State of NCT of Delhi v. Rashid

judgment reads as under:

¶11Besides the rules regarding appreciation of evidence, the Court has to keep in mind certain significant principles of law under the Indian Criminal Jurisprudence, i.e. right to fair trial and presumption of innocence, which are the twin essentials of administration of criminal justice. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefits of such presumption which could be interfered with by the courts only for compelling reasons and not merely because another view was possible on appreciation of evidence. The element of perversity should be traceable in the findings recorded by the Court, either of law or of appreciation of evidence.

¶12The Legislature in its wisdom, unlike an appeal by an accused in the case of conviction, introduced the concept of leave to appeal in terms of Section 378 Cr.P.C. This is an indication that appeal from acquittal is placed at a somewhat different

footing than a normal appeal. But once leave is granted, then there is hardly any difference between a normal appeal and an appeal against acquittal. The concept of leave to appeal under Section378 Cr.P.C. has been introduced as an additional stage between the order of acquittal and consideration of the judgment by the appellate Court on merits as in the case of a regular appeal. Sub-section (3) of Section 378clearly provides that no appeal to the High Court under sub-sections (1) or

(2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. This legislative intent of attaching a definite value to the judgment of acquittal cannot be ignored by the Courts.

¶13Under the scheme of the Cr.P.C., acquittal confers rights on an accused that of a free citizen. A benefit that has accrued to an accused by the judgment of acquittal can be taken away and he can be convicted on appeal, only when the judgment of the trial court is perverse on facts or law. Upon examination of the evidence before it, the Appellate Court should be fully convinced that the findings returned by the trial court are really erroneous and contrary to the settled principles of criminal law."

¶22While deciding the present leave to appeal, the aforestated principles culled out by the Apex Court are to be kept in view. In the present case the investigation conducted by Investigating Officer, Sangeeta

(PW18) is tainted. There is no compliance of section 157 of Code of Criminal Procedure and there is inordinate delay in recording the statements of witnesses u/s 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure by PW18. Also the explanation given by PW18 for lapses on her part is unconvincing, untrustworthy and has no sanctity. Further, there is no evidence on record to establish that the accused was the person who committed the alleged sexual act with the victim. Hence in our opinion trial court has rightly rejected the case of the prosecution as it

failed to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond the shadow of all reasonable doubts.

¶23For the reasons stated above, the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court does not call for any interference. The Leave Petition is meritless, the same is accordingly dismissed.

G. S. SISTANI, J.

SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J.

FEBRUARY 03, 2015 gr

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + CRIMINAL LEAVE PETITION No. 51/2015 % Date of decision: 3rd February 2015 STATE OF NCT OF DELHI ………. APPELLANT Through : Mr. Sunil Sharma, APP for the State along with SI Yash Pal, P. S. Chandni Mahal. versus RASHID .……….RESPONDENT Through : None CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G. S. SISTANI HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL CRL.M.A 1593/2015 1. Exemption allowed subject to all just exceptions. Application stands disposed of. CRL.L.P 51/2015 2. By the present criminal leave petition filed under section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the state seeks leave to appeal against the judgment dated 31.10.2014 passed by the learned ASJ in sessions case No. 56/2013 whereby the respondent (accused before the trial court) was acquitted of the charges punishable under section 376(2)(f) of Indian Penal Code read with section 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. 3. The relevant facts, as noticed by the trial court are that on 16.12.2012 at about 11:05PM intimation was received from mobile no. 9210300090 that rape has been committed with a girl at House No. X18, DDA Flats, Turkman gate, Delhi. The information was reduced into writing vide DD No. 27(Ex.PW17A). 4. SI Sangeeta (PW18) recorded the statement of the Complainant, father of the victim (Ex.Pw1/A) wherein he stated that on 16.12.2012 he had sent his nephew aged about 9 years and his daughter aged about 6years to the opposite block to deliver food to his sister and at about 10:45 PM his nephew returned home and informed the complainant that his daughter was caught by one boy in the stairs who pulled down her pyjama and was doing 'chera khani' with her. The complainant rushed downstairs and apprehended the said boy at the distance of about 200mts. A call was made to the PCR, FIR was got registered under section 376 IPC read with section 4 of the POCSO Act, victim was medically examined and accused was arrested. On completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed. Thereafter charges against the accused were framed under section 376 (2) (f) IPC read with Section 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. 5. The respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge, upon which the prosecution examined 22 witnesses to bring home the guilt of the respondent. 6. Learned trial court while passing the impugned judgment has observed that intimation of the incident was received by the PCR on 16.12.2012 from mobile no. 9210300090 which was found to be registered in the name Savita Bhasin but as per prosecution case, the call was made by the Fufi of the victim (PW9). During investigation no effort was made to interrogate Savita Bhasin from whose number PCR received the information about the incident and no evidence was adduced to establish that Fufi of the victim (PW9) had any connection with Savita Bhasin. Trial Court further observed that there is a possibility that the name of PW9 as an informant was introduced later on when police failed to find out the alleged Savita Bhasin. 7. It is also noticed by Learned Trial Court that the Investigating Officer, Sangeeta (PW18) recorded the statement of Fufi of victim (PW9) nearly after two and a half months i.e on 2.3.2013. The version of PW18 that PW9 had gone out of station and hence she could not record her statement does not get any support from PW9 as she deposed in her examination that she went out only in the month of June and this shows that the Investigating Officer, Sangeeta (PW18) has made a false statement in the court that PW9 told her that she was out of station. The Trial Court has relied upon Paramjit Singh vs State of Punjab 1997 (1) RCR 336. The relevant para has been reproduced below: ".......the main reason for discarding their evidence is that their statements under section 161 of CrPC came to be recorded on 8th August, 1991 after about four and a half months. No explanation whatsoever was given by the Investigating Officer Gurmeet Singh (PW11) as to why their statements could not be recorded earlier. Both the