Shanti Opticals v. Raj Rani

order was passed.

¶12The learned counsel for the tenants, Mr. Saroj Kumar Thakur, argued before this Court that the Trial Court had erred in treating the petition as a summary proceeding under section 25 B of the Act. The learned counsel argued that the landlady had failed to mention that the eviction was under section 25 B of the DRC Act read with section 14(1)(e). It was submitted that since no such petition requiring the Court to treat the eviction petition as summary in nature was made, the Court was incorrect in treating the petition as otherwise. It was further submitted that the Trial Court erred in allowing the landlord to rely upon the Supreme Court"s judgment of Satyawati Sharma through LRS v. Union of India 148 (2008) DLT 705 SC in the eviction

petition as the judgment abovementioned does not mandate every section 14(1)(e) petition to cite the judgment in its eviction petition.

¶13The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the tenant are untenable. It would be rather absurd and unfounded in law if this Court were to hold, that mere non-mentioning of section 25 B in an eviction petition filed for bona fide requirement, would be a ground to allow an application seeking leave to defend. The purpose of treating "bona fide" need petitions as summary in nature would stand defeated if Courts were to allow the leave to defend application and subject the petition to trial, simply because of a certain clerical error or bona fide oversight. This Court finds the proposition that unless a section 14(1)(e) petition specifies it is being filed under section 25 B, it cannot be one requiring summary trial as one without merit. Section 25 B(1) is as follows:

"25B. Special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement- (1) Every application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or under section 14A [or under section 14B or under section 14C or under section 14D] shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section."

A bare reading of the section under Chapter III A of the Act which provides for summary trial of certain applications, it is

apparent that an eviction petition moved under section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act will be treated as summary proceedings. The purport of section 25B of the Act is to provide summary procedure for a special class of landlords mentioned therein so that their need to possess the tenanted premises is neither prejudiced nor extinguished by the efflux of time. The language of the statute is clear and mandatory. It leaves no doubt or scope for interpretation. The law is settled and it is understood that an eviction petition filed for bona fide requirement under the Act will ipso facto be treated as a summary proceeding under Section 25B.

¶14The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the tenant is that the landlady had failed to produce details of the grandson from whom allegedly the tenanted premises was sought. It was argued that the landlady has not shown the grandson to be dependent on her thereby failing to make a case under section 14(1)(e) of the Act. This Court does not agree with the argument of the counsel as it has been conclusively held that the grandson is construed as a member of the family who may be dependent on the landlord. This Court in Om Prakash v. Chander Shekhar 102 (2003) DLT 746 held:

"11. It is now well settled that while considering the eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide personal need of a landlord the court has to keep in mind that the landlord's requirement of the tenanted premises from which the eviction is sought, is not motivated by extraneous consideration, whimsical or

mere wishful. The need of landlord should be sincere, real, genuine and honest desire. The Controller has to bear in mind the paramount consideration is the requirement of the landlord to be bona fide………..The wife, son and son's wife and children are the members of the family of landlord whose need of accommodation is the need of the landlord. There is no dispute about this fact. His requirement is only qualified by its genuineness and bona fide…."

It is clear that a grandson is considered as a dependent. Such being the settled position, the landlady can evict the tenants herein for her grandson"s need. The Trial Court had noted the tenant"s admission of the landlady, her unmarried daughter and the grandson living in one portion together (paragrapgh 15). Such being the circumstances, the landlady does not have to satisfy the identity of the grandson to the Court in order to get an eviction order. The landlady is only required to show the existence of prima facie need, which in the present petition stands satisfied.

¶15The argument of the learned counsel questioning the size of the premises required for opening a coaching class is immaterial to the fate of the eviction petition, as it is exclusively for the landlady to decide how she wishes to put the tenanted premises to use. If the landlady is of the view that the tenanted premises will suffice her need, neither the tenant nor the Court can hold otherwise.

¶16Each of the contentions raised by the tenant have been duly dealt with and based upon the material on record, they have all

been rejected with cogent reasons. The view taken by the Trial Court is plausible in law. The reasoning for and the conclusion arrived at in the impugned order does not suffer from material irregularity. There is no cause for this Court to interfere with the said order. There is no merit in the petition and it is accordingly dismissed.

NAJMI WAZIRI (JUDGE)

SEPTEMBER 25, 2014/d/acm

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on :06.03.2014 Pronounced on :25.09.2014 + RC.REV. 139/2013 SUKT ..... Petitioner Through: Ms. Saroj Kr. Thakur, Adv. versus RAJ RANI ..... Respondent Through: Mr. Anil Sharma, Adv. + RC.REV. 140/2013 SHANTI OPTICALS ..... Petitioner Through: Ms. Saroj Kr. Thakur, Adv. versus RAJ RANI ..... Respondent Through: Mr. Anil Sharma, Adv. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI % MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI 1. This revision petition under section 25 B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act ( DRC Act) assails an order dated 02.01.2013 which directed the petitioners (tenants) to evict the tenanted premises bearing Municipal No. 1/2239, Subhash Marg, Ram Nagar, Shahdara, Delhi-110032. The eviction petition was filed against Smt. Adesh Maheswari and Shanti Opticals. The following judgment shall apply to both the revision petitions filed herein. 2. The brief facts are that the tenanted premises in the above stated address consists of two shops measuring 65 sq. ft. and 55 sq. ft each occupied by the tenants herein running commercial businesses. There is no dispute as to the landlord- tenant relationship between the parties. The landlady filed an eviction petition against both the tenants under section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act on the ground that her grandson required the tenanted premises to run his coaching classes. Both the eviction petitions are filed under section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The landlady submitted that her grandson was well qualified but unemployed. He needed and she wanted to help him to start his own coaching centre. It was submitted that the landlady had no other suitable alternative accommodation and the tenanted premises was best suited for the requirement. 3. In the leave to defend application filed by the tenants, it was submitted that the tenant was running the optical shop and had given the landlady a security deposit of Rs 20,000/- at the time of constructing the tenanted premises with an assurance that the said amount shall be returned during possession of the same. The tenant further submitted that an additional amount of Rs 25,000/- was paid towards the construction of the premises to make it functional. The tenant possessing the other shop submitted, in his leave to defend application that he had also given a security deposit which was refundable and had also paid towards making the shop usable. Both the tenants submitted that the landlady had not repaid the amounts till date and hence she was restrained from evicting them. 4. The Trial Court took note that the landlady had acquired proprietary possession of the property through a sale deed dated 21.09.1967. She constructed two shops in it, both of them are now in possession of the tenants/ petitioners herein. The learned counsel for the tenants submitted that the landlady had constructed three storeys building in 75 sq. yards which consisted of one big hall, a verandah, latrine and bathroom on the ground floor. The construction on the first floor was similar to that on the ground floor and that the second floor consists of a two room set. The counsel for the tenant further submitted that the landlady was living on the first floor with her unmarried daughter and her grandson. The son of the landlady along with his family allegedly occupied the second floor and that none of the children of the landlady were dependent on her. The counsel submitted that the landlady had a large hall behind the tenanted premises from where the grandson could very well run his coaching centre. 5. In the reply to the leave to defend application, the landlady disputed the construction of three storey building in the 75 sq. yards of land. It was submitted that only one half of the property belonged to her and the other half was under the ownership of her son. It was further submitted that the landlady was living with her unmarried daughter and her grandson on a construction made above the tenanted shops. The godown behind the tenanted shop is smal