Sri N Pradeep Kumar v. The State of Karnataka

Order from the Competent – Authorities may be awaited.

Submitted for kind orders.

Sd/-

7.12.2016 DRE – 3

51) xxxx

52) DRE – 3

The Competent Authority has issued Government Order vide No. RDP 863 GPS 2016, Bengaluru dated 07.01.2017 to hold departmental enquiry against respondent No.2 / Shri. Sanju Kumar, PDO, Gadilingadhalli, Chincholi Taluk, Kalaburgi District (Date of retirement

30.06.2035). The Government Order issued by the Competent Authority is in accordance with the recommendation made in the report under Sec. 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984.

Copies of the report under Sec.12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 dated 03.12.2016 & Government Order dated 07.01.2017 are submitted herewith for the favour of issuing nomination order.

In this case, no nomination order has been issued earlier.

Further, with respect to non receipt of Government order pertaining to respondent No.1, a separate note will be submitted before the Hon'ble Upalokayukta – 1 seeking further orders.

Sd/-

12.1.17. DRE-3

53) Hon'ble Registrar Put up draft nomination proceedings.

Sd/- Registrar

54) In view of the submission made by the Scrutiny Officer i.e., DRE-3, in Pre-paras, draft proceedings in No.UPLOK-1/DE/61/2017, for nominating the Inquiry Officer is submitted in the file for kind perusal.

Sd/- 13.01.2017 Gazetted Assistant

55) Hon'ble Registrar

The Additional Registrar of Enquiries – 3 may kindly be nominated as the Inquiry Officer. Accordingly, draft proceedings are placed in the file for kind approval.

Sd/- 13/1

Registrar

56) Hon'ble Upalokayukta

ARE – 3 – is nominated

Sd/- 13/1 Upalokayukta, State of Karnataka.

57) Registrar

Copies of Nomination proceedings signed.

Sd/- 13/1 Registrar

58) DRE – 3

In this case 12(3) report was sent against respondents 1 & 2.

The Competent Authority of respondent No.2 has issued Government Order. Based on the said Government Order, nomination order has already been issued and departmental enquiry against him is under process.

With respect to respondent No.1 who is an official belongs to Water Resource Department, the Competent Authority has not issued Government Order to hold departmental enquiry against him.

59) Hence, my lord, if approved, a reminder may be sent to the Competent Authority of respondent no.1 and G.O. against him may be awaited.

Submitted for kind orders.

Sd/-8.2.17 DRE – 3

60) xxxx

61) DRE – 3

In this case Nomination Order vide No.Uplok-1/DE/61/2017 has already been issued to hold departmental inquiry against respondent No.2. The said enquiry has been entrusted to ARE - 3.

Now, the Competent Authority of respondent no.1 has issued Government Order vide No. WRD 193 SDE 2016, Bengaluru dated 13.02.2017 to hold departmental enquiry against Shri.Nagendrappa S/o Sharanappa, Assistant Engineer, Lowerti Bund Mullamari Project sub-Division, Chimmanachola (respondent no.1). The Government Order issued by the Competent Authority is in accordance with the recommendation made in the report under Sec. 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984.

Copies of the report under Sec.12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 dated 03.12.2016 & Government Order dated 13.02.2017 along with copy of earlier nomination order are submitted herewith for the favour of issuing nomination order.

The date of retirement of respondent no.1 is

31.05.2030.

Sd/- DRE – 3

1.3.17.

62) Hon'ble Registrar

Put up draft nomination proceedings.

Sd/- 3/3 Registrar

63) In view of the submissions made by the Scrutiny Officer i.e., DRE-3, at pre-paras, draft proceedings in No.UPLOK-1/DE/340/2017, for nominating the Inquiry Officer is submitted in the file for kind perusal.

Sd/- Sr.J.W

03.03.17

64) Registrar The Additional Registrar of Enquiries – 3 may kindly be nominated as the Inquiry Officer. Accordingly, draft proceedings are placed in the file for kind approval.

Sd/- Registrar

65) Hon'ble Upalokayukta

ARE – 3 – is – nominated

Sd/- Upalokayukta State of Karnataka 66) Registrar

Copies of Nomination Proceedings signed.

Sd/- 4/3 Registrar

67) DRE – 3

In view of the nomination orders vide No.UPLOK-1/DE/61/2017 dtd.13.01.2017 & UPLOK-1/DE/340/2017dtd.

03.03.2017, records have been sent to ARE-3 to proceed with the enquiry against the respondents.

68) Hence, kind orders are sought to send this complaint file to records under 'B' disposal

Submitted for kind orders.

Sd/-

13.3.17 DRE – 3 69) xxxx "

Two glaring facts emerge from the entire order sheet maintained by the office of the 2nd respondent-Lokayukta concerning the enquiry against the petitioner would clearly indicate that the Lokayukta insisted upon the enquiry to be entrusted to its hands and at note No.61, it is clearly indicated that the competent authority had issued the Government Order entrusting the enquiry to the Lokayukta and the Government Order issued was in accordance with the recommendation made in its report under section 12(3) of the Act.

¶21Thus, it becomes clear that no discretion isexercised by the competent authority to take a decision,

as to whether the enquiry has to be entrusted into the hands of the 2nd respondent-Lokayukta or otherwise. It is a clear case of the competent authority abdicating its discretion to an external agency like the 2nd respondent-Lokayukta.

¶22Sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Act casts aduty upon the competent authority to examine the report forwarded to it and then take a decision after such examination. A bare perusal of the order entrusting the enquiry under Rule 14-A of the Rules depicts flagrant violation of Section 12(4) of the Act as the competent authority has not even examined as required under Section 12(4) of the Act as to whether enquiry requires to be entrusted to Lokayukta or is there any grievance worthwhile to hold an enquiry again the petitioner. All that the order dated 7.1.2017 would say is the extract of the findings in the report to the Lokayukta under Section 12(3) of the Act and the fact that the Upa-Lokayukta has sought enquiry to be entrusted to itself and in those circumstances, the enquiry was entrusted. Perusal of the order sheet would clearly indicate that the reminders were sent to the competent authority by the 2nd respondent to entrust the enquiry to itself.

¶23The unequivocal fact that would emerge, fromour consideration above, is that the disciplinary authority/competent authority has surrendered its discretion of decision making to the dictates of the 2nd respondent-Lokayukta thereby abdicating its duty cast

under Section 12(4) of the Act. Abdication of ones discretion in decision making and capitulating to the dictates of the external agency amounts to itself nonapplication of mind in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of STATE OF U.P. VS. MAHARAJA DHARMANDER PRASAD SINGH reported in (1989)2 SCC 505, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 55 has held as follows :

¶55It is true that in exercise of powers of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partakes of a quasi-judicial complexion and that in exercising of the former power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind, consider impartially the objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot permit its decision to be influenced by the dictation of others as this would amount to abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the authority's discretion that is exercised, but someone else's. If an authority "hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires". Such an interference by a person or body extraneous to the power would plainly be contrary to the nature of the power conferred upon the authority. De Smith sums up the position thus: "The relevant principles formulated by the courts may be broadly summarised as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: failure to

exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive." In a subsequent judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ANIRUDHSINHJI KARANSINHJI JADEJA V. STATE OF GUJARAT reported in (1995) 5 SCC 302 at paragraphs 12 to 14 has held as follows :

¶12Reference may be made in this connectionto Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji [1952 SCR 135 : AIR 1952 SC 16] , in which the action of Commissioner of Police in cancelling the permission granted to the respondent for construction of cinema in Greater Bombay at the behest of the State Government was not upheld, as the rules concerned had conferred this power on the Commissioner, because of which it was stated that the Commissioner was bound to bear his own independent and unfettered judgment and decide the matter for himself, instead of forwarding an order which another authority had purported to pass.

¶13It has been stated by Wade and Forsyth inAdministrative Law, 7th Edn. at pp. 358-59 under the heading "Surrender, Abdication, Dictation" and sub-heading "Power in the wrong hands" as below: "Closely akin to delegation, and scarcely distinguishable from it in some cases, is any arrangement by which a power conferred upon one authority is in substance exercised by another. The proper authority may share its power with someone else, or may allow someone else to dictate to it by declining to act without their consent or by submitting to their wishes or instructions. The effect then is that the discretion conferred by Parliament is exercised, at least in part, by the wrong authority, and the resulting decision is ultra vires and void. So strict are the courts in applying this principle that they condemn some administrative arrangements which must seem quite natural and proper to those who make them…. Ministers and their departments have several times fallen foul of the same rule, no doubt equally to their surprise…."

¶14The present was thus a clear case ofexercise of power on the basis of external dictation. That the dictation came on the prayer of the DSP will not make any difference to the principle. The DSP did not exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by the statute and did not grant approval to the recording of information under TADA in exercise of his discretion.

¶24In terms of the law declared by the Hon'bleSupreme Court in the afore extracted judgments, it becomes unmistakably clear that discretion, which is surrendered to an external agency, would itself suffer from the vice of non-application of mind.

¶25The report under Section 12(3) of the Act is communicated by the 2nd respondent-Lokayukta to the competent authority and in terms of the report, entrustment of enquiry was ordered to the hands of the 2nd respondent under Section 12(4) of the Act. The statute mandates examination of the material before the enquiry is entrusted. The word 'examine' means to 'test critically' as defined in the Major Law Lexicon 4th edition 2010 Lexis-Nexis-Butterworth-Wadhwa-Nagpur at page 2455. The words 'consider' and 'examine' are synonyms (see Roget's International Thesaurus, 3rd Edition Oxford Book Company, page No.765 and 316). The importance of the word consider and its purport has been elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of BARIUM CHEMICALS LTD AND ANOTHER VS. SH. A. J. RANA AND OTHERS reported in (1972)1 SCC 240 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interpreted the word 'consider' which is nothing but examination. In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

¶14The words "considers it necessary"postulate that the authority concerned has thought over the matter deliberately and with care and it has been found necessary as a result of such thinking to pass the order. The dictionary meaning of the word "consider" is "to view attentively, to survey, examine, inspect (arch), to look attentively, to contemplate

mentally, to think over, meditate on, give heed to, take note of, to think deliberately, bethink oneself, to reflect" (vide Shorter Oxford Dictionary). According to Words and Phrases — Permanent Edition Vol. 8-A "to consider" means to think with care. It is also mentioned that to "consider" is to fix the mind upon with a view to careful examination; to ponder; study; meditate upon, think or reflect with care. It is therefore, manifest that careful thinking or due application of the mind regarding the necessity to obtain and examine the documents in question is sine qua non for the making of the order. If the impugned order were to show that there has been no careful thinking or proper application of the mind as to the necessity of obtaining and examining the documents specified in the order, the essential requisite to the making of the order would be held to be non-existent.

¶15A necessary corollary of what has beenobserved above is that mind has to be applied with regard to the necessity to obtain and examine all the documents mentioned in the order. An application of the mind with regard to the necessity to obtain and examine only a few of the many documents mentioned in the order, while there has been no such application of mind in respect of the remaining documents, would not be sufficient compliance with the requirements of the statute. If, however, there has been consideration of the matter regarding the necessity to obtain and examine all the documents and an order is passed thereafter, the Court would stay its hand in the matter and would not substitute its own opinion for that of the authority concerned regarding the necessity to obtain the documents in question. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of LIC Vs. A. MASILAMANI, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 at paragraph 19 has held as follows :

¶19The word "consider" is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, "to think over", "to regard as", or "deem to be". Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term "consider" postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar [(2006) 11 SCC 147 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 388] and BhikhubhaiVithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [(2008) 4 SCC 144 : AIR 2008 SC 1771] .)

If the case on hand is examined in terms of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as extracted herein above, it unequivocally demonstrates non-application of mind by the competent authority. It is apposite to refer to a Judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court in an identical case involving a challenge to the order of entrustment in the case of KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA Vs. H.N. NIRANJAN & ANOTHER reported in 2017(6) KLJ 80, wherein it is held as follows :

¶3It appears that the tribunal has exercised the power of allegiance breach and noncompliance to the provisions of section 12(4) of the Karnataka Lokayukta act, 1984. The relevant reasoning recorded by the tribunal in the impugned order at para-7 reads as under: One other ground urged on behalf of the applicant is that there is non-compliance of Section 12(4) of the Lokayukta Act by the first respondent while taking further action on the recommendation made by the Hon'ble UpaLokayukta in the report under Section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act. Section 12(4) o the Lokayukta Act reads as follows:- "The Competent Authority shall examine the report forwarded to it under subsection (3) and within three months of the date of receipt of the report, intimae or cause to be intimated to the Lokayukta or the Upa-Lokayukta the action taken or proposed to be taken on the basis of the repot." Inviting our attention to Section 12(4) of the Lokayukta Act, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the applicant that a reading of he impugned order dated 12.11.2013 prima facie indicates that there is non-compliance for Section 12(4) of the Karnataka Act by the first respondent, for the reason that the first respondent has failed to examine the report forwarded under Section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act before ordering departmental enquiry in the matter. In the preamble to the Government Order dated 12.11.2013, paras – 1 and 2 relate to the substance of the recommendation made by the UpaLokayukta. In para – 3 of the Government Order, it is stated that as recommended by the Hon'ble UpaLokayukta, it has been decided to hold disciplinary proceedings against the applicant and to entrust the same to UpaLokayukta. It has not been mentioned in the impugned order dated

12.11.2013, that the first respondent has examined the report

sent under Section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act. When the statute mandates examination of the report sent under Section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act, it is the bounden duty of the Competent Authority to which the said report is sent, to examine the report before taking any decision on the recommendation made in the report under Section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act. The object of examination of the report sent under Section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act is to ensure that the public servant concerned is not subjected to any unwarranted disciplinary action. When the statute mandates examination of the report, the Competent Authority has to comply such mandates and failure in that regard invalidates the decision taken on such report. A reading of the impugned Government Order dated 12.11.2013 no where indicates that the first respondent has examined the report sent under Section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act. It is only stated that as recommended by the Hon'ble UpaLokayukta, it has been decided to hold disciplinary proceedings and to entrust the same to UpaLokayukta concerned. It can be certainly said that the omission of the first respondent in this regard, which amount to non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of Rule 12(4) of the Lokayukta Act, has resulted in the vitiation of the order dated 12.11.2013 passed by the first respondent. We have to note in this case that in the complaint filed before the Karnataka Lokayukta in the matter, there was no allegation against the applicant the name of the applicant figures in the case for the first time in the report submitted by the Technical Wing of the Karnataka Lokayukta. It Is Submitted On Behalf Of the Applicant That the Assistant Executive Engineer concerned was the implementation officer as regard to the concerned work and that the applicant cannot be held to be liable for any irregularity in the matter. The contentions of the applicant in this regard in the above facts are required to be examined by the first respondent while considering the recommendation made by the Upa-Lokayukta in the report under section 12(3) of the Lokayukta act. It is for the said reason, the competent authority concerned has been mandated to examine the report forwarded to it under section 12(3) of the Lokayukta act. At the cost of repetition, we may point out that nowhere in the impugned order report under section 12(3) of the Lokayuktha act has been examined by the first respondent before passing the order dated 12.11.2013 directing initiation of departmental inquiry against the applicant. The Competent Authority has blindly accepted the recommendation made in the report sent under section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act and directed initiation of inquiry against the applicant. Having regard to the same, the order of initiation of departmental inquiry against the applicant and entrustment of the inquiry to the Hon'ble Upa-Lokayukta as per order dated 12.11.20 13 will have to be quashed. Consequently, all further proceedings pursuant to the said order, particularly issuance

of articles of charge dated 20.01.2014 cannot be sustained. However, the first respondent will be at liberty to examine the report and take appropriate action in the matter."

¶5It is not the case of the petitioner herein, that the State Government has independently considered the matter under section 12(4) Of the Lokayukta Act and thereafter had passed the order. But the only contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that in the preamble of the order the State Government has referred to the contents of the recommendation of the Lokayukta and therefore it may be considered as deemed consideration by the State Government and resultantly compliance to section 12(4) of the Act.

¶6We are afraid that such contention can be accepted. What is required to be considered as per the provisions of 12(4) of the act is consideration and application of mind by the Government for concurring with the opening of the Lokayukta, for initiation of inquiry. When There Is No Examination of the Case by the Government under Section 12(4) of the Act. It cannot be said that the tribunal had committed any error which may call for any interference by this Court. In terms of the facts narrated hereinabove, perusal of the entire order sheet pertaining to the case and the law declared in the afore-extracted judgments, the order of entrustment impugned, entrusting the enquiry to the hands of the 2nd respondent to the hands of the 2nd respondent - Lokayukta suffers from non application of mind and is vitiated. The point is answered accordingly.

¶26Re. Point No.2: To consider this point in terms of the submission made by learned Counsel for the respondent No.2Lokayukta, the provisions under which the Lokayukta would get jurisdiction to hold an enquiry against a Government Servant requires to be noticed. The relevant Rule i.e. Rule 14-A of the Rules is extracted hereunder for the purpose of ready reference.

"Rule 14-A: Procedure in cases entrusted to the Lokayukta: (1) The provisions of sub-rule (2) shall, notwithstanding anything contained in rule 9 to 11A and 13, be applicable for purposes of proceeding against Government Servants whose alleged misconduct has been investigated into by the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta either under the provisions of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 or on a reference from Government. 3 [or where offences alleged against them punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, or the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has been investigated by the Karnataka Lokayukta Police before 21st day of December, 1992.]

(2) (a) Where on investigation into any allegation against –

(i) a member of the State Civil ServicesGroup-A or Group-B; or

(ii) a member of the State Civil ServicesGroup-A or Group-B and a member of the State Civil Services Group-C or Group-D; or

(iii) a member of the State Civil ServicesGroup-C or Group-D, [the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta or, (before the twenty first day of December, 1992), the Inspector General of Police of the Karnataka Lokayukta Police is of the opinion], that disciplinary proceedings shall be taken, he shall forward the record of the investigation along with his recommendation to the Government and the Government, after examining such record, may either direct an inquiry into the case by the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta or direct the appropriate Disciplinary Authority to take action in accordance with Rule 12.

(b) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiryinto a case under clause (a) the enquiry may be conducted either by the Lokayukta or the Upalokayuka, as the case may be, or an officer on the staff of the Lokayukta authorised by the Lokayukta, or the Upalokayukta to conduct the inquiry; Provided that the inquiry shall not be conducted by an officer lower in rank than that of Government servant against whom it is held. Provided further that an inquiry against a Government Servant not lower in rank than that of a Deputy Commissioner shall not be conducted by any person other than the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta or an Additional Registrar (Inquiries). Provided also that an officer on the staff of the Lokayukta authorised to conduct an inquiry under clause (b)

shall not have the power to appoint another officer to conduct it wholly or in part.

(c) The Lokayukta, the Upalokayukta orthe Officer authorised under clause (b) to conduct an inquiry shall conduct it in accordance with the provisions of rule 11 in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this rule and for that purpose shall have the powers of the Disciplinary Authority referred to in the said Rule.

(d) After the inquiry is completed, therecord of the case along with the findings of the Inquiring Officer and the recommendation of the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta, as the case may be, shall be sent to the Government.

(e) On receipt of the record under clause(d) the Government shall take action in accordance with the provisions of 1 [xxx] Rule 11-A and in all such cases the Government shall be the Disciplinary Authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 8.

(3) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall be applicable to members of the Karnataka Judicial Service or Government servants under the administrative control of such members or of the High Court of Karnataka. (Explanation.- In this rule, the expressions 'Lokayukta' and 'Upalokayukta' shall respectively have the meaning assigned to them in the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, and the expression 'Karnataka Lokayukta Police' means the Police Wing established under Section 15 of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 and includes, so far as may be, the corresponding establishment under the Karnataka State Vigilance Commission Rules, 1980, and the Expression 'Inspector General of Police' shall be construed accordingly.

¶27Relying upon the afore-extracted provisions,learned Counsel for the respondent No.2 in particular Rule 14-A (2) (a) (iii) would contend that if the investigation is conducted by the Lokayukta, the Government has no other option, but to entrust the enquiry to the Lokayukta.

¶28We are unable to accept the contention. Rule14-A(2) (a) (iii) cannot be read in isolation, it has to be read along with the other clauses under Rule 14-A.

Rule 14-A(1) enumerates classes of cases to which Rule 14-A would apply Sub-Rule (2) commands that record of investigation should be forwarded by the Lokayukta to the disciplinary authority with his recommendation and Government after examining such record shall take a decision either to entrust the inquiry to the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta or direct the appropriate authority to resort to Rule 12 which would be for imposition of a minor penalty. A further reading of the other clauses would clearly indicate the purport of the provision relied on by the learned counsel for the second respondent, Clauses

(d) and (e) of Rule 14-A would clearly indicate that after the inquiry is completed, the record of the case along with the findings of the inquiring officer and the recommendation of the Lokayukta or the Upa Lokayukta as the case may be, Shall be sent to the Government, clause (e) mandates that on receipt of the record under clause (d) the Government shall take action in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11-A and in all such cases the Government shall be the disciplinary authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 8.

¶29A conjoint reading of the provisions indicated herein above would unequivocally make it clear that the discretion is available to the Government to entrust the inquiry to the second respondent or otherwise in case the Government is of the opinion that it is a case only for imposition of minor penalty under Rule 12, where there is no necessity to hold regular departmental inquiry,

it may advise the appropriate disciplinary authority to take action for imposition of such minor penalty, this provision would not mean that when the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that a major penalty should be imposed or in all cases where proceedings under minor penalties are not taken up, the inquiry has to be entrusted to the Lokayukta. This interpretation of the second respondent that the inquiry has to be entrusted to the Lokayukta, once the investigation is conducted by them and a report is submitted to the Government under Section 12(3) would render the power of the Government or the discretion of the Government being completely taken away and rendering the provision nugatory. This is not the purport of the statute. The law with regard to discretion as discussed in the preceding paragraphs with regard to point No.1, would be applicable to this contention as well. This point is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioner.

¶30Re. Point No.3 The Tribunal, by the impugned order, has rejected the challenge of the petitioner to the order of entrustment on the ground that it is premature and the petitioner does not have a right to question the order of entrustment at that stage of the proceedings. The Tribunal has followed the judgment rendered by a Coordinate Bench in Writ Petition No.104460/2018 and connected cases, by its order dated 10.09.2018. The facts obtaining in the aforementioned judgment of learned Division Bench are

completely distinguishable with the facts obtaining in the instant case on hand. The Tribunal has failed to notice that the grounds that were urged before the Tribunal in the instant case where completely different to the one considered in the aforementioned judgment. The issue before the learned Division Bench was not with regard to non-application of mind by the competent authority at the time of entrustment of the inquiry to the hands of the second respondent or that of the abdication of the decision making power by the competent authority to the hands of an external agency like that of the second respondent.

¶31The issues in the present case never fell for consideration before the learned Division Bench in the writ petition mentioned hereinabove. The Tribunal has misdirected itself in placing reliance on the judgment of the coordinate bench without looking into the facts and issues considered therein. There can be no dispute with the principle laid down in the judgment of the coordinate bench following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the issue as to whether a writ petition would be maintained on merits of the charge sheet, but its applicability qua the facts had to be analysed.

¶32Though the charge sheet issued subsequent to the order of entrustment is under challenge in the instant writ petition, the principal challenge is to the order of entrustment and the examination by the Tribunal ought to have been with regard to the order of entrustment. The

Tribunal has placed reliance on the judgment of the coordinate bench without looking into the facts of the case that was considered by the learned Division Bench. It is settled principle of law that each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. One additional or different fact may make a difference between conclusions in two cases.

¶33As stated hereinabove, the facts of the case before the Tribunal were different from the facts in the judgment which the Tribunal has placed reliance on. On the contrary, the finding of the Tribunal runs completely counter to the law laid down by the by this court in the case of H.N. Niranjan (Supra), wherein it is clearly affirmed that the if the order of entrustment does not bear application of mind, it would sometimes result in unnecessary proceedings against the Government servant. Here is also a case, if the proceedings are permitted to be continued would result in unnecessary hardship to the petitioner as the property alleged to have constructed is in civic amenity site, which comes under the rehabilitation scheme / project of the KNNL and the petitioner being a PDO of the Gram Panchayat will not get jurisdiction to demolish the property of another department unless the property is brought under the Gram Panchayat. This is an admitted fact by the 2nd respondent-Lokayukta and the learned Counsel appearing for KNNL and the Government that the

property is yet to be transferred to the hands of the jurisdictional Grama Panchayat. When the property itself is not coming under the jurisdiction of the petitioner, there can be no dereliction of duty, as alleged by the Lokayukta in its report under Section 12(3) of the Act. If the petitioner had no duty to perform with regard to the allegations, it cannot be alleged to be dereliction of his duty amounting to misconduct. Thus, the Tribunal ought to have interfered with the order of entrustment dated

7.1.2017 as it was completely contrary to law. In the peculiar facts of the case, the order of the Tribunal, impugned herein, warrants appropriate interference.

¶34For the aforementioned reasons, we pass the following: ORDER

(i) The writ petition is allowed.

(ii) The order of the Tribunal dated order dated

3.10.2019 is set aside and the application No.2127/2017 is allowed.

(iii) The order of entrustment dated 7.1.2017, issued by Government/Competent Authority/Disciplinary Authority and the consequent charge sheet dated 13.1.2017 are hereby quashed.

(iv) There shall be no order as to costs."

¶6In the instant case as stated supra, respondent No.1-State specifically addressed three communications/letters dated

15.10.2022, 30.01.2024 and 12.08.2024 calling for certain documents from BBMP and despite the same having not been received by respondent No.1, respondent No.1 specifically passed the impugned order, which suffers from non application of mind warranting interference of this Court in the present petition.

¶7Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I deem it just and appropriate to allow the petition by issuing certain directions. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER

i) The petition is hereby allowed.

ii) The impugned order dated 08.11.2024 passed by respondent No.1 is hereby set aside.

iii) Liberty is reserved in favour of respondent No.1 – State as well as respondent No.2 – BBMP to reconsider the matter afresh and proceed further in accordance with law.

iv) It is needless to state that the time spent by the parties in the present petition shall be excluded for the purpose of limitation.

Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE

MDS List No.: 1 Sl No.: 87

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO. 33924 OF 2024 (S-RES) BETWEEN: SRI N. PRADEEP KUMAR S/O SRI. NAGARAJAIAH AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, WORKING AS ASST. DIRECTOR TOWN PLANNING SOUTH ZONE BRUHAT BENGALRU MAHAVNAGARA PALIKE SOUTH END CIRCLE, R V ROAD, BENGALURU – 560 041 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. A. RAVISHANKAR, FOR SRI. MUNIRAJA M., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT VIKASA SOUDH,A DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BENGALURU REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY 2. THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER BRUHAT BENGALRUU MAHANVAGAR PALIKE HUDSON CIRCLE, BENGALURU – 560 002 3. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA M S BUILDING BENGAULURU REP. BY ITS REGISTGRAR …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. G. RAMESH NAIK, AGA FOR R1; SRI. B. L. SANJEEV, ADVOCATE FOR R2; SRI. K. PRASANNA SHETTY, ADVOCATE FOR R3) Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DTD. 08.11.2024 VIDE GOVERNMENT ORDER NO. UDD 96 MNU 2022 PASSED BYTHE R-1 GOVERNMENT BY ENTRUSTING THE INQUIRY TO THE R-3 LOKAYUKTHA UNDER RULE 14-A OF THE CCA RULES AS PER ANNX-A IN SO FAR PETITIONER IS CONCERNED. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR ORAL ORDER In this petition, petitioner seeks the following reliefs: a) To issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to quash the impugned order dated 08.11.2024 vide Government Order No.UDD 96 MNU 2022 passed by the 1st respondent – Government by entrusting the inquiry to the 3rd respondent Lokayukta under Rule 14-A of CCA Rules as per Annexure-A insofar as the petitioner is concerned. b) To grant such other or further relief/s that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case, including the cost of this proceedings, in the interest of justice. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned AGA for respondent No.1 and learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 and perused the material on record. 3. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order at Annexure-A dated 08.11.2024 passed by respondent No.1-State under Section 14-A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, is erroneous, arbitrary or without jurisdiction of law inasmuch as, the petitioner was not an employee of respondent No.1 – State but was working as Assistant Executive Engineer of respondent No.2 – BBMP who was entitled/authorized/empowered to pass the impugned order and not respondent No.1 – State and the impugned order deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. It is further submitted that the impugned order entrusting the enquiry to be conducted against the petitioner by the Lokayukta is laconic, cryptic, unreasoned, non speaking order with absolutely no application of mind, which deserves to be quashed on this ground also. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be set aside. 5. Though several contentions have been urged by both sides in support of their respective claims, a perusal of the impugned order will indicate that respondent No.1 – State has specifically referred to the communication/letters/correspondence dated 15.10.2022, 30.01.2024 and 12.08.2024 addressed by the respondent –State to the BBMP, where petitioner was working as Assistant Executive Engineer. It is specifically recorded in the impugned order that the BBMP had not submitted any documents sought for by the State Government. It is well settled that for the purpose of passing the order under Rule 14-A of the CCA Rules, it was incumbent upon the Disciplinar