Devayanti v. UOI & Ors

ORDER

12.07.2010 In terms of the common judgment rendered today in Writ Petition (Civil) 9478/2007 titled "Wing Commander M.P. Set/il (Retd.) & Ors v. Union of india & Another" along with eight connected writ petitions, this writ petition is dismissed with no orders as to costs. Application also stands dismissed. A copy of the judgment passed in W.P. (C) No. 9478 of 2007 be placed forthwith on the file. t'--lu S. MURALIDHAR, J JULY 12, 2010 rk Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. IN '111 E iHGU COURT OF DELII I AT NEW DEIJI I Reserved oil: Kiy 31, 20 10 Decision on: .luly 12 7 2010 WRJ1' PETITION (CIVIL) 9478/2007 & (;M APPI, 17858/07 WING COMMANDER MI'. SETftIJ (REI).) & ORS Pciitioners Jhrough: Mr. Rakesh Tikku with Mr. Prakasli Gautani. Advocate versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR .... Respondents Ihrough: Ms. J yo t i Si ngh, Advocate WIRII'F PETITION ((:IvIL) 9525/2007 & (:1\iAi'pI 1 7931/07 LX. N.K. KR1SHAN KUMAR & ORS .... Petitioners Jhrough: Go]......Diganibar Sing], Advocate versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR Rcspondcni:s ihrough: Ms. Jyoti Singh, Advocaic WRI' .F IETiiiON (CIViL) 9546/2007 & CM APPL 17954/07 CIJANDRO DE\'I .... Petinoner ilirough: Go]. K. I)igamhar Singh, Advocate versus UN ION 01' INDIA & ANR Respondents Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh. Advocate W1i'F PETJTJ(I)N (CIViL) 9568/2007 & CM Ai'I'L 1798.1/07 11A . HONY. CAPT BALBIR SJNGH .K.ADIAN .....Petitionci Through: Go]. K. f)iganibar Singh, Advocate versus UNION OF INDIA & ANi Respondents Through: M. .Iyoti Singh. Advocate WRIt' IEi'ITiON (CIVIL) 6447/2008 & CM Ai'l't 1231 5/08 .IAGI)ISJ-1 I'RASAD .... Petitioner Through: Go]. K. Digambar Singli, Advocate WP (C) No. 9478107, 9525/07, 9546107, 9568107, I'age 1 of 35 U versus I.JN JON OF iNDIA & ANR . Respondents ihrough: Ms. Jyoti Singh Advocate WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 6494/2018 & CM AP1'I., I 2381/08 \'I.J];NJ)ER SJNGI-I Pelitioner Through: Col. K. 1)igambar Singh, Advocate versus UNION OF INDJA & ANR Rcsponcicnts ihrough : Ms. lyon Singh, Advocate WRIT PETITION (Ci\'J L) 6761/2008 & CM APPI I 300S/08 LX. 1-IONY. SUB MAJ RAM PAL & ANR . .... Petitioners ihrough: Mr. Rakesh uk ku with Mr. Prakasli (]autam, Advocate versus UNION OF IN])IA & ANR .... Respondcnis Through: Ms. Mancesha Dhir with Ms. Preeti Dala! and Mr. K.P.S. Koh!i, Advocate WRIT PETITION ((,- IVIl ) 7366/2009 & CM API'L 321 0/09 DF\'A YANTI .... Peti tinier 'Fhrough: (o! . K. l.)iganihar Sint;h, i\dvocatc versus UNION OF 1N1 IA & ANR .... Respondcnts Ihrougli : Ms. 1yon Singh, Advocate And WIiT PFTI1'iON (CiViL) 14034/2009 & CM APP1, 16083/09 LX.

Sl--,',Il \'iRENDER SJNGH Petitioner ihrough: Go!. K. F)igambar Singh, Advocate versus UNION OF iNDIA & ANR Respondents 'I'hrough: Ms. .Jyoti Si ngh, Advocate (:oR.A,M: .IUSTJ('E S. MURA1.AI)I1AR WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, Paqc 2 of 35 \Vhether Reporters ol local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? No. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes Whei:her the judgnient should he reported Yes in Digest? .IUDG E1\1 ENI' Ihe nonrenewal of the licences in respect of the shops located in the shopping complex under the control of the Ministry of DelCnce, Un ion of in ia (Respondent No. I) in favour of the Petitioners pursuant to a poi icy de 'ision made effective from 30' Apn I 2007, is the subect matter of the chal ICOQc in iii is batch of writ pet ions. Ba ck ro an dfacts The Petitioners belong to categories of ex-servicemen (and their thmily members) who died either in war and/or while being in service and/or having suffered battle casuaLties and/or discharge from the armed forces and/or those arnieci personnel who retire after rendering frill service. The case of the Petitioners is that among various measures adopted by the I )ireeiorale General of Resettlement ('DGR') was the allocation of , the shops in the areas mannerl and managed by the Station Conirnander iii various localities in i)elhi such as S.I. Marg, Delhi Cantt, 1\rjun Vihar, I)hat.ila Kuan, Shankar Vihar etc. It is stated that with a view to streamline t.hc allotnients made of the above shops in the shopping complexes, the Respondents have been issuing guidelines from time to time known as Standing Operating Procedure 'SOP'). In terms of Clause 6 of the SOP issued or 1 011 August 200 I , as WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, 6447108, 6494108, 6761108. 7366109 & 14034109 . Paqe 3 of 35 and when any of the shops 1iI I vacant, the Station Commander at Station I leadquarters was expected 1:0 give wide publicil:y through the DGR in local newspapers. The allotment of shops was to be (lone on yearly basis. Clause I of the SOP dated 1 0' August 2001 provided for priorities in the allotment of shops. Various parameters have been laid clown for allotment. On meeting such parameters a person was given a licence for a period of II rionths si.iblccl to renewal. Clause 17 o F ihc SOP dated 0 August 2001 reads as uii (ICr: "17. Renewal of licence deed: Renewal of licence (Iced vi II he clone on the recommendation of resicicnhal associations, which will be obtained three months in advance from the dale of expiry of licence deed by DDA & QMG. Station. i-IQ Delhi Canit. if the recommendations are in fvour of al lottee, then the Station Commander may renew the licence deed for the subsequent year. However, the licence deed may be terminated at any time by the Station Commander at his discretion."

¶4According to the Petitioners, till the policy of 1 311 April 2007 which is challenged in this petition was announced, as a matter of practice, the I icences were being renewed from time to time. Many of the Petitioners have been occupying the shops in their pOSSeSSIOn br Over nine years. In fict, the Petitioners including Wing Commander M.P. Sethi and two others in Arjun \/ihar have been in occupation of, their respecti\'e shops for over 21 years. It is stated that in terms of. Clause 17 of the SOP only where the Residents' Association did not favour any par icular allottec of a shop. was the renewal withheld, in terms of Clause 28 of the SOP a (lefaultinc allotlee WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, has to be referre( to the Estate Officer fbr the purposes ot initiation of eviction proceedings under the Public Premises ft;viction and Unauthorized Occupants) Act. 1971 ('PP Act') It is stated that 1982 onwards man)' of the Petitioners were aIlo(tcd their respective shops and licence deeds were also executed. The licence deeds wcrc last cxtcnded in the year 2000 and were to expire in the latter part of 2007. It is stated that the Petitioners had legitimate expectation that the licence (leeds may indeed be renewed. I lowever, on I 3111 April 2007 the new policy effective from 30 ill April 2007 was issued. (:le 18 of the new policy reads as under:

¶18Icncw'al of licence dcccl: Renewal of licence (feed will be done on the recommendation of residential aSsociatic)nS, which will be obtaiied three nionihs in advance from the date of expiry of licence deed by AQIVIG, Station Ilead Quarter, Delhi Canti. Ifthc recOmmendations are in favour o:f alloitee. then tIic Station Conmiandcr may renew the licence riced forthe subsequent year. I lowcver, the licence dee.i may be terminated at any time by the Station Commander at his discretion. No extension beyond live years will he given under any circumstance. Ihe saiie person can apply after a gap of minimum three years of clear break (not running in any Army Colony oINCR)." In teiiTis of the above Clause 18, the right to get the liccnccs renewed immediately on the expiry of live years has been withdrawn. The allottees are expected to apply again after a mini mum break OF three years. In tcrins WP (C) Nos. 9478107. 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, Paqe 5 of 35 Of the revised pol Icy, the Respondents issued letters to the Petit loners declining renewal of licences. ihe copies of letters requiring the Petiliorcrs to vacate the shops under their occupation have been encloSed with the petition. Petitioner Nos. I, '2 and 4 to 9 Wing Commander M.P. Sethi (Reid.), lx .JW() A.S. Chadha, Ex. (3NR 'Narender l)ev, Lx. Naik Unni Krishnan-TP, Ex. Sepoy Dharam Chand, Smt. Chandro Dcvi, Ex. Subcdar R.K . Pawar, Smt. Vimki Dcvi] in V.P. (C) 9478 of 2007 Petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 5, 9. 1 2, 14, 15 and 17 I l:x. N.K.. K.rishan Kuniar, I.I. (Rerd.) Colonel Raiicshwar, Mrs. \/ccria Mulc.liyar, Smt. 'Narangi Dcvi, Fjx. Sigrrin ]shwar Singh. I'lony. Capt. (Rctd.) Dhanraj Sharma, Mrs. Shakuntla Dcvi and Smi. Lilawati] Ill W.P. (C) 9525 of 2007; Smt. Chandro Dcvi, wife ot' late N.K. 1 loshiyar Singh, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) 9546 of 2007; Lx. I tony. Capt. l3alhir Singh. the Petitioner in W.I. (C) 9568 of 2007 were Servc(I \'acation notices dated 231 November 2007 requiring the said Petitioners to vacate ihc shops in their possession within one month. However. the Court is in formed by tl'ic Respondents that Chandro Dcvi, Petitioner No. 7 in W.P. (C) 9478 of 2007 has already vacated the shop in her posscssion. Shobhawat i l)evi, the wife of Ex . I-tony Captain Satpal Yadav, Petitioner No. II in W.I. (C) 9478 of 2007 made a representation to the Respondents requesting them to transfer the licence to the shop allotted to tier deceased husbard to her. On 3 ° October 2007, the Respondents in reply to this representation dated I 711 August 2007 stated that there was no policy to WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, transler the allotted Shop from the original al louce to the spouse in case uI the irmer's death. The licence For tile shop allotted to her . deceased husband had already eXpired on I 9111 August 2007. I lowever, on Compassionate grounds she was allowed to Continue iii I 3 I December 2007. This stand was reiterated by the Respondents by a communication dated I 311 November 2007 in reply to the Petitioner's representation dated I 7 November 2007.

¶10Shri i\4agan Lal. Petitioner No. 10 in W.P. (C) 947$ of 2007 whose licence expired on 2711 October 2007 and Shri Havrnan Singh, Petitioner No. 18 in W.P. (C) 9525 of 2007 whose licence expired on 25h11 November 2007 received vacation notices dated 27111 November 2007 requiring them to vacate the shops in their respective possession within one month. Shri NI P. Singh, Petitioner No. 3 in W.P. (C) 9478 of 2007 received a similar notice Oil 2811 November 2007 after his licence expired on 2711 November 2007. The licence of Shri .Iagdish Prasad, the Petitioner in A/. P. (Civil) 6447 of 2008 expired on 14111 August 2007. He was served a vacation notice by the Respondents on 21 SC May 2008 askiiig him to vacate the shop in his OS5CS5iOil by 25hh1 .Iune 2008. Similarly 1 the licence oF Shri Virender Singh, the Petitioner in W. P. (C) 6494 of 2008 expired on I 9111 January 2008. .1 Ic was served a vacation not ice dated 3° May 2008 asking hi Fl to vacate the shop in his posSeSsion by 25111 June 2008. l-lowever, the Respondents informed the Court that the Petitioner in W.P. (C) 6494 of 200$ has already vacated the shop. The licence of Shri Rampal, Petitioner No. 1 in W.P. (C) 6761 of 2008 expired on 2011 April 2008 and of Shri K.amcshwar Prasad WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, Paqe 7 of 35 Singh, Petitioner No. 2 in W.P. (C) 6761 of 2008 on 2811 February 2008. They were served vacation notices on 8111 May and 24' Ap!- Il 2008, respectively, requiring them to vacate the shops in their poSseSsion by I61 September 2008. Smi. Devyanti Dcvi, the PeI:itioncr in W.P. (C) 7366 ol 2008 was issued a vacation notice on S' January 2009 when her licence had expired on 6h11 July 2008. She was required to vacate the shop by 2111 February 2009. 11 The licence of Shri \'irendcr Singh, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) I 4034 of 2009 expired or 31 si January 2007. However, by a letter dated 21 December 2006 the Respondents had cancelled his licence under pam 15 of the licence deed due to sublctt:ing of the shop. By a letter dated 30111 November 2007 he was asked to vacate the shop within 30 days. Consequently, the Respondents served an eviction notice dated I $l August 200$ on the Petitioner. .12. 1 t. Cot. (Re(d.) B.M. Kapoor, Petitioner No. 4 in W.P. (C) 9525 of 2007 was served a \'aeation notice on I 9111 December 2007 while his licence had expired on 7 ' July 2007. Similarly, U. Col . (Retd.) I )..K . I )ebnath, Petitioner No. I in W. P. (C) 9525 of 2007 was served a vacation notice dated 14111 August 2007 when his licence expired on 24hh1 March 2008. Petitioner Nos. 3, 6, 7, 11, 13 and 16 in W.P. (C) 9525 of 2007 have also been served with si iii ar vacation notices, vli ich are mpugned, after cxpi ry of their I icerces. WP (C) Nag. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, . The Peiiiione,w' case It is submitted by the Petitioners that the very pu1)ose of D(R, alkeating shops in favour of the Petitioners was to enable them to have some reasonable means ol subsistence. It is stated that continued allotment was a rule and non-renewal an exception. Continued allotment automatically Jollowed if there were no negative rcporth .11cm the residents' associations. It is stated that primarily the Pet tioners are selling grocery items, eatables, vegetables, limited items of clectrical goods etc. in their shops. 'Ihese are made available to the residents of the localities where defence shopping complexes are located, at reasonable rates. The bask idea is to make available things of day-to-day use to the residents of these areas near their door steps. 'fhe very purpose of allocating these shops to various allottecs was to enable the servicemen and their ftimily members to earn a decent living. It is stated that the new policy made effective from 30 April 2007 gives, a complete go-by to this philosophy. It introduced a break in the continuity o .f their rehabilitation process with the Respondents pressunsing the Petitioners to vacate the shops. At t lie initial (late of hearirg i.e. on 20 December 2007, this Court passed the following order: "Issue notice. Ms. .lyoti Singh, Advocate accepts notice Nile-on behalf of Respondents. Counter affidavit shall be lilcd within two weeks. Rejoinder, if any. may be tiled within two weeks therealler. W1' (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, I'oq' 9 of 35 List on 8tI February 2008. CM APPL 17850/2907 (slay) I have considered the materials on record. The applicants' grievance is that they were allotted the premises by the Respondents as a measure of rchahiliiaiion, On account at their being ex-serviccman or being war widows. II is èontendcd that sudden change of pot icy has gravely and irrcparably affected them. Learned counsel br the Petitioners relied upon the documents. They suggest that Respondents took a conscious decision that the at lotnient, in case of rehabilitation NvaS understood as not to the subject of later cancellation. However, learned counsel for the Respondents has disputed the applicability of the documents. Accordini to her, the letter pertained to allotment of premises in Rceimcntal Areas it is not disputed that the allotment of these spaces were given as a measLire of rehabilitation to the Petitioners. The objective of the new Schente, it is emphasized, is to ensure availability of these prciTiises to as many beneficiaries as possible, haviig regard to the limited resources available with the .torce. It is contended that a large number of applications were filed and are pending consideration. While the discretion of public aLithority to at lot the pnses within its possession, control and ownership and the parameters for such lreal:ment can never he denied yet he question here appears to be one of balancing competitive disadvantages, as it were. 'fhe debate here is whether haviiig allotted the premises, as a measure of , rehabilitation, the Respondents caii, alter some time reverse that process and insist that such allottecs who admittedly were eligible for the benefit should retui -n the premises and wait for three more years to claim at lotment fbr the same and other such spaces. I am of the opinion that while the Respondents' power to frame a pot icy WI' (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, cannot he questioned yet the considerations which the authority has to keep in this regard, i.e. the level of prosperity or inComC attained by the aII.ottees who wcrc given premises earlier, the sufficiency of such income to make them tide order the difficult situation and other objective factors can certainly be gone into under Article 226 oI the Constitution. In view of the above, the Respondents are lierchy restrained from t:aking any steps to dispossess the Petitioner during the pendency of , this wrii petition." Case oft/ic Respondents In the counter affidavit filed in W. P. (C) 9546 of 2007, which is more or less similar to the counter affidavit filed in other peti ions, the Respor dents have categorically stated that ''the doniinani, purpose of ihcsc ft shopping complex/centres is the wet 6ire of the servicemen and their timil es residing in the vicinity thereof and NOT resettlement oh a war widow, a widow, battle casualty and ex-servicemen which is only ancillary rather than at lot shop to outsiders. It may be further ic-emphasised that the shops in the shopping complexes/shopping centres are allotted on contract LW1 basis on the normal rental basis and no promise has been held out to the allottees that their licence will be necessarily renewed/extended in perpetuity." The rationale for changing the policy as set out in the SOP dated I August 2001 is attributed to the requests made by a lat -ge number of war "-4' widows, widows, battle casualties and ex-scrviecnien approachine the Respondents for allotment of shops in shopping complexes/shopping centres. It is stated that in a period of five months, 47 such applications WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, 6447108, 6494108, 6761108, 7366109& 14034109 I'oge ii of 35 were received but none of them could be entertained since the existing allottees were continuing since inception and the number of shops available was limited. Ihe reasons for the change in the policy as introduced in the SOP dated 1 3 (h April 2007 are stated to be the Ibilowing: assisting those families registered iii the waiting list lbr allotment of sliops. illegal sub-letting of shops by the existing allottees whose licences have been kept renewed for a long duration. the fct that there is no increase in the number of shoppine complexes even while the demand for allotment keeps increasing. since the allotment of shops is a wet fire measure, it is necessary to rotate the allocation SO that a larger number of ex-scrvicemen are bcncIitted.

¶18The Respondents claim that the changed policy was made known to all licencecs including the Petitioners in June 2007. In the additional affidavit tiled on 22 l:el,niau_y 2010, the Respondents have drawn a (list inction between unit shops (Pegimental Shops) and shops in shopping cenlrcs/complexcs which are located in the "main malTicd complex''. l:ncloscd with the affidavit is a COPY of the 'Scales of Accommodation 1983 ('SOA 19831. Regimental shops are authorized by para 3.'l I of the SOA I 983 and provide for trades such as tailor, boot maker (NJ3R), cycle repair and grocer (uilit baniya and wet canteen). These unit sliops "are meant purely fbr troops and their families as a weliirc activity and are located in unit lines wherein civilian population has limited or no access." WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, The additional affidavit proceeds to state that shops in shopping centres/complexes as descnbed in para

3.42.1 of SOA I 93 and are located at military stations ''where no civil shopping coniplex exists within it reasonable distance from the main married complex. The trades can be selected out ot categories like aerated watcr, barber, book arid stationary, car and scooter repair, cloth, chemist and druggist, dry cleaner, cycle, gas, furniture, restaurant, milk dairy, bakery, vegetable and 'fruits and other trades vli cli meet the requirements of the troops and their families." It is slated that these shops have a clientele of the dependent civilian population also. The Respondents point out that t;herc arc two sub-categories of shops in shoppuig complexes/centres. One category is covered by para 3,42. I of S(A I 983 which are created on defence lands From government funds. The other category is shops created on defence lands using non public ('unds. On 1 l September 2008, the 'Mini.try of Defence ('MoD') Government: of India, brought out 'Guidelines for running shopping centres/complexes and unit shops' .Para 8(b) of the guidelines states that the Defer cc Shoppiu Centres/Complexes (Maint:enance and Administration) Rules, 2006 (' DSC Rules 2006') framed by the MoE) and issued on I 35 .Jui'ie 2006 WOO Id he applicable to both categories of shopping complexes, i.e., those created with govei -nment funds and those with non public funds. 2 I . the I )SC Rules, 2006 make it clear that they (10 not apply to Regimental shops created exclusively for military personnel and their WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, N) thmil es. Rule 2(c) defines a shopping complex to mean "a composite area comprising shops established on A-i or analogous defence iaiil under the management of the Army/Navy/Air lorce but would not include Regimental shops created exclusively for military personnel and their families." Under Rule 3(a) the existing alloitces were allowed to continue til I the expi ry of their licence period and such (1 those in unauthorized occupation of the shops, i.e., where the period of licence has expired, would be given six months time to vacate in terms of Rule 3(c) liiling which the [state Officer would initiate action to evict (bern in accordance with law.

¶22Under Rule 7 no transfer was penTissible except in case ol demise of the allotice, in which case it would be transferred to the dependent/legal heir for the residual period of the licence. tJnder Rule 12, 60% of the shops in each shopping complex were to he reserved in the order of priority as under: war widows/vido'vs of defence personnel killed while on duty. disabled soldier ex-ser\'icemen spouses/widows of cx-serviccmen. [he remaining ,40% were to he allotted to the lollowing: Government agencies icluding public sector undertakings and civilians whose spouse or dependent thmi ly member (10 not own any shops in the coniplex/niilitary station/cantonment. WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, 6447108, 6494108, 6761108, 7366109 & 14034/09 Poqo .14 of 35 Any unal lotted shops in the 60/0 quota were to he considered for bein g g iven to the civil ian category. tinder Rule 13, allotment was to he given under licence for a period of three years. Further allotment was to be made "strictly under thc Ruics framed herein." Under Rule 18, on termination ol the licence, ii the shops Were lot vacated, action NAILIS to he initiated un(ier the PP Act. Under Rule 25(a) any matter not covered by the DSC 2006 would be decided by the Mol) in consultation with the Director General of the Defence Estates and the i-Leadquai-tcrs of the Army/Navy/Air Force. A l:urther additional affidavit was liled on 2711 April 2010 clariFying that the shops in Army Hospital, Raj Rifle Centre, lase Hospital, Pal lavi Shoppine Complex, Taurus CSI) Canteen. Army I leadquarlers and Parade Ground are Regimental shops to be adniiiistered by their respective commandants. l'hese were different, from Station shopping complexes where the shops allotted to the Petitioners were located. Statistics of the applications received for allotment of shops and the actial allotments made from 2005 till (late have been set out to show that only I 0% oF the applicants have been allotted due to unavailabil it); of shops. The last affidavit was tiled in response to new facts stated in the Rejoinder by the Petit oilers Ofl 30h March 2009 listing out some of the shops occupied by civilians. The Petitioners also filed an additional rejoinder affidavit oil I 211 May WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, I, 2010 giving details of shops run by civilians in Dcliii Cantonment. Photographs of some of these shops were also enclosed. The basic contention of , the Petitioners is that f there is a shortage of shops for a! lotmcni for those in the waiting list, then these civilians should be asked to \'i-1(;.itc. SuIwiissio#is of counsel This Court has heard the submissions of Mr. Rakesh i'ikku, Col. K. Digamlxir Singh and Mr. Sanjay Rathi, learned counsel fOr the Petitioners and Ms. Jyoti Singh, leai -ned counsel for the Respondents. The central plank of the submissions on behalf of the Petitioners is based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation. II is submitted that the afOrementioned notices sent by the Respondents requiring the Petitioners to vacate the shops in question are arbitrary and unreasonable. The rcftisal by the Respondents to renew the Petitioners' licenccs is slated to be arbirary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution when tested on the touchsiore oi the doctrine of legitimate expectations. 2$. There is both a procedural and substantive component to the right, asserted. The piocedure lol owed here is that each of , the Pet itior ems has been given thirty days' advance notice to vacate and hand over vacant possessiono.f the premises. 'i'liis is exactly what the terms of the licence stipulate. 1-lowever, it is contended that the Petitioners were not aware when such licence was issued that there would be no renewal afler five years and WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, 6447108, 6494108. 6761108, 7366109 & 14034109 therelore such requirenlent can only apply to those whose I icenccs were cyv i issued fir the first time after the new policy dated I 3111 April 2007 canic into force i.e 3011 April 2007. In other words a conditional it)', of non-renewal a 11cr live years, cannot be applied retrospectively to the Petitioners. The procedure followed by the Respondents is attacked J01 its unfairness. It is submitted by the Petitioners that had they known in advance that such a five-year rule would he applied then they could have made alternative arrangements which accor ling to Chem requires sonic time. 1 he doctrine of legitimate expectation is invoked as regards the substantive content of the policy. Ii: is contended that, notwithstandine these were licences for a year at a time, as a mat:ter of practice the licenccs were Ak hemg renewed year aller year by ibllowing the pre-amended policy as expressed in Clause .17 of the SOP dated I 0111 A ugust 2001. In other words, there was a legitimate expectation even this time around that their licenees would be renewed. The frustration of this iceitimaic expectation is said to attract Article l'l. Independent of the ground based on legitimate expectation, it is submitted that the policy to restrict the initial licence period to live years. a (Icr the licence has already been renewed in terms of the CXisting policy i.e. the SOP dated 1 0111 August 2001, is arbitrary since it; runs contrary to the very object of providing rehabi I itatior to the cx-servieemen and their relatives who, having set up shops, cannot he expected to suddenly wind up their business and move on. Given the restrictions as to the price at which W1' (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, I'aqe 17 of 35 they can sell their commodities, and the advanced age at which some are, they cannot he expected to find alternative means of livelihood. They cannot be reasonably expected to have made substantial proii1s in the short period that would help them to sustain thcmsclves alici' losing their shops. Also, alternative commercial space in the samc area, or any other area, would hc unaf fordable. They would be back to being i'educcd to penuly which will delcat the object, of their being extended a wel larc measure (or sustenance. A commercial shop has to be run or borrowings and it lakes some tinie to even break even. Itcannot be abruptly stopped at the end of five years jl.ist alX)ut when it is possible to make some profits. Heing made to wait for thrce years thereafter before re-applying, only compounds the uncertainty and is based on a nonunderstanding of' how the retail trade in goods works. 11 is submitted that the period of five years, which has been arbitrarily fixed, does not subserve the purpose and object of the wel fore measure and therefhi'e is also irrational. Forcing the Petitioners to make way for other exserviccmen who may be waiting in the queue, and then granting them shops for a maximum period of live years, does not help either group of ex-servicemen, it is submitted that there is no supervening public interest that justifies such a drastic change in the policy. The answer to the demand for allotment of such shops was pei'haps to construct more shops or decrease the existing quota of 40 1/o for civilians instead curtailing the licence pei'ird o.l' the shops given to the ex.-ser'vicemen. 31 . The other limb of this argument is that there cannot he a discrimination between 'regimental' shops and shops in a commercial shopping complex as both are after all as a nieasure of welfire and arc oil defence land. WP (C) Nos. 94 78107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, Appearing for the Respondents Ms. .lyoti Singh, learned counsel first subniits that the CaUSC of action in the present petition admittedly ariSes out of and seeks the continuation of a contractual agreement and therefore a writ petition under Article 226 of the' Constitution seeking such rclicf is not maintainable. Secondly, it is submitted that the Petitioners have an efficacious remedy under the PP Act. Ihirdly, it is StlhiTiittCd that the Pctitioncrs have not come with clean hands and are tryirie to mislead thc Court, that they have been allotted "regimental shops" as agai iist shops III a shopping complex. It is pointed out that policy for allotment makes a clear distinction between 'regimental shops' and shops in a 'shopping complex', While the former may be said to be allotted by way of rehabilitation, the shops in a sl'iopping complex are for the families residing in the vicinity where there are no shops at a reasonable distance. Ms. Singh emphasized that the shops in question were ivcn under licence deeds ibr terms of, 11 months renewable at the discretion of, the Station Commander. It is submitted that there is a growing (lcrnand from the \'cry same categories of ex-servicemen and their limi ly members, who have bccomc eligible later for the allotment of shops on I iccncc basis. It is claimed that there is a waiting list of such prospective allottecs. Given that the nui'nber of shops are limited, and in order to ensure equal treatment, the policy of 3011 April 2007 has been devised. It is pomted out that there arc other ex-scrviccnien equally deserving in the queue and cannot possibly he acconiniodated unless the current occupiers arc asked to V:ic:ite. It is denied that the non-refusal to renew the licences is either arbitrary or mala (lde as WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, 6447108, 6494108, 6761108, 7366109&14034109 ' Page 19af3S alleged. it is further denied that any specific unequivocal pronli Sc was made or assurance given 10 any of the allottees that the shops would be allotted for life or iii perpetuity. Statistics giving details of allotment of ShOpS in the shoppinu complexes have been produced by the Respondents which show that against 87 applications received in the year 2005 only 4 shops \\'ere allotted; agai ist 37 applications received in the year 2009, 3 shops were allotted, and 26 applicat ions have already been received for 2010, while there has been no allotment since there is no vacancy. With this background of' facts, this Court is called upon to examine whether the policy decision announced by the Respondents effective 30h April 2007 is arbitraty or unreasonable and whether the non-renewal of the licenees in favour of the Petitioners is arbitrary or unreasonable. Preliiiiiiiary objecfwizs US 10 Iii (lifltUiflU/)iIiIJ? The scope of' the jurisdiction of this Coi.iri under Article 226 of the Constitution to review a policy decision is limited. The Court normally does not interfere in the matters of policy except where it dircctiy impacts on fundamental rights. The right being asserted here is essentially the right to be treated fairly and reasonably. To that extent the judicial review Of the impugned actions of tile ReSp011(.ICI1IS is itideed periiiissible. i\ iso. the scope of the proceed ngs under the PP Act is h ui ted to siiowirg why tile continued occupation OF the shops is not unauthorized and why the occupier shou id not he asked to pay penai rates during such period of unauthorized WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, 6447/08, 6494108, 6761108, 7366109 & 14034109 occupation. A challenge cannot be raised in proceedings under the PP Act to the validity of any policy change or to the impugned orders on the ground that they are arbitrary and violate Article 14. In other words the remcdy under the PP Act is neither an efficacious nor an alteniativc remedy to thc present petitions. The preliminary objections of the Respondents as to maintainability of these petitions are accordin gly ovCtTlticd. Legilinz ate expectation

¶37Turning to the merits, the first issue U) be considcred is whether the impugned actions are rendered arbitrary III that they frustrate the legitimate expectations, both procedi.iral and substantive, of the Petitioners thi:is i-cndering them arbitrary and unreasonable under Article 14? Our Supreme Court has developed the doctrine of legitimate expectation largely on the basis of the decisions of the courts in England. In Council of('ivil Service (Jiiions i Mw,ster for Civil Service 1984 All El? 935. it was contended by the Unions that an employee had a legitimate expectation that the Minister would lbhlow the existing practice of' consulting the Uruonis before their mcmbci-ship could be withdrawn. It was explained that the procedural part of the expectat ion was that the appropriate procedure, including an opportunity of being heard would be followed, before the benefit or the advanlac was withdrawn. The substantive part was that a representation was made that the benefit of a substantive nature would either be granted or continued and not substantially varied. It could be a representation. to the individual or generally to a class of persons. 'l'hc Australian I ugh Court in Attorney Genera/for New South Wales v. Qui,i 1990 (64) Aust LII? 327 apprehended that ''to strike down the exercise of , adnii n istrative power WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525/07, 9546107, 9568107, 6447108,6494108, 6761108, 7366109 & 14034109 I'oge 21 oJ35 Solely oii the gi-ound of avoiding the disappointment of legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts ar lit on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law." The House of I 'ords in Re Findluj' 1984 (3) All ER 801 ilL rciectcd the argument that there was any substantive legitimate expectation that the poi icy relating to parole for certain category of prisoners cm.ild not he changed and required prior consultation. It was held that "the most that a convicted prisoner can legitimately expect is that his case be exannned individually in the light of whatever policy the Secretary of Slate sees fit to adopt provided always that the adopted policy is a lawful exercise of the - discretlori confeiTed upon him by the statute. Any othc.r view would entail the conclusion that the unfettered discretion conferred by statute upon the minister can in some cases be restricted SO as to hamper, or even to prevent ch anges of policy." 3$. The above was the stage of development of the law when in lVui'jpoti Co-oj,eratii'e Groujj housing Society i (in ion of 1,zdia (1992) 4 SCC 477 the Supreme Court adopted the principle to grant relief to the Petitioners in that case. The fucts were that the existing list of co-operative societies for allotment of land was altered under a changed policy by reckoning the seniority with reference to the dale oF approval ot the final list by the Registrar. The SupreiTie Court accepted the argument that affbctcd socictics had a legitimate expectation that the past consistent practice would be WI' (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, followed particularly since the Respondents liii led to show ally ovcrriding public intcrest.

¶39In Food Corporation of India i'. Kaniadhenu Cattle Feet! Industries

(1993) 1 SCC 71 the action of the appellant in rcli.ising to accept the Respondent's Ii ighesi tender for purchase ol stocks of damaged food grains was challenged. it was submitted that there could not be any subsequent neiotiation to improve upon the highest hid and that the person offering the highest lender had a legitimate expectation that the hid would he accepied. Negativing the pica of tile Respondent it was held that, "8. The mere reasonable or legiti iiiate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself he a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render tile decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due considera!ioii of a legitimate expectal ion frms part of tile principle of 11011-arbitrariness, a necessary conconlitant of the rule o.l law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair deciSioll rnakmg process. Whether the expect:ation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate ill the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest Wilercin other illOiC illijlortant considerations iiia' outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimatc expectation of the clailllailt. A bolla lick decision of the public authority reached ill this manner would satisl3' the requirci lent of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of, legitimate expectation gets assimi kited ill the ruie of law and operates in our legai system ill this manner and to this extent. WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107,

¶110The doctrine was further developed in (mmii af India i'. JIindi.istan O~k,

Developiiient Corporation (1993) 3 SCC 499 where it vas cxplaiiied in para 28 that: "ftc legitimacy of an expectation call be infelTed only if it is founded oil the Sanction of law or custom or an cstabl ished Procecilire followed in regular and natural scqucnce. Again it is distinguishable ironi a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimatc and P1i)tectablc. I very such legitimatc expectation does not by itself fructify 11110 a right and therefore it does 1101 amount to a right in the conventional Sc rise." it was further explained in para 33: "1 he doctrine does 1101 give scope to claim relief straightaway From the adrnmistrativc authoritIes as 110 crystal ised right as such is involved. The Protection of such legitimate expectation (loes not require the frilfillment of tile expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise in other words where a persons legitimate expectation is not Jul11 led by taking a particu ar decision then decision-maker should justi ly the denial of such expectation by showing some overrating public irterest. Therefore even if substantive proleclior of such expectation is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right to a particular person. It simply ensures tile circumstances in which that expectation may be denied or restricted. A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by Past practice aroused expectation which it would he within its powers to fulfill. The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within those limits." WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, 6447108, 6494108, 6761108, 7366109 & 14034/09 • .. 'II Alter emphasising that the burden was on the person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation to satisfy that there has been a representation or a past practice that has given rise to such expectation, it must be shown that the decision of the authority was ''ai -biirary, unrcasonablc and not taken in public interest''. It was observed: ''I I it is it question ol policy, cvcn by way of change of old policy, the coi.iils cannot ntcr.ferc with the decision''. Even if the cowl. was satishcd that it case Of legitimate expectation was made out, it can grant relief only where the Etilure to give an opportunity of hearing prior to such ticcisiun has resulted in Eu I ui -c o fj ust cc.

¶42In Madras (_'ity, Wine Merchanis'Associaiio,, v. Slate u/TN (1994) 5 SCL 509 the licence holders invoked past practice to claim a legitimate expectation of renewal of bar lieenccs under the Tanii I Nadu Prohibit ion Act. 1937 read with the Tanii I Nadu (Vending in l3ar) Rules 1 992.

I eforc the bar licencecs could apply for renewal, a policy decision was taken not to renew their I iccnces. It was held that even under the carl icr policy, it licence under the liar Rules was only for a period of one year arid renewal was based on payment of 1 5 (Yo more than the "privilege amount at which the sa IC of the privilege was con firmed the pre\hIonIs year". Renewal for the third year was on payment of' 1 00o more than the pm' lege amount. It was held that ''if there is a change in policy or in public interest the position is altered by it rule or legislation, no quest iou of lcgitiniat:e expectation would NJ arise.'' It was observed that the expectation that the licence would he renewed at best was at best "a hope". WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525/07, 9546107, 9568107, !'oqe 25 of 35 The law regariing legitimate expectation was (liScuSse(.1 in great detail thereafter in Pun/nb Coni,nu,ucatwns v. Union of' I,zdia (1999) 4 SCC

¶727'[he facts were that the Asian Development Hank (' Al)13') agreed to lend to the Government: of India US $113 million for providing digital wireless telecom facility to 36,000 identified villagcs in Eastern U.P. The appellant, and another company were short-listed a:ilcr exaniiiaiion ol if ollcrs of sevcral lndian and foreign companies. I lowever, a high level committee thereafter disqualilied the appellant to enable the calling of t'rcsh lenders on the basis of the analog system. The Union of India took a policy decision not to avail the AD13 loan. The previous tenders \.\'crc accordingly cancelled. 'I'hc appellant invoked legitimate expectation o( a substantive nature to urge that that even if the government was ftinding the project on its own, the policy could not be changed and the original lender noti Rcation could not be abandoned. Negativing these arguments, it was lie Id that: "change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on Weclnes,5u,-v reasonableness (Associated Pro i'incu,/ Pictures houses Ltd. i'. JVednesl,urj (:1)17) 119481 1 KB 223 GA). We have noticed that in I/iiidusian Devt"/opoirni case, also it was laid down that the decision maker has the choice in the balancing of the pns and cons relevant to the change in policy. It is, thereibre, clear that the choice ot the policy is fi)r the decision-maker and not fir (he Court, The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits (lie Court to find out if (lie change in policy, which is the cause for defeating i lie legitimate expectation is irrational or pe''e1'se or one wh icli no reasonable person could have macic". The above law has been reiterated in a large number of eases ir different coniexts. The most recent judgment being .Jasbir Sin,/i (Jiliabra WI' (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525/07, 9546107, 9568107, i'. Slate of' Puiijah 2010 (2) SCALE 754, where the plea of legitimate expectation of being allotted residential plots only on the basis of past practice of' the Punjab Small Industries and Fxport Cot -poration I.W. was ncgativcd by the Supreme Court.

¶45To complctc this narration, it. must be not ccd that the I ngl ish courts cont i nile to rcdraw the contours of the doctrine. Laws I J in I? (on the applicatioiz of Bizatt Murphy (a firm) v. independent Assessor 12008/ if J4'('A Civ 755 pointed out the difficulties in drawing the line between substantive legitimate expectation and ordinary ji.idicial review of a new policy. I Ic explained that \vhilc the latter might require application of the traditional 14edneshurv standard of' review, substantive legitimate expectation would require a more involved consideration, I Ic observed: "it seems to nie, however, that on the face of it the cxistcrce of a pmniisc or pi'actice of present and future substantive policy serves as a somewhat fragile boundary by which to set I imils to substantive legitimate expectations. Onec set in place, eve , policy of' a liublic authority, not subject to a stated tci'minal (late or terminating event, may no doubt be expected to continue in cl'l'cct i.inti I rational grounds for its cessation ai'isc. A promise of its continuance, ii it points to no particular date or future event to tiiark the end of the policy, represents little more than this ordinary expectation. And nothing is added by referring to a practice of the policy in operation over time,'' (emphasis supplied) N.J I ,aws I J pi'occcded to observe: "Authority shows that where a substantive expectation is in i -un the pi'omise or practice which is its genesis is not mci -ely a WP (C) Nos, 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, l'aqe 27 of 35 reflection of the ordinary fact (as I have Pitt it) that a policy with 110 terminal date or tel-Illinating event will continue in effect until rational grounds for its cessation arise. Rather it must constitute a specific undertaking, directed at a particular individual or group, by which the rele'ant policy's continuance is assured." (emphasis supplcd) 'i'hc upshot of the above discussion, particularly in We teal m of policy making, is that the burden is on the Petitioners who clai ill legitimate eXpe(t:itloi1 to Sho\v that there was a speci tic representation made that their I icences would he renewed for an mdefinitc period notwithstanding Clause 17 of the earl icr policy as this was the standard pract ice; that there was a legitimate expectation that the change in the policy restricting the maxntm period to five years would he only after giving them all OppOrtunil:y of bciig heard; that the changed policy has ftustrated the substantive icgitimatc expectation thus rendering the decision not to renew the 1 icences arhitraiy and unreasonable. This Coui-t finds that the Petitioners have not been ablc to, in the first place, show that there is any specific representation either to any of them or to all of them generally that their licences would stand automatically renewed year ater year by the Respondents. The mere fact that as a matter of practice the I icciices were renewed (foes not constitute the Speci tic representation by the Respondents to each of them that indeed their licenccs would be rcnc\vcd. The renewal, it must he recalled, was only ('or a year at a time and was in accordance with the pre\;alhilg policy and Clause 17. In other words, the only 'representation' or 'assurance' to each of thcni was that at the most the I icence would he renewed for one more year at the W1' (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, F'oqe 28 oJ35 discretion of' the Respondent. No challenge was laid to Clause 17 of tlic SOP date 10 August 2001 which left it to the discretion 'of the Respondents to renew the licence at the en.l of , a year. The reasons for the change in the policy as explained by the Respondents appear to this Cowl to constitute sufficient justification for such change. Ihe scope of judicial review of such policy change is indeed limited. Unless it is shown to be not i'ilormcd by any reasonable criterion or not being in public interest. the Court cannot and should not interfere. Given the Ibet that the nuniber of , shopping complexes is unlikely to increase, and the waiting list of applicants is a growing one, the concern of the Respondents that those cx-servicemen waiting in the expectation of allotment of a shop should also be accounted for, cannot be said to bean unreasonable one. F3ot,h groups of cx-servicemen, ic, the present allottees and those awaiting allotmeni are from the same 'catchment'. The demand for shops far exceeds the supply. 'l'hcrc has to be a balancing of these two sets of 'expectations'. If the Respondents take a call and decide to change the policy so that the chances of those in the queue waiting br allotment of shops improveS, the Court cannot be expected to judicially review such policy. As explained in Madras City Wine Merchants ', no question of legitimate expectation would i.irise if' there is a change in policy or the position is altered by a rule or legislation.

¶48The Petitioners have riot questioned the DSC Rules 2006 or the Guidelines issued in September 2008. It appears that each of these Petitioners has been a beneficiary of renewal of licence several times over. l';ich of them has been granted renewal for i'nore than three yeats which is the maximum period of licence envisa(Ied under Rule 1 3 of the I )SC Rules. WP (C) Nos, 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, It has been made clear iii Clause 8 of the September 2008 C iuidel lies that the DSC Rules would apply to the shopping complexes covered by :3.42.1 of SOA 1983. Consequently, even pmcedurally, none ol the Petitioner can harbour a lcgitimatc expectation of being consulted before a change in the policy. 49 For the alorementioned reasons. this Court negatives the Plea that the impugned changed policy a-S announced by the SOP dated 13 li April 2007 frustrates any legitimate expectation, either substantive or procedural, of the Petitioners and is thciefhre rendered arbitrary or unrcasonablc. I'nj,iuiied orders ,ieitlier discrii,iinalorp Ilor arI)ilrary,

¶50the SOA 1983, the DSC Rules 2006 and the Guidelines (late 45 September 2008 leave no manner of doubt that Regimcntil shops (unit shops) are distinct and different than shops in shopping complexes and both sets of shops are not governed by the same conditions. The plei of the Petitioners that there is an), disc..imination on this score does not merit acceptance. l'he classification of such shops into two distinct categories appears to be based on rational criteria subscrving di ftcrcnt ohcc1s. Regimental shops are essentially (or providing (laity nccc.ls ot troops. Shopping complexes serve the civilian population as well. The fict that the I)SC Rules 2006 provide a 40% quota for civilians in shopping complexes (Rule 12). which Rule has not been challenged, is a pointer to the aict that the shops in shopping complexes are not mcart exdusi 'cly for cx-servicemen. ]'hc 60% quota for the ex-serviccmer is mdeed a wel kire WI' (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, 6447/08, 6494108, 6761108, 7366109 & 14034109 I'aq' 30 of 35 measure and therelore, there cannot he any vested right of being at lttted such shops. The ftict that civilians have been allotted some of the shops is thereftrc Consistent vith the We provision in the DSC Rules 2006. The Contention of the Petitioners that any shortagc in the shops availablc for allotment to cx-serviccnien can be made up by asking the civilians to vacate the shops at lotted to them IS therefore misconceived. 51 .. This Court is unable to lind the decision of the Respondcrts to restrict the licence period in respect of shops in shopping complexes to five years with the opportunity of again applying afler a break of three years to be either discriminatory or arbitrary. Also, any prcudicc that may be caused to the Pctiiioners in whose cases the liccnccs werc icncwcd prior to the change in the policy has been neutralized by the fact t:hat they have continued in possession for nearly thice years thereafter (amounting to more than two renewals) under the interim orders of this Court. As regards thosc Petitioners seeking transfer of the existing licence in their capacity as widows of ex-servicemen, they would be govcricd by Rule 7 of the l)SC Rules 2006 and in any event, they too have continued to be in the premises ftir beyond lhc period of licence under the interim orders of this Coi.irt

¶52l..3efire concluding this portion of the ju.lgmert, this Court would like to obsei-ve that there are at present at least live documents that govern the licence granted to the allottee of a shop in a shopping complex. First we have the SOA 1981 i,ara 3.42.1 of which describes what a shoppinu coniplex is. then there is the licence deed itscl F which sets out some of the WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525/07, 9546107, 9568107, applicable terms and conditions. Then there are The i)SC Rules 2006. '[here ap)eai's It he Sonic iiconsistency between the Rules and the condilions of the licence. '[hen we have the 'Guidclincs' of 4hhl September 2008, Clause $ of' which in fact states that the DSC roles 2006 will apply to shopping complexes covered by para 3.42.1 of the SOA 1983. lustly, the SOPs which arc issued from time to time. In fact it is the SOP (lated ]3t5 April 2007 that. has given rise to these set of petitions. For the purposes of' grant and renewal of' licences thei'e is some inconsistency in these five (locuments which require to be reconciled by the Respondents. Although the Petilioneis have themselves not raised any objection on this scoi'e, this Court finds that any inconsistency between the DSC rules 2006 and the SOP is not to the advantage of any of the Petitioners here as each of them has already overstayed their respective periods of licence by many years. Nevertheless, it is imperative for the Respondents to reconcile these different documents and brmg out a unifon'n set of Rules. Lxleiswn O/ti1ie 1(1 vacate the shoj,s

¶53'[he fttrther aspect to be considered is of the hardship faced by these Petitioners by relatively sudden change of policy. Considering that many of the Petitioners have been getting their hicenees renewed for the pasi several years, the announcement made in June 2007 of' a policy made effective 30111 A pri I 2007, slating that theie would be ho renewal beyond live years niust have indeed come as an unpleasant surprise. The nature of retail trade is such that most shop keepers have to buy stock on ci'edit and are under constant pressru'e as to liquidity. Unless sufficient lime is given fr vacating the shops, it will undoubtedly cause sevei'e prejudice. It is undei'standable that finding alternative conimercial space to Rill a shop n'iay neither be easy WP (C) Nos, 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107,

1.101 a llordable in the cases oi the Petitioners beiore the Court. I Jowcvcr, gi\'en the ni:imber of years they have enjoyed the hene lit, the need to give the others in the queue a similar oppOrtuility would outweigh such llardShij). 1 laying said that, with a change in policy having been made aller nearly six years, a time period of thirty days to vacate the pi .erniscs cannot be Said to he a rcasonable one. tirder Rule 3(a) of the DSC Rules 2006 : the existing allotices were allowed to continue till the expiry of their licence period and such of those in unauthorized occupation of the shops, i.e., where the period of licence has expired, would be given six months time to vacate in terms of Rule 3(c) failing which the Estate Officer would initiate action to evict them in accordance with law. The nuninii.im time to vacate the shops in question having been set out in Rule 3(a) itself ought to he six months and therefore the impugned notices giving the Petitionei -s' thirty days' time for the purpose were contrary to the above provision in the DSC Rules 2006. liowever. as a result of the interim orders the Petitioners have continued well beyond the six months' period. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of, the case. as fir as the i'etit ioners before the Court are concerned, this Cot.iri is of: the view that a ftirther period of six months must be given to each of them to vacate the shops order their occupation. This would not include such of those Petitioners which have vacated the shops during the pendency of the present case. WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, I it is accordingly directed that each of these Petit iorers, except those who have already vacated the shops allotted to them, shall be given six months' Ii lie to vacate the ShOpS in their respective Occupation. In other words, they should hand over the ShopS On or before 15 0 January 2011 This would be further subject to each of them filing an affidavit: before this (:.irt undertaking that: (i) they will hand over vacant and peaceful P0SSCSSIO1 of the shop(s) in their occupation on or before I 15 .lanuary 2011,

(ii) that they will promptly pay the licence lee as and when it falls due, (iii) and further they will not sublet the premises or induct any other pson or entity into the shop(s) in their occupation. It is made clear that this undertaking should be flied within ten days from today, i.e, on or before 2 I' July 2010, failing which it would be open to the Respondents to forthwith initiate proceedings under the PP Act for eviction of the Petitioners. Where such proceedings have already been initiated and si.ich of those Petitioners file the above undertaking within the time granted by the Court, the PP AS proceedings would remaii stayed till I 5' January 201 I or upon the Petitioners violating any of the terms of the undertaking. It is needless to say that where the Petitioners alter giving the undertaking to this Cowl, violate any of the terms of the undertaking, they will be liable to be proceeded with firthwith both for contempt of' corn -I and proceedings under the Pt' Act. It is made clear that the directions issued by the Court granting time to the Pciitioners to vacate the shops under their occupation is limited only to the Petitioners before the Court who have not vacated the premises and is not to be treated as a precedent for any other allottee. The allotments made WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525107, 9546107, 9568107, Poqe 34 of 3S of shops in shopping complexes hereafter would strictly be in accordance With the DSC Rules 2006 and the oilier relevant instruments which have been rclenvd to earlier, as amended from time to time. 5$. For all the above mentioned reasons and subject to the directions issued, the writ petitions are dismissed. The interim orders stand vacated and the pending applications stand disposed of'. S. MURAl JJ)HAR, j Jul Y 12, 2010 rk f \-

4, WP (C) Nos. 9478107, 9525/07, 9546107, 9568107, Paqe 35 of 35

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: May 31, 2010 Decision on: July 12, 2010 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 7366/2009 & CM APPL 3210/09 DEVAYANTI .... Petitioner Through: Col. K. Digambar Singh, Advocate versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR .... Respondents Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh, Advocate is CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR