Court on Its Own Motion v. Rahul Khare

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J VEENA BIRBAL, J JULY 26,2011 kb

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment delivered on 26.07.2011 + CRL.CONT.REF. NO.01/2011 COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION versus RAHUL KHARE … Respondent Advocates who appeared in this case: For the Appellant : Mr V.K. Rao, Sr. Adv. learned Amicus Curiae with Mr Ayushya Kumar. For the Respondent : Mr A.N. Haksar, Sr. Adv. with Mr Udayan Jain, Adv. with Mr R. Pandey CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE VEENA BIRBAL 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? Yes 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest ? Yes BADAR DURREZ AHMED (ORAL) 1. This Criminal Contempt Reference which has reached this court through a petition made by an Assessing Officer under the Income Tax Act, 1961, raises the fundamental question as to whether an Assessing Officer is a court for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? In case this question is answered in the affirmative, the next issue would be whether an Assessing Officer is a court subordinate to the High Court? 2. These questions arise in the backdrop of the provisions of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which empower the High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts. Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'), reads as under:- "10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts.- Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself: Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code." 3. A plain reading of Section 10 of the Act would make it clear that every High Court has the power and can exercise the same jurisdiction and authority in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it, as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of itself. There is also a proviso which may be of some significance which stipulates that no High Court shall take cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Before we consider the questions raised in this matter, it may be pertinent to point out that Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, specifically provides for an offence when there is an intentional insult or interruption caused to a public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding. In the present case, one of the complaints of the Assessing Officer in question is that the respondent, a lawyer, was unduly harassing the said Assessing Officer by writing very strong letters on behalf of his clients (who were assessees) and was not only insulting him but was also interfering with the 'judicial proceedings' of a public servant, namely, the said Assessing Officer. So, there is an argument which could be raised even on the basis of the proviso that this court ought not to have taken the cognizance of the case at all in view of the fact that there already exists an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code to which the present complaint relates. 4. Anyhow, without going into the issue of the proviso, let us consider the first question itself. Mr Rao, the learned senior counsel who has assisted this court as an amicus curiae has placed before us the various provisions of the said Act as well as of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and has also placed before us a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Shamrao & Others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner: 2003 (3) SCC 563. He referred to paragraph 4 and particularly to paragraphs 12 and 13. Paragraph 17 was also referred to where the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the Ass