Shilpa Jain v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors

MADHU JAIN, J JULY 29, 2026/b/m

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision: 29.7.2026 Uploaded on : 30.7.2026 + CRL.M.C. 5330/2026 & CRL.M.A. 22366/2026 & CRL.M.A. 22367/2026 SHILPA JAIN .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Varchaswa Singh, Adv. (through VC) versus STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. .....Respondents Through: Mr. Nawal Kishore Jha, APP. ASI Inder Singh, PS Farsh Bazar CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN Madhu Jain, J. (Oral) 1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode. 2. The present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the 'BNSS') read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the common judgment dated 22.01.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in Criminal Revision Nos. 210/2024, 209/2024 and 45/2025. 3. The aforesaid revisions arose from the order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Mahila Court-01, Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in proceedings arising from FIR No. 718/2021 registered at Police Station Farsh Bazar under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. By the said order, the learned Trial Court directed framing of charge against the husband and the parents-in-law under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC, while discharging them of the offence punishable under Section 406 IPC. 4. Criminal Revision Nos. 210/2024 and 209/2024 were filed by the father-in-law and the mother-in-law respectively against the direction for framing of charge under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC. The proceeding instituted by the Petitioner, initially as an appeal and thereafter treated as Criminal Revision No. 45/2025, challenged the discharge of Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 under Section 406 IPC. All three revisions were dismissed by the common judgment dated 22.01.2026. 5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the complaint dated 31.03.2021, the list of articles, the note dated 09.11.2020 and the material collected during investigation disclose a prima facie case of entrustment and dishonest retention of the Petitioner's stridhan. 6. Learned counsel submits that the Petitioner was permitted to take only limited articles while leaving the matrimonial home and that the remaining articles continued to be under the joint possession and dominion of Respondent Nos. 2 to 4. Reliance is also placed upon the return of certain articles during the proceedings before the CAW Cell. 7. Learned counsel further submits that the Courts below applied an unduly high standard at the stage of charge, conducted a mini-trial and failed to consider that entrustment in a matrimonial relationship may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Furthermore, it is asserted that the petitioner was not heard by the learned Trial Court and that the impugned orders are non-speaking and mechanical. 8. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and have examined the material placed on record. 9. At the stage of charge, the Court is not required to determine whether the prosecution would ultimately result in conviction. However, the material, taken at its face value, must disclose the basic ingredients of the offence for which the accused is sought to be charged. In the context of Section 406 IPC, there must be prima facie material disclosing entrustment of property, or dominion over it, followed by its dishonest misappropriation or conversion, or its use or disposal in violation of the terms governing such entrustment. 10. The learned Revisional Court applied the aforesaid standard and observed as under: "......At the stage of framing of charge, the Court need not delve into realm of whether the case is proven beyond reasonable doubt as that determination comes at a later stage i.e. after conclusion of the trial. A strict standard of proof is not required while evaluating the material on record for purpose of framing of charge, however, there must ex