Ramesh Vasantrao Patil v. The State of Maharashtra Thr Its Dept. of Rural Development and Ors

Order as under :- O R D E R 1) The Respondent No.1 is removed from the post of Sarpanch of the Grampanchayat – Tandulwadi, Taluka – Walwa, for the remaining period of tenure under the General Election 2017, from the date of this Order. 2) All the remaining Respondents, except Respondent No.6, are removed from the post of Member of the Grampanchayat – Tandulwadi, Taluka – Walwa, for the remaining period of tenure under the General Election 2017, from the date of this Order. 3) It has come to the notice during the course of hearing that, the Respondent No.6 by name Smt. Nandatai Shankar Salunkhe, a member of the present Grampanchayat Managing Committee has passed away and therefore, no order has been issued against her. 4) This Order be communicated to all the persons concerned. Place : Pune. Date : 06.12.2021. (Signature Illegible) (Saurabh Rao) Divisional Commissioner, Pune Division, Pune."

¶20The petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 6 December, 2021 passed by respondent no. 2 filed an appeal before the appellate authority namely the Hon'ble Minister under the provisions of Section 39(3). The said appeal was adjudicated by the Hon'ble Minister by an order dated 23 February, 2022 whereby the petitioner's appeal was allowed in terms of the following order: " ORDER

¶1The Appeal preferred by the Appellant Shri Ramesh Vasantrao Patil, Sarpanch and 9 others, the members of Grampanchayat Tandulwadi, Tal. Walwa, District Sangli, is allowed.

¶2The Appeal preferred by the Appellant Shri Bhanudas Yashwant Mote, residing at Tandulwadi, Tal. Walwa, District Sangli, is partly allowed. Shri Bhanudas Yashwant Mote, residing at Tandulwadi, Tal. Walwa, District Sangli is declared as qualified to be a member of Grampanchayat Tandulwadi and his request to disqualify Shri Ramesh Vasantrao Patil, Sarpanch and 9 others, the members of Grampanchayat Tandulwadi, Tal. Walwa, District Sangli, to be the members of Grampanchayat Tandulwadi, except him, is rejected.

¶3The Order dated 06.12.2021 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Pune Division in this matter is set aside.

¶4This Order should be intimated to the persons concerned."

¶21Against the said order dated 23 February, 2022 passed by the Hon'ble Minister, respondent no. 4 approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 5222 of 2022 wherein the learned Single Judge by an order dated 5 September, 2022 admitted the petition and stayed the aforesaid order dated 23 February, 2022 passed by the Hon'ble Minister.

¶22The legal consequences which are brought about by the said interim order passed by this Court is that the disqualification of the petitioner under section 39(1) as ordered by respondent no.2-Additional Divisional Commissioner by order dated 6 December, 2021 continued to operate and the petitioner was prohibited from acting as a member of Village Panchayat or the Sarpanch. Also, by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court, the effect and operation of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Minister allowing the petitioner's appeal and/or setting aside disqualification under Section 39(1) ceased to operate.

¶23It cannot be that the interim order dated 05 September 2022 passed by this Court was of no consequence and despite such order, the petitioner nonetheless could to held to be qualified. Such interim orders passed by this Court although as an interim measure halted the effect and operation of the petitioner being declared to be not removed under Section 39(1) of the Panchayats Act. Any other interpretation of the High Court's order if accepted, it would render the interim order nugatory. It is difficult to accept the petitioner's case that by virtue of the stay, the petitioner was eligible to contest the election and/or even if such contest was legal, the High Court intended that he continues to hold legally.

¶24In other words, as a consequence brought about by such interim order passed by this Court, the provisions of Section 14(1)(d) certainly had become applicable, which inter alia provide that 'No person shall be a member of a panchayat or continue to be such if he has been removed from office under sub-section (1) of Section 39 and a period of six years has not been elapsed from the date of such removal.

¶25It is surprising that during the existence of the clear legal position as brought about, the petitioner nonetheless contested the subsequent elections after the end of term of earlier election under which the petitioner suffered such disqualification (October 2017 to October 2022), namely, the Village Panchayats elections held in November-December, 2022.

¶26As rightly urged on behalf of the respondents on the application of Section 14(1)(d) certainly a period of six years had not elapsed from the date of removal of the petitioner under Section 39(1), the date of removal being 6 December 2021, as the period of six years from such date would otherwise come to an end in December, 2027. It is qua such election, respondent nos. 4 and 5 again filed a complaint before respondent no.3-Collector seeking disqualification of the petitioner under Section 14(1)(d). Respondent no.4 and 5's complaint came to be rejected by the Collector vide order dated 19 May 2023. This order of the Collector was challenged by respondent nos. 4 and 5 before respondent no. 2-Additional Divisional Commissioner, who by the impugned judgment has allowed the said appeal and held that the petitioner was disqualified under Section 14(1)(d) to hold the office of Member of the Panchayat, as the petitioner was removed from the office of Sarpanch during the previous term under Section 39(1) and the period of six years had not elapsed.

¶27In so far as the petitioner's prayer that this Court examines the legality of the provisions of Section 14(1)(d) of the Panchayats Act is concerned, we are of the opinion that certainly the facts of the case do not warrant that this Court need to delve on such issues considering the vague and ambiguous challenge as mounted and for such reason, issue notice to the Advocate General and admit the petition. In our opinion, there is no legal injury to the petitioner to raise such challenge in the present facts. This more particularly accepting what is pointed out by the State Government in its reply affidavit that the petitioner was disqualified from contesting the election in question as held in December 2022. and that the petitioner was rightly disqualified by the impugned order. Thus, to test the legality of the provisions in the present proceedings would be wholly academic and/or of no consequence, considering our aforesaid discussion. The Court can be called upon to examine the validity of the legislative provision only when a strong prima facie case has been made out by a litigant of a legal injury being suffered by the petitioner and it is in the context of such legal injury, a challenge being mounted to a legislative provision is accepted and prudent norm. The petitioner certainly does not make out any such case that we make such endeavour and delve on such academic issues, which would be in an absolute vacuum.

¶28We do not find that anything erroneous or illegal in the impugned order passed by respondent no. 2-Additional Divisional Commissioner for more than one reason. By virtue of the interim order dated 5 September 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5222 of 2022 staying the order dated 23 February, 2022 passed by the Hon'ble Minister setting aside the removal of the petitioner as a member/Sarpanch of the Village Panchayat, the legal consequence was certainly of the order of the Hon'ble Minister not being available to the petitioner the same being halted and/or made inoperative by such interim order passed by this Court. Such order has continued to subsist and is legal and valid till date.

¶29It is well settled position in law that every order passed by the Court and moreso an order which grants interim injunction, has a consequence and a legal effect. This is certainly not a paper order and once such orders passed by the Court, it would give rise to a particular legal position, which necessarily would be required to be recognized and given effect to. In the present case as noted hereinabove, the legal position was that the petitioner's removal under Section 39(1) which triggered the operation of Section 14(1)(d) of the Panchayats Act, although set aside by the Hon'ble Minister by virtue of stay granted by this Court, the setting aside has remained in a suspended animation. Hence, the position of the petitioner having stood disqualified under Section 39(1) under the order dated 6 December, 2021 passed by the Additional Divisional Commissioner cannot be said to have any legal recognition.

¶30As held by the Supreme Court in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi vs Shri Raj Narain and Anr.4 an order of stay granted by the Superior Court, is a plenary order. It has the effect of eclipsing the order, which is stated to bring about a legal position that for no purpose whatsoever, it can be given effect. The consequence of this position in the present facts would be to the effect that the order passed by the Additional Divisional Commissioner, removing the petitioner under Section 4 AIR 1975 SC 1590 39(1) would stand recognized as a consequence of which the petitioner having suffered a disqualification under Section 14(1)(d) (supra) for a period of six years from the date of the removal, having not elapsed the petitioner was disqualified to be a member of the Panchayat. There cannot be any other reading of the stay order dated 05 September 2022 as passed by this Court. It is for such reason, it cannot be said that the impugned order passed by respondent no. 2 to disqualify the petitioner under Section 14(1)(d) to be bad and illegal.

¶31For such reasons, the petitioner's contention on the non-applicability of provisions of Section 14(1)(d) qua his disqualification under section 39(1) is not well-founded. If the petitioner's contention in regard to applicability of Section 14(1)(d) is to be accepted, then the period of six years as provided for in the said provision is rendered nugatory. We also do not accept the petitioner's case on the applicability of Section 14(1)(d) vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 39(1) and/or to accept the petitioner's contention, that as there is no order passed under section 39(2), he would not suffer a disqualification would amount to reading something alien in the provision of section 14(1)(d) which the legislature itself has not provided.

¶32We may also observe that Section 14(1)(d) is a provision which incorporates the applicability of section 39(1) namely a consequence of removal of a member of Panchayat and it is in such context, the period of disqualification of six years has been prescribed. If such period of six years from the date of such removal has not elapsed, the candidate would suffer disqualification as a member of the Panchayat. It is thus clear that the petitioner has no legal right whatsoever to continue as a member of Panchayat. The petitioner in contesting the election in November-December was qualified to so context, having suffered disqualification under section 14(1)(d) as also urged on behalf of the State Government.

¶33Insofar as Mr. Patil's contention that the order dated 5 September, 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court on Writ Petition No. 5222 of 2022 filed by respondent no. 4 is required to be held to be void and/or a nullity, as the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain such Writ Petition and grant such order inasmuch as under Chapter XVII Rule 18(3) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, jurisdiction to entertain such petition was not conferred on the learned Single Judge, but was of the Division Bench relying upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Shivaji Laxman Wadkar vs. Election Returning Officer, Grampanchayat Velu & Ors. (supra) is not well founded. This for two fold reasons. Firstly, a Division Bench of this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India per se would not have any jurisdiction to determine the legality of an order passed by the learned Single Judge. A Division Bench exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is no manner exercises appellate jurisdiction against an order passed by a learned Single Judge. If the petitioner was to be aggrieved by such order passed by the learned Single Judge, the only remedy to the petitioner in the absence of writ appeal, was to approach the Supreme Court. The petitioner, however, has accepted such order passed by the learned Single Judge and the said order continues to be legal, valid and subsisting and all material consequences, as observed hereinabove, emanating from such order passed by the learned Single Judge, are required to be taken into account. Secondly the petitioner's contention that said order is required to be held to nullity and without jurisdiction, also cannot be accepted as the Full Bench of this Court in its judgment in Magnum Opus IT Consulting Pvt. Ltd., Pune vs. Artcad Systems, Nashik (supra) as rightly pointed out on behalf of respondent no. 4, has held the decision of the Division Bench in Shivaji Laxman Wadkar (supra) as relied by Mr. Patil to be per incuriam, in paragraph 13 of the said decision, the Full Bench has made the following observations: "13. In conclusion, it is declared that the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Shivaji Laxman Wadkar, which holds that only those quasi-judicial orders and enactments specified under Rule 18(3) of Chapter XVII of the 1960 Rules fall under the purview of a Single Judge, is per incuriam of the Full Bench decision in the case of Prakash Securities and, therefore, does nto constitute a binding precedent. The decision in the case of Hariom Krishi Kendra pertained to an entirely different aspect. The existing pronouncement of the Full Bench in teh case of Prakash Securities, whcih has held that the Explanation to Clause (3) of Rule 18, added in 1999, encompasses orders of any quasi judicial authority under any other legislation, even if not specified in Clauses (1) to (43), is binding."

¶34We find that Ms. Prabhune, learned AGP is correct in her contention and relying on the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government as noted hereinabove, that the provisions of Section 14(1)(d) and Section 39(1) operate independently. They are compartmentalized. Merely because Section 14(1)(d) makes a reference to Section 39(1) by incorporation, cannot bring about any bearing on the applicability of sub-section (2) of Section 39, in the consequence of a disqualification brought about by Section 14(1)(d).

¶35We may also refer to the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the State Government wherein the State Government justifying the impugned order has stated that as there was a specific order passed removing the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch/member of the Village Panchayat under the provisions of Section 14(1)(d) of the Panchayats Act, the petitioner was disqualified from contesting election of Grampanchayat for the period of 5 years from the date of the said order and that, once such order was passed under Section 39(1), the provisions of Section 14(1)(d) of the Panchayats Act are automatically applicable. The averments in that regard are required to be noted with read thus:- "5. I say that on 18/8/2020, the Respondent No.4 herein filed complaint with the Respondent No.2 U/s. 39 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1959. I further say that after following due process of Law, the Respondent No.2 passed an order dated 6/12/2021 thereby holding that the Petitioner and other members of Tandulwadi Grampanchayat are liable for removal U/s.39 of the said Act and according passed an order of removal of Petitioner from the post of Sarpanch from the post of Sarpanch from the date of order for the remainder period. The Respondent also ordered that except deceased member Smt. Nandatai Shankar Salunkhe, other members are removed from post member for remainder period. It is pertinent to note that there was specific order of removal of Petitioner from the post of Sarpanch from the date of order and as per section 14(1)(d) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1959, the Petitioner was disqualified from contesting election of Grampanchayat for the period of 5 years from the date of order. I say that once an order is passed u/s. 39(1), the provisions of Sec 14(1)(d) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1959 are automatically applied.

¶9I say that as provisions of section 14(1)(d) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1959, the petitioner is disqualified for contesting election and/or acting as a member of Grampanchayat until 6/12/2027 and as such an impugned order dated 21/2/2024 passed by the Respondent No.2 is proper and legal. I further say that an appeal filed by the Respondent No.4 and 5 was partly allowed by the Respondent No.2, by considering the mandatory provisions of law and by following due process of law and on this ground only the present Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner deserves to be rejected."

¶36While parting, we may observe that the entire edifice of the rights being asserted by the petitioner are statutory rights. The petitioner when contested the election in December 2022, was bound by these statutory provisions which pertain to disqualification. There cannot be any fundamental right of the petitioner being violated on such assertions of the petitioner which are purely in regard to the election and the code as prescribed for such election. As held by the Supreme Court in Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party v/s. Union of India5, all rights in relation to election are statutory rights and there cannot be any complaint of breach of fundamental rights.

¶37We clarify that our observations in this judgment are in the context of deciding the present proceedings. All rights and contentions of the parties in any other proceedings are expressly kept open.

¶38In the aforesaid circumstances, looked from any angle, this petition is wholly misconceived. It is accordingly rejected. No costs. (ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.) 5 (2011) 1 SCC 228

PSV/VSA IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 3729 OF 2024 Ramesh Vasantrao Patil ...Petitioner Vs. 1. The State of Maharashtra 2. The Additional Divisional Commissioner 3. The District Collector, Sangli 4. Bhanudas Yashwant Mote 5. Prakash Vilas Patil 6. Satish Manohar Gondkar ...Respondents _________ Mr. Pramod Patil with Mr. Shyamsunder Solanke i/b. PNP & Associates for Petitioner. Ms. Savita Prabhune, AGP for State/Respondent Nos.1 to 3. Mr. Vishal Kanade with Ms. Janhvi Joshi i/b. Mr. Bhalchandra Mote for Respondent No.4. __________ CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI & ARIF S. DOCTOR, JJ. DATE: 16 JULY 2025. Oral Judgment (Per G. S. Kulkarni, J.) :- 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges an order dated 21 February 2024 passed by the Additional Divisional Commissioner (respondent no.2) being the appellate authority, upholding the disqualification of the petitioner as a member of the Gram Panchayat, Tandulwadi, Taluka – Walwa, District – Sangli under the provisions of Section 14(1)(d) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959 (for short, "Panchayats Act"). 2. The facts lie in a narrow compass:- It is the petitioner's case that prior to elections in question, general elections of the Village Panchayat were held on 16 PRAJAKTA SAGAR VARTAK Digitally signed by PRAJAKTA SAGAR VARTAK Date: 2025.07.16 +0530 October 2017 for a five year term till 15 October 2022. The petitioner in such election was elected as a member of the village panchayat and later on as a Sarpanch. In relation to this election, on 18 August 2020, a complaint came to be filed by respondent no.4/Bhanudas Yashwant Mote, before respondent no.2 seeking removal of the petitioner, and some other members of the Village Panchayat under Section 39(1)1 of the Panchayats Act. This complaint was adjudicated by respondent no.2 by an order dated 06 December 2021, whereunder the petitioner was removed from the post of Sarpanch of Village Panchayat. The said removal order was challenged by the petitioner by approaching the Hon'ble Minister for Rural Development and Panchayat Raj, Maharashtra State (appellate authority) in an appeal filed under Section 39(3) of the Panchayats Act. By an order dated 23 February 2022, the Hon'ble Minister set aside the removal of the petitioner. Respondent no.4 (complainant) challenged the said order passed by the Hon'ble Minister before this Court in the proceedings of Writ Petition No. 5222 of 2022. In the proceedings of the said writ petition, learned Single Judge passed an order dated 05 September 2022, whereby the writ petition was admitted and an interim relief in terms of prayer clause (b) of the said petition was granted. By virtue of the interim order, the relief which was granted to the petitioner by the Hon'ble Minister (appellate authority) in his appeal against removal as a member of the village panchayat, was stayed. 1 Section 39 – Removal from office 3. In such situation of a removal of an elected member of the Gram Panchayat under Section 39(1), a disqualification under Section 14(1)(d) of the Panchayats Act automatically kicks in. Section 14(1)(d) inter alia provides that such member of the Panchayat cannot continue as a member till a period of 6 years has not elapsed from the date of such removal, unless by an order of the State Government notified in the Official Gazette, the candidate has been relieved from disqualification arising on account of such removal from the office. 4. It may be observed that the stay orders passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, in the nature of interim relief, cannot be said that it would have no legal effect. This in as much as, although the appellate authority passed the order dated 23 February 2022 setting aside removal of the petitioner as a member of the Gram Panchayat, such order being stayed by the High Court by an order dated 05 September 2022 in the writ petition filed by respondent no.4, it certainl