Harcharan Singh Deceased Through Lrs Harmeet Singh v. Yashodha Nand

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA RSA No.445 of 2012 Reserved on: 21.07.2026

Decided on  : 30.09.2026 Uploaded on : 30.09.2026 Harcharan Singh (deceased) through LRs & Anr. …Appellants

Versus Yashoda Nand and Ors. …..Respondents Coram: The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Appellants      : Mr. Mukul Sood and Mr. Het Ram Thakur, Advocates.

For the Respondents      : Mr.   Jia   Lal   Thakur, Advocate,   vice   Mr.   G.R. Palsra,

Advocate,

for respondents No.1 to 3. Mr. Amardeep, Advocate, as Court

Guardian,

for respondents   No.13(e)(i)   to 13(e)(iii). ______________________________________________________ Virender Singh,

Judge The   appellants   have   preferred   the   present Regular Second Appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'CPC'), against   the   judgment   and   decree   dated   31.12.2011, passed   by   the   Court   of   learned   Additional   District Judge,   Mandi,   District   Mandi,   H.P.,   (hereinafter referred to as the First Appellate Court), in Civil Appeal No.76 of 2008, titled as Harcharan Singh and another versus Yashodha Nand and others.

¶2By   way   of   judgment   and   decree   dated

31.12.2011,   the   learned   First   Appellate   Court,   has dismissed the appeal of the present appellants, which had   been   filed   by   them,   against   the   judgment   and decree   dated   24.05.2008,   passed   by   the   Court   of learned   Civil   Judge,   (Junior   Division),   Court   No.2, Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the trial Court), in Civil Suit No. 314/99/97, titled as "Yashodha Nand Vs Harjeet Kaur (deceased) through LRs & Ors.".

¶3By   way   of   judgment   and   decree   dated

24.05.2008, the learned trial Court has decreed the suit of respondent No.1­Yashodha Nand and passed a preliminary decree.

¶4For the sake of convenience, the parties to the   lis   are,   hereinafter,   referred   to,   in   the   same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court.

¶5Brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal, before this Court, as borne out from the record, may be summed up, as under:­

5.1. Plaintiff­Yashodha Nand has filed a suit for redemption of mortgage against the defendants, on the ground,   that   his   father   has   mortgaged   the   property comprised in Khewat­Khatauni Nos. 81/167 to 174, bearing   Khasra   Nos.2134,   2136,   2142,   2147,   2155, 2153,   2156,   2144,   2133,   2137,   2140,   2143,   2148, 2151,   2152,   2154,   Kittas­16,   measuring   229.64   Sq. meters, situated at Mauza Tarna Mandi Town, District Mandi,   H.P.,   consisting   of   house   and   shops   two storeyed, (hereinafter referred to as the suit property).

5.2. According to him, the date of mortgage is

27.04.1973   and   mortgagor   was   Madho   Prashad Sharma, son of Jiwa Nand (father of the plaintiff) and mortgagees were defendants.

5.3. The said property was mortgaged for a sum of   Rs.35,000/­   with   interest   at   the   rate   of   1%   per month, which is liable to be adjusted, in rent of suit property.     According   to  him,   it  was   agreed  between mortgagor and the mortgagees that the suit property will be redeemed, on payment of the mortgage amount, with interest, as per the terms and conditions.   The proforma   defendants   have   consented   to   redeem,   on obtaining their due shares, in sum secured which, they have got obtained and in this manner 2/3rd share of property in mortgage stood redeemed.

5.4. According to the plaintiff, he is entitled to redeem   the   property,   on   payment   of   due   share   of mortgage to defendants No.1 and 2, i.e. Rs.11,700/­ with interest, for which, defendants No.1 to 3, were requested, in the last week of January, 1996, to accept the   amount   and   recovery   and   redeem   the   property, which, defendants Nos. 1 to 3 have been evading.   The legal   notice,   in   this   regard   was   also   served,   upon defendants Nos.1 to 3.

5.5. On the basis of the above facts, the plaintiff has   prayed   that   the   subject   matter   of   the   lis,   may kindly   be   redeemed   and   preliminary   decree,   to   that effect, may kindly be passed, by permitting the plaintiff to deposit the mortgage amount.

¶6When,   put   to   notice,   the   suit   has   been contested, by the defendants.   Defendant No.1(c) has filed   the   written   statement,   by   pleading   that   the defendant   is   in   possession   of   one   shop,   comprising Khasra   No.2147.     The   same   was   in   possession   of defendant  No.1(c),   on   the   basis   of   Rent   Deed   dated

22.03.1997,   executed   between   the   plaintiff   and defendant No.1(c) with the consent of Lala Bisan Singh, who   was   the   father   of   defendant   and   expired   on

22.08.1999.  He has made no objection, if, the property is redeemed, but, according to him, plaintiff shall not interfere   in   the   physical   possession   of   defendant No.1(c), over Khasra No.2147.

6.1. Defendants No.1(a) and 2, have filed their separate written statement, admitting that the father of defendant was in possession of one shop, as tenant, comprising Khasra No.2147 and entry to this effect, is in revenue record and Kultar Singh, being son of Bisan Singh, is entitled to retain the possession to the extent of 1/5 share.   Admitting the claim of the plaintiff, a condition has been put forward that he is not entitled for the possession of Khasra No.2147.

6.2. Defendant No.1(e) filed the separate written statement, by admitting that the father of defendant was   tenant,   in   the   shop   constructed   over   Khasra No.2147.   Admitting the claim of the plaintiff, it has been pleaded that the plaintiff is not entitled for the possession of land bearing Khasra No.2147. According to him, he is entitled to receive the redemption money.

6.3. Defendants   No.1   (b)   and   3   filed   their separate written statement, by taking the stand that the shop comprising Khasra No.2147, together with the store   was   on   lease,   with   late   Sardar   Bishan   Singh, which   tenancy   was   originally   created   by   late   Bajir Madho   Prashad   Sharma,   father   of   the   plaintiff   and after the death of said Sardar Bishan Singh, his sons and daughters are the tenants.     According to them, after the death of Sardar Bishan Singh, his successors are necessary parties.

6.4. It   is   his   further   case   that   the   plaintiff colluded   with   Sardar   Narender   Singh,   son   of   late Sardar Bishan Singh, prior to the institution of the present suit, executed a fake, false and concocted rent note in his favour.  Suit is also stated to be not valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction; the suit is not maintainable.

6.5. Since, the suit has only been contested, by defendants No.1(b) and 3, as such, the plaintiff has filed the replication, in which, it has been pleaded that the   shop,   comprising   Khasra   No.   2147   was   in   the tenancy of late Sardar Bishan Singh and thereafter, Sardar Narender Singh, who was running business, in the premises, in dispute and suit is stated to be with regard to redemption of mortgage and not with regard to   the   tenancy,   as   such,   tenants   are   stated   to   be necessary   parties.   Preliminary   objections   have   also been denied.

¶7From the pleadings of the parties, following issues   were   framed   by   the   learned   trial  Court,   vide order dated 08.01.2003: 1).   Whether   the   plaintiff   is   entitled   to redeem   the   suit   property   and   deposit the mortgage amount? OPP. 2). Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPP. 3). Whether the suit is not maintainable in the eyes of law?OPD­1(b) & 3. 4). Whether the defendant No.1(b) has suffered by loss and is entitled to be indemnified  by  the  plaintiff?  If  so,  its effects? OPD­1(b). 5).   Whether   the   suit   is   bad   for   non joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OPD­1(b). 6). Whether the legal representatives of the   plaintiffs'   father   late   Sh.   Madho Prashad Sharma are necessary parties? If so, its effect? OPD­1(b). 7). Whether the defendant No.1(c) is in possession   of   one   shop   comprised   in Khasra   No.2147   on   the   basis   of   rent deed   dated   22.03.1997   executed between him and the plaintiff with the consent of late Bishan Singh as alleged? If so, its effects? OPD­1(c). 8).   Whether   the   defendant   No.2   is entitled to 1/3rd share in the shop as alleged? OPD­2.

9. Relief.

¶8Thereafter, parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence.

¶9After   closure   of   the   evidence,   the   learned trial   Court,   upon   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the parties, decreed the suit of the plaintiff and preliminary decree was passed.

¶10Against   the   said   judgment   and   decree, defendants No.1(b) and 3, filed the First Appeal, under Section 96 of CPC, before the learned First Appellate Court.

¶11The findings of the learned trial Court have been assailed, on the ground, that the plaintiff is not entitled   to   redeem   the   property,   without   joining   the other legal heirs of late Madho Prashad.  The learned trial Court has wrongly relied upon the joint affidavits of   Shyam   Sharma,   Sanoo   Sharma,   Raksha   Sharma and Sansari Devi, as the said joint affidavit has not been proved, in accordance with law, as none of the deponents has appeared in the witness box, to state the   contents   thereof   and   opportunity   of   cross examination has not been given to the defendants.

¶12The findings have further been assailed, on the   ground,   that   the   suit  of   the   plaintiff   for   partial redemption is not maintainable.  The document Ex.DA, is stated to be not a public document and the contents of the same cannot be proved, by oral evidence.

¶13On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the appeal, by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and it has also been prayed that suit of the plaintiff may kindly be dismissed.

¶14The   learned   First   Appellate   Court,   in   the present case, has dismissed the appeal, vide judgment and decree dated 31.12.2011.

¶15Feeling aggrieved from the said judgment and decree, present Regular Second Appeal has been filed, before this Court, in which, findings have been assailed, on the ground, that both the Courts below have   misconstrued   the   documents   Ext.   DA,   Ext. DW3/A, Ext. DW3/B, Ext. DW4/A, Ext. DW4/C, and Ext. P­1 to Ext. P­3.

¶16The findings have further been assailed, on the ground, that the mortgage, in the present case, had neither, been redeemed, nor, could be redeemed, in the manner,   in   which,   it   has   been   alleged   and   no contribution allegedly having been proved to have been made by defendant No.2, as such, there could be no redemption.

¶17It is the case of the appellants/defendants that   peacemeal   redemption   of   the   property   is   not permissible in law.   The relief granted, while passing the   preliminary   decree,   in   the   alternative,   are contradictory and not sustainable.

¶18According to the appellants, both the Courts below   have   failed   to   consider   the   fact   that   the appellants were tenants in the property, as such, a specific direction ought to have been issued that the redemption   of   the   property   would   not   affect   their tenancy as their tenancy was prior to the mortgage. The judgment is also stated to be in violation of the provisions of Order 20, Rule 5 of CPC.

¶19On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Mukul Sood,   Advocate,   appearing   for   the   appellants   has prayed   that   the   appeal   may   kindly   be   allowed,   by setting   aside   the   judgment   and   decree   passed   by learned trial Court, as upheld by the the learned First Appellate Court and the suit of the plaintiff may kindly be dismissed.

¶20The   appeal   has   been   admitted,   on   the following substantial questions of law:­ 1). Whether the judgment  of the Court below is perverse, based on misreading of oral and documentary evidence and pleadings   of   the   parties   and misconstruction of the basic document of title Exhibit DA and documents DW3/A, DW3/B, DW4/A, DW4/C and P1 to P3? 2).   Whether   on   the   pleadings   of   the parties   and   the   material   on   record,   it had to be held that the property could not be partly redeemed and in any case, the   appellants   have   not   received   their share of the mortgage amount pursuant to   the   alleged   redemption   when   the appellant   Avinash   Kaur   contributed Rs.8,000/­?

¶21This Court, while exercising the power under Section   100   of   CPC,   can   only   interfere   with   the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, as upheld by the learned First Appellate Court, if the findings are perverse.

¶22Hon'ble   Apex   Court   in Arulvelu   and Another   Versus  State represented by the Public Prosecutor  &  Another,   (2009)  10  Supreme  Court Cases   206,  has   elaborately   discussed   the   term 'perverse findings'.     Relevant paragraphs 24 to 30 of the said judgment, are reproduced, as under:­ "24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others (2001) 1 SCC 501 this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate   authority   are   not   supported   by   the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others  AIR 1966 Cal. 31, the Court observed   that   `perverse   finding'   means   a   finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In  Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, the Court observed that this   is   not   a   case   where   it   can   be   said   that   the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.

¶26  In  M.   S.   Narayanagouda   v.   Girijamma   & Another  AIR 1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc.

27. The expression  "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:

1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition "Perverse – Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable."

¶2  Longman   Dictionary   of   Contemporary English – International Edition "Perverse – Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable."

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English ­ 1998 Edition "Perverse   –   Law   (of   a   verdict)   against   the weight   of   evidence   or   the   direction   of   the judge on a point of law."

4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) "Perverse   –   Purposely   deviating   from accepted   or   expected   behavior   or   opinion; wicked   or   wayward;   stubborn;   cross   or petulant."

5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition "Perverse – A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence."

28. In  Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P.

(2003) 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus: "We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the   charges   as   the   view   taken   by   it   was reasonable   one   and   the   order   of   acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the   same   is   found   to   be   perverse.   In   the present case, the High Court has committed an   error   in   interfering   with   the   order   of acquittal   of   the   appellants   recorded   by   the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity."

29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the scope of  Articles 32  and  226  of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.

10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse   and   those   which   are   not.   If   a decision   is   arrived   at   on   no   evidence   or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which   could   be   relied   upon,   howsoever compendious   it   may   be,   the   conclusions would   not   be   treated   as   perverse   and   the findings would not be interfered with."

30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer­cum­ Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points   on   which   the   challenge   to   the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained   was   not   appropriate.   In   our opinion,   the   High   Court   was   in   error   in constituting   itself   into   a   court   of   appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the   respondent   to   have   raised   and   for   the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to  Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High   Court   re­appreciate   the   primary   or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the   domain   of   the   fact­finding   authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary   or   inferential   facts   based   on primary   facts   found   by   the   statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was,   in   substance,   the   correctness   –   as distinguished from the legal permissibility – of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material   or   by   taking   into   consideration irrelevant   material   or   if   the   finding   so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law."

¶23Similar view has again been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 'S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another', reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment, is reproduced, as under:­ "30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or   excluding   relevant   material   or   by taking

into

consideration irrelevant/inadmissible   material.   The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no   evidence   or   thoroughly   unreliable evidence   and   no   reasonable   person would act upon  it, the order  would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record   which   is   acceptable   and   which could   be   relied   upon,   the   conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings   would   not   be   interfered   with. (Vide:  Rajinder   Kumar   Kindra   v.   Delhi Administration, Kuldeep   Singh   v. Commissioner   of  Police  &  Ors.,  Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh

thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala)."

¶24Being guided, by the above decisions, now this Court would proceed further to consider the fact, whether   the   documents   Ext.DA,   Ext.   DW3/A,   Ext. DW3/B, Ext. DW4/A, Ext. DW4/C and Ext. P­1 to Ext. P­3, have rightly been considered, by the learned trial Court or not.

¶25Ext. D­A is the copy of the mortgage deed, by virtue of which, Madho Prashad Sharma, mortgaged the subject matter of the lis, in favour of Sansar Devi, Mohani Devi, Harjeet Kaur, Prakash Kaur and Avinash Kaur.   As per clause 8 of this document, there is a stipulation   that   without   the   consent   of   the   owner, mortgaged property could not be rented out, whereas the defendants in the present case, have taken the plea that one shop, out of the suit property, was rented out, which is contrary to Ext. D­A.

¶26Ext. P­1 is the affidavit of Smt. Sansari Devi, by   virtue   of   which,   she   has   accepted   1/3rd   of   the mortgaged amount from plaintiff Yashodha Nand and possession of the shops and houses has been handed over to him.

¶27Similarly,   vide   affidavit   Ext.   P­2,   Shyam Sharma,   Jagdish   Chander   Sharma­sons   and   Smt. Shano Sharma & Smt. Raksha Sharma­daughters of Madhoo Prakash had accepted the mortgaged money qua   1/3rd   of   their   share   and   handed   over   the possession to plaintiff Yashodha Nand, after receiving a sum of Rs. 11,667/­.

¶28This document has rightly been considered by   the   learned   trial   Court   to   consider   the   scope   of partial   redemption   of   the   subject   matter   of   the   lis. Even,   the   learned   first   appellate   Court   has   rightly considered   the   stand   of   the   plaintiff,   according   to which,   the   share   of   other   mortgagees   was   already redeemed,   as   such,   the   plaintiff   has   every   right   to redeem the share of remaining mortgagee.

¶29Considering   the   prayer,   as   made   by   the plaintiff, for redemption of the mortgage, the stand, as taken by the defendants has rightly been negated by learned trial Court, as upheld by learned first appellate Court.

¶30Considering   the   above   facts,   there   is   no reason   to   interfere   with   the   judgment   and   decree passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court,   as   well   as,   the learned first appellate Court.

¶31Consequently,

both the

substantial questions of law, are liable to be decided against the appellants.   Ordered accordingly.   Consequently, the appeal is dismissed, however, there shall be no orders as to cost.

¶32Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.

¶33Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

¶34Record be sent back.

( Virender Singh ) Judge 30th September, 2026 (Subhash/Pramod Kumar)