Pramod v. Ndmc and Anr

judgment. ' • •

¶4To, give a brief background oP the dispute, learned counsel for the respondent/NDMCwalked this Court tliroug.hsorne prominenfdecisionsol the SupremeCourt rendered Prom time'to time, which relate to-pavemont W.F.(C)•474-3/2011r •S254/2011 ib co.nnexr.Cedrnaiters , /"aye uf: 2S squaLLers/l-iawkers,starting TroiTi the decision in-l:he case of bpdai).SJjiyli vs. NDMC -Sl Ors. reported as (1.998) 2 SCC 727, the inlverim i?i'der dnted .03.03.2.006-passed by the .Supreme'Court in fW,.IP'..(C) 1699/19:8.7 erititled Sudhir l^ladan Ors. vs. MCD, the Pinal judgment in tlie cn.so of •S11 ti|-iir 1'^^aC.Ian (sup ra1.reported as (2009) 17 SCC £^97 and .lastly, tho, judgmentdated 08/10,.2'010passed in the case oT GanidaJ'Uui.l.Uui;^'^ '5. Learned counsel'for the respondent/NDMC vehemently opposed tlie I prayer or the petitioners/vendors l;or grant of interim orders restiainiiig tl'ie respondent/IMDMC-from removing tlien") from the sites occi.i|iie(.l l;)y them till tl'i"e' enactment of an appropriate legislation, in term.s ol' tl.ie :direcljons issued by the' Supreme Court in the. case of Galrida jlarir (sLilDra). She particularly referred to the observations made liy the Supreme Court in paras 40 and '-IJ. of the judgment in the cqse of ,SDdm_i Sirvgh (supra.)., whicfi dealt With the immediate eviction of ur)cii.illifM'i/.ed ' . -.1 . sqi.iatters/i'iawkers and laid emphasis on.tfie Pact that in tlie said case, tlie Supreme Court had directed removal of unautilorized squatters/hawkers, without awaitin.g final allotment of sites to be allotted to eligible claiiriant.'; at tlie places recommended b.y 'tlie Thareja'Committee or suggested by the NDMC. • . ' • . ; • • • \ • \

¶6Again, in the interim order dated

03.03.200.6 passed in Sudhir . Madan's case (supra), the following obsei'vati.on n'lade by the .Supi einci Court was highlighted by the counsel for the respondeni;/i\IDMC; - ,

(C) 4-743/2011, 5254/-leil Si conneci.ed rnaiiers Frige 5 .7if Jf- "While we undertake. Irhis exfercise, ,we direct U'le Aathoril:ies to see to it that those persons, who are carrying on hawking activities or who are squatting oii public land without any authority/ even in accordance with present day scheme in force, are removed Torthwith. This "includes unauthorized hawking, squatting on public streets, footpaths and public |.;iail<5, including playground. We direct the Delhi Adrninistratioii to take steps immediately in collaboration with MCI3 and NDMC with' necessary assistance from Delhi i-.'olice to clear Iroads, •streets, footpaths, parks etc. by srs."

¶7-As to the judgnre'nt dated ;l.7.0b.2007 rendered in. tlie case of Sudhir Madan fsupral, much emphasis was laid by 'tlie counsel for tlie respondent/NDMC on paras 28-to .30 and 35, which are rei.-i.roduced hereinbelow for ready reference;-' ^ "28. The New Delhi Municipal Committee has al.so, submitted its Scheme. We have considered tine Sctieme submitted before us. The area which falls under' l\IL")M.(.. does not create problems such as those in tfie areas, under MCD. However, in the said Scheme reference iins been made to persons wiito do not ha've perniission under Section 225 or licence Linder Sectton 330 of the NDMC Act, 1994 but ,wl'io are unauthorisedly conl.inuiiig to csi'ry on, business, as hawkers/street vendors. Ilioy have been described as those who are "tolerated" in the ' .NDMC area. We fail'to understand'why any person who violates the, law should be tolerated. Either they si'iould be compelled to obey tl"ie law or the law may be sLiitably amended, if it is found to create undue l"iardslii|:i. 1 he problems need, to be addressed by. the legislature or I.he rulen'iakin'g authority. We, therefore,-observe tl'iat if it is fel't that the persons who fall in ttiis category requii'e special protection, the Act n^iay be suitably amended to cover their cases or else number of such illegal squatters may increase from time to time. W.P.fc) 4743/201.1, 5254/20.11 & conne<:!:ed matters Page 6 of 20-

¶29There has' been no serious objecl:lon l;o Llie Scheme submitted by IMDIHC which is. a coinpreliensive scheme;. Certain. direcLlons have, however, been soughl; for from this Court.. We approve Sciierne. submitted by I^D|V|C." " • ' • •

¶30It is submitted before us that tlie 'Schemes wliic.li •have been approved by Uiis Court must be subjecl: to any /Act or rules that may be framed in consonance wil.l'i National Pojicy on Urban Street Vendors. .It,goes .withoLit saying that we have approved the Schemes as framed by MCD and NDMC. If the legislati.ire intervenes and' frames another scheme or regulations governing such. Schemes, tinat will certainly, supersede ttie Schemes prepared by MCD and NDMC. It is well settled that any administrative action is always subject to law •that may be framed by the competent legislature. bs. Subject to the aforesaid rnodificatioi'is/changes in the Schemes submitted -by MCD. and NDMIC, tlie sai'i'ie are approved. The said authorities shall now 'tal<e appropriate steps to irnplen'ient the Scheme forthwith. In case.of any difficulty faced'b.y them in implementing the scheme's,- they shall have the liberty to apply to thi.s. Court."

¶8Lastly, in the I'ecent judgirient in the case of Gain da Mam (.sup_.i:a), learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC specifically relied upon pai'as 30, 32, 50 to 66 to state that the Supreme Cotirt was conscious of the fact tliat a structured regulation and legislation is Lirgeritly requiipd l.u control and regulate,,the funda.mental right of hawking. She also pointed out that three tier disputes redressal meclianism set out -, in the -affidavit filed by the-'then Chairperson .of ttie-.NDMC was taken, I'lOto.'; ol I'ly' .the Supreme Court in (Dara 12 of the aforesaid judgment and in par'a 7;'!, 11; r • • was then observed as below 4743./20:i:l, 525^/20X1 & connBcfscJ maU.ers Pays 7 of 2(1 ;' "73,; In paragraph 12 of the'arndavit it has been stated that there shall be an A\ppellate /Authority wliicti sliall attend to redressai of grievances oP squatters, hawkers, traders, residents or any other person by hearing appeals against decision-oP tlie Vending Committee (i^ain). Paragraph 12 ofttiat affidavit is sol: out below:- There shall be an Appellate ' Authority. On l;iie' forwarding of petitions . received by tlie Ctiairperson, this Authority sfiaii attend lo redressai of grievances of sqUjatters, liawicers, traders, I'esidents or any otl'ier person. "iiie •/-Vu'thoiity shall also liear appeals against l:he deicisipn of Vending Comrhittee

(Main). Ilecisions of this Authority unless challenged before a l-liglier Forum or in any Competent Court, shall be final.- Tliis Authority shall be initially headed by a iiei'son appointed by the Chairperson having at least J.O years legal or judicial background. Tliere can be more than one member in tfiis'ALithority

¶9/After mak'ing the aforesaid observation.5., iii paras /4 to /b of judgn'ient, the Supi-eirie Court went on to observe as b.elow-;- "74. .In the said •affidavit, which was affirmed before this Court pn 24^'' August, 2010 it has been stabed-that MDMC sliall comply witti the orders wtiich worrld fie passed by the adjudicatory, mechanism contemplated in the scherrie and .which has been approved by this Court for the NIDMC area, unless such orders ai'e. made subject matter of challenge before a higher forum or' in any other competent Court.

¶75Iri, vi.ew of such schemes,' ttie hawkers, squallers and vendors must cibide by Dispute i^edressal scheme mentioned ab.ove. 'TJ-iei-e should not be .ariy direct approach to this Court by way of fresh petition or I/As, bypassing ttie DispLite FCedressal Mechaitism provicl-ed-in the sctienle. W.PlCC) 4/43/2011, 5254/20X1 Ik connected matters Fage S of 2'f •• i

¶76However; before 30'" June, 2011, l:he appropriale Government .is to enact a law on the basis of ttie I3ill ' mentioned •above, or on basis of any aniendrnenl; tliereo.r so.'that hawkers may-precisely know t.he contours of their rights."

¶10It was tlius sought to be contended on belialf • ul • l.lie respondent/NDMC that there can 'be no vacuum as far as legulabon of .trade of street hawkers/vendors in the NiDMC jurisdiction is concei-ne(.i and • the faiiure on ttie part of the legislatui-e to abide by the tiineline set out by the-SLiprerne Court in the case of Gainda I'-icam fsu'pi'a), by f)Lif.ting in .place a statute on or-before 30.06.2011, cannot be interpret.ed by the petitioners/vendors to n-iean that tliey Cc|;n continue their tiade •! untiii'idered at any 'place of their choice in the NDI^'IC juiisdiction, in an unregulated manner and-without any' obstruction or objection fi oin the NIDMC. • • • ' • -

¶11i_earned cO:Unsel for the respdndent/NDIvjC particularly referred to • paras 74 and 75 of ttie aforesaid Judgrnent to state that the di-S|;)ute redressal scheme, noticed by the Supreme Court, in para 7'd was iJie one ttiat .was legally functioning .in NDI^IG jurisdiction aiid wjiich Was takeii note of by the Court in'the preceding para 74. In other woi;ds, she stated • that the scheme as set, out in the affidavit dated 24.08.20:1.0, filed l.)y tlie then Chairperson of NDMC before the Supreme Court in _GaiJ.'.lCla .liani,'s case (supra).,' was'..the one which was fi'i'ially approved by the .Su|)renie Court. She further subi'nitted that assuming, vvilhout admitting, that the f/l/'.i".CCJ 4^743/20 f 525^1/1.011 & caiinec-t:ed rTiBi:S:efs Page 9 of2B dispute redressal sciieme set out by the IMDMC liad lapsed on 30.,6.201:1-as clainied by the petitioners, tiien ttie NDMC Act provides an aiJequate fallback to ensui'e orderly management oP vendors in the ai'ea. Speciiic rePerenceiwas made in this regard to the provisions contained in SecLioiis 221, 22^1, 225 and ,226. of the said Act.

¶12It was Purtlier argued by Llie cdun5,el for [.tie resporident/NDMC that the application filed, by tlie NDMC Ijefore the Supi"en-ie Courl: in .Inly .ZU I I. praying inter alia for extension, of time l:o regulate hawkei's/squatLers in ttie NDMC area,- as per the sclieme mentioned in tlie judgment iii Gainda Ram's case (supra.), till the enactment of a law by the legislature in that regard, had not yet been finally disposed of by the Supreme CoL.irt at the time of passing of the status quo order dated ,15.07.2011 and similarly, the other-application filed by one of the hawkers/vendors praying inl(?.i alia for restraining-the respondent/NDMC from granting TehlDazari riyliLs,- ' to the winners of theducky di'aw of lots for allotment, which was to l:)e; j held on

12.05.2011^ or any date thereafter, was also pending consideration before the Supreme Coi.irt. Hence, no finality could be attached to the order-dated

15.7.2011 which can-'only be considered an interim measure till tlie final .disposal of the aforesaid applications oi' the enactment of a legislation. 13-On merits, learned counsel for the respondent/NDi^lG refei'i ed l:o the affidavit dated

01.08.'20,11-'filed by tlie Director (Enfoi'ceinent), N[)MIC, th/.P^CCJ474-3/20li^ 5254/20X1 St. connected infjl:l:ers ' • Page, io of J'H wherein it was stated that pursuant to the public liibtice issuecJ ijy the. NDMC inviting applications under I\IDIV|C Ui'ban Str'eeL Vending, Scheme in the year 2(3.07, the respondent/IMDMC had received' 4Jb/ applications. The documents required by the applicants Tor registration under the Schen'ie included a ..prooT oT age, docunrsntary prooP/ariidavit for the purpose or-annu£fi income, prooP of residence, proof in support oP special categories like inandicapped, Kashmiri migrants etc. and prooP oP squatting in the NDMC area,' IP any: In para 4 oP^the aPoi'esaid aPPiilavit, the Pollowing critei'ia •'approved/adopted by the-Vending ,Commil"tee to shortlist-the eligible applicants is set out;- ' • . "4. That the criteria approved/adopted by tlie Vending Committee to shortlist eligible applicants is -as . under:- • '

(i) The applicants shoi.ild be resident oP Delhi, witli his •, name registered in electoral rolls as per abstract oP photo E-P^bll or Elio certiPicate. . ' ' :

(ii) TPie applicant should be a n-iajor, viz.- witli over :l M . years of age as per valid birtPi certiPicate or age certiPicate or school certiPicate etc.

(iii) The •applicant should, be a needy as per income records of i3C (Revenue) or as vulnerability records oP Government oP NCT of Delhi (Samajil< Suvidha Sarigam; .vulnerable.and most vulnerable category). •

(iv) The apTjIicant should be registered as per NDML. Street Vendors Scheme. The policy veriPication oP the. applicant should be available. ' •

(v) Th.e applicant or his dependent Pan'iily member should not be employed or should not have any otln^r-tehbazari/yending or any other-bLisiness premises iit ;Delhi as per record veriPication'oPNDMC/MCD. W.P.(C) 4743/201 Ir 5^254/2011'8k connected maiteis Fays J1 iff 2B (\/i) Preference will be. given to applicants wlio-are physically handicapped or widows or senior ciLiz-ens above GO yeai's • or Kashmiri migi'ants or SC/S"I' (necessary cei'tiPicate to be submitted and relaxation may be given in the above criteria):" , I'^l. As per respondent/NDMC, categoi"y~wise list oF eligibki" shortlisted applicants in terms of the aforesaid criteri.a totalled to 3P.7(..l 'applicants. The afridavit dated"

01.08.201:1.' states' tliat respondent/WDMC has identified 183 new spaces, in addition to tife 2()3 remaining spaces iden'tified by the Thareja Committee in the Nt')MC ai ea., wliich were available' for allotment, thus taKing ttie total numbei' ot available spaces to 336. -It was further stated that due to factors l'il':e de-listing of the Parliament .Street on security grounds, constructi.on of flyovers and'Metro Stations at various locatio'ns in the NDMC 'jurisdiction, the number of-authorized tehbazari squatters lias changed fronr ,:^'lfi-to 404 in number.- The number of applicants, who the respondei'it/NI..)M(... claims, are vending-unauthorisedly at Connaught Place, Sai'o'jini Nagar', Parliament Street and. Janpatti areas and in wl'iose. favour', slalus quo orders are operating, is-stated to.be-323 in number. The affidavit asserts that s-iitiply because the names of tlie peti.tioners, wlio are registered with ttie NDMC, figure in the eligibility list di"awn by tlie resi.-iondent/Nl.iMC.., cannot be treated as proof of their regularly vending in ttie NDMC: aiea and nor does it confer on them any ervforcea.ble vested right to eirsure' a vending space for them in the NDMC area, whicti is directly dependent on Vir.P.(C) 4743/2011, S25.4/-2011 Si carrnecf.ed mslters F^ge. 12 2il tl'ie number of spaces available. Thus, it was contended tliat neither tjie possession of any num.ber of challans, nor the absence thereof can make . .a difference, for the reason tl-)at' challans cannot form basis for the • ' petitio'ners to claim 'any vested legal right to squat at a given space. ;l.5. Counsel for ' the' respondent/NDMC asserted' that tfie presenl: petitions are no,t •'maintainable inasmuch - as. the petitioners liav/e an-equally i efficacious alternate remedy of approaching ttie, appellate' authority constituted by ttie Chajrperson, NDMC, for redressal of tlieii' grievances and failLn"e. on their pa-it to have approached l.l'ie Veridii'ig Committee is hot on-account of the fact tliat ttie said Coiriiyiittee including the appellate auttiori.ty is not functioning, but because they Ivave foi.ind it more convenient to.bypass the aforesaid ..forum and'approacli tfiis Court'" . i . • . - I .• • , - • . directly, -which is not permissible. . She stated that extensive measures .have been taken by th'e'respondent/ND|v|C to. constitute ttie adjudical.ory ^ - •mecfian'ism by way-of a three tier system in the following rnanhei :- - • " , •1. Vending Sub-Committee (Site of Spaces),. : • 2. • Vending-Sub-Committee (Heath and Hygiene) ahd .3. ' Vending Sub-Committee (Enfqrcen')ent).

¶16She stated that ttie creation of ttie aforesaid three Vending Sulj-Committees, Vendin.g Committee (IHain), as also of ttie appellate authoi ily 'vvh-icli was constituted • to redress griqvance-S-of, the siiiiatters, hawkers, traders, residents or any other, person'agSinst the, decision of Vi/.P.(C) 47^13/2011, 52S4/2011 Si connected matCers Page .1.5 uf 2li "'•I the Vending Con'uTiitliee(Main), was placed before l:he Supreme Courl; I'oi" consideration and the said three tier adjudicatory rnechanisivi was duly approved in the jud.grnent of Gainda Rarn fsupraV "17. Per contra, Learned counsels for tlie petitioners/vendors, wlio appeared on different dates, veheinently opposed the aforesaid stand-taken by the respondent/NDMG and asserted tliat the scf)enie floal.ed Ijy the respondent/NDMC for regulating vending activities in its jurisdiction had lapsed on 30.06.2011 in the absence of the enactn'ient of a legislation as per directions of tli'e Supreme Court in tfie case of Gainda jjaill.(suPLa). and as on date, thei'e is no^ scheme, in existence. It was canvassed tliat implication of the .aforesaid order of status quo passed by tlie • Supreme Court on 15.07.2011 can only.nnean that ii'respective of the fact whether the squatting is legal or illegal, tfie samie be permitted to continue; on an 'as is wlhere is' basis, and such status' quo is to he maintained by all the parties.till a law is framed by the legislature.

¶18Mr. . B.B. • Savvhney, Sr. Advocate appearing ' for l:he petitioners/vendors submitted that i;n the case of Gaiiida .PxcLiIl.Xsupi.a),the. Supreme Court had directed that tfie appropriate government must enact a. law on or before

30.06.2011 so ttiat tfie hawi<ers may fji-ecisely know contours of their rights, tience dispute redressal meclin'nism provided for in the scheme mentioned in tlie aforesaid judgmeht could operate only upto

30.06.2011 and thereafter, the said scheim.e would W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 a connecf.ed matters , Pug-e 14 of'lit automatically stand lapsed. He stated that no other interpretation can g-iven tO' the order dated 15.07.2011, directing-maintenance of s/.b/.x/sqi.io, - in view oP the qualifying -words, "as it is obtaining today".- .He argued that, : if the schehie was continuing to' operate, as, claimed by tlie k^anied . counsel for the respondent/NDMC, then there was no good r.ea.soM foi" the respondent/NDMCto hjave refrained from tiolding'a draw of loLs, wliicli was slated for the same clay, i.e., lb.07.20.11, and ttiat fact of the niaitei is that even the respondent/NDMC had understood \:\-\e. sLaius quo order to mean ttiat there is no scfieme in.place after 30.6.201:1., .for the reason , • tfiat -in para 68 of the-aforesaid judgment in .the case of Gaijjda,Jiani ' CsLipraJ, all the writ petitions and the interim applications filed tiefore i;l)e Supreme Court were disposed ofwith clear and specific directions l.liattlie problem of hawking .and street vending could be regulated liy ' the '• schemes fran-iecl-by the IMDMC and MCD only upto 30.06.'20.1 .1, i-.md not ttiereafter; It was asserted on behalf of the petitioners/vei idoi s tfiat .as.. ©I'l date, the directions' of the Supreme Court tliat si:ai:us quo ^s .\.o-be - n-iaintained by ttie parties can only be given one intei pretatiori, wfiichJ.s tftat till a law is ultimately enacted by the l^arliament, irrGSpective of inieii . ; legal status, all the petitioners/vendors would be permitted to continue • .squatting/Jiawking at the sites that have been occupied by tfiern. 19- .'Insofar as the composition of the .dispute redi'essal r 'concerned, learned. Senior Advocate for ttie iDetitionfers .submil.tec.! contrary to understanding of the resppndent/IMDMC, Lfie scheme 'W:i\(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 Si cunnect/sd nial:l:ers Page I'f of 2B . • \s . LIici .. i • reproduced at paras 72-and 73 in tlie judgment in the case of Glajnda llajri .(supra), was not the one which was actually recognized by the u|,)re me Court, and rather it is the, dispute redressal scheme n:iei:]tioried in i^ara 75 " or the aforesaid judgment i.e., "'a scheme for Lirban-street vendois foi NDMC area as formulated in year .2006, which was ultimately"-^ approved . by the Supreme Court on 17.05.2007, in the case o( Sudhir Maclap (supra)., which is the sclieme <A/tiich finds mention 5|;)eGifif:ally in tfie following para 74 and is the one approved by the Su|:)i-eme Courl'. II. was contended that'even otherwise, tfie INational Capital 1'erritory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2011 (hereinafter i-eferred to as 'Speciiall IP'roviiEiioins Acit') comes to the. rescue of the petitioners for the rea.son that sub-clause

(2) of Section 3 of tlie Special Provisions Act mandate.s . maintenance of status quo as on

01.01.2006, notwithstanding any judgment,• decree or order of any court, in respect of encroaciinienl: or unautfiorized development. Thus, it was submitted on. Inehalf of l.lie petitioners/vendoi's tliat tfiey were entitled to grant of interim |:irotcction till the .enactment of a legislation to regulate hawkJng/vending activities ii') urban streets in Dell'ii on the basis of the National Policy on Ui-I.)an .Streel. Vendors, 2009 framed on 17.06.2009 and the Special Provisions Act,

¶20With reference lo Special Provisions-Act, learned Seiiioi /Advocate for btie • petitioners .stated that phrase, "i.inai.ithori/.ed developmenf ifeed in-the definition cl.ause has to be seen in Mie same context as tl')e one in which the phrase "encroachrneiit" has been defined, l/l/.P.rc; A,7^t3/2011, 5254/2011 & coiutected nia[t:ers Page 16 of Zf:f • • V • .!• wherein it is iTientioheci'that putting up oP temporary, semi-temporary or permanent structure Po.r.residential use or cdmrt'iercial use^ or any otliei: use, and the placement of goods on the pavements by the petitioners is liable to tie termed as unauthorized use for maintaining status quo iiiif.ler the Special Pi'ovisions Act. Much emphasis was laid on ttie avernients made by the respondent/NDMC in its interim application filed befora thi;:; Supreme Court in G.ainala Ram's.case fsupral in July 2011, to'suljmitMJiat the respondent/NDMC itself had stated in the said application thai: ttie schehie had lapsed and therefore, the only interpretation that' can bo given to the' sL'atuS''quo order passed by the Supreme Court •on,.

15.07'.2011 can be that'no scheme would e)i!jist after

30.0G.2(.);lJ and thus, the benefit of the Special [Provisions Act ought to be extended to the petitioners. He submitted that tlie .phrase 'street vendors' lias be.en-clearly defined under the National Po.licy on Urban Street Vendors, 2009. Reliance was placed in the case of Patri Vyapar MandaLDM!lL..(Jisy.Cl-.)--.VS. MlCD Town.H.all Ors. reported as

(2009). 12 SOC A\1S and the-provisions of the Special Provisions Act to submit that even,ttie Suriren'ie clurt had recogniz.e.d the fact that the Special Provisions .Act is Lli.e onjy .Cfentra'i law governing'the field and it would ^have primacy over oliier.. Statutes and admini'straliive orders. It is'thus stated, that ttie provisio.ns of the NDMIC /Act cannot be invoked by. the respondent/NDMiC as• ttie said Act is not in consonance with Article 96 of the .Cdnstitutioh of India,and . fufthermore, ' the Special 'Provisions /Act being' valid till "the end ol' W.P..(C) •^•743/2011^ S254/2011 Si connected maf.l.'ers Phge 17 of 2H y •• December 2011, no orders in derogation of the provisions oP tlie said /\c:L • tan be passed. ;

¶21Mr. S-K-TripatlTi, ^Advocate appearing Por some of Plie kvi"- ' ^ petitioners/vendors sbught l:o ernbellisli the submissions oP l^lr.Sawliney, I'- " . ' -y bi".Advocate and relied ' on •the orders passed in ¥V,.IP-(C) . i449/2'0i;ll. entitled Mohd. Ismail.'vs. NDMC 8t. Ors. to urge that tln.e "Appellate /Authority" coiistituted under dispute redressal mechanism ixii' the NfJMC area, I'las not,been functioning, whicti Pact he stated is boi iie uul ProiiT a perusal oP the order dated

08.03.2011' passed in tPie aPoresaiid-. : case, wherein the Court took notice oP the claim oP the.petitioner/vendor ' therein-to ePPect that-inspite oP oi ders'passed by Llie Appellaiie Authority allow/ing squatting at a .particular site, till a Pinal deterniinntipri by the .Vending Committee as to-his eligibility, the respandent/l\ll.)MC and the police vyere disturbing tiis activities. In the aPoresaid orcler, tlie 5i:aten'ient oP the. counsel Por the respondent/NOMC was recorded to I.he ePPect that the appellate authority, whose order was being relied upon by . the petitioner therein,, was constituted initially Por tlie MCC) areas and later started Punctioning. Por'tli-e NDMC areas as well Por tPie reason tiiat at that time, .there was no separa'te-.appellate autliority Por the NDMC areas, but subsequently, in accordance with the scheme-approved by tlie Supi erne Court, Chairperson,. NDMC had constituted a separate apfieliate aittbority for • the NDMC areas. TtierePore, ,the appellate appointed earlier had ceased to have jurisdiction qua the NLOMC areas. W.P.(s:j 47-^i3/20.11, S254-/3011 Si conr!ecl:ed ntatt&s } Page Iff of 2H was thus contended oh .behalf of petitioners/vendors ttiat-aforesaid order clearly iridicates that the appellate authority in the l\li:)MC; ' f. ' - areas is'not functioning. • • • .

22.- RelianGB was ajso placed on iViinuites-of the meeting of tl ie ' •Vending Cornniittee dated •11.03.2010, to ciain'i that if ttie fact of whether there was actual squatting/vending was verified by tfie Conirnittee and if the names of the petitipners/Vendors. figured in tlie eligibility list [.irepared .by the. respondent/MDMC for holding the draw of lots, then it did not lie in the mouth of the respopdent/IMDMCto claim'tha.t'tjhepetitioners, wl'io had been verified' and' found to-be eligible, vA^ere, not entitled to S(|uat at.-, various sites in the NDMC area after 30.06-201;L. "23. In rebuttal, counsel ! for the' respondent/MDMC disputed ttie \ • • • contentions of the petitioners/vendors and. while reiterating tier eai'lier submissions, asserted' that petitiohers did not I'lave.ai'iy legally enforceable ri.glit, creal:ed on the basis of the eligibility list drawn l..jy NDMC, for claiming, griint of interin'i orders in ttieir favour. .She again referred to paras 68, 69, 75, 76 and 78 of tii.e judgmei'it 'in the cn.se of Gain da Ram fsupra), .to eiriphasize ttiat when aforesaid 'paras are read collectively, it, is clear tliat petitioners cannot claim' an entitlement to any interim, ordei^s as sought by them in tl'ie |')resent proceedings-Stie-.' further stated • that even otfierwise, tl'ie .S|..)ecial Provisions Act relied upon by 'the petitioners-has duly recoqni'zed W.F.CC) 4/43/20:tl, 5254/2011 & connecieii ;hst:l:ers ' Page. 19 af 2n i. . 1 ; '"•'-..i;;!- ,,schemespreparedby the local authoritiesin the NationalCapitalTerritory j or Delhi for regulationot urban street vendo,:s-. -To substantiatethe sai.J j submission,she drew tlie attention or tliis Court to the preamble ot Hie • .afoi-esaid Act, which iTieiTtioRsthe tacf that,all the schenVes pi-epai-ed hy the local' authorities in the National Capital Teiritory of Deliii,.•ibr , •regulation of urban street vendoi's in accordancewith tlie-Matiunalr:olicy on Urban £ti-eet Vendoi-s; 2009 and the Master Plan for IDelhi 202 I,, Ii,^\/f5 ' . been inipleineiited and tui'ther that more time is lequirefei for |)ic)pei ' implementation of the schemes regarding hawkei's and urban sl:i"eet vendors.;- . . . ' , , . .

¶24A specific reference was made • by learned counsel rpr the ... respondent/NDMC to Section •2(l)(c) of the Special Provisions Act, whicJi-.," defines.the phrase-.'-encroachment" to claim that it does not covci' , petitio.nei's herein,-who are squatters. Further reference was made Ijo tlie j-c I provision of Section .3 of the Special Provisions Act, wliicli contains a nori obstarite clause, to state Uiet status quo with regard to ttie encroaclirnei it or uaatitl'iorized development as on '01.01.2006, mentioned in tlid .sai.d provision, was. in . the coptext of definition of the. |.)ltVa.ses • "encroachment" and "unautl'iorized development," set out in the definition clause-at-Sections 2^1)(c) and '2Cl,)(i') respectively of the .Special Provisions Act and thus, the petitioners/vendors did not qualify i.iiuler tiie afor&said enactment-for claiming protection as none of the inc)redie.;nl.sset ^ • 4 ; ' • • - • - • out,in the provisions of the al^oresaid enactment are found to exist in ti'ieir • W.F.CCJ 4y43/201.1^ 5254/2011 Si connected nial:Lers ' Pftge.20 or 2.0 case. II: was submitL'eclthat the Special ProvisionsAct, wliicli came inh;. eTfecL in Lhe year 2007 and has been extended rrorri tin'ie Lo Lime and lasdy, Lill Deceinbei 2011, does-not give perrrrissionto persons l:(.) ic-slari: any acLivity once they have been removed .by Lhe civic aLil;l'ioril:y and similarly, the Scl'ienie of" 2009 does noL entitle the recjisLrai-iLs to s(.|i.ial. unless they have been'allotted a specific site. Jn support of the afmesaid submission, reliance was place on the judgment in tlie case of MCD. vs. Giurnam Kaur' reported as (1989) 1 -SCC iO'i. For tlie |:)ur|)ose of interpreting the nneaning of,the phj-ase, "structure", reference was made to judgment of .the Supreme Court in tlie case of Municipal •' Coi~poration of Grealiei'' Bombay Bl Ors. vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., reported as AIIR 1991-SC. 686. l-or tfie purpose of understandiiig tiie expression, 'status quo', reference was made to tlie judgment in tlie case of Messrs Bharat Coking Coal Limited, vs. State of Biliar'Bc Ors. reporl.ed ns ;1L9S7 (Supip) SCC 394 to submit that in ordinary legal connotation, term 'status quo' implies'the existing state of tfiings at any given i.joini; ol time. • ' • . • •

¶25As for the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, counsel for I.he respondent/NDi^lC stated tliat both, the 2004 policy and the 2000' policy, find mention in the decision of tlie Supren'ie Court in tfie case of Gqirida Pvam fsupral and it was only' aftei-tal<ing into consideration tlie said policies, did Court directed iiistitutionalization of urban sticel' vending through legislation. It was further stated that a.t the time of W.l\(CJ 4743/2011, 5254/2011 «,connecf.e(./ matters PFige. 2:l:Of 2fJ . delivering the. judgmehl: dated 8.-10.2010, the Supreme Court took notice of the NCr of: Delhi, Laws (Special Provisions) /Act, 2009, whicl'i was, valid upto

30.12.2010, • apai"t from noticing ttie Model Street Vendors ' •C'^rotection-or Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) tMII,' 20(.)y introduced by Government of India, Ministry of IHousing i't Uiban Poverty Alleviation. ,She stated that nothing new is now being suljm.itted by petitioners/vendors herein, Toi" present petitions to I'je entertained for any purpose-whatsoever and all the giievances raised by . the petitioners can easily' be • addressed before tlie Vei'idii.ig Gornmittee/appellate authority under the scheme relating to urban sLree.t vending in the IMDMC area, which fora.'contihue to ren'iain functioual, even ' after 30.6.20.;IJ.. . . • ......

¶26• Ttiis Court has heard--these' matters at length since l/.-tL^UtJ., on different dates. Various counsels for the petitiohers/vendois and tlie Standing; Counsel, for -the respondent/MDMChad addressed tlie Louit. Their respective argumerits have been taken'note of. Both'sides t.iave made strenuous efforts to explain what the status quo oidei ili.itcd,. IS.7.2011 passed by the Supreme Court in the case ol •,G:aiijdd Ra.i'.n.Cs:upi:a)implies. The leitmotif tlVe argumentsaddressed on belialf of the petitioners/vendorsis that the status quo' order read witli the ', qualifying.words, "as it.is obtainingtoday",suffixed to the order, caii only be read to imply that as on date, i.e., 15.f2011, .tliere was no scheme operationalin the NDMC areas to regulatevending activitiesand till a law W.P.(C}47-'13/2011,.525-^/2011S, cpnneclBCfrnalXers Pagt?.22 of JU , o is ultimatelyenatted by the legislature,alf the petitioners, irrespectiveof their legal status, can continue squatting/hawking at different sites that have been occupied by.them. It is also assertedthall in the teeth of the status quo orders passed by the Supreme Court, the respondent/NDMC in collusion with the pojice authorities,is threateningto illegallyremove the ; peftioners/vendorsfrom different sites,' which is detrimental, adverse, ; harassing and belligerentto-those, who have been found eligible by the ' respondent/NDMC for,being allotted specific tehbazari spaces v\/ithin the NDMC jurisdiction, but are being threatened due to lack of further action in this regard which is. pending at the end of the respondent/NDMC. The second limb of submissions made by learned counsels for petitioners/vendors was that the Special Provisions Act would additionally come to the rescue, of the petitioners/vendors, which also required maintenance of status quo as existing on 01.10.2006, till the end of December, 2011.

¶11On the other hand, the main thrust of the argufnents addressed by counsel' for the respondent/NDMC was that as the legislature has ' failed to enact an appropriate legislati®n in terms of the decision of, the Supreme Court in the case of.Gainda Ramfsupral, the subsequent order-dated

15.7.2011 directing parties to maintain the status qUo as it is obtaining dn' the said date can only imply that the state of affairs as V ' existing on date are not to be -disturbed, until the rights of the parties can be finally deitermined'through legislation. It, was submitted that while W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connected matters /M^ i passing Liie status quo. order on 15.07.2011, the Supreme Court was conscious of tlie .fact •tiia.t tlie Parliament p'lad yet to enact a . cornprel-iensive legislatidii to regulate urban street vending and in .such cfrcumstances, it goes without saying that it was ttie interU; of the Court that ttie ei.itire dispute redressal mechanism as I'ecognized iri the case of Gainda Ramfsupral would continue to remain in operation, so as .to regulate the urban street vending in.ttie NDMC area, till the legislation in, ttiat regard ' is enacted. Further, it was stressed tliat tlie Special • ~ • • -i' . ' • Provisions Act did not. pro.vide any pi'otective umbrella to ttie petitioners, whose • squatting "activities neither Pell under derinition oi' ."encroachment", nor under "unauthorized development".. It was ri.irt.her asserted ttiat •even otherwise pending-an appropriate legislation, I • • . ! .NDMC Act w.a^'availableas a fall back option and the relevant provisions in the said enactnlent.wouid continue to regulate'street.vending activity in the NDMC area and th-e. petitioners/vendors could not claim a vested i V to squat at any site-of ttieir own.

¶28From above, . it is : apparent that arguments ahd coiintei' (Tirgunnentshave been-raised by both sides on their respective versions oT nieaning and the, effect of the status quo order' dated .:t!r.7.2-(.):l.t .passed by the Suprerne"Court. It is also very apparent, that the meantng sought to be attributed by both sides as to the implication ot ttie said status .'quo, order, is dian'ietrically opposed to eacli other. N'ot only tliiS; • both sides are at a tangeiit on the tactum of ttie pendency 'or ottierwise ot - wr.P.(C) A743/2011^ S25'«.y2011 8i connected maiiters • .. ^ f'Bge. 24 of li! •• the "interim applications filed before Supreme Court'l:).y both; tlie applicants/vendors and the' respondent/NDMC, for clarifications, on wtiicli' aforesaid order came to-be passed as it is stand of tlie respondeni'/NDMC tliat .the aforesaid applications were not disposed; oC while passing the orcler dated 15.7.2011. The parties are poles a|>art oh • question of import of the status quo order, and effect of the • observations made-by':j;the Supreme Court in' ttie case of Gajiida llamXsupraJ. as regards the approval of NDMC scherrie. Tliey arc also at logger-heads on composition of the adjudicatory mechai'iism in ttie MDiyiC jurisdiction apd the manner of its functioning, as also ttie irientity • of tiie scheme which is valicfly operating in the NDMC areas for regulating • urban street vending; which had all been subject matter of .coiisideral:ion before Suprenie Court in the-a-foresaid case. The-other i.'-.sue.s agitated by the parties-, starting -from the, interpretation of tlie varioi.is observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, .tw • the formulatioiT, of the scheme as'approved by the Supreiiie Court in'the, case of Su-dhir Madan Csupra), to tlie con'iposition of tlie (lisfiutes ... redressal mechanism' and its validity as also .the mean.ing .of ttie .Ktati.m quo order, are all in' a turmoil as both the parties tiave stoutly, defeiuled ' -«• - • . . their respective stands wliich are completeily at variance witi i. eadvotl ier. The only .common ground shared by the parties .Is the factuni of pas.sliiy'. , •of recent judgment' dated

08.10.201CJ in tine case of Gaii.tcla .r<a!Ti(sugri.i) and the subsequent status quo order dated 15.7.20.1.J passed, I W.P.(€) 5254/20XX & cdnnecLed inaaers " 25 •trC 23 I. • I. by tlie Su|:)reiT)e Lo'unt:

¶29Tl'ie roLintainhead: of. the dispute in present cases thci efore remains the status quo. order dated

15.7.2.011 passed by tlie .Su|.).renu;: Court. The issue whicin is soug|-it to be agitatetl before this CoLirt is l:iial liaving. I'egard to tlie status quo order, whether a stay order ougiit to tie • I granted by this Court In favour of the petitioners/vendor.s as prayetl f'.ir by them, irrespective-of their legal status, ttius foitu'dding The ' respondent/NDMC from threatening and/or removing them from different sites occupied by them in the MpMC areas, lii otlier words, this • Court is being called upon to examine tne meaning, scope and elfect o.l •the status quo order-'dated

15.07;.2011. On the question ol how to ascertain the implication of a status .qu-. order passed by a court, in the ca.se of Messrs Bharat Coking Coal.LimitsJ Tsupral, it was observed l.)y i.lie Supren'ie Court that tjie expression, 'status quo' is LMidoubtedly a lerm of • an'ibiguity and at times,'gives rise to doiibt aird difficulty'and iri f:ase any .party has any doubt oi'i l:he' n|ieaning and the effect of the -statirs quo order, the pr'oper course, for such a partv .would be to approach tlio (.:ouii-tliat had pass'ed tlie status quo order, to seeji^xlarifications.

¶30.Tn the case at fiaind, while seekirig i.i:) ride the wave of the aforesaid status quo order, parties have chosen to overlool<, qiic imporlanl factor, which is that a •status quo order'operates on both sides. tin:.. • Sup.reme Court fias,passed orders rec|uiring both sides to maintain stal.us •W.P.fC) 4743/201X, 5254/2011 ft connecled luallers Page 20 of 2H • S ! • X. quo. Once such ap-order of l;l')e Suprenie Court is on record, IJie same not only binds all the parties to the adjudication, and all the parties, civil-or judicial who are required,, to act in accordancie vv/ith the said ordois, l.uit it equally binds the High Court from interfering witli such an orcier, as tlie said, order has been passed in litigations before-the higtiest Court/if the-land- • - ( • .

¶31Ihe orders of the-Supreme Court'are on record. Tlie stal.ns .(|U(i order is a clear signal to the High" Court as well, to .avoid granting any order, including an interim order, when the Suprerne Courl: iias direcl.ed. for status quo to be maintained: In such circumstances, if tliis Court w.as ' •' to grant a stay order in favour of the petitioners/vendors arrayed tiefoie it, it woLild be tantamount'to negating the orders of the-Supi-emc-i'(.lourt, I wl'iicl) require the parties 'to miaintain status quo pending enai.:ti)"ier)l: of appropriate legislation. If eitlner of the parties were unclear-al-)(.)ul: tlie 1^-- intgM'pretatiGnof the status quo order, it was for them to have nijplied to Jy . • . • ' ; the-Supreme Court, for clarifications thereof. Additionally, l.lie r-eliarice • I I . ' j placed by the petitioners/vendors on the Special Provisions Act seel^jng interin'i legal sanctity to placement .of goods by t|-iem on the. • pavements, by ten-iiing it as. encroactn-nent/unauthorized i.rso, a.s , i _ recognized under 'the said Act and their contention that-tl-)e Si.iriiome I • • , . ' • ; • r. I • Court had recognized the fact that tlie Special ProvisionsAct -is t.lie only ! Central law having primacy over other Statutes, ar'e also matter's i.tiat. the W.P.(C} -<S7-^3/20XX,5254'/2Vll cpnhected masters .' P^ye 27 »f 7:H •/\ petiUoners/venclorsought to have placed bePore the Supreme Coiirl'wlule seeking clariricationsoP. the. status quo order,.' It would therefore he •advisable Por the;, petitioners/vendorsas also'the respondent/l\ip|v|f:i.o approach Ihe ' Supreme Court and malce their submissions there as regards their grievances. However^ as both parties insisted tliat their' arguments be taken note of and their submissionsbe placed on'rec;ord, some pains have been taken to do the needPul.

¶32hi view oP the aPoresaidfacts and circumstances,this'courtis (,>P the opinion that it will not be appropriate Por it to grant.stay orders in Ihe face oP the status quo order dated 15.07.2011passed by the Supreme (.,:oiirt. It is reiterated that any such order shalP be an anti-thesis to the orders oP the SupremeCourt, which rnusfbe respectedboth, in letter and s|.)irit. In •such circumstances,the present petitions are disposed of by decliriiny. grant of any interim orders to the petitioners. However, libsrty is grrlnl:ed ' to botn the parties to apply to the Supreme Court for a clai%icatioiiof tl'ie status quo order,dated 15.07.2011 passed in the case of Gairida,Kaiii , raj. The parties are left to bear their own costs. nTOr^cOTYi Q I OGTOERpl1, 2011 rich W.P.(C)4.743/2011^ 525^1/2011 B,. connected ma He/;s (MilMA lie(QIIlilt,.I) JUDGI,^ 28 of 2It

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on : 21.Q9.2011 Pronounced on: 24.10.2011 + W.P.fC) 4347/2011. 4559/2011. 4593/2011. 4610/2011. 4650/2011. 4651/2011. 4827/2011. 4923/2011. 5024/2011. 5028/2011. 4775/2011. 5247/2011- 5254/2011. 5255/2011. S257/2011- 5258/2011. 5261/2011. 5262/2011. 5263/2011. 5264/2011. 5277/2011. 5292/2011- 5312/2011. 5317/2011. 5402/2011. 5403/2011. 5405/2011. 5408/2011. 5410/2011- 5411/2011- 5413/2011. 5418/2011. 5423/2011- 5444/2011- 5473/2011. 5484/2011. 5485/2011. 5497/2011- 5498/2011- 5503/2011. 5504/2011. 5505/2011. 5506/2011. 5507/2011. 5508/2011. 5595/2011. 5614/2011. 5615/2011- 5616/2011. 5618/2011, 5627/2011. 5630/2011. 5631/2011. 5643/2011. 5645/2011. 5654/2011. 5656/2011. 5711/2011. 5717/2011. 5718/2011. 5728/2011. 5729/2011. 5731/2011. 5732/2011. 5737/2011. 5738/2011. 5739/2011. 5743/2011. 5761/2011. 5784/2011. 5785/2011. 5791/2011. 5794/2011. 5797/2011. 5798/2011. 5822/2011. 5911/2011. 5918/2011. 5928/2011. 5931/2011. 5933/2011. 5934/2011. 5935/2011. 5957/2011. 5965/2011. 5966/2011. 5967/2011. 5968/2011. 5969/2011. 5970/2011. 5974/2011. 6096/2011. 6100/2011. 6101/2011. 6102/2011, 6107/2011. 6108/211. 6114/2011. 6115/2011- 6116/2011. 6117/2011. 6118/2011. 6119/2011. 6120/2011. 6121/2011. 6122/2011. 6123/2011, 6144/2011- 6250/2011. 6270/2011. 6271/2011. 6449/2011. 6527/2011- 6528/2011. 6529/2011. 6530/2011. 6531/2011. 6532/2011- 6533/2011. 6534/2011. 6538/2011. 6555/2011. 6667/2011- 6668/2011. 6669/2011. 6670/2011. 6684/2011. 6701/2011. 5173/2011. 4739/2011. 5046/2011. 5051/2011. 5157/2011. 4649/2011. 4722/2011. 2601/2011. 2602/2011. 3052/2011. 3181/2011, 3185/2011. 3189/2011. 3196/2011. 4340/2011. 4342/2011, 4343/2011. 4344/2011. 4345/2011. 4349/2011. 4350/2011, 4352/2011. 4354/2011. 4356/2011. 4358/2011. 4359/2011. 4360/2011. 4361/2011. 4362/2011. 4363/2011. 4364/2011, 4365/2011. 4366/2011. 4367/2011. 4368/2011. 4369/2011. 4370/2011. 4371/2011. 4372/2011. 4373/2011. 4374/2011, 4375/2011. 4377/2011. 4387/2011. 4388/2011. 4389/2011, 4391/2011. 4392/2011. 4393/2011. 4395/2011. 4396/2011, •2^398/2011. 4398/2011. 4399/2011. 4400/2011. 4402/2011, 4404/2011. 4405/2011. 4406/2011. 4407/2011. 4408/2011. 4409/2011. 4410/2011. 4412/2011. 4413/2011. 4414/2011, 5341/2011. 4847/2011. 4859/2011. 4887/2011. 4990/2011, W.P.(C} 4347/2011 and connected matters Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. .1 f- N. 5063/2011. 5089/2011, 5099/2011. 5114/2011. 5115/3011 5117/2011t—5129/2011. 5139/2011. 5144/2011. 6708/2011. 6799/2011, 6824/2011. 6825/2011. 6826/2011. 687_7/:?nil 6896/2011, 6901/2011. 6902/2011. 6903/2011. 6904/2011, 6905/2011, 6906/2011. 6907/2011. 6908/2011. 6909/2011. 6910/2011, 6917/2011. 6919/2011. 6920/2011. 6921/2011^ 6922/2011. 6932/2011 and 5420/2011. THE MATTERS OF MOHD. AZAD Petitionerin W.P.(C)4347/2011 IMOHD. ALAM ..... Petitionerin W.P.(C)4559/2011 KIRPALSINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C)4593/2011 SHAILENDERKUI^AR Petitionerin W.P.(C)4610/2011 SANJAY Petitionerin W.P.(e)4650/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4651/2011 AMAR NATH SINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C)4827/2011 GANESH PRASAD Petitionerin W.P.(C)4923/2011 BHUPALSINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5024/2011 SURENDERSINGH AND ORS. Petitionersin W.P.CC) 5028/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4775/2011 RAKESH KUMAR AND ORS. ..... Petitionersin W.P.(C) 5247/2011 RAM DASS Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5254/2011 VISHAMBARJHA Petitionerin W.P,(C) 5255/2011 DINESH KUMAR Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5257/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5258/2011 RAJESH CGUPTA AND ORS. Petitionersin W.P.(C) 5261/2011 lAKHPATIAND ORS. Petitionersin W.P,(C) 5262/2011 SOHAN LAL AND ORS. ..... Petitionersin W.P.(C)5263/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5264/2011 ARUN KUMAR ALIAS LUCKY Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5277/2011 MITHU LAL Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5292/2011 MOHD. ZAHID Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5312/2011 SHAKEELAHMED Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5317/2011 NAND KISHORE Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5402/2011 RINKU KUMAR GUPTA Petitionerin W.P