settled their dispute and have filed petition under section 13B of Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of their marriage with mutual consent on 0120722022 wherein the first motion statement of the parties has already been recorded and the same is fixed for 0220122023 for second motion statements of the parties. In the settlement, it was agreed between the parties that second party will pay a sum of Rs.22 Lac to the first party and her minor daughter as maintenance and permanent alimony. An amount of Rs.11 Lac has already been paid at the time of first motion statement whereas the remaining amount of Rs.11 Lac shall be paid at the time of second motion statement. In the compromise it was further agreed that both the parties will withdraw their cases, if any, pending against each other in different courts.

¶6That as per the compromise, now there is no grudge between the parties and the second party has fully satisfied the first party in all the manners and поw there is no further dispute between the parties. This compromise deed has been executed in between the parties without any undue influence, coercion, threat or promise of any kind from any body & both the parties have signed and executed the present compromise deed with their own sweet & free will and consent with the intervention of the respectable person in the presence of the following witnesses to maintain the peace & harmony between the families in future." %.    $oti!e  of  -otion  of  the  instant  petition  <as  iss)ed  on 2024.04.30 10:17 76.7..%7%%  <here)pon  the  !o)nsel  for  the  respondent  $o.%  had  entered CRM-M-40359-2022             3

appearance  on  that  day  itself  and  had  admitted  the  factum  of compromise/settlement  (Annexure  P-2).  Further  vide  order  dated

20.03.2024, the parties were directed to get their statements recorded qua the factum  of  compromise  before  the  concerned  Illaqa  (Jurisdictional) Magistrate.    It  is  pertinent  to  mention  herein  that  on  the  said  date  i.e.

20.03.2024, the learned counsel for respondent No.2 had again admitted to the  factum  of  compromise  whereupon  the  order  for  recording  of  the statements by parties before the concerned Illaqa (Jurisdictional) Magistrate was passed.

2.1.    In terms of the above-said order dated 20.03.2024 passed by this  Court,  a  report  has  been  received  from  the  concerned  Illaqa (Jurisdictional) Magistrate that the petitioner-husband had duly appeared for making the requisite statement but respondent No.2 (herein)-wife did not turn up.  It is further stated in this report that there is no other accused in the FIR  in  question  other  than the petitioner-husband; the petitioner  was not involved in any other FIR & the petitioner was not declared a proclaimed offender by any Court of law.  The statement of the investigating officer of the  FIR  in  hand  was  also  recorded  by  the  said  Court  to  this  effect. Thereafter, the arguments in the matter were heard on 26.04.2024 and the judgment was reserved.

3.    Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner  has  argued  that  the  entire dispute(s) between the petitioner-husband and the respondent No.2-wife was amicably  settled  &  the  petitioner-husband  has  fulfilled  in  entirety requirement(s)/condition(s)  on  his  part  as  per  the  terms  of  the settlement/compromise deed dated 06.07.2022.  It has been further argued that  the  petitioner-husband  had  paid  a  total  sum  of  Rs.22.00  lacs  to 2024.04.30 10:17 respondent No.2-wife; a decree of divorce under Section 13-B of the Hindu CRM-M-40359-2022             4

Marriage Act, 1955 was also passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Sirsa on 03.08.2022; the respondent No.2-wife had withdrawn the petition filed by her under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. for grant of maintenance & the petition  filed  by  the  petitioner  (herein)-husband  under  Section  11  of  the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was also withdrawn by him in the Daily Lok Adalat  of  the  Family  Court,  Sirsa  on  03.08.2022.    Learned  counsel  has further  argued  that  the  matter  was  also  amicably  settled  regarding  the custody of the minor daughter born out of the wedlock of the petitioner-husband and respondent No.2-wife.  Learned counsel has further argued that, respondent  No.2-wife  is  now  intentionally  not  turning  up  to  have  her requisite statement recorded for quashing of the impugned FIR in terms of the  compromise/settlement  entered  into  between  the  parties,  only  with  a view to harass the petitioner as also to prolong the litigation. Thus, it has been  argued  that  the  FIR  in  question  as  also  all  proceedings  emanating therefrom deserve to be quashed.

3.1    Learned counsel for the respondent No.2-wife has argued that he had ratified the factum of valid compromise having been entered between the parties before this Court on 05.09.2022 as also on 20.03.2024 in terms of the instructions given to him by respondentNo.2-wife.  However, learned counsel has fairly submitted that he has no instructions in the matter as to why respondent No.2-wife did not turn up to have her statement recorded in terms of the earlier order dated 20.03.2024 passed by this Court.

3.2    Learned State counsel has not denied the factual aspects raised by  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner.  Learned  State  counsel  has  further submitted that, as per her instructions, the compromise/settlement (Annexure P-2) was, infact, entered into between the petitioner-husband and respondent 2024.04.30 10:17 No.2-wife. CRM-M-40359-2022             5

4.    I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. Prime Issue

5.    The prime issue for consideration in the instant petition is that as  to  whether  the  impugned  FIR  (as  also  all  proceedings  emanating therefrom) deserves to be quashed in the facts/circumstances of the present case.  The analogous legal issue that arises for consideration is as to whether an  FIR  (as  also  the  proceedings  emanating  therefrom)  deserves  to  be quashed  when  the  complainant-wife  has  reaped  all  the  benefits  from  a settlement/compromise entered into between her and the husband/accused side but is not turning up to make requisite statement in accordance thereof for quashing such FIR (as also all proceedings emanating therefrom). Relevant Statutory provisions

6.    Section  406  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  1860  (hereinafter referred to as 'the IPC, 1860') reads as under:- "406.  Punishment  for  criminal  breach  of  trust.—Whoever  commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both." Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 reads as under:- "498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,  subjects  such  woman  to  cruelty  shall  be  punished  with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine." Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads as under:- "482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under CRM-M-40359-2022             6

this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." Rele ant ,ase @a< /.     #he  pre!edents,  3er-ane  to  the  iss)e9s;  in  2)estion,  are  as follo<s: 9i;    5n  a  j)d3-ent  titled  as  Ruchi  Agarwal  vs.  Amit  Kumar Agarwal 2005(3) SCC 299, the HonB(le S)pre-e ,o)rt has held as )nder:1 "7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that though the appellant had signed the compromise deed with the above2 mentioned terms in it, the same was obtained by the respondent2husband and his family under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump sum maintenance and her Stridhan properties, we find it extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent2husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted thus had performed his part of the obligation under the compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings were pending that the compromise deed was filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a statement before the said court affirming the terms of the compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the compromise, we cannot now accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents. 9ii;    Reiteratin3  the  di!ta  of  j)d3-ent  in  Ruchi  Agarwal  case (supra), the HonB(le S)pre-e ,o)rt in a j)d3-ent titled as Mohd. Shamim vs. Smt. Nahid  !gum" 2005(3) SCC 302" has held as )nder:1 C14. This Court in Ruchi Agarwal v. Amit Kumar Agarwal & ors., 2004(4) RCR (Criminal) 949 (SC): [2004(8) Supreme 525], in almost a similar situation has quashed a criminal proceeding against the husband, stating : "….Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the 2024.04.30 10:17 compromise, we cannot now accept the argument of the learned counsel CRM-M-40359-2022             7

for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents.

¶8In view of the above said subsequent events and the conduct of the appellant, it would be an abuse of the process of the court if the criminal proceedings from which this appeal arises is allowed to continue…."

9iii;    5n a j)d3-ent titled as Mahmood Ali # ors. $s. Stat! o% &.'. # (rs. 2023 )NSC *+," the HonB(le S)pre-e ,o)rt has held as )nder:1 "12. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation…...............D 9i ;     5n a !ase titled as C-alima vs. Stat! o% .ar/atia atid oth!rs" N!utral  Citatioti  No.202,1'..C103523*"  de!ided  on  '%.70.%7%*,  this ,o)rt has held as follo<s:1 CRM-M-40359-2022             3

¶9To consider this aspect, it would be apposite to delve into the nature, scope and ambit of powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., 1973.

9.1. Section 482 of Cr.P.C. of 1973 is, in fact, statutory recognition of the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction of a High Court. This doctrine received statutory recognition, for the first time, when Section 5612A was inserted in Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 by way of Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment Act) of 1923. By way of introduction of Section 5612A in Cr.P.C., 1898, the legislature recognized the existence of inherent powers in a High Court and provided that nothing in the Code can be deemed to limit inherent powers of a High Court to make such order(s) as would be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Mohammad Naim (supra) has held that this Section gives no new powers to a High Court; it only provides that powers which the High Court already inherently possesses, shall be preserved and a provision has been inserted into statute book lest it be misconstrued that only those powers are possessed by the High Court which are expressly conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure & that all such inherent powers stand extinguished after the Code come into force. In essence, this provision refers to residuary plenary powers of High Court to do justice. It is notable that such inherent powers, which received statutory recognition at the end of legislature, empowers a High Court to exercise such inherent jurisdiction not only in respect of proceedings before it but also in respect of proceedings in the Subordinate Courts. The legislature, acknowledging the significance and importance of such inherent powers, chose to keep alive the provision of Section 5612A of Cr.P.C., 1898 in the Cr.P.C. currently in vogue i.e. Cr.P.C. of 1973 albeit only by renumbering the provision as Section 482.

9.2. The important aspect that immediately next craves attention is as to what are the "inherent powers of a High Court" recognized under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., 1973. At the outset, it deserves to be noticed that these inherent powers are not defined in the statute. Inherent powers are essentially those powers which ipso facto exist in the Court by virtue of its existence. The phraseology of inherent powers as defined in the dictionaries is as under:2

(a) Black's Law Dictionary defines 'inherent powers' as "Existing in something as permanent, essential, or characteristic attribute."

(b) Webster's New World Law Dictionary defines it as "A power that must be deemed to exist in order for a particular responsibility to be carried out." AJAY KUMAR CRM-M-40359-2022             9

(c) Oxford (Advanced Learner's Dictionary) defines "inherent" as "existing as a natural or permanent feature". The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of "Devendrappa" (supra) has relied upon the maxim of "4uatido l!5 ali4uid alicui cotic!dit" cotic!d!r! vid!tur !t id siti! 4uo r!s i6sa!" !ss! 0oti 6ot!st" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist) to hold that the inherent powers of a High Court are all such powers which are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in this judgment, has further referred to the maxim "!5 d!7ito 8ustitia!" to say that such powers are ones given to do real and substantial justice for which purpose alone High Court exists. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Parbatbhai (supra) has held that the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. of 1973 are aimed at preserving the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice.

9.3 A cumulative reading of the above said would show that the inherent powers of a High Court are powers which are incidental replete powers, which if did not exist so, the Court would be obliged to sit still and helplessly see process of law and Courts being abused for the purpose of injustice. These powers of a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible amplitude. It is trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case which in fact arises. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner should, therefore, have unfettered power to deal with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with to prevent injustice or an abuse of the process of law and Courts.

9.4. Accordingly, it is unequivocal that the inherent powers of a High Court; recognized by way of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. of 1973; are powers which are unbridled, unfettered and plenary in nature. These powers are to be exercised keeping in view the following salutary purposes viz; (a) to give effect to any order passed under the code (b) to prevent abuse of process of any Court (c) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither conceivable nor desirable to lay down any exhaustive set of guideline(s) to govern the exercise of this plenary inherent jurisdiction, however alluring this aspect may be. Such exercise of power would definitely be dependent upon the factual matrix of the case which the court is seisin of."

CRM-M-40359-2022             10

9i ;     5n a !ase titled as C$aruti Sharma vs. Stat! o% 'u08a7 atid atioth!r" N!utral Citatioti No.202,1'..C1029*92" de!ided on '%.7%.%7%*, this ,o)rt has held as follo<s:1 "10. Section 4982A of IPC was brought, by way of an Act of 1983, into the IPC with a salutary principle for curbing the evil of dowry which has been unfortunately prevailing in our Society since long. A bare perusal of the statement of Objects and Reasons for enactment of 1983 Act endorses this aspect of the matter.

10.1 More recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the celebrated judgment of Arnesh Kumar's case (supra) has extensively dealt with the issue of deliberate and rampant misuse of provisions of Section 4982A of IPC as a tool of harassment by a disgruntled wife. The Courts are flooded with cases where it is found that the complainant2wife has misused the provision of Section 4982A of IPC to settle score(s) with her husband and his family members, but at the same time it cannot be ignored that in very many cases such allegations of dowry harassment made by the wife turn out to be true. This Court cannot also lose sight of growing lack of a family level/Social Forum for redressal of grievance(s) of a wife arising out of matrimonial acrimony and therefore criminal proceedings under Section 4982A of IPC are launched at the instance of such wife on her being left with no other alternative redressal forum. Therefore, in many cases, the wife tends to initiate criminal proceedings under Section 4982A of IPC against her husband as also his relatives as a means of a solution seeking redressal mechanism. In other words, in large number of cases, the criminal prosecution under Section 4982A of IPC at the instance of a disgruntled wife are launched for settlement of the matrimonial discord in one way or the other." Analysis 9re la<; +.    #ho)3h  Se!tion  *.+1A  <as  (ro)3ht  into  the  5P,,  (y  <ay  of  an a-endin3 a!t of '.+0, <ith the sal)tary o(je!ti e of !)r(in3 the e il of do<ry, ()t j)di!ial e:perien!e e in!es that this pro ision alon3 <ith Se!tion *78 of 5P, is (ein3  hea ily  -isapplied  (y  the  !o-plainant1<ife  to  settle  s!ore9s;  <ith  her h)s(and  and  his  fa-ily  -e-(ers.    #his  ,o)rt  in  the  !ase  of  $aruti  Sharma 9s)pra; has held that, it has (een noti!ea(le in se eral !ases, that the <ife tends to initiate !ri-inal pro!eedin3s )nder Se!tion *.+1A of 5P, a3ainst her h)s(and as CRM-M-40359-2022             11

also his relatives, as a means of a 'solution seeking redressal mechanism' rather than actually seeking to criminally prosecute them. On numerous occasions an individual wail does not ensue due to a vengeful proclivity or anger, but owing to distressing disappointment endured by a discontented spouse (wife, in the present case),  in  securing  a  copacetic  solution  of  the  matrimonial  discord.    The predicament  of  such  a  discontented  partner  (wife)  is  exacerbated  when  she  is mentally/emotionally  enervated  due  to,  inter  alia,  an  acceptable  solution  not seemingly forthcoming,  as a result resorting  to actuating  a  torsion  of criminal prosecution.    Yet,  the  abovesaid  cannot  be  stated  to  be  true  in  all  the  cases. Nevertheless, the fact remains, that the above-said situation is true for a large volume of cases being preferred in the Court(s).  Ergo, the Courts ought to be prudent and cautious in dealing with such cases and must take into consideration all  the  pragmatic  realities  while  evaluating  the  matrimonial  discord  related criminal cases.  The Courts cannot be oblivious to countenancing the pragmatic and realistic necessities of time.  The High Court, while exercising inherent and intrinsic powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. of 1973; ought to countenance the tangible and concrete realities and cannot engirth itself in an ivory tower.

8.1    It has been observed, inveterately, that a wife after having entered into a willful and valid compromise/settlement with the accused-husband and/or his family members, tends to reap all the benefits thereof and, thereafter, does not step  forward  for  undertaking  the  necessary  steps  towards  having  the  FIR  in question  quashed.    The  Hon'ble  Supreme  Court  in  cases  of  Ruchi  Agarwal (supra) and Mohd. Shamim (supra) have extensively dealt with such like situation(s) & has enunciated that once the wife has reaped the benefit, she sought without contest on the basis of terms of such a compromise, it can be readily and unequivocally deciphered that conduct of such a wife in adopting 2024.04.30 10:17 dilatory  tactics  is  only  aimed  at  causing  harassment  to  the  husband/his CRM-M-40359-2022             12

family members. It is a settled cannon of our jurisprudence that credibility in the functioning of the justice delivery system and the reasonable perception of the affected parties are, but of-course, relevant considerations to ensure the continuation of public confidence in the credibility as also majesty of our jurisprudential set-up.  Needless to say that faith of people in the efficacy of law is; saviour and succour for the sustenance of the rule of law.

8.2    The essential question that next arises is as to whether the High Court, by way of exercising of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., can quash such an FIR (as also proceedings arising therefrom) in such a situation as was before Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases of Ruchi Agarwal (supra) and Mohd. Shamim (supra).  The nature, scope and ambit of powers of the High  Court  under  Section  482  of  Cr.P.C.,  1973  have  been  copiously delineated  in  the  case  of  Talima  (supra).    The  essential  postulate  that emerges is that the High Court; in its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of  Cr.P.C.;  has  unbridled,  unfettered  and  plenary  powers.  The  only restriction on exercise of such powers is self restraint.  Further, the nature, mode and extent of exercise of such intrinsic powers by the High Court depend upon the judicial discretion required to be wielded by a High Court in the facts and circumstance of a given case.

8.3    The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahmood Ali case (supra) has held that in case of vexatious or malicious proceedings, the High Court  is  saddled  with  a  bounden  duty  to  look  into  the  attending circumstances  as  also  can  even  go  on  to  read  between  the  lines,  while considering a plea for quashing of an FIR (as also all proceedings arising therefrom).  It is hence ineluctable that ends of justice are higher than ends of mere law though justice ought to be administered according to laws made 2024.04.30 10:17 by the legislature.  Accordingly; the High Court in exercise of its inherent CRM-M-40359-2022             13

powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. of 1973; can even well "read between the lines" as also examine the "attending circumstances" in a case if its facts/circumstances so warrant.

9.    As  a  sequel  to  above  discussion,  the  following  principles emerge: I.(i)   In  an  FIR,  arising  from  matrimonial  related  dispute,  where  the complainant/wife  has  reaped  the  benefits  of  a  compromise/settlement  & nothing more is required to be done by the accused-side/husband then such FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) deserves to be quashed.

(ii)  In  a  case of  above kind; the  complainant/wife may,  but of-course, raise  plea(s)  that  such  compromise/settlement  was  a  result  of fraud/coercion/duress etc. However, such plea(s) ought to be substantiated by  tangible  material  and  merely  bald  assertion  in  that  regard  would  not suffice.  Furthermore, before allowing the wife to raise such a plea(s), the Court  may  also  consider  directing  the  complainant/wife  to  return  the financial benefit(s) received in pursuance of such compromise/settlement. II.    In a case where the accused side/husband has undertaken some steps, in terms of as also in furtherance, of the compromise/settlement & such  accused  are  willing  to  undertake  all  further/remaining  act(s),  as required in terms of such compromise/settlement; the High Court will be well  within  its  jurisdiction,  under  Section  482  of  Cr.P.C.  of  1973,  to favorably consider such quashing petition upon the further/remaining act(s) being so undertaken by the accused side/husband. III.     No comprehensive/exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid-down in  this  regard  as every  case has  its own  unique  factual  conceptus. Needless to state that the High Court may exercise its intrinsic powers under CRM-M-40359-2022             14

Section 482 of Cr.P.C. of 1973 as called for in the facts/circumstance of a particular case. Analysis (re facts)

10.    Now  this  Court  reverts  to  the  facts  of  the  case  in  hand  to ratiocinate thereupon.

10.1    As  per  the  case  pleaded  by  the  petitioner-husband;  a compromise deed/agreement dated 03.08.2022 was entered into between the petitioner-husband  and  respondent  No.2-wife.  Acting  upon  the  said settlement/compromise,  the  petitioner-husband has  already  paid  a sum  of Rs.22.00  lacs  to  the  wife  towards  maintenance/permanent  alimony  for respondent No.2-wife as also the minor daughter born out of the wedlock; a mutual consent divorce decree has been passed by the concerned Family Court on 03.08.2022; the petitioner-husband has withdrawn on 03.08.2022 a petition  filed  by  him  under  Section  11  of  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  & respondent No.2-wife has also withdrawn on 03.08.2022 a petition filed by her under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., 1973 for grant of maintenance to herself and the minor daughter.  It, accordingly, is indubitable that respondent No.2-wife  has  reaped  all  benefits  from  the  compromise/settlement  deed  in question  and  has  also  withdrawn  a  maintenance  petition  filed  by  her  & nothing further remains to be done on part of the petitioner-husband.  So much so; the respondent No.2-wife, through her counsel, had admitted the factum  of  compromise/settlement  deed  which  stands  recorded  in  orders dated 05.09.2022 as also 20.03.2024 passed by this Court.

10.2    The  report  dated  18.04.2024  sent  by  the  concerned  Judicial Magistrate indicates that the petitioner-husband had turned up for having his statement recorded in terms of the order dated 20.03.2024 earlier passed by 2024.04.30 10:17 this Court & the Investigating Officer of the case has also appeared before CRM-M-40359-2022             15

the said Magistrate to submit that petitioner-husband was neither involved in any other case nor was declared a proclaimed offender by any Court of law. The said report also indicates that the respondent No.2/complainant/wife did not  turn  up  to  have  her  statement  recorded.    The  reason  thereof  is  not difficult to fathom, in the factual backdrop of the lis.

10.3    The  above  said  factual  matrix  clearly  reflects  that  the continuation of proceedings in the impugned FIR is nothing but sheer abuse of process of law and Courts.  Nothing except harassment would be caused to  the  petitioner-husband  in  case  the  proceedings  in  pursuance  of  the impugned  FIR  are  permitted  to  continue.  This  Court,  especially  while exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. of 1973, cannot be expected to turn Nelson's eye to the vexatious and virulent attempt(s) by unscrupulous elements in misusing the process of law in Courts.  Hence, it would be expedient in the interest of justice that the impugned FIR (as also the proceedings emanating therefrom) are quashed.

10.4    Before parting with this judgment, it is pertinent to note that the conduct of respondent No.2-wife is inexplicable in terms of bona fide.  Any attempt to misuse the process of law/Courts ought to be detested. The feeling of rancor or bitterness cannot be permitted to be genesis for procrastinating the culmination of legal proceedings especially when settlement/compromise has been arrived at between the rival parties.  Abhorrence of such attempt(s) is pertinent.  Ergo, the respondent No.2-wife deserves to be saddled with costs, which essentially ought to be in the nature of veritable real time costs. Decision

11.    In view of the above, it is directed as follows:

(i)    The impugned FIR No.584 dated 23.06.2018 registered for the 2024.04.30 10:17 offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323 and 406 of IPC at Police CRM-M-40359-2022             16

Station City Sirsa, District Sirsa as also all proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed.

(ii)    The respondent No.2-wife is saddled with costs of Rs.50,000/- which shall be deposited by her with Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Sirsa within four weeks from today.  In case such costs are deposited; CJM, Sirsa shall have the same remitted to Haryana State Legal Services Committee, Panchkula.  In case, the said costs are not deposited by respondent No.2-wife as  directed  for;  the  CJM,  Sirsa  is  directed  to  intimate  the  Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa who shall have such costs recovered from respondent No.2-wife  as  arrears  of  land  revenue  and  upon  realization  thereof,  the Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa shall have the same submitted to CJM, Sirsa, for further remittance thereof to Haryana State Legal Services Committee, Panchkula.  A  compliance  report  be  sent  by  CJM,  Sirsa  as  also  Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa to this Court accordingly.

(iii)    Registry  is  directed  to  transmit  a  copy  of  this  judgment  to respondent No.2-wife; CJM, Sirsa as also Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa for requisite compliance.

(SUMEET GOEL) JUDGE

April 29, 2024 Ajay

CRM-M-40359-2022 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-40359-2022 (O&M) Date of decision:29.04.2024 Deepak ....Petitioner V/s State of Haryana and another ....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL Present: Mr. Ojas Bansal, Advocate for the petitioner. Ms. Priyanka Sadar, AAG Haryana. Mr. Tejas Bansal, Advocate for respondent No.2. *****