Arti Singh v. Cashfree Payments India Private Limited

ORDER

Issue ex-parte Temporary Injunction order against the defendant Nos.1 and 2 as prayed in I.A.No.1, till next date of hearing.

Plaintiff shall comply Order 39 Rule 3 of C.P.C. Issue emergent notice on I.A:No.I, order and suit summons to the defendants, if P.F. is paid. Call on: 17.06.2026."

¶19Upon careful perusal of the impugned order, it is seen that the trial Court observed that after bestowing

anxious consideration to the principles emerging from the decisions relied by the plaintiff and on perusing the materials on record, plaint averments, documents and looking to the facts and circumstances, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for grant of exparte order of temporary injunction. Apparently, it is seen that the trial Court has not clearly said what is a prima facie case made, why the exparte ad interim order of temporary injunction is required to be granted prior to the issuance of notice and that delay would cause irreparable injury or hardship to the plaintiff. Thereby the trial Court has not spelt out in its order with regard to the prima facie case being made out for grant of an ad interim order of temporary injunction. The trial Court while considering an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of CPC is required to follow the three essential requirements namely prima facie case, balance of convenience and the hardship that would be caused to the aggrieved party.

¶20The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiv kumar Chadha -vs-Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others4, held at paragraphs 32, 33, 34 and 35 as under: "32.Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The courts have to be more cautious when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. That is why Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code requires that in all cases the court shall, before grant of an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite-party, except where it appears that object of granting injunction itself would be defeated by delay. By the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, a proviso has been added to the said rule saying that "where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay…".

33.It has come to our notice that in spite of the aforesaid statutory requirement, the courts have been passing orders of injunction before issuance of notices or hearing the parties against whom such orders are to operate without recording the reasons

4 (1993) 3 SCC 161

for passing such orders. It is said that if the reasons for grant of injunction are mentioned, a grievance can be made by the other side that court has prejudged the issues involved in the suit. According to us, this is a misconception about the nature and the scope of interim orders. It need not be pointed out that any opinion expressed in connection with an interlocutory application has no bearing and shall not affect any party, at the stage of the final adjudication. Apart from that now in view of the proviso to Rule 3 aforesaid, there is no scope for any argument. When the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendant.

34.The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. Before the proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said "the court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite-party". The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the court "shall record the reasons" why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the

requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplusage for all practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of

the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch D 426 : 45 LJ Ch 373] and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) : 63 IA 372 : 37 Cri LJ 897] . This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare [(1975) 1 SCC 559 : AIR 1975 SC 915]

¶35As such whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. But any such ex parte order should be in force up to a particular date before which the plaintiff should be required to serve the notice on the defendant concerned. In the Supreme Court Practice 1993, Vol. 1, at page 514, reference has been made to the views of the English Courts saying:

"Ex parte injunctions are for cases of real urgency where there has been a true impossibility of giving notice of motion….

An ex parte injunction should generally be until a certain day, usually the next motion day…."

¶21The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund -vs-Kartick Das5, held at paragraph No.36 as under:

"36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction are—

(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff;

(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve;

(c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented;

(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant ex parte injunction;

(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application.

(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a limited period of time.

(g) General principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the court."

5 (1994)4 SCC 225

¶22In the case of Time City Infrastructure and Housing Limited, Lucknow -vs-State of UP and others6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph No.5 as under:

"5.Looking to the scheme of Order 39, CPC it is clear that ordinarily an order of injunction may not be granted ex parte. The opposite party must be issued a notice and heard before an injunction may be granted. Rule 3 carves out an exception in favour of granting an injunction without notice to the opposite party where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay. Conferment of this privilege on the party seeking an injunction is accompanied by an obligation cast on the court to record reasons for its opinion and an obligation cast on the applicant to comply with the requirements of Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso. Both the provisions are mandatory. The applicant gets an injunction without notice but subject to the condition of complying with Clauses (a) and (b) above said."

¶23The Principles governing grant of temporary injunction has been explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi -vs-Harish

6 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1674

Ambalal Chokshi7, wherein at paragraph nos.32 and 33, it is held as under: "Principles governing grant of temporary injunction

¶32In Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad [Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad, (2001) 5 SCC 568] , it was held by this Court that it would not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini-trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction.

¶33The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition precedent for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely, one that

7 (2024)11 SCC 351

cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. (See Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719] .)"

¶24Apparently, in the present case on hand, an ad interim order of temporary injunction has been granted by the trial Court. Hence, this Court will have to see whether the trial Court has provided proper reasoning to come to such a conclusion for grant of an ad interim order of temporary injunction. Upon careful perusal of the impugned order, it is seen that the trial Court has merely stated that it has considered the principles emerging from the decisions relied by the respondent/plaintiff, perused the materials on record, so also the plaint averments and

documents and came to a conclusion that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for grant of ex parte temporary injunction and if the notice was ordered to be issued, it would cause delay and defeat the very purpose of filing the suit and therefore, in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, granted an ex parte order of temporary injunction.

¶25In my opinion, the trial Court has not assigned any reasons for grant of temporary injunction and not stated what is the prima facie case that is made out and why the delay would defeat the very purpose of filing of the suit. When an application is filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of CPC, the trial Court is obligated to consider whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and come to the conclusion by arriving at a proper reasoning and not merely stating prima facie case is made out. The trial Court is obligated to spelt out in its order as to what is the prima facie case that is made out by way of

application of mind through judicial reasoning and thereafter whether the plaintiff has made out balance of convenience to be tilting in his favour and so also the irreparable injury would be caused by non grant of such an order. It is only then the temporary injunction order could be granted. If no such thing is decided or adjudicated by the learned trial judge while passing the ad interim order of temporary injunction, it would squarely come within the meaning of non-application of mind and improper exercise of judicial discretion while appreciating the materials on record and granting an ad interim order of temporary injunction amounting to perversity. In the present case on hand, it is apparently clear that reasons are not spelt out in the impugned order passed by the trial Court as to what is the prima facie case made out and the two other essential requirements of balance of convenience and irreparable hardship that would be caused more to which of the parties.

¶26As I have already stated, the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and several judgments of this Court have clearly laid down the principles as to how an application under Order - XXXIX Rules - 1 & 2 of CPC for grant of an ad interim order of temporary injunction to be decided. It is not merely by saying prima facie case is made out or balance of convenience tilts and irreparable injury would be caused. It is for the trial Court to specifically spelt out the reasons for all three essential requirements, which in the present case has not been clearly opined.

¶27As stated supra, whenever an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC is considered, the trial Court is required to deliberate upon three essential requirements of prima facie case, balance of convenience and the hardship that would be caused more to which of the parties. While doing so, the trial Court is required to legally articulate the specific reasons of prima facie case

and the balance of convenience would tilt in whose favour, so also the hardship that would be caused more to which of the parties. In the present case on hand, the trial Court has not specified by way of a proper reasoning and not applied its judicial mind to give brief details of prima facie case, balance of convenience and hardship that would be caused to the plaintiff. It is rather held that prima facie case is made out based on the citations relied by the plaintiff, but not adverted to what is the prima facie case made out by the plaintiff for grant of an ex parte ad interim order of temporary injunction prior to giving notice to the defendants. Therefore the order that is passed by the trial Court is clearly coming within the ambit of an unreasoned order, so also it would amount to an order which is perverse, arbitrary, capricious for having ignored the settled principles of law regulating the grant of temporary injunction.

¶28In view of the discussion made hereinabove and having heard learned counsels for both parties and the judgments relied by them, I am in agreement with learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge is illegal and perverse for not having legally articulated the essential requirements of the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable hardship in the proper perspective. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. The 2nd point raised in the present appeal is answered accordingly.

¶29Now coming to the next question, whether this Court should consider the application and pass necessary orders or should it remand the matter back to the trial Court for reconsideration of the application - I.A. No. 1 filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and Rule 2, it is seen that whenever an application is filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, it is required to be filed in the Court of the

first instance, so also in the present case such an application is filed. But before issuance of notice, the trial Court found it appropriate to grant an ad interim exparte order of Temporary Injunction for the reason that the delay would defeat the purpose of filing the suit. It is always for the Court of the first instance to deal with the application and decide the matter on merits. The appellants/defendants have already filed their vakalath and have come on record before the trial Court. If they have not filed their objections to the application, they are at liberty to file the objections so also the written statement and contest the application on merits. It may not be appropriate for this Court to pass an order on the said application as it is for the trial Court to deal with the application based on the pleadings and the materials available on record, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd8.

8 1990 Supp SCC 727

¶30The appellate Court should not interfere with the order if it is passed by following the principles of three essential requirements of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable hardship. Had it been the case where both the parties were heard, this Court could have considered the appeal on its merits on the application. But in the present case on hand, the impugned order is an unreasoned exparte order without hearing the appellants/defendants. Therefore in my opinion, an opportunity requires to be given to the appellants/ defendants before the trial Court by remitting this matter back to the trial Court for reconsideration of the application once again in a time bound manner rather than this Court deciding the application.

¶31Under the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the matter requires to be remanded to the trial Court for reconsideration of I.A No. 1 by providing an opportunity to the plaintiff as well as the defendants,

keeping open all contentions with regard to the merits of the application.

¶32Accordingly, I pass the following: O R D E R

i) The appeal is allowed.

ii) The impugned order dated 03.06.2026 passed on I.A No. 1 in O.S No. 3717/2026 by the i/c LXXXV Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, is hereby set aside.

iii) Matter is remitted back to the trial Court to re-consider the application - I.A. No. 1 afresh and pass reasoned order after providing sufficient opportunity to both parties, within fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

iv) The parties are at liberty to file further pleadings and documents, if required.

v) It is open to the parties to urge all grounds that are urged in the present appeal.

vi) It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter, so also on the application.

vii) All contentions of parties are kept open.

Ordered accordingly.

Sd/- (PRADEEP SINGH YERUR) JUDGE

GSS List No.: 1 Sl No.: 42

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 4754 OF 2026 (CPC-) BETWEEN: 1. ARTI SINGH AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS HAVING HER PLACE OF WORK AT A-30 TAKSHILA APARTMENT PATPAR GANJ COMPLEX DELHI 110 092. 2. HEAD AND TALE MEDIA PVT.LTD. A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013 HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT A-30, TAKSHILA APARTMENT PATPAR GANJ COMPLEX, DELHI 110 092. …APPELLANTS (BY DR.MALAVIKA PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. A S VISHWAJITH.,ADVOCATE) AND: CASHFREE PAYMENTS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT 10TH FLOOR, BUILDING NO. 7 ECO WORLD, SARJAPUR-MARATHAHALLI OUTER RING ROAD BENGALURU 560 103. REP. BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY R by GAVRIBIDANUR SUBRAMANYA GUPTA SREENATH Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA MR.JAMAL SAIT …RESPONDENT (BY SRI.RAGHURAM CADAMBI., ADVOCATE FOR C/R) THIS MFA IS FILED U/S.43 RULE 1(r) OF THE CPC, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DT. 03.06.2026. PASSED ON IA NO.1 IN O.S.NO.3717/2026 BY THE i/c LXXV ADDL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR ORAL JUDGMENT This appeal is preferred by the appellant/defendant Nos.1 and 2 challenging the order dated 3.6.2026 passed on I.A. No.1 in O.S. No.3717/2026 by the i/c LXXV Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, granting an exparte order of Temporary Injunction against the appellant/defendant nos.1 and 2. 2. Parties shall be referred to as per their ranking before the trial Court for the sake of easy understanding. (i) Brief facts of the case 3. Brief facts leading to filing of this appeal are as under: 3.1 The plaintiff filed the suit against the defendants for the relief of mandatory injunction directing the defendants, their agents or any other person acting on their behalf or under their instructions to remove the defamatory article about the plaintiff, on the social media platform of the 1st defendant and for Permanent Injunction directing the defendants and their agents from making statements which are defamatory, denigrating, disparaging, false and misleading content in respect of the plaintiff and its business and also for other consequential reliefs. 3.2 Along with the plaint, the plaintiff filed an application - I.A. No.1 for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a direction to the defendants to immediately take down the defamatory article published on the platform of the 1st defendant available at the URL mentioned therein, along with any social media handles of the defendants, pending disposal of the suit. 3.3 The trial Court took up the matter for consideration. As an ad-interim order was sought prior to issuance of notice, the application was heard and the learned trial judge granted an ex parte order of Temporary Injunction and ordered issuance of notice on I.A. No. 1 and also suit summons to the defendants. It is this order of ad interim temporary injunction granted in favour of the plaintiff that is questioned by the defendants in this appeal. 3.4 The appellant no. 1/defendant No.2 is a journalist for over 18 years and for the past 9 years, she has been closely tracking India's fintech space and has written some of the most defining pieces on the ecosystem. Prior to that, the appellant no. 1 served as a Deputy Editor at India's leading business daily, Mint, where she covered the intersection of finance and technology. Prior to that, she worked at the Economic Times Prime, a subscription-led platform by India's top newspaper. She has done several various other activities as a journalist. The appellant No.2/defendant no.1 is a private limited company, incorporated in 2024 and it runs a reader-funded news media and news platform engaged in publishing reports, articles, a