Gulfam v. Commissioner of Customs

order:

Mr. Mukesh Gulia, Superintendent, Legal

Office of Commissioner, Customs IGI Airports, T-3, New Delhi Email id: igilegaldelhi@gmail.com

¶15The petition is disposed of in these terms. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.

PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUDGE

SHAIL JAIN JUDGE NOVEMBER 19, 2025 dj/sm

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision: 19th November, 2025 Uploaded on: 22nd November, 2025 + GULFAM .....Petitioner Through: Ms. Richa Kumari, Adv. versus COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS .....Respondent Through: Ms. Anushree Narain, SSC. CORAM: JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral) 1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode. 2. The present petition has been filed by the Petitioner- Mr. Gulfam under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, seeking release of the gold bar weighing 117 grams (hereinafter, 'gold bar') which was detained by the Customs Department. 3. A brief background of the Petitioner's case is that the Petitioner was working in Saudi Arabia. He arrived in India on 5th January, 2023. Upon his arrival at the Indira Gandhi International Airport New Delhi, the gold bar was seized by the Customs Department vide detention receipt dated 5th January, 2023. 4. The case of the Petitioner is that after the detention receipt was issued, no Show Cause Notice has been issued to the Petitioner, and no personal hearing has been granted. Thus, the Petitioner is seeking release of the gold bar as continued detention of the same would be contrary to law, in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3489/2024 titled Union of India and Ors. v. Jatin Ahuja dated 11th September, 2025. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under: "17. It is difficult for us also to subscribe to the views expressed by the Bombay High Court in Jayant Hansraj Shah's case (supra). We are of the view that the only power that has been conferred upon the Revenue to extend the time period is in accordance with the first proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 110 of the Act, 1962. The Delhi High Court is right in saying that any effort to say that the release under Section 110A of the Act, 1962 would extinguish the operation of the consequence of not issuing show-cause notice within the statutory period spelt out in Section 110(2) would be contrary to the plain meaning and intendment of the statute. 18. The Delhi High Court has done well to explain that this is so because Section 110A, is by way of an interim order, enabling release of goods like fast moving or perishable etc. The existence of such power does not, in any way, impede or limit the operation of the mandatory provision of Section 110(2). 19. In the case in hand, indisputably the car was seized under sub-section (1) and furthermore no notice in respect of the goods seized was given under clause (a) of section 124 of the said Act within six months of the seizure. The consequence, therefore, in such a case is that the goods shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized. The first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 110 of the said Act, however, provides that the Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the six months' period by a period not exceeding six months and inform the person from whom such goods were seized before the expiry of the period so specified. The proviso therefore contemplates that the period of six months mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 110 of the said Act can be extended by the higher authority for a further period not exceeding six months, for reasons to be recorded in writing. The proviso also requires the higher authority to inform this to the person from whom such goods were seized before the expiry of the period of six months mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 110. We find that in respect of the seized car, there is neither any notice under clause (a) of section 124 issued to the respondent within six months of the seizure nor the period of six months ever came to be extended for a further period of six months. In the absence of there being any notice as required by the first proviso even within the extended period upto one year, the consequence that ought to fo