Anu Manglani v. Suresh Arora and Anr

Order XVA CPC.

¶3This Court has gone through such impugned order dated 04.09.2024 and since the execution of lease deed in question was not in dispute, after hearing arguments from both the sides, the learned Trial Court allowed the abovesaid application and directed the petitioner herein to deposit rent @ Rs.3,60,000/- per month plus GST and other applicable taxes from 01.12.2023 within two months. There is also a direction to deposit future rent

on monthly basis till the defendant remains in possession of the tenanted premises.

¶4The Court has gone through the lease date dated

14.10.2021 which is a registered one.

¶5Admittedly, the abovesaid rent has already been deposited by the petitioner herein, till the present month.

¶6The question whether the lease could have been terminated in the manner it has been, is subject matter of trial and has no bearing with respect to the impugned order passed under Order XVA CPC, particularly, keeping in mind the stand taken by the respective parties. xxxx

¶15Accordingly, it is also clarified that, as and when, any such application moved under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is taken up by the Court and is decided, the learned Trial Court, it shall dispose of the same in accordance with law, without being influenced by the observations appearing in the impugned order."

¶30In the application filed by the Respondents/Plaintiffs under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, the Appellant/Defendant filed a reply only on 20th September 2024. On 21st November 2024, the ld. Counsel for the Appellant/Defendant sought deferment in the application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC on the ground that he has challenged the order dated 4th September 2024 passed under Order 15A of the CPC in CM(M) 3661/2024.

¶31On the said date, the Appellant/Defendant was also directed to submit a fresh FDR for a sum of Rs 86,44,320/-. The Respondents/Plaintiffs had also made applications for the enhancement of rent.

¶32On 11th February 2025, the application filed by the Respondents/Plaintiffs for the release of rent was allowed by the Trial Court

in the following terms: "9. Ld. Counsel for the defendant opposed this application on the ground that no inherent power U/s 151 CPC could be invoked for present relief, however, this is no hurdle in granted relief on present application as there is a specific provision U/o XV A(3) of CPC as narrated above wherein it has been prescribed that the amount deposited under this order shall be paid to the plaintiff/ lessor after being deposited in the court. This provision comes into picture only after deposition of rent in terms of Order XV A(1) CPC. Merely the fact that this court has not directed the said amount to be released to the plaintiff in order dt. 04.09.2024 do not disentitle the plaintiff from the benefit of the order XV A

(3) of CPC, thus there is no force also in the argument that this application is hit by principle of resjudicata. Ld. Counsel also submitted that Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Raghubir Rai case (Supra) directed the amount so deposited be not released to the landlord, however the said condition is passed in the peculiar circumstances of that case, therefore no help to the defendant in present facts and circumstances. The plea that the defendant will suffer the financial prejudice because of his investment in the tenanted property and the security deposit already given is not relevant for deciding the present application in view of Order XV A

(3) of CPC. It is reiterated that Order XV A (3) of CPC mandates the release of deposited rental amount to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff is allowed to withdraw the rental amount deposited in terms of order dt. 04.09.2024 and 21.11.2024 by way of FDRs i.e. bearing no. 43568587650 dt. 28.11.2024 for a sum of Rs. 90,20,160/-, bearing no. 43685888008 dt.

04.01.2025 for a sum of Rs. 3,75,840/- and bearing no. 43797149535 dt. 06.02.2025 for a sum of Rs. 3,75,840/- by the defendant. Defendant is directed to keep on depositing rent in terms of order dt. 04.09.2024 and

21.11.2024 till he remains in possession. Application

allowed and disposed off accordingly."

Thus, until February 2025, the landlord was not able to obtain the rent for two years, while the Appellant continued to enjoy the property and earn monetarily by running its business.

¶33Thereafter, orders were sought by the Appellant/Defendant to restrain the Respondents/Plaintiffs from withdrawing the FDR for a period of three working days as recorded in order dated 14th February, 2025. Subsequently, adjournments were sought again and costs were also imposed. An application for striking off of the defence was also filed by the Respondents/Plaintiffs. The monthly rents were then released in favour of the Respondents/Plaintiffs.

¶34The application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC was repeatedly adjourned at the request of the Appellant/Defendant. The suit was finally decreed on 16th May, 2026 under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.

¶35The Trial Court record reveals that the Appellant/Defendant had to be directed to pay even the admitted rent as per the Lease Deed for several months. There was no justification in the non-payment of the rent. The landlord-tenant relationship was also fully admitted by the Appellant/ Defendant and the execution of the Lease Deed was also admitted.

¶36Even in terms of the judgment Pushpa & Ors. (Supra) which is relied upon by Mr. Sushil K Tekriwal, ld. Counsel for the Appellant/Defendant, unless and until there are disputed questions of fact or any substantial question of law, the matter need not be sent to trial.

¶37The Supreme Court, in the decision in Pushpa & Ors. (Supra) had considered and discussed the scope and principles governing the passing of a decree on the basis of admissions under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. The

relevant portion of the said decision reads as under: "33. A plain reading of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC indicates that the provision confers a discretionary power upon the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of admission made either in pleadings or otherwise however the exercise of such power is conditioned upon the existence of a clear admission of fact. The object of the provision is to enable a party to obtain speedy relief where there is no substantial dispute requiring trial. At the same time, the provision cannot be invoked in a manner so as to deprive a party of adjudication where the controversy involves disputed questions of fact requiring evidence.

¶34The term "admission" has been defined under Sections 17 and 18 of the Evidence Act, 1872, an admission is a statement which suggests any inference as to a fact in issue or relevant fact and is made by a party to the proceeding or by a person authorised by such party however every statement made by a party cannot automatically result in a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. Thus, the admission must be categorical, unambiguous, unconditional and unequivocal.

¶35This Court in several decisions has consistently held that before passing a decree on admission, the Court must be fully satisfied that the admission relied upon leaves no room for controversy and if the alleged admission requires interpretation, inferential reasoning or examination of surrounding circumstances, the matter ought to proceed to trial and it is similarly well settled that where substantial triable issues arise, the parties cannot be denied the opportunity to lead evidence. Recently, this Court in Vikrant Kapila v. Pankaja Panda (supra) reiterated the principles under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, the relevant paragraph reads as under:

"40. In Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd. [Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd., (2011) 15 SCC 273 :

(2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 376] it is held that "Admissions" should be categorical and intentional, as Order 12

Rule 6CPC allows discretion rather than obligation. Admissions result in judgments without trial which permanently deny any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous, and unconditional, the discretion of the court is not exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. Hence, discretion should be used only where there is a clear and unequivocal admission. The relevant paragraphs read thus: (SCC pp. 276-77, para 11)

"11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an "admission" contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short the discretion should be used only when there is a clear "admission" which can be acted upon. There is no such admission in this case." (emphasis supplied) "

The Lease Deed itself being registered and being an admitted document, the suit has been decreed on the basis of the admitted Lease Deed.

¶38Thus, it cannot be said that there was no admission. The written

statement filed by the Appellant/Defendant admits the execution of the Lease Deed. There is no argument of forgery or fabrication which is being raised by the Appellant/Defendant.

¶39Under such circumstances, the Lease Deed by itself is sufficient to pass the decree which has been passed by the Trial Court. The Trial Court is right in observing that in such contractual relationships, when both parties are parties of means, the argument of unconscionability cannot be entertained. The relevant observations of the Trial Court in this regard are set out below: "15. Defendant is the sole proprietor of Meena Bazar. The plaintiffs are also persons of means. The landlord – tenant relationship between two businessmen/persons of means having thriving business/income can hardly be called one where one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other. No doubt, similar economic conditions of both the parties may not be material while considering an unconscionable term but it gains significance in landlord-tenant relationship such as the one in the present suit. By Clauses 11.1 and 11.3, both the parties have given themselves the right to terminate the Lease Deed without issuing any reason after giving a prior notice of 3 months to the other party in writing. It is not as if the Lessors reserved this right for themselves only. Lessors as well as the Lessee both had the right to exercise this option. Such a clause can hardly be called unconscionable or unfair.

¶16The scheme of clauses 11.1, 11.2 and

11.3 would show that the right of both the parties to terminate the lease without any cause any time after the expiry of the 12 months lock-in period was a major stipulation expressly agreed between

them and the conditions mentioned in clause 11.2 were the additional circumstances in which the Lease could be terminated. The parties have specifically used the phrase "Notwithstanding what is herein stated, it has been expressly agreed by and between the Parties hereto... "in Clause

11.3. The Clause 11.3 clearly shows that it has an over-riding effect on Clause 11.2 which constitutes additional grounds of termination only. The plaintiffs have, thus, validly exercised their right under the clause 11.1 and 11.3 of the Lease Deed. There is nothing to show that the Termination clause in the Lease Deed is violative of any applicable law.

¶17The defendant has also not explained anywhere what undue influence was exercised by the plaintiffs while incorporating Clauses 11.1 and 11.3 specifically when right under these Clauses is available to both the parties."

¶40The present appeal is bereft of any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. All pending applications are also disposed of, if any.

PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUDGE

DINESH BHATT JUDGE SEPTEMBER 24, 2026/MR/SS/CK

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of Decision: 24th September, 2026 Uploaded on: 30th September, 2026 # CNR No. DLHC010435632026 + RFA(COMM) 614/2026 and CM APPL. 62501/2026, CM APPL. 62502/2026 ANU MANGLANI .....Appellant Through: Mr. Sushil K Tekriwal and Dr. Mamta Tekriwal, Advs. versus SURESH ARORA AND ANR .....Respondents Through: Mr. Suresh Chand Singhal, Mr. Saideep Kaushik and Mr. Parth Mahajan, Advs. (M: 9810061558) CORAM: JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUSTICE DINESH BHATT Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral) 1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode. 2. The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, inter alia, challenging the impugned order dated 16th May, 2026 passed by the ld. District Judge (Commercial Court)-03, South East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi in CS (COMM) No. 891/2023. Vide the impugned order, a decree has been passed against the Appellant for possession and for mesne profits. 3. The suit filed by the Respondents has been decreed by the Trial Court in the following terms:- "33. The present suit is, therefore, decreed for possession of the suit shop bearing no. G-20, Ground Floor, South Extension -I Market, New Delhi as shown in the site plan Ex.P1 in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. The defendant shall handover the peaceful, physical, vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs within a period of 60 days from the date of this Order. The defendant shall have the liberty to remove the fitments installed by him in the suit shop before handing over of its physical, vacant possession to the plaintiffs without causing structural damage to the property. 34. The suit is also decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for recovery of arrears of rent for the period from 01.01.2023 to 12.04.2023 @ Rs 3,60,000/- per month and recovery of mesne profits/user and occupation charges for the period from 13.04.2023 till the date of filing of the present suit i.e. 03.10.2023 @ Rs 3,60,000/- along with applicable taxes. Since the suit property is commercial in nature, pendentelite and future interest@ 12% per annum on the total outstanding arrears of rent till realization of decretal amount is granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the plaintiff. The amount towards admitted rent already deposited in the Court by the defendant and released to the plaintiffs in terms of Order dated 14.07.2025 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in CM(M) 3661/2024 & CM. APPL 61682- 61683/2024 & CM APPL 70550/2024 & CM APPL 10236- 1023 7/2025 titled as Anu Manglani vs Suresh Arora & Anr shall be adjusted towards the abovesaid arrears." 4. The brief background of the present case is that the Respondents are the owners of commercial property bearing no. G-20, Ground Floor, South Extension-I Market, New Delhi-110049 (hereinafter, 'premises'). The Appellant, who was the Defendant in the suit, is the sole proprietor of a well- known garment shop chain by the name 'Meena Bazar'. 5. A registered Lease Deed was entered into between the parties dated 14th October, 2021 bearing Registration No. 5166 in Book No. 1 Volume No. 1746 on Pages 76-88. 6. The execution of the said Lease Deed is admitted in the written statement filed by the Appellant/Defendant in paragraph 4(a) and 4(b) which read as under:- "4. That the preliminary submissions in the instant suit are hereunder: a. That the subject property i.e., Shop No. G-20, Ground Floor, South Extension 1 Market, New Delhi 110049 admeasuring approximately 550 Sq Fts. was purchased in two parts by the deceased Ramji Das Arora whose LRs are not made a party herein along with P1 and P2 herein. The half of the subject property was purchased by deceased Ramji Das Arora whose LRs are not a made a party herein and P1 herein wherein other half of the subject property was purchased by deceased Ramji Das Arora