Shree Raj Travels & Tours Ltd. & Ors v. Destination of the World (Subcontinent) P. Ltd

order dated

14.02.2011 tile learned ACMIV dismissed the application(s) undir'=l. Section 177 Cr.P.C. filec by the petitioners on the grounci tJ-,at view o"f the dict:urr of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisior Cri.M.C.No.1056/20:ll & connected Pages of 27 reported as (2004) 7 SCC 338 /Ida/at Prasad 11 Roop La! Jindal once the Magistrate has taken cognizance of complaint he ha·s no power to return the same to complainant with a direction tl1at the same be filed in J. court of competent jurisdiction.

¶7Aggrieved by the order dated 14.02.2011 passed b'r the !earned ACMM, the petitio11ers have filed the above-captioned petition(s) under SectiOil 4B2 Cr.P.C. requiring this Court to hold that courts at have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaints question and seek directions to the learned 16.CMM to ,-eturn the same fo1 before the Court of

¶8It is the case of the petitioners that the cheques m question were drawn at Mumbai. The drawee bank i:; a:= MumbaL, notice issued by the respondent to the petitioner company was received at Mumbai and thus merely because the respondent posted the notice from and depositec! tile cheque with its bank at hi would not confe-jurisdiction on Courts in Delhi.

¶9The issue l1as to be debated Nit!l reference to Sectior, 138 of the Nl P,ct and the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure -i.e. Sections 177, 178 and 179 of thE: Code of Criminal Procedure.

¶10decision reported as 1999 (7') sec 51( KB/?askaran Vs. Sha-nkata}}_ Vaidhvan Balan & t!'1E Supreme Court. opined, after considering Sections 17t to Section 179 of the Code of Procedure, that ar Cri.IVJ.C.l\Jo.l055/2011 F>< connected lll;jtte·s !'"': .. offence may be completed rn different and thus can be trieol in any Court !laving· jurisdiction ove1· said localities. To put it pithily, iin relation to territona jurisdiction, qua an offence, law :-ecognizes more than 1 court having territorial jurisdiction and the issue of jur-isdiction would have to be decided with reference to whether a part of an offence vvas committed withi:1 the territorial jurisdiction of a court. The issue is no longer integr-a and l just need to the decision of the Supreme Court in. KBhasRaran's case (supra) and highli.ght that aforesaid is to \Je curled out fror11 paras 11 and 12 of t:c1e said decision.

¶11The next· logical question would· be, what are ti•e contours of Section 138 of the Nl pertaining to acts to be performed in relation to an offence contemplated !Jy the said Section? !t hardly be re-emphasized that it are acts of commission or omission c:or;stitute offences, with ur without the requisite n1ens rea, depending upon wl1eth2r. the offence is an absolute offence or not.

¶12Let me thus note Section 1313, Nl A.ct which reads CIS under:-Where any cheque clr-awn by a person on 2n account: maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of rrnoney to another person from out of that account for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liabiiity, is returned by tile bank unpaid, either because of tile arnount of money standing . to tile credit of that accounl: is insufficfent to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid fron1 that account by an , Cri.M.C.No.lOSG/2011 & connected mattel"s Page 10 of 7..1 agreement made with tl1at llank, such person shall be deemed to have cor-nrnitted an offence and shall without to any other prov1s1ons of· this Act, be punished imprisonment for a term may extend to two year, or with fine which may extend to twice the <?mount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply unless-

(a) The cheque has been pl-esented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity,, whichever is earlier"

(b) The payee or the holder Induce course of the cheque,. as the case may loe,, rnakes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer, of the cheque,. within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank return of the cheques as unpaid, and

(c) The drawer of such cheque fai.ls to make the payment of the said amount: of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice" · Explanation: For the purpose of this section. "debt or other liability" means a legally ·enforceable debt or other

¶13In Bhaskaran's case (supra) Supreme had an occasion to cleal with the issue of territorial jurisdiction in relation to Section 138 of the Nl and of necessity, the discussion required the Supreme Court to tf-·,e various acts of commission and cmrssiorli' constituted the offence punishable under Secbon 138 of the Nl J.-\ct and suffice would jt be to l1ighligl1t tl1at in para 14 of CrLM.CNo.1056/2011 & connected matters Page 11 [ decision, the Supreme Court that there are 5 acts which are the components of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Nl Act and re-produce tile same from para 14 o·f the decision of the Supreme Court. They read as under:-

(i) drawinq of the ch_eque,

(ii) presentation of the cheque to tile bailk,

(iii) returning the cheque by the drawee bank,

(iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheoue demanding payment of the cheque amount,

(v) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.

¶14After holding that acts constitute components of an offence under Section 138 of the Nt Act, in paras 15 and 16 the Supreme Court observed as undel-:- "15. it is not necessary that the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at five different localities. But a concatenation of all tile above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Code. In this context a reference to Section 178( d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below:

¶16Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in different any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can becorne the place of for the offence under Section 138 of tile Act. In other words, tile c:omplainant can d1oose any one of Cri.M.C.No.l056/201l & connected matter.:; Page 12'. :Jf :':.7 those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. As amplitude stands so and so expan51ve it is an idle exercise to raise j u risdic:tional question reg a 1 ding offence under Section of the Act." (En?phasis Supplied)

¶15On the issue of service of notice required to be given by the complainant to the accu:sed, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "17. The more important point to be deddled in this case is whether the cause of action has arisen at all as notke sent by complainant to the accused 1Was returned as "unclaimed". The conditions pertaining to the notice to be given to the drawer, have been formulated and incorporated in clauses (b) to (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. The said clauses are extracted below:

¶18On the part of the pay.ee he has to make a demand by "giving a notice'''' in wribng. If that was only requirement to complete offence on the failure of tile drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of such "giving", the travaiis, of the prosecution would have been very much lessened. But the legislature says that failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days "of tile receipt'' of the said notice. is, therefore, clear that "giving in the context is not the same as rec-eipt of notice. Giving is a process of which receipt is tile it is for tl!e payee to perform the forme( process by send1n9 the notice to drawer at the correct address. Cri.M.C.No.1056/2011 & connected matters · 20. If a strict interpretabor1 given that the drawer should llave actuaHy received! the notice for the period of 15 days to start running n.o matter that the payee sent the notice on the correct address, a trickster clheque drawer wou!d get the premium to avoid the notice by different strategies a·nd he could escape from the legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act. it must be borne ih mind that the court should not adopt .an interpretation whicll helps a dishonest evader and clips an honest payee as that would defeat the very legislative measure. 21 ..... The context envisaged in Section 138 cf the Act invites a liberal for the person who has the statuto,-v obligation to give notice because he is presumed to be the loser in the transaction and it is for his interest the very provision is made by the The worcls in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act sl1ow that tile payee· has the statutory to "make a demand" by giving notice. The thrust in the clause is on the need to "make a demand". is only the mode for making such demand which the legislature has prescribed. A payee can send the notice fo1r doing his part for giving the notice. Once it is despatched his part is over and the next depends on what tile sendee does.

¶22It is wei! settled ti1at a notice refused to be accepted by the addressee can be presumed to have been served on him (\,ride Harcharan Sinah v. 517/vranP and )age/ish Sing/7 v. 1\fatthu Singh3).

¶23the notice is returned as unciiaimed and not as refused. VVill thE:re be any significant difference between :=vvo so far .as the presumption of service is r=oncerned? this Cr!.IVI.C.No.1056/2011 & connected m2tters PagE: 1.4 oll.7 connection a reference to Section 27 of the General Clauses Jt\ct will be useful. The section thus:

¶24No doubt Section 138 of· the Act does not require that the notice should be given only by "post". Nonetheless the incorporated in Section 27 (quoted above) can· profitably be imported in a case where sender has despatched the notice by post with the correct address written on it. Then it can be deemed to have been served on the sendee unless he that it was not really served and that he was not r·esponsible for suc:h non-service. Any other interpretation can leacl to a very tenoous position as the drawer of the cheque who is liable to pay the a1T1ount ·resort to the strategy of subterfuge by successfuHy avoiding the notice.

¶25Thus, when a notice is returned by the sendee as unclaimed such date would be the commen.c1ng date in reckoning the period of 15 days contemplated in clause (c) to the proviso of Section 138 of the Act. Of course such reckoning would be without prejudice to the right of the drawer of. the cheque to sl1ow that he had no knowledge that the notice vvas brought to his address. In the present case the accused did not even attempt to discharge tl1·e burden to rebut presumption." (Etnphasis Supplied) '

¶16The expressions: }Jresen.tation of t/1e cheque to the Bank' and 'if the five different acts were clone in .fiLre different localities any one cf the courts exercis/ng jurisdiction lr7 one of t/1e five loca/ areas can becorne t'?e place of trial for the orfence under Section 138 ol the be in paras 1_4 and 16 r.:;::spectiveiy in case (suprel) have been understood by many to mear:. that Cri.M.C.\\Jo.1056/2011 8t connected the Coul-t within local limits of vvhich the payee Bank·i.e. the Bank where the complainant deposited cheo;ue i.s situated has the jurisdiction to try the complaint unde,- Section 138 of the Ni Act, and the understanding appears to be fortified by the observations of the Supreme Court in paras 15 and 16 that if the 5 acts contemplated as the ingredient of an offence under 138 of the 1\H ,LI.ct were done in 5 different localities, any one of the court exercising jurisdiction in any one of the 5 ·iocal areas would have jurisdiction.

¶17But, it is apparent that the observatiqns in para 15 and 16 are an obiter as it is not 5, places where the 5 acts constituting an offence under Section 138 of the Ni Act =an possibly be performed. The can be performed, ::1s would be ·explained hereinafter, onlly at 4 places and i would immediately state that act No.2 and act No.3 to oi-dy one place i.e. the place where the dravvee bank is located.

¶18The second and the tl1ird aclc, of the 5 listed by tne Supreme Court, as constituting thr2 offence under Section 138 of the Nl A.ct are: (a) presentabon of the cheque to the bank; and (b) returning tl1e cheque unpaid by the drawee bank.

¶19The third act is the return of tile cheque by the drawee bank and thus there is no scope for any argument as to which bank is contemplated with reference to the sa1d act. The second act pertains to the act of presentation .Jf cheque to the bank. i highlight tnat the twin words used are 'the bank. Cri.M.C.No.l056/2011 8t connected matters PagE 16 of .!.7 li(! t!,' f! I

¶20as 2001 (3) SCC 609 Shr: !shar Allov Steels Ltd. Vs. /avaswals Neco Ltd., a 3 Judge Be:1ch the Supreme Court, having as a member of the Bench the author of the judgment in Bhaskaran's case (supra), dealt with and decided a's to what would be meant by 'the ba!7K' as mentioned in Section 138 of the Nl Act. Was it the drawee bank or the payee bank? The Supreme Court answered the question in the following words:- "2.

(a) \1\/hat is .rneant by, ''the bank" as mentioned in clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable !Instruments Act, 1881?

(b) Does such bank mean the bank of the drawer of the cheque or the payee of the cheque?

(c) To which bank the cheque is to be presented for purposes of attracting penal provisions of Section 138 of the Act?, are the questions to be determined by this Court in this appeaL 7 _ has further tc noticec! that to make an offence .. under Section 138 of the Act, it is mandatory that the cheque is presented to "the bank" within a period of six months from the date on whicr11 it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.· is the cheque drawn which l1as to be presented to "the bank" within the period specified When a post-dated cheque is written or dravvn, it is only a bill of exchange. The post-dated cheque become a cheque under the Act on the date which is written on the said cheque ancl the six months' Cri.M.C.No.1056/2011 & connected m.;tte!'5 period has to be reckoned, for the purposes of Section 138 of the Act, from the said date.

¶8Section 138 provides that where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained bv llilll with a ll banker" for payment of any amount of money to another person Jrom out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned iby "the bank" unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the creol of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arran\;;1ed to be paid from that account by an agreement made that bank, such person shall be deemed to have commiitted an offence punishable with imprisonment as prescribed therein subject to the conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and

(c) of the proviso. Section 3 of the Act defines ll banker" to include any person acting as a banker and any post office savings bank. Section 72 of the Act provides that a cheque must, in order to charge the drawer, be presented at the bank upon which it is drawn before the relations between the drawer and banker has been altered to the prejudice of the drawer.

¶9The use of the words "a ba1nk" and "the bank" in the section is an indicator of the intention of the legislature. The former is an inqirect (sic indefinite) article and tile is prefixed by a direct (sic definite) intended to have the same meanings for "a bank" and 11tl1e bank", was no cause or occasion for mentioninQJ it di?tinctly and differently by using two different articles. It is worth noticing that the word "banker" in Section 3 of the Act is prefixed by the indefinite article "an and the word "bank" where the cheque is intended to be presented under Section 138 is p1·efixed by the definite articile uthe". The same section permits a person to is::.ue a cheque on an account maintained by hirn "a bank" and Cri.M.C.No:l056/2011 & connected matters P3ge 18 of 27 makes him liable for prosecution if it is _ returned by "the bank" unpaid. The payment of cheque is contemplated by "the bank" meaning thereby where the person issuing the cheque has an account. "The" is the word used before nouns, with a specifying or particularising effect as opposed to indefinite or force of "a" or '''am". determines what particular thing is meant; that is, what particular thing we are to assume to be meant. "The" is always mentioned to denote a particular thing or a person. "The" vvould, therefore, refer implrdtiy to a specified bank and not any bank . . "The bank" referred to in clause

(a) to the proviso to Section 138 of the Act would mean the drawee bank on which the cheque is drawn and not all b·anks where the cheque is presented for collection inciuding the bank of the payee, in whose favour the cheque is issued.

¶10it, does not mean that the cheque is always to be presented to the drawer's bank on whiich the cl1eque is issued. Tl1e payee of tile cheque has the option to pn:sent the cheque in any bank including the collecting bank where he has his account but to attract the criminal liability of the drawer ·of the cheque such collecting bank is obliged to _present the cheque in the drawee or pavee bank on which cheque is drawn within the period of six months from the date on whicll it is shown to have been issued ....... The non-presentation of the cheque to the drawee bank within the period specified in the section would absolve tr1e person issuing the cheque of his criminal !iabWt)r under Section 138 of the Act, who shall otherwise may be Hable to pay the cheque amount to the payee in a civil action initiated under the A combined readinq of Sections 3, 72 and 138 of the Act would leave no doubt in ou1= that the lavv mandates the cheque to be presented at the barik on which it is drawn if the drawer is to be held criminally liable. Such presentation 1s Cri.M.C.No.1056/2011 & connected matters [.5 necessar-ily to be made within six months at the bank on . which the cheQJJ!2 drawn, whether presented personally or through anothe;- bank_,_ namely, collecting of the payee." ·(Emphasis Supplied)

¶21Though the decision m ishcV lV!oVs case (supr-a) has been rendered in the context of limitation for presentaticn of a cheque, the said decision brings out in no uncertarn terms that .Section 138 of the 1\H Act contemplates that a cheque is required to be presented for encasl1ment to the drawee Bank and that the payee Bank, merely acts as an agent of the payee/complainant for tl1e purposes of presenting the cheque in questi()il for encasllment to the drawee Bank.

¶22Thus, the 2nd act to which the Supreme Court referre=l to in Bhaskaran's case as one of the 5 which constitute5 offence under Section of tllle Nl Act presentation. of the cheque to the drawee bank and needless to state the 3'a act constitutes an ingrec.l1ent of the offence is the return of the cheque unpa icl iJy the di-awee bank and thus it becomes crvstal clear that f:he 2n:J and 3rd act constituting the offence would relate to only one place i.e. tile place V1/ilere the drawee bank is located.

¶23These are my humble reasons to hold that observations in. paras 15 and 16 have to be read as an orbiter and thus the 5 acts contemplated as constituting the offence are cap?ble of being performed not in 5 but only in ' 4 places and since deposit of the cheque with the pe:.1yee bank is not an act conternpiated as an ingredient :J:' ;-he offence, the p!ace where the bank located \tlouicJ be Crl.M.C.No.1056/2011

8.t connected irrelevant for purposes of jurisdiction of the criminal court.

¶24It is settled law that a deci5ion is an a,uthority for the point it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefr-om and the 1·atio of a has to be ,gathered with reference to the facts of a ca:'::e and highlight cnl/ one decision of the Supreme Court being the decis;oil reported as Dhodl?a House v 5./C I1Jaingri (2006) 9 SCC 41

¶25The matter regarding jurisdiction can also be decided with reference to Section 6, :3ection 7, on 64 and Section 72 of the Nl ft,ct.

¶26The relevant portion of Section 6, Section a:1d Section 64 of Act (V;d Section 72 of the Nl reads as ·under:- Section 6. Cheque: - A "cheque" is a bill of exchar1ge drawn on a banker and no:: expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand and it includes the electronic image of a truncated cheque and a cheque in the electronic form. )( )( Section 7. The maker of a of exchange or Cheque is called "drawer"; persor, thereby directed to pay is called tile "Drawee". X )( )( Section

¶64Presentment for payment.

(l)]Promissory biH':; of exchange and cheques must be presented for payment to the maker, acceptor or drawee tllereof respectively, by or on behalf of the holder as hereinafter provided. !n default of suc1·11 presentment, Ct·i.M.C.No.1056/2011 & connecteci rn<1it2rs ,/', 1/ / I other parties thereto are not thereon to such holder ....... . X )' \ )( Section 72. Subject to prov1s1ons of section 84 a cheque must in order to charge the draw-er, be presented at tlhe bank upon which it is drawn before the relation lbetween the drawer and his banker has been altered to the prejudice of the drawer.

¶27A co-joint reading of Sections 6, 7, 64 and 72 as also cf Section 138 of the Nl Act bhngs out that in order to attract penal provisions of Section 132: of Act a c!leqL•e required to be presented for encashment to the arawee Bank and that the payee Bank acts merely as an agent of for the purposes of presenting the cheque in question to the drawee Bank. The nece:ssary corollary thereof is that no pari: of cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Ni Act anses ir1 the Court within the local limits of Bank of the i.e. payee Bank is situated and thus saic CoUI·t has no jurisdiction to try a complaint under Secti,Jr 138 of the Nl Act filed by the conitplainant.

¶28This takes me to the consideration of second questior involved in the present case i.e. whether tile court withir local liimits of which from where t'nE-complainant had sent a notice under prov'sc

(b) appended to Section 138 of the Nl Act is situated has tl1e jurisdiction to try a complaint filed under Section 138 of t:1e Nl Act. Cri.IV1.C.I\Io.l056/2011 & connected

¶29I have already noted the observations 111ade by u·e Supreme Court in Bl7askaran's case (supra) in the foregoin;J paras and would highlight that in paras 17 to 23 th2 Supreme Court has reflected upon the limitation within which the notice has to be given to the accused. The Supreme Court was considering the expression 'giving a notice' in proviso (b) to Section 138 o"f the 1\1! .L\ct, 1rvith reference to the 15 days' time contemplated then by vvhich the requisite notice had to be served, which time is now 3C days.

¶30Another decision of the Supr,eme Court, reported as

(2009) 1 sec 720 Harman Ele'ctronlcs Private Lirr:ited II National Panasonic India Private is wortl1 noting on the subject.

¶31In Hannan's case (supra) tl1e question which had arisen before the Supreme Court was precisely tile sa:T1e, .question which arises for consideration in the present petition i.e. whether the court witl1in the limits of which the· place from where the compia1inant had sent a notice contemplated! under proviso (b_) to Section 138 of the N! Act is situated has the jurisdiction to try a complaint filed under Section 138 of the Act. Answering the aforesaid question in the negative, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "12 ...... The only question, tl1erefore, wl1ich arises for consideration is that as to whether sending of notice from Delhi would give rise to a cause of action for taking cognizance under the Negotiable Instruments Jl,ct. Cri.M.C.No.1056/20E 8( connected matters

¶13It is one thing to say that sending of a notice is one of the ingredients for maintaining the complaint but it is another thing to say that dishonour of a cheque by itself constitutes an offence. For the purpose of proving its case that the accused had cornmijtted an offence under Section 138 of the Negc;tiable Act ingredients thereof are required to be proved. What would constitute an offence is stated in main provision. The proviso appended thereto, however, imposes certain further conditions which are required to be fulfilled before cognizance of the offence can be taken. If the ingredients for constitution of the offence laid down in provisos

(a),. (b) and (c) appended to Section 13t3 of the Negotiable Instrumen-ts Act are intended to be applied in favour of the accused, there cannot be any doubt that receipt of a notice woulld ultimately 9ive rise to the cause of action fo1r fiHng a complaint. As it is only on receipt of the notice that the accused at his own peril may refuse to pay the amount. Clauses (b) and (c) of the pr·oviso to Section 138 therefore must be read together. issuance of notice would not by itself ghre rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would . ....... For constitution of an offence under Section 138 of tile Act, the notice must pe rec;:eiveol by the accused. may be c;,1eemed to have been received in certain situations. The word "communicate" alia means "to make known, inform, convey, etc". ,.

¶20.. ... A court derives a jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose within .its jurisdiction. The same cannot be conferred by any act of omission or commission on the part of the accused. A distinction must also be borne in mind between the ingredient of an offence and commi,ssion of a part of !:he offence. \Nhi!e issuance of a notice bL the holder of a negotiable Cri.M.C.No.1056/2011 & connected matters Page 24 ofn instrument is thereof is also imperative. Only on a of such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, commission of an . offenc:r:= completes. Givinq of n_otice, therefore, cannot have any precedent over the service. It is .only from that view of the matter that in Daln1ia Cetnent (Bharat) Ltd. v. · Galaxv Traders & Agencies Ltd emphasis l1as been on ser·vice of notice." (Ernphasis Supplied)

¶32At a first blush -reading of tlle decisions of the Supn'=rne Court in Bhaskaran ;-)nd cases (supra) rTI3Y strike to the reader that there is a confiict between the twc decisions inasmuch as in Bhaskpran's case (supra) it vvas held that the expression I gh,ing of notice' proviso (b) to Section 138 of t:le 1\H Act means I send1ng of notice' whereas in Harmar(s ca:se (supra) it \Nas heid :J1a:: tile said expression means of notice'.

¶33A careful reading of the two decisions shows that is no conflict between the said inasmuch

3.S t"ey have been rendered in different contexts. The decision IP Bhaskaran's case (supra) was rendered in the ccwtext Jf stal-ting point of limitatio:r. pe1-r.od of 15 days prescribed I;' proviso (b) to Section 133 of thr::; 1\U Act and it vvas: in tha\: context i.e. context of limitation that it was held by the Supreme Court that g.iving of notice· occun--ing in proviso (b) to Section1 138 of Act n-ear's 'sending or notice'. The decision Harn1an's case (sunra,' was rendered iri the context of cause of action for filir:g a complaint under Section 138 f\H jurisdic:t'oq c1f a particular cour-t and in that r was held ·J',E: Ct!.fVI C.No.1056/2.()H 15t connected m2tters Supreme Court that expression giving of rot!ce' occurring in proviso (b) to 138 of the Nl Act means 'receipt olnotice

¶34Now, sarne expression can have different meanings ;:- different context as held by the Supreme Court in l-he decision reported · as Malik LCJI 111/aiumdar v GouraroC;_' Chandra Dev (2004) 1.2 SCC 448 wherein it was observed that a word occuiTir:g m a statutory provision ca11 have different meanings in d1ffe1-ent context vvithi n thr? sa rqe statute.

¶35Thus, the inevitable conclusion would be that the l<:h act contemplated as an of the offence highlighted in Bhaskaran's case i1.e. 'giving notice in writ/179 to the drawer of cheque' den7ano'il7g payment of the chec;·de an7ount for purposes of limitation would have a meaning explained in Bhaskaran·s case and for purposes of jurisdiction would have a meaning as explained in ls/7_3r ,f.!//oJ(s case (supra).

¶36Before concluding I De failing not to lodge a caveat. With banking. and facility payable at ;Jar of clearance provided by bankers and especially n metropolitGin cities, where cheques are clearecl by not bei1lg presented to the qrawee bank but at nodal branches of U'e concerned banks, tile matter of juhsdiction rnc.y have to be decided keeping in \rilew that the drawee bank has creat'ed an agency where the cheque in quest1on s transmitted for clearance and the situs where the dearance tc.l<es place would then arguably become the p_lace whe1·2 Cri.!V1.C.No.1056/2011 8t connectec: m<:Jtters Page 2.6 c-•f l7 the cheque·wouid be required to be treated as presented to 'the bank' Le. the drawee bank. But, in such circumstances. properly constituted pleadings have to be found in a complaint and lodging the caveat, I leave it at that fo1 the debate to be. properly argued in an appropriate cc:se the necessary relevant pleadings. 37 .. hold that on the in the complaint(s). ·no part of cause of action can be said to have accrued to the conrtplainant qt Delhi; that the notice demanding paymen was posted from Delhi and tllai= the cheque vvas with the payee bank at Delhi ·would not constitute the act:: contemplated as ingredients of an offence punishable unje1· Section 138 Act and thus i dispose of the petitions quashing the-impugned order(s) dated 14.2.2011 and dir2ct learned ACMM to return complaint(s) to respondents for filing in a Court having territo -ja jurisdiction.

38.. No costs. SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 mrn Cri.M.C.No.1056/2011 & connected matters - -- ·._ (PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) jUDGE Page Z7 cf 27

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment reserved on: lffh September, 2011 Judgment pronounced'on: 21st September, 2011 + CRL.M.C. 1172/2011 SHREE RAJ TRAVELS & TOURS LTD. & ORS. .. ... Petitioners Through: Mr.Sunil. Gupta, Sr.Advocate with Mr.jatin Zaveri, Mr.Gaurav Agarwal and Mr.Tanmaya Advocates versus DESTINATION OF THE WORLD(SUBCONTINENT) PRIVATE LTD. .. ... Respondent Through: Mr.Anindya Malhotra, Advocate CORAM: HON.BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG 23. Whether the Reporters of local .papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 24. To be referred to Reporter or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? PRADEEP NANDRAIOG, j. For orders, see Cri.M.C.Noll056/2011. SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 mm Certify that the digital and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. % + j_ucf:itne;)t reseritcy" on _ 18-1' > • .:"'-f.)_.? .. jurjgrneot on., 21sr Septern(Ji1L2'l__,_·j: C!RLM:C 10.56/2011 ·-------------- SHREE RAJ TRAVELS[), TOIURS LTD. & Through: Gupta, with Mr.Jatin Zaveri, .a nivcJ I and M r.Ta n i-·lc.' 1. a .L\gai"vva l, - DESTI NPIT!ON OF: THE \NOF\LD (SUBCONTH\JENT) PP.IVATE f_TD. . ... Through: Malhotra, ->-:- CHLM.C. Jllfi6/201l SHREE RAj TRAVELS & LTD. E,(ORS. Throuoll". !-.s G, upta, 5r. with ,Mi·.jatin Zaveri, · and Aga I-ll!' a I, Advocates \iersus OF THE Vv'OHLU rsu PP.i'J A-i"E LTD. . .... L Througi-L f'-ll; .P:li!;·,dya Malhotra, .. ::cat · rRL '111 ·c . 111 -"" 'Lf"»n 11 .., • I'"!. -. ·'" I·.' L <\.1' JL l SHREE Ftl\j TRAVELS & tTD. 6,, ORS. . .... !Vl r 5 !_; 1l 1 G u 5 r ··..:!J C.3. :_ ·.::: Throuqh. vu it 11 r. J a b n Z ave n . M r G :;,, L.: · c: · .6. a ::w v a it 01 n d r. T a n m a v 23 J . /':1ga' \1 2· i,, '>.• .i c z: versus DESTINATION OF THE \NORLD _, I (SUBCONTINENT) PRIVATE LTD. . .... Respondent Through: Mr.Anindya Maihotra, Advocate CRLM.C.. 117'2/2011 SHREE RAJ TRAVELS & TOUHS LTD. & ORS. . .... Petitioners Gupta, Sr.Advocate with Mr.jabn Zaveri, Mr.Gaurav Agarwad and Mr.Tann1aya Advocates Through: versus DESTINATION OF THE WORLDI(SUBCONTiNENT) PRIVATE LTD. .. ... Respondent Through: Mr.Anindya Malhotra, Advocate CRLM.C. 1173/2011 SHREE RAJ TRAVELS & TOUHS LTD. & ORS. . .... Petitioners Mr.Sunil Gupta, Sr.Advocate with Mr .. Jatin Zaveri,, Mr.Gaurav Agarwal and Mr.Tanmaya AgarwaL Advocates Through: versus DESTINATION OF THE WORLD (SUBCONTiNENT) PRIVATE LTD. .. ... Respondent T!1rough: Mr.Anindya Malhotra, Advocate SHREE RAJ TRAVELS & TOURS LTD. . & ORS. . .... Petitioners Through: Mr.Sunil Gupta, Sr.Advocate with Mr.jatin Zaveri, Mr.Gaur-av t\garwal and Mr.Tanmaya Advocates Crl.fvl.C.f\Jo.1056/2011 81 conner.terJ Page 2 of 2.7 versus DESTINATION OF THE VVORILD PRIVATE LTD. . .... Respondent Through: Mr.Anindya Advocate CRLM.C. SHREE RAJ TRAVELS & TOURS LTD. 6( ORS .. . .... Petitioners Mr.Sunill Gupta, Sr.Advocate with Zaveri, Mr.Gaurav Agarwa1l and Mr.Tanmaya Agarvvall .. Advocates Through: versus DESTll\IATION OF THE WORLD (SUBCONTINENT) PRIVATE LTD. .. ... Respondent Through: Mr.Anindya Malhotra, .Advocate CRLM.C. 11161/2011 SHREE RAJTRAVELS & TOUIRS LTD. & ORS. .. ... Petitioners Gupta, Sr.Advocate with Zaveri, Mr.Gaurav Through: ' ' Agarwal and M r.Tanmaya Agarwal, Advocates versus OF THE \1\/0RL.D (SUBCONTiNENT)PRIVATE LTD.. .. ... Respondent Througll: Mr.Aninolya Malhotra, CRLM.C. SHREE F\Aj TRAVELS & TOURS LTD . & ORS. .. .. . Pebtioners Mr.Sunil Gupta, Sr.Advocate with Mr.jlatin Zaveri, Mr.Gaurav Agarwal and Mr.Tanmaya Through: Cri.M.C.No.1056/2011 8t connected matters Advocates versus DESTINATION OF THE WORLD (SUBCONTINENT) PRIVATE LTD. .. ... Respondent Through: Mr.P111indya Malhotra, Advocate CRLM.C. 1119/2011 SHREE RAJ TOUR.S LTD .. & ORS. .. ... Petitioners Through: Mr.Sunil Gupta, Sr.Aolvocate with Mr.Jadn Zaveri, Agarwal and Mr.Tanmaya Agarwal, Advocates versus DESTINATiON OF THE \1\/0Ri_D (SUBCONTiNENT) PRIVATE LTD. . ..... Respondent Through: Mr.Anindya Malhotra, Advocate CRLM.C. 1181/20