Delhi Race Club Ltd v. Gnct of Delhi

f i * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + WP(C) No.987/2010 Reserved on : 16^^January, 2012. % Date of Decision : 8^*" February. 2012. THE DELHI RACE CLUB LTD. ....Appellant Through Mr. Sanjay Jain, Sr. Adv. with Mrs. Rana Pravee Siddiqui, Mrs. Ruchi Jain, Ms.Namisha Gupta, Mr. Abhijit Mittal, Mr. Rishabh Wadhwa and Mohd. Qumar Ali, Advs. VERSUS GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS Respondent Through Mr. N. Waziri,standing counsel with Mr. Shoaib Haider and Ms. Neha Kapoor, CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.V. EASWAR

¶1WhetherReportersof localpapersmay be allowedto seethejudgment?

¶2To be referred to the Reporters or not ? Yes.

¶3Whetherthejudgmentshouldbe reportedin the Digest? Yes. R.V. EASWAR. J.; The short question which arises in this writ petition is whether entertainment tax is payable on the amount paid by a person for carrying his mobile phone inside the Delhi Race Club, under the Delhi Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as "the Act". f

¶2The relevant facts which have given rise to the filing of the present writ petition are as follows.

¶3The petitioner is Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd., a company incorporatedunder Section 25 of the Indian CompaniesAct, 1913 and having its registered office at Race Course Road, New Delhi. It is engagedin organizingboth "on-course"and "off-course"horse races. It collects entrychargesfrom thosewho visitthe Race Courseto placebets on the races or merely derive pleasurefrom watchingthe races. On the entryfee collectedby the petitioner,it collectsentertainmentaxunderthe Act @ 25% and pays the same to the betting tax authorities. It is submitted that with the advent of mobile phones, the petitioner felt that indiscriminateuse of these phonesinsidethe Race Coursewas becoming a nuisance. Therefore, in order to restrict the entry and use of the mobile phones, the petitionerdecidedto levy a separatecharge or entry fee for carryingthe mobile phones inside the premises as a regulatorymeasure. It was also felt that placinga total ban on the mobilephonesmay not be feasible since the patrons or punters would like to remain in touch with their families or place of work and the phones may also be usefiil in cases of emergency.

¶4Apparently the betting tax authorities under the Act came to know that the petitioner was collecting mobile entry fee from its patrons. They, therefore,issuednoticedated 18^*^ February,2002 askingthe petitionerto pay entertainment tax @ 25% on the charges collected for carrying the •a mobilephones. The notice was issuedby the Entertainmentand Betting tax officer, L&M Block, Vikas Bhawan,New Delhi who is the respondent No.3 in the present writ petition.

¶5The petitioner submitted a reply dated 24'^^ February, 2002 objectingto the notice. It was contendedthatthe mobilephones did not fall in the category of entertainmentnor were they attached to the entertainmentin any manner and, therefore,the levy of entertainmenttax onthe samewas illegalandnot authorizedbythe Act. Thepetitioneralso requestedthe respondentNo.3 who issuedthe noticeto informit as"to the statutoryprovisionunderwhichthe tax was being demanded. There was no responseto this reply sent by the petitionerfrom respondentNo.3 for more than three years.

¶6On 22"*^ June, 2005, the respondent No.2, namely, the Commissioner of Entertainment, Betting and Luxury Tax, L&M Block, Vikas Bhawan, New Delhi issued an order No.3171/ETO purporting to be issued under Section 46 of the Act alleging that the use of mobile phones inside the Race Course had given rise to illegal betting, that proper records were not being maintained by the petitioner in respect of the mobile phones used in the betting ring and, therefore, the entry of mobile phones into the betting ring of the petitioner during inter venue betting and betting on Delhi races was banned with immediate effect. Page3 of20

¶7Apparentlythe above order banning the entry of mobile phones inside the betting ring of the petitionergave rise to problems to the petitioner. Obviously,patrons and punters felt it inconvenientthat they could not carry mobile phones inside the race club. The petitioner perhaps got v^orriedabout the falling patronageand accordinglymade efforts to enter into an amicable settlementwith the respondent and sort out the issue of the levy of entertainmenttax on the entry of mobile phones in the larger interests of the club. It would appear that an understandingwith the bettingtax authoritieswas arrivedat to the effect that 50% of the bettingtax which amountedto Rs.39,50,406/-would be paid and the balanceof50% wouldbe paid in yearlyinstalments. Asum of Rs. 10 lacs was paid immediatelyon 1'^ December,2005 as the first yearly instalment. The terms of such settlementwere recorded in the petitioner'sletterto the secondrespondentwrittenon 1'^December,2005, which is Annexure P-4 to the writ petition.

¶8Contempariouslywith the settlementarrivedat, a letterdated 30^*^ November,2005 was writtenby the Deputy Commissioner(Tax) to the presidentofthe petitionerclub,whichis annexureP-5 tothe writpetition. The petitionerwas informed that with effect from December, 2005 entryof mobilephonesinto the petitionerclub was beingallowedsubject to the following conditions "a) DRC will pay weekly entertainmenttax @ 25% on collection of charges of mobile phones by DRC. b) DRC will maintaina detailedrecord in form of bound registermentioningthe names of personswho are carryingthe mobile phones, mobile phone numbers, addresses of persons who are carryingthemobilephones,amountof chargecollected for entryof mobilephoneby DRC, amountof entertainmentax collected. c) The registerto be maintainedby Delhi Race Club shall be seriallyof entertainmenttax department,Govt. of NCT of Delhi. d) ThatDRC shallbe liableto paythe entertainmentax on amount received from mobile phone charges from Financial Year 2002-03 onwards till 21.6.2005 as per the decision of the CompetentAuthoritywhichwillbe conveyedseparately." (DRC standsforDelhiRace Club,thepetitioner) The petitionerwas also informedthat the order dated 21^^ June, 2005 barmingthe use of mobilephones was being withdrawnwith immediate effect.

¶9Whilemattersrestedas notedabove,a showcausenoticedated 10^^ August, 2006 was received by the petitioner from respondentNo.3, that is, the Entertainment Tax Officer. The notice is armexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-6, The same is reproduced below:- "No: F23(1)/(06-07)/ETO/3407 Dated:- 10-08-2006 WP{C) NO..987/2010 i SHOW CAUSE NOTICE Whereas the Delhi Race Course Club (DRC) has allowed the entry of mobile phones in the Race Course Club During the venue and inter-venue races on payment per mobile phone per day. AND WHEREAS, DRC had collected payment on entry of mobile phones since financial year 2002-03 onwards without taking permissionfrom the Commissioneras per section 8 (1) ofDelhiEntertainments&BettingTax Act, 1996 till 30^"^ Nov. 2005. AND WHEREAS, the payment received on mobile phones is taxable under the said Act, as per provisions 6 (1) and 2 (m) of the said Act @ 25% on the collection charges of entry of mobile phones. AND WHEREAS, DRC has not made the payment of tax since financialyear2002-03till 30'*^Nov. 2005. NOW THEREFORE, I DEEPAK VIRMANI, ENTERTAINMENT TAX OFFICER would like to carry out the assessment proceedingsu/s 15 (1) of the said Act. M/s DRC is directed to appear in person or through the authorized representativeon 17.8.06at 11.00 a.m. along withthe relevant books of accounts and the amount received on account of paymentof entryof mobilephonesonthe weeklybasissince April 2002 onwardsand to show cause as to why interestand penalty shall not be leviable on DRC. Page6 of20 i VI In case of non-appearance,I will recoverthe dues as arrearsof land revenue and will take necessary action as per relevant provisions of law. (DEEPAK VIRMANI) ENTT. TAX OFFICER" In responseto the show cause notice,the petitionersent a detailedreply dated 5^ October, 2006 explainingthat the tax was not leviableon the chargesreceivedfor carryingthe mobilephonesinsidethe club and thata settlement had already been arrived at between the petitioner and respondentNo.2 to buy peace and avoid litigation,that the petitioner stoodbythe settlementprovidedtherespondentsalso werewillingto own their part of the settlementand that in these circumstancesthere was no justificationfor issuingshowcausenoticeproposingto levyentertairunent tax on the entryofmobilephonesfrom 1^' April,2002 to 30^^^November, 2005.

¶10Apparentlynothing was heard from respondentNo.3 for a while. th However, the petitioner received an assessment order dated 24 November, 2006 for the period April, 2002 to June 2005 in which entertairmienttax @ 25% was levied on the chargesfor entry of mobile phonesin accordancewith Section2(m)(iv)read with Section6(1) of the Act. The total collections made by the petitioner as mobile charges for the aforesaidperiod and the entertairmienttax demanded from it came to Rs. 3,40,26,718/- & Rs.85,06,679/- respectively as set out below:- Page7 of20 # Year Total Collection by DRC fi-om mobile charges (in Rs.) Entt. Tax Payable by DRC (in Rs.) 2002-03 63,31,568.00 15,82,892/- 2003-04 1,13,19,150.00 28,29,787/- 2004-05 1,39,52,750.00 34,88,187/- 2005-06 (upto June/2005) 24,23,250.00 6,05,812/- Grand Total 3,40,26,718.00 85,06,679/- Deducting the amount of Rs.lO lacs paid by the petitioner earlier a demand of Rs.75,06,679/- as entertainment tax and a demand of Rs.52,96,783/-as interestwas raisedonthe petitioner. Thetotal demand raised was thus Rs.1,28,03,462/-. The petitionerwas directedto pay the aforesaid amount within a period of 15 days. A copy of the assessment order is annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-8

¶11Aggrieved by the assessmentorder, the petitioner filed a revision petitionbefore the Commissionerof Entertainmentsand BettingTax who is the second respondent in the writ petition, under Section 42 of the Act. Detailed submissions were made in the revision petition raising objections to the levy of the entertainment tax on the entry fee collected in respect of t the mobile phones. It was, inter alia, contendedthat the assessmentorder had been passed without following the rules of natural justice, that under Section 6(1) of the Act the tax was levied on admission to the entertainment and it cannot be levied for carrying a mobile phone, that the conditions prescribed in Section 2(m)(iii) of the Act were not satisfied because the mobile phones did not in any manner enable a person to get a normal or better view of the horse races and that the horse races can be viewed even without the aid of the mobile phones and that in these circumstances the levy of entertainmenttax in the assessment order and the huge demandraisedthereinwere illegal. It was, therefore,prayedthat the revising authority may quash the assessment order and pass such further orders as may be deemed fit and proper.

¶12By order dated 21®^ December, 2009, the Commissioner of Entertainmentand LuxuryTax, the respondentNo.2 herein, dismissedthe revisionpetition. After noting the submissionsof the petitionerand the departmental representative, he concluded as follows "I have careftillyconsideredthe argumentsadvanced both by the Petitioner and the Departmentalrepresentative. I agree with the opinion of learned EntertainmentTax Officer that charges for entry of mobile phones in the Race Club attracts entertainment tax @ 25% as per section2 (m) (4) and section6(1) of theDelhi Enter Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1996. Hence the impugnedorderis upheldandthe revisionpetitionis rejected." This order is attached to the writ petition as Annexure P-10. Page9 of20

¶13On 29^^ January, 2010 the AdditionalEntertainmentTax Officer sent a letter to the Deputy Commissioner/Collector(Revenue),District New Delhi, 12A, Jam Nagar House, S.R. New Delhi requestinghim to recover a sum of Rs.1,28,03,462/-from the petitioner as arrears of land revenue and also recoverinterest@ 2% for the delay in paymentof the above sum from the 15^^ day after the issuing of the assessmentorder dated24^ November,2006. Acopyofthe aforesaidorderwas markedto the secretary of the petitioner. if

¶14The present writ petition has been filed against the assessment orderspassedby the thirdrespondentraisingthe demandand againstthe orderpassedby the secondrespondentin revision,rejectingthe revision applicationfiled by the petitioner. It is prayedthat the assessmentorder and the revision order be quashed. Prayers have also been made for quashing the recovery notice dated 29"^ January, 2010 and for passing such further order or orders as may be deemed fit and proper.

¶15Section6(1) of the Actwhichis the chargingsection,providesthat "there shall be levied and paid on all payments for admission to any ^ entertainmenfan entertainmenttax and the tax shall be collectedby the proprietorof the entertainmentfrom the person making the demand for admission and it shall be paid over to the government of the national capital territory of Delhi. Section 2(a) defines "admission to an entertainmenf as including admission to any place in which the entertainment is held. It further provides, that in case of entertainment --i t . throughcable service,each connectionto a subscribershallbe deemedto be an admission for entertainment. Section 2(i) defines the word "entertainment" as meaning "any exhibition, performance, amusement, game, sportorrace(includinghorseraces)or inthe case of cinematograph exhibitions, cover exhibitions of news reels, documentaries, cartoons, advertisements,shorts or slides, whether before or during the exhibition of a feature film or separately,and also includes entertainmentthrough cable service."

¶16Section2(m) defines"paymentfor admission"as follows:-"payment for admission"includes-

(i) any payment made by a person for seats or other accommodation in any form in a place of entertainment;

(ii) any payment for cable service;

(iii) any paymentmade for the loan or use of any instrument or contrivance which enables a person to get a normal or better view or hearing or enjoyment of the entertainment, which without the aid of such instrument or contrivance such person would not get;

(iv) any payment, by whatever name called, for any purpose whatsoever, connected with an entertainment, which a person is required to make in any form as a condition of attending, or continuing to attend the entertainment, either in addition to the •payment, if any, for admission to the entertainment or without any such payment for admission;

(v) any payment made by a person who having been admitted to one part of a place of entertainment is subsequently admitted to another part thereof, for admission to which a payment involving tax or more tax is required; Explanation —Any subscriptionraised, contribution received or donation collected in connection with an entertainment, where admission is partly or entirely by tickets/invitation specifying the amount of admission or reduced rate of ticket shall be deemed to be payment for admission;" The questionfor decisionis whetherentertainmenttax can be levied on amounts collected by the petitioner as entry fee for mobile phones under sub-clause (iv) of clause (m) of Section 2 read with Section 6(1) of the Act. There was some debate as to the applicability of sub-clause (iii) and the objectiontaken on behalf of the petitionerwas that this sub-clauseis not applicable at all since the mobile phone cannot be considered as something which enables a person to get a normal or better view of the races or as an instrument or contrivance without which the person viewing the races would not get any enjoyment. A further objection raised is that sub-clause (iv) was referred to and relied upon only in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents and not in the assessment order. It was however, clarified on behalf of the respondents that sub-clause (iii) is not applicable to the present case and that the basis of the assessment order was sub-clause (iv). We find that the assessment order refers to only sub-clause (iv). We would, therefore, proceed to consider the question posed before us only with reference to this sub-clause.

¶17A careful perusal of the charging Section 6(1) shows that the entertainmenttax is to be leviedandpaid on all paymentsfor admissionto any entertainment. Sub-clause(iv) of clause(m) of Section2 ofthe Act, in our opinion,coversthe paymentmade by visitorsto the petitionerclub as mobile entry fee charges since such payment is connectedwith the entertainment,namely,horseraces conductedbythe petitioner. A careful perusal of the sub-clause(iv)would show that the payment should be connected with an entertainment and it is a matter of irrelevance as to how the payment is called or as to for what purpose it is made. The only conditionis thatthe paymentshouldbe connectedwiththe entertainment, whichis the horseraces in the presentcase. The furtherconditionis that the payment should be one which a person is required to make as a conditionof attendingthe entertainment.This conditionis satisfiedinthe case of persons who wish to carry their mobile phones inside the race club. If they wantto attendthe races carryinga mobilephonewiththem, they are obliged to make the payment for the entry of mobile phones. This paymentis in additionto the paymentmade by them for theirentry. Thus all these conditions of the sub-clause are satisfied.

¶18The argument of the petitioner that the mobile phone is not connected with the horse race and, therefore, the levy is not covered by sub-clause (iv) is based on the premise that the words "connected with an entertainment" qualify the words " for any purpose whatsoever", appearing just before them. With respect, this is an incorrect way of ( > reading the sub-clausehaving due regard to grammar and punctuation. There is a comma after the words "any payment". There is also a comma after the words "by whatevername called ft)r any purposewhatsoever". If it is the intention of the legislaturethat the purpose for which the paymentis made shouldbe connectedwiththe entertammentand not that the paymentshouldbe connectedwiththe entertainment;thenthereis no need to place a comma after the words "for any purpose whatsoever". SecondlySection6(1) leviesthe tax on all paymentsfor admissionto any entertainment.The tax is on payments,thoughthe taxableevent may be the holdingof an entertainment. Any paymentwhich is connectedwith the entertainmentthus attractsthe levy under Section6(1). Therefore,in our opinion, the entertainmenttax authorities were right in law in invokingsub-clause(iv)ofclause(m) ofSection2readwith Section6(1) of the Act for levying entertainmenttax on payments made as mobile phone entry charges. Moreover,had it been the intentionto providethat the purpose (use of mobile)shouldbe connectedwith the entertainment (horse race), then the use of restrictive words "connected with the entertainment" would make no sense, because the purpose could be "whatsoever". This is one more reason to hold that it is the payment which should be connected with the entertainment and not the purpose of the payment.

¶19It is, therefore, not necessary that the purpose for which the payment was made should be connected with the entertainment. Herein, / / ( ) n/ the purpose for which the payment was made was the carrying of the mobilephoneinsidethepremisesofthepetitioner. As rightlypointedout on behalf of the petitioner,there is no.connectionbetween the mobile phone and the horse races. However, as we have pointed out in the precedingparagraphs,it is the paymentthat shouldbe connectedwiththe horse race. That connection is afforded by the fact that it is collected from persons who wish to attend the races carryingtheir mobile phones with them. If any person wishes to enter the premises of the petitionerto attend the horse race carryinghis mobile with him, he has to make the payment for the entry of the mobile phone. The payment is thus a condition for attending the horse race. The payment for carrying the mobile phone inside the premises of the petitioneris in additionto the paymentwhichthe personis requiredto pay for his own entry. Thus all the conditions of the sub-clause are satisfied. Hence the levy is legal and valid. In this view of the matter, we are unable to uphold the contention of the petitionerthat the subjectoftaxationis not coveredby the taxable event since the use of mobile phone has no connectionwith the taxable activity.

¶20Even if the sub-clauseis interpretedto mean that the purpose for whichthe paymentis made shouldbe connectedwith the entertainment, that condition also stands satisfied in the present case. The payment has been made for the purpose of carryingthe mobile phone inside the race club. The purpose of the paymentcannot, therefore,be separatedfrom Page15of20 the entertainment,namely, the horse race. If any person wants to carry his mobile phone inside the premises of the race club for the purpose of attendingthe horse race, he has to pay separate charges for the mobile phone, in additionto what he pays for his entry. The purpose of the paymentis thus connectedwith the entertainment. To put it simply,the patronwouldnothave carriedthe mobilephoneinsidethepremisesofthe race clubexceptfor attendingthe horseraces,just as he himselfwouldnot have enteredthepremisesoftherace clubhadit notbeenfor attendingthe entertainment. Both the personandthe mobilephone,therefore,standon the same footing for the purpose of the sub-clause.

¶21Reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme court in State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. DrivenEnterprices(2001) 4 SCC 60. In this case, the State of Karnatakaleviedentertainmenttax on admissionof cars into drive-in theaters. The levy was challenged and the challenge was upheldby the KarnatakaHighCourt. On appealby the StateofKarnataka to the SupremeCourt, it was contendedby the respondentthat the state legislaturecould levy entertainmenttax on human beings but not on any inanimateobject. The SupremeCourt, however,rejectedthe contention ofthe respondentand allowedthe appealofthe Stateholdingthatthe real nature and character of the levy was not on the admission of cars or motor ^ vehicles,but the levy was on the person entertainedwho takes the car inside the theater and watches the film while sitting in his car. The contentionof the petitioneron the basis of this judgmentwas that unless Page16of20 the mobile telephones were in any manner connected with the entertainment (the horse races in the present case), the levy cannot be brought under sub-clause (iv) of clause (m) of Section 2. This judgment, contrary to what the petitioner contends, is actually against it. If the decision is to be applied to the present case, it has to be held that the levy of entertainment tax was really not on the admission of mobile phones into the premises of the petitioner, but it was on the person entertained; who takes the mobile phone inside the race club and watches the horce races. Moreover, we are not in the present writ petition concerned with the constitutional validity or the competence of the state legislature to enact sub-clause (iv). We are only concerned with the interpretation thereof. In our view. Section 6(1) read with Section 2(m)(iv) of the Act authorises the levy of entertainment tax on all payments for admission to any entertainment provided the payment is connected with the entertairmientand is required to be made by the person as a condition for attendingthe entertairmient,whether in addition to the payment made for admission to the entertainment or whether without any such payment for admission. The payment under the sub-clause may be called by any name or may have to be made for any purposewhatsoever,but so long as the paymentis cormectedwith the entertainment,the tax is leviable.

¶22The other case cited on behalf of the petitioner is Aashirwad Films vs. Union Of India & Ors. (2007) 6 SCC 624. In this case the Andhra Pradesh government issued a notification levying entertainment tax at Page17 of20 i ; 10% on Telugufilms and 24% on non-Telugufilms. The petitionerM/s Aashirwad Films was a distributer of Hindi films and was required to pay entertainment tax at the higher rate of 24%. It challenged the constitutional validity of the notification under Article 32 of the Constitution. The contentions of the petitioner were that the levy contravened Article 351 of the Constitution and was discriminatory in nature and thus ultra vires under Article

¶14These contentions were rejectedby the Supreme Court. The controversyin the cited case has nothing to do with the controversy before us.

¶23Anotherjudgmentcited on behalfof the petitioneris the case of ExpressHotels Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujaratand Anr. AIR 1989 SC 1949. In this case the levy of tax on luxuries was challengedon the groundthat it shouldrelateto and be basedon the actualutilizationofthe luxury and not on the mere existence of the means of providingthe luxury. This argumentwas rejectedby the Supreme Court which held that the taxable event need not necessarilybe the actual utilizationor the actual consumptionofthe luxuryand that a luxurywhichcan reasonably be said to be amenable to potential conception can provide the nexus. Thus the levy was upheld. We are afraidthatwe are unableto appreciate the relevanceof thisjudgmentto the contentionraisedby the petitioner.

¶24In Markand Saroop v. M.M.BajajAIR 1979 SC 110, the Supreme Court was concerned that the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937 which was extended to Delhi. A restaurant in Delhi conducted Page18 of20 ( >' V cabaret performances every evening. The minimum charges for eatables at the time of the performance were Rs.5 for evening tea and Rs.10 for the dinner. These amounts were adjusted towards eatables that were consumed over and above what was provided by the restaurant for these charges. The price of the eatables were not raised for the purpose of covering the entertainment, but the condition was that whether a person consumed anything or not, he had to pay Rs.5 for the evening and Rs.lO for the night. A minimum fee was levied for taking a seat for witnessing the show and for taking tea or dinner. On these facts the Supreme Court held, affirming the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in State vs. VN.Sood and Ors, ILR 1976 Delhi 842 that the payment for the tea or the dinner would come under Section 2(6) of the UP Act as a payment for admission. It is noteworthy that Section 2(6)(iv) of the UP Act is identicallyworded as Section 2(m)(iv) of the Act. It was held by the SupremeCourtthat thoughthe paymentmay be for takingtea or dinner for a minimum charge, as the admission was to a place where the entertainment was held it would come within the definition of "payment for admission"and furtherheld that the paymentof Rs.5 or Rs.lO,though it was stated to be for the tea or dinner, as it was connected with the entertainmentand as the personwas makingthe paymentas a condition for attendingthe entertainment,it would attractthe definitionofpayment for admission under Section 2(6)(iv) of the Act. The ratio of this judgmentappliesto the facts ofthepresentcase. 19 of 20 ) \ )

¶25The contention of the petitioner that the levy is opposed to the settlement arrived at with the entertainment tax authorities and goes much beyondthat and, therefore,shouldnot be upheld, is untenable. There can be no settlement in the matter arising under a fiscal statute, in the absence of any specificprovisionin the statute. No such provisionwas pointed out to us. In any case, there can be no estoppel against the statute. In Mathura Prasad & Sons vs. State AIR 1962 SC 745, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that if the law required that certain tax is to be collected, that cannot be given up and any assurance that it will not be collected will not bind the government,whenever it chose to collect the. same. We need not dilate further on this aspect.

¶26For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this writ petition. The same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. FEBRUARY 8,2012 Bisht (R.V. EASWAR) JUDGE (SANJIVKHANNA) JUDGE \ 15^72" ^