Pankaj Pandey v. Ndmc

judgment.

¶4To give a brief background of the dispute, learned counsel for the respondent/NDMCwalked this Court through some prominentdecisionsof the-SupremeCourt renderedfrom time to time, which relate to pavement yv.p.(c)4743/2011,6254/2011 &connectedmatters ^ squatters/hawkers,starting from the decision in tlie case of Sodmi.Smgh vs. NDMC &_Ors,, reported as (1998) 2 SCC 727, tlie interim order dated

03.03.2005 passed by the Supreme Court in W"P.(C) 1699/.iL9S7 entitled ^nHhir Madan &Ors. vs-.MCD, the final judgment in the case oF Madan Tsupra) reported as (2009) 17 SCC 597 and lastly, the judgmentdated 08.10.2010passed in the case of GarndcLRMrLl^BmL.

¶5Learned.Gouhsel for the respondent/NDMCvehementlyopposed the •prayer of the petitioners/vendorsfor grant of interim orders restraining the respondent/NDMCfrom removing them .from the sites occupied by them till the enactment,of an appropriate legislation, in terms of the directions issued by the Supreme Court, in the, case of Gan^da_.Rmii (supra). She particularly referred to the observations made by the Supreme Court in. paras 40 and 41 of the judgmentin the case of So.dan } Singh .(syp.raj., which "tlealt with the immediate eviction of unauthorized .squatters/hawkersand laid emphasison the fact that in the said case, the Supreme Court had directed removal of unauthorizedsquatters/hawkers without awaiting final allotmentof sites to be allotted to eligibleclaimants at the places recommended'by the Thareja Committee or suggested by the NDMC.

¶6Again, in the interim order,dated 03.03.2006 passed in Sudhir MadRn;s case fsuDrgl,- the following observation made by the Supreijie Court was highlighted by the counsel for the respondent/NDMC;- W.P.(C}4743/2011, 5254/2011 Si connected matters "While we undertake l:his exercise, we direct /Authorities to see to it that those persons, who aie carrying on hawking activities or who are squatting on public land without any authority, even in accordance with the present day scheme in force, are removed forthwith. This includes unauthorized hawking, squatting on public streets, footpaths and public paiks, including playground.We direcfthe Delhi Administration to take steps immediatelyin collaborationwith MCD and NDMC with necessary assistance from Delhi Police to clear the roads, streets, footpaths, parks etc. by unauthorized occupants/squatters/hawkers."

¶7As to the judgment dated 17.05.2007 rendered in the case of _S.U.dJiji:..Madan.Xsj-ii2raLmuch emphasis was laid by the counsel for the respondent/NDMC on paras 28 to .30 .and 35, which are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:- "28. The New Delhi Municipal Committee has also submitted its Scheme. We have considered the Scheme submitted before us. The area which falls under NDMC does not create problems such as those in the areas under MCD. However,'in the said Scheme reference has been made to persons who do not have periTiission under Section 225 or licence under Section 330 of the NDMIC Act, 1994 but who are unauthorisedlycontinuing to carry on business as hawkers/streetvendors. They have been described as those who are "tolerated" in the .NDMC area. We fail to understand why any person who violates the law should be tolerated. Either they should be compelled to obey the law. or the law may be suitably amended, if it is found to create undue hardship. The problems need to be addressed by the legislature or the rulemaking authority. We, therefore, observe that if it is felt that the persons who fall in this category require special protection, the Act may be suitably amended to cover their cases or else number of such illegal squatters may increase from time to time. W.P.('iZ)4743/2011, 5254/2011 &connected matters

¶29There has been no serious objection to the Scheme submitted by IMDIviC which is a comprehensive scheme. Certain directions have, however, been sought Tor Trom this Court. We, "approve the Scheme submitted by NDMC.

¶30It is submitted-,,before us that the Sciiemes which have been approved by this Court must be sulDject to any Act or rules that may be framed in consonancewith National Policy on Urban Street Vendors. It goes without saying that we have approved the Schemes as framed by MCD and NDMC. If the legislature intervenes and frames another scheme or regulations governing such Schemes, that will certainly supersede Schemes prepared by MCD and NDMC. It is well settled that any administrativeaction is always subject to law that may be framed by the competent legislature.

¶35Subject to the aforesaid modifications/changesin the Schemes submitted by MCD and NDMC, the same are approved. The said authorities shall now take appropriate,'steps to implement the Scheme forthwith. In case of any difficulty faced by them in implementing the schemes, they shall have the liberty to apply to this Court."

¶8Lastly, in the recent judgment in the case of Gcillldci RaiTL-.Csup.j_a), learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC specifically relied iipon paras 30, 32, 50 to 66 to state that the Supreme Court was conscious of the fact that a structured regulation and legislation is urgently reguired to control and regulate the fundamental right of hawking. She also pointed out that three tier disputes redressal mechanism set out in the affidavit filed by the then Chairperson of the NDMC was taken note of l"jy the Supreme Court in para 72 of the aforesaid judgment and in para 73, it was then observed as below W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connected matters "73. In paragraph 12 of the'affidavitit has been stated that there shall be an /Appellate AXuthority which shall attend to the redressal of grievances of squatteis, hawkers, traders, residents or any other person by hearing appeals against the decision of the Vending Committee(Main). Paragraph 12 of that affidavitis set out below;- There shall be an Appellate A\uthority. On tiie forwarding of petitions received by Chairperson, this Authority shall attend to redressal of grievances of squatters, hawkeis, traders, residents or any other person. Ihe Authority'shall also hear appeals against the decision of Vending Committee (Main). Decisions of this Authorityunless challengedbefore a Highei Forum or in any Competent Court, shall be final. This Authority shall be initially headed by a person appointed by the .Chairperson having at least 10 years'legalor judicial background. There can be more than one member in this Authority."

¶9After making the aforesaid observations,in paras 74 to 76 of the judgment,the SupremeCourt went on to observeas below "74 In the said affidavit, which was affirmed before. this Court on 24^'^ August, 2010 it has been stated that NDMC shall comply with the orders which would be passed by the adjudicatorymechanism contemplatedin the scheme and which has been approved by this Court for the NDMC area, unless such orders are made subject matter of.challenge before a higher forum or in any other competent Court.

¶75In view of such schemes, the hawkers, squatters and vendors must abide by the Dispute Rediessal scheme mentioned above. There should not be any direct approach to this Court by way of fresh petition oi" I/-\s, bypassing the Dispute Redressal Mechanism provided in the scheme. . • . . M/.P.CC)4743/2011, 5254/2011 Ik connectedmatters

¶76However,' before 30^'^ June, 2011, the appropriate Government is to enact a law on the basis oT the Bill mentioned above or on the basis of any amendment thereof so that the hawkers may precisely know the contours of their rights."

¶10It was thus sought to be contended on behalf of respondent/NDMCthat there can be no vacuum as far as regulation of trade of street hawkers/vendorsin the NDMC jurisdictionis concernedand the failure on the part of the legislatureto abide by the timeline set out by the Supreme Court in the case of Galnda Ram pi-itting in place a statute on or before 30.06.2011,cannot be interpreted by the petitioners/vendors to mean that they can continue their trade unhindered at any place of their choice in the NDMC jurisdiction, m an unregulated manner and without any obstruction or objection from the NDMC.

¶11Learned counsel for the respondent/NDMCparticularlyreferred to paras 74 and 75 of the aforesaid judgment to state that the dispute redressal scheme, noticed by the Supreme Court in para 75 was the one that was legally functioning in NDMC jurisdiction and which was taken note of by the Court in the precedingpara 74. In other words, she stated that the scheme as set out in the affidavit dated 24.08.2010, filed by tfie then Chairperson of NDMC before the Supreme Court in Gciiiidci !lam.'s case (supra), was the one which was finally approved by tfie Supreme Court. She further subinitted that assuming, without admitting, that the m.P.{C) 4743/'2011, S2S4/2011 & connected matters ' dispute redressalscliemeset out by tlie NDl^^C had lapsed on 30.6.2011, as claimed by the petitioners,then the NDMC Act provides an adequate fallback to ensure orderly managementof vendors in the area. Specific referencewas made in this regard to the provisionscontained in Sections 221, 224, 225 and 226 of the said Act.

¶12It was further argued by the counsel for the respondent/NDMCthat the applicationfiled by the NDMC before the Supreme Court in .July 2011 praying inter alia for extension of time to regulate hawkers/squattersin the NDMC area, as per the scheme mentionedin the judgmentin Gmnda. rase fsupra), till the enactmentof a law by the legislaturein that regard, had not yet been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court at the time of passing of [.he status quo order dated 15.07.2011 and similarly, the other application filed by one of the hawkers/vendorspraying inter alia for restrainingthe respondent/NDMCfrom granting lehbazan lights to the winners of the lucky draw of lots for allotment, which was to be held on

12.05.201,1 or any date thereafter, was 3\sp . pending consideration before the Supreme Court. Hence, no finality could be attached to the order dated 15.7.2011 which can only be considered an interim measure'till the final disposal of the aforesaid applications or the enactment of a legislation.

¶13On merits, learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC referred to the affidavit dated

01.08.2011 filed by the Director (Enforcement), NDMC, W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 ffi connected malters J I-\ ' wherein it was stated that pursuant to the public notice issued iDy the NDMC inviting applications under the NDMC Urban Street Vending Scheme in the year 2007, the respondent/I^DMC had received 4357 pplications.The documents required by the applicants for registration nder the Scheme included a proof of age, documentary proof/affidavit or the purpose of annual income, proof of residence,'proof in suppoit of pedal categorieslike handicapped,Kashmiri migrants etc. and proof of squatting in the NDMC area, if any. In para 4 of the aforesaid affidavit, the following criteria approved/adoptedby the Vending Committee to shortlist the eligible applicant? is set out;-"4. That the criteria approved/adopted by the Vending Committee to shortlist the eligible applicants is as under;-

(i) The applicants should be resident of Delhi with his name registered in electoral rolls as per abstract of photo E-Roll or ERO certificate.

(ii) The applicantshould be a major, viz. with over J.8 years of age as .per valid birth certificate or age certificate or school 'certificate etc.

(iii) The applicant should be a needy as per income records of DC (Revenue) or as vulnerability records of Government of NCT of Delhi (Samajik Suvidha SangaiTi: •vulnerable and most vulnerable category).

(iv) The applicant should be registered as per NDMC Street Vendors Scheme. The policy verification of the applicant should be available.

(v) The applicant or his dependent family rnembei should not be employed or should not have any otlie tehbazari/vending or any other business premises ' Delhi as per record verification of NDMC/MCD. r in.- W.P.fCJ 4743/2011, 5254/2011 a connected matters (\/i) Preference will be given to applicants who are physically handicapped or widows or senior citizens above 60 ' years or Kashmiri migrants or SC/Sl (necessary certificate to be submitted and relaxation may be given in the above criteria)."

¶14As per the respondent/NDMC, the category-wise list of eligible shortlisted applicants in terms of the aforesaid criteria totalled to 3878 applicants. The affidavit dated

01.08.2011 states that respondent/NDMChas identified 183. new spaces, in addition to the 203 remainingspaces identifiedby the Thareja Committeein the NDMC area, which were available for allotment, thus taking the total number of availablespaces to 386. It was furtherstated that due to factors like de-listing of the Parliament Street on security grounds, construction of flyovers and Metro Stationsat various locationsin the NDMC jurisdiction, the number of authorized tehbazari squatters has changed from 3^18 to 404 in number. The number of applicants, who the respondent/NDMC claims, are vending unauthorisedly at Connaught Place, Sarojini Nagar, Parliament Street and Janpath areas and in whose favour, status quo orders are operating, is stated to be 323-in number. The affidavit asserts that simply because the names of the petitioners, who are registered with the NDMC, figure in the eligibility list drawn by the respondent/NDMC, cannot be treated as proof of their regularly vending in the N13MC area and nor does it confer on them ajiy enforceable vested right to ensure a vending space for them in the NDMC area, which is directly dependent on W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 St connect:ed matters the number oP spaces available. Thus, it was contended that neither the possessionof any number of challans, nor the absence thereofcan make a difference, for the reason that challans cannot form the basis for the petitionersto claim any vested legal right to squat at a given space.

¶15Counsel for the respondent/NDMC asserted that the piesent petitions are not maintainable inasmuch as the petitioners have an equally efficacious alternate remedy of approaching the appellate authority constituted by the Chairperson, NDMC, for redressal of then-grievances and failure on their part to have approached the Vending Committeeis not on accountof the fact that the said Committeeincluding the appellateauthorityis not functioning,but because they have found it more convenientto bypass the aforesaid forum and approach this Court directly, which is not permissible.She stated that extensive measures have been taken by the respondent/NDlviCto constitute the adjudicatory mechanism by way of a three tier system in the following manner:-

¶1Vending Sub-Committee (Site of Spaces),

¶2Vending Sub-Committee CHeath and Hygiene) and • 3. Vending Sub-Committee (Enforcement).

¶16She stated that the creation, of the aforesaid three Vending Sub-Committees, Vending Committee

(Main), as also of the appellate autliority which was constituted to redress grievances of squatLers, hawkers, traders, residents or any other person against the decision of W.P.(C) 4743/2011^ 5254/2011 K connected matters Pnge 13 of 28 the Vending Committee(l^ain), was placed before the Supreme Court for consideration'andthe said three tier adjudicatory mechanism was duly approvedin the judgment of Gainda Ram fsupraV

¶17Per contra, learned counsels for the petitioners/vend.ors,who appeared on different dates, vehemently opposed the aforesaid stand taken by the respondent/.NDMCand'assertedthat the scheme floated by the respondent/NDMCfor regulating vending activities in its jurisdiction had lapsed on 30.06.2011in the absenceof the enactmentof a legislation as per directionsof the SupremeCourt in the case of Gmnl^JiaOl.tsuiDra). and as on date, there is no scheme in existence. It was canvassed,that the implication of the aforesaid order of status, quo passed by the SupremeCourt on 15.07.2011can only mean that irrespectiveof the fact, whether the 'squatting is legal or illegal, the sairie be permitted to continue on an ^as is where is' basis, and such status quo is to be maintainedby all the partiestill a law is, framed by. the legislature. .

¶18Mr. B.B. Sawhney, Sr. Advocate appearing for petitioners/vendorsubmittedthat in the case of Gainda Rain (5U|Jj_a)_,.the Supreme Court had directedthat the appropriategovernment must enact a law on or before 30.06.2011 so that the hawkers may precisely know contours of their rights, 'hence .the dispute redressal iriechanism provided for in the ischeme mentioned in the aforesaid judgment could operate only upto 30.0®.2011 and thereafter, the said scheme would VJ.P.(C) 4743/2011, 52S4/2011 & connected matters automaticallystand lapsed. He stated that no other interpretationcan be given to the order dated 15.07.2011,,directingmaintenanceof staixisquo, in view of the qualifyingwords, "as it is obtainingtoday". He argued that if the scheme was-continuing to operate, as claimed by the learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC,then there was no good reason for the respondent/NDMCto have refrained'from holding a draw of lots, which was slated for the same day, i.e., 15.07.2011,and that fact of the matter is that even the respondent/NDMChad understood the status quo order to mean that'thereis no scheme in place after 30.6.2011,for the reason that in para 68 of the aforesaid judgment,in the case of Gamd^IlmH all the writ petitionsand the interim applicationsfiled before the SupremeCourt were disposedof with clear and specificdirectionsthat the problem of hawking and street vending could be regulated by the schemes framed .by the NDMC and MCD only upto 30.06.2011and not thereafter. It was asserted on behalf of the petitioners/vendorsthat as on date, the directions of the Supreme Court that status quo is to be maintained by the parties can only be given one interpretai:ion,which is that till.a law is ultimatelyenacted by the Parliament,irrespectiveof then legal status, all the petitioners/vendorswould be permitted to continue squatting/hawkingat the sites that have been occupied by them.

¶19Insofar as the composition of the dispute redressal mechanism is concerned, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners submitted thai contrary to the understanding of the respondent/IMDMC, the scheme W.P.(C)4743/2011r 5254/2011 &connected matters reproducedat paras 72 and 73 in the judgmentin the case oP Gamd^i^-^ (supra), was not the one which was actually recognized by the Supreme Court, and rather it is the dispute redressalscheme mentioned in para lb or the aforesaid judgment i.e., a scheme Tor urban street vendors for NDMC area as formulated in the year 2006, which was ultimately approved by the Supreme Court on 17.05.2007, in the case of SLitH-iil' Madap (suRra)., which is; the scheme which finds mention specifically in the following para 74 and, is the one approved by the Supreme Court.. ,lt was contendedthat even otherwise,the National Capital Territoryof Delhi Laws (Special Provisionj^')Act, 201-1 (hereinafterreferred to as ^SpecSaiB ProvBsionsAct') comes to the rescue of the petitioners for the reason that sub-clause (2) of Section 3 of.the Special Provisions Act mandates maintenance of status quo as on 01.01.2006, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, in respect of encroachmentor unauthorized development. Thus, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners/vendorsthat they were entitled to grant of interim protection till the enactment of a legislation to regulate hawking/vending activities in urban streets in Delhi on the basis of the National Policy on Uibaii StieeL Vendors, 2009 framed on 17.06.2009 and the Special Provisions Act.

¶20With reference to' Special Provisions Act, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners stated that phrase, "unauthorized development" used in the definition clause has to be seen in the same context as the one in which the phrase "encroachment" has been defined, W/.P,(C) 474.3/2011, 5254/2011 & connected matters wherein it is mentioned that putting up of temporary, semi-temporary or permanentstructure for residential use or commercial.use or any other use, and the placementof goods on the pavements by the petitionersis liable to be termed as .unauthorizeduse for maintainingstatus quo under the Special ProvisionsAct. Much emphasis was laid on the averments made by the respondent/NDMCin its interim applicationfiled before the SupremeCourt in Gainda RanVs case (sui^l in July 2011, to submit tliat the respondent/IMDMCitself had stated in the said application fhal; Lhe scheme had lapsed and therefore, the only interpretationthat can be given to the status quo order passed by the Supreme Court on

15.07'.201J. can be that no scheme would exist after 30.06.ZOJ.I and thus, the benefitof the Special ProvisionsAct ought to be extended Lo the pefitioners. .He submitted that the phrase 'street vendors' has been •clearly defined under the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, 2009. Reliance was placed in the .case of Patri Vvapar MancjaJJ2elJiL.(llg-qd MCD Town Hall &. Ors. reported as (2009) 12 SCC 475 and Lhe provisionsof the Special ProvisionsAct to submit that even Lhe Supreme Court had recognized the fact that the Special ProvisionsAct is Lhe only Central law governing the field and it would have primacy ovei othei Statutes and administrative orclers. It is thus stated that the provisions of the NDMC /Act cannot be invoked by the respondent/NDMC as the said Act is not in consonance with Article 96 of the Constitution of India and furthermore, Special Provisions /Act being valid till Lhe end of W.P'.(CJ^.'743/2011, S254/2011 8, connected matters December2011, no orders in derogaliionof the provisionsof the said Act can be passed.

¶21Mr. S.K. Tripathi, Advocate appearing for some of jthe petitioners/vendorssought to embellish the submissionsof Mr.Sawhney, Sr./-\dvocate and relied on the orders passed in W,P.(C) 1449/21I1JL entitled Mnhd. Ismail vs. NDMC 8c Ors. to urge that the "Appellate Authority" constituted under the dispute redressal mechanism for the NDMC area, has not been functioning,which fact he stated is boine out from a perusal of the order dated 08.03.2011 passed in the aforesaid-case, wherein the Court took notice of the claim of the petitioner/vendor therein to the effect that inspite of orders passed by the Appellate Authority allowing squatting at a particularsite, till a final determination by the Vending Committeeas to his eligibility,the respondent/NDMCand the police were disturbing his activities. In the aforesaid order, the statement of the counsel for the respondent/NDMC was recorded to the effect that the appellate authority, whose order was being relied upon by the petitioner therein, was constituted initially for the MCD areas and later started functioning for the NDMC areas as well for the reason that at that time, there was no separate appellate authority for the NDMIC areas, but subsequently, in accordance with the scheme approved by the Supreme Court, Chairperson, NDMC had constituted a separate appellate authority for • the NDMC areas." Therefore, appellate authority appointed earlier had ceased to have jurisdiction qua the NDMC areas. It W.P.(CJ 4743/2011^ 5254/2011 & connected matters ' was thus contended on behalf of the petitioners/vendors that aforesaid order clearly indicates that the appellate authority in, the MDMC areas is not Functioning.

¶22Reliance was also placed on the minutes of the meeting of the Vending Committeedated 11.03.2010,to claim that if the fact of whether there was actual squatting/vendjng was verified by the Committee and if the names of the petitioners/vendorsfigured in the eligibilitylist prepared by the respondent/NDMCfor holding the draw of lots, then it did not lie in the mouth of the respondent/NDiv|Cto claim that the petitioners, who had been verified and found to.. be eligible, were not entitled to squat at various sites in the NDMC area after 30.06.2011.

¶23In rebuttal, counsel for the respondent/NDI^IC disputed contentions of the. petitioners/vendors and while reiterating her earlier submissions, asserted that the petitioners did not have any legally enforceable right, created on the basis of the eligibility list drawn by NDI^IC, for claiming, grant of interim orders in their favour. Sfte again referred to paras 68, 69, 75, 76 and. 78 of the judgment in the case of Gainda Ram fsupral, to emphasize that when aforesaid paras are read collectively, it is clear that petitioners cannot claim an entitlement to any interim orders as sought by them in the present proceedings. She further stated that even otherwise, Special Provisions Act relied upon by petitioners has duly recognized W.p.(C) 4743/2011^ 5254/2011 Sn connected matters Page l9of28 schemes prepared by the local authoritiesin the National Capita! rerritory oF Delhi for regulation of urban street vendors. To substantiate the said submission,she drew the attention of this Court to the preamble of the aforesaid /Act, which mentions the fact that all the schemes prepared by the local authorities in •the National Capital Territory of Deliii, for regulationof urban street vendors in accordancewith the National l-'olicy on Urban Street-Vendors,2009 and the Master Plan for Delhi 202.1, have been implemented'and further that more time is required for proper implementation of the schemes regarding hawkers and urban street vendors. '

¶24/-\ specific-referencewas made by the learned counsel for the respondent/NDMCto Section 2(l)(c) of the Special ProvisionsAct, which defines the phrase "encroachment"to claim that it does not cover the petitionersherein, who are squatters. Furtherreferencewas made to the provision of Section 3 of the Special ProvisionsAct, which contains a non obstante clause, to state that stai-usquo with regard to the encroachment or unauthorized development as on 01.01.2006, mentioned in the said provision, was in context of definition of phrases •"encroachment" and "unauthorized development" set out in the definition clause at Sections 2(l)(c) and 2(l)(i) respectively of Special Provisions Act and thus,, the petitioners/vendors did not qualify under the aforesaid enactment for claiming, protection as none of the ingredients set out in the provisions of the aforesaid enactment are found to exist in tlieir IV.P.CC) 474-3/2011, 5254/2011 Si connected matters U['^ case It was submitted that the Special ProvisionsAct, which came into effect in the year 2007 and has. been extended fron'i time to time and lastly, till December2011, does not give permissionto persons to re-start, any activity once they have been removed by the civic authority and similarly,, the Scheme^of 2009 does not entitle the registrants Lo squat unless they have been allotted a specificsite. In supportof the aforesaid submission, reliance was place .on the judgmentin the case of Gui:iiani..J<au!:reported as (19H9) 1 SCC 101. For the purpose of interpretingthe meaning of the phrase, "structure",referencewas made to the judgment of/the Supremfe' Court in the case of •MuniciB^ rnrpm-ntinn of Greater Bombay &Ors. vs. Indjaji^^LCgrBorajmi-LtcL reported as AIR 1991 SC 686. For the purpose of understandingthe expression,^status quo', referencewas made to the ju.dgmentin the case nP Rharat Coking Toal Iimited vs. State of Bihar_8LOl5.reportedas 1S)S7 (Supp) SCC 394 to submitthat in ordinary legal connotation,the term 'statusquo'impliesthe existingstate of things at any given point of time.

¶25As for the National Policy on .Urban Street Vendors, counsel for the respondent/NDMCstated that both, the 2004 policy and the 2009 policy, find mention in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gairida Ram Csupral and it was only after taking into consideration the said policies, did the Court directed the institutionalization of urban -street' vending through legislation. It was further stated that at the time of W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 St connected matters ^6 deliveringthe judgmentdated 8.10.2010,the Supreme Court took notice ' of the IMCT of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions)Act, 2009, which was valid upto 30.12.2010, apart from noticing the l^lodel Street Vendors ^ (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Bill, 2009 introduced by the GovernmenL of India, Ministry of Housing 8(, Uiban Poverty Alleviation.She stated that nothing new is now being subniitted by the petitioners/vendorsherein, for the present petitions to be entertainedfor any purpose whatsoeverand all the grievancesraised by petitioners can easily be addressed before Vending Committee/appellateauthority under the scheme relating to urban street vending in the NDMC area,,which fora continueto remain functional,even after 30.6.2011.

¶26This Court has heard these matters at length since 17.8.2011, on different dates. Various counsels for the petitioners/vendorsand the Standing Counsel for the respondent/NDMChad addressed the Court. Their respective arguments have been taken note of. Both sides have made strenuous' efforts to explain what the status quo order dated

15.7.2011 passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Gmil^ RamCsupra) implies. The leitmotif of the arguments addressed on behalf of the petitioners/vendors is that the status quo order read with the qualifying.words, "as it is obtaining today", suffixed to the order, can only be read to imply that as on date, i.e., 15.7.2011, there was no scheme operational in the NDMC areas to regulate vending activities and till a law m.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connected nyatters is Lillimateiyenacted by tlie legislature,all the petitioners,irrespectiveof their legal status, can contin-ue squatting/hawkingat diPferent sites that have been occupied by-them. It is also assertedthat in the teeth of the status quo orders passed by the SupremeCourt, the respondent/NUMCin collusion with the police authorities,is threateningto illegally remove the petitioners/vendorsfrom different sites,-which is detrimental, adverse, harassing and belligerentto those, who have been found eligible by the respondent/NDMCfor being allotted specific tehbazarispaces within the NDMC jurisdiction,but are being threateneddue to lack of further action in this regard which is pending at the end of the respondent/NDMC. The second limb of submissions made by the learned counsels foi petitioners/vendorswas that the Special ProvisionsAct would additionally come to the rescue of the petitioners/vendors, which also requires maintenance of status quo as existing on 01.10.2006, till the end of December, 2011'.

¶27On the other hand, the main thrust of the arguments addressed by the counsel for" the respondent/NDMC was that as the legislature fias failed to enact an appropriate legislation in terms of the decision of tlie Supreme Court in the case of Gainda Ramfsupral, the subsequent order dated

15.7.2011 directing parties to maintain the status quo as it is obtaining on the said date can only imply that the state of affairs as existing on date are not to be disturbed, until the rights of the parties can be finally determined through legislation. It was submitted that while W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connected matters Page 23 or 28 y passing the status quo order on 15.07.2011, the Supreme Court was conscious of fact that the , Parliament had yet to enact a comprehensivelegislation to regulate urban street vending and in such circumstances, it goes without saying that it was the intent of the Court that the entire dispute redressal mechanism as recognized in the-case of Gainda_R^CsLLI2ralwould contihye to remain in operation, so as to regulate the urban street vending in the NDMC area, till the legislationin that regard is enacted. Further, it was stressed that the Special Provisions Act did not provide any protective umbrella to the petitioners, whose squatting activities •neither fell under ' the definition of "encroachment",nor under "unauthorizeddevelopment". It was further asserted that •even otherwise pending an appropriate legislation, the NDMC Act was available as a fall back-option and the relevant provisions in the said enactment would continueto regulatestreet vending activityin the NDMC area and the petitioners/vendors could not claim a vested light to squat at any site of their own.

¶28From the above, it is apparent that arguments and counter argumentshave beenj-aisedby both sides on their respectiveversions of the iTieaning and the effect of the status quo order dated 15.7.2011 passed by the Supreme Court. It is also very apparent, that the nieaning sought to be attributed by both sides as to the implication of the said status quo order, is diametrically opposed to each other. Not only this, both sides are-at a tangent on the factum of the pendency or otherwise of W.P.(C) A743/2011, 5254/2011 Si connected matters ^ the interim applications filed before the Supreme Court by both, the applicants/vendorsand the.respondent/NDI^C,for clarifications,on which aforesaid order came to be passed as it is the stand of the respondent/NDMCthat the aforesaid applications were not disposed of while passing the order dated 15.7.2011. The parties are poles apart on the question of import of the status quo order, and the effect of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of G_aiiida Ramfsupra) as regards the approval of NDMC scheme. They are'also at loggerheads on the composition of the adjudicatory mechanism in Lhe NDIvjC jurisdictionand the manner of its functioning,as also the identity of the scheme which is validly operating in the NDMC areas for regulating urban street vending, which had all been subject matter of consideration before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case,. The other issues agitated by the parties, starting from the interpretation of the various observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, ..Cfer the formulation of the scheme as approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Sudhir Madan fsupra), to composition of disputes redressal mechanism and its validity as also the meaning of tfie status quo order, are all in a turmoil as both the parties have stoutly defended their respective stands which are completely at variance with each otlier. The only common ground shared by the parties is the facturn of passing of recent judgment dated

08.10.2010 in case of Gainda RamCsyi^ra) snd the subsequent status,quo order dated 15.7.20:1.1 passed V]r.P.(C) 4^743/20X1, 5254/2011 ffi connected matters by the Supreme Court.

¶29The fountainhead of the dispute in the present cases therefore remains the status quo order dated

15.7.2011 passed by the Supreme Court. The issue which is sought to be agitated before this Court is that having regard to the status quo order, whether a stay order ought to be granted by this Court in favour of the petitioners/vendorsas prayed for by them, irrespective of their legal status, thus foi bidding respondent/NDMC from threatening and/or removing them froni the different sites occupied by them in the NDIMC areas. In other words, this Court is being called upon to examine the meaning, scope and effect of the status quo' order dated 15.07.2011. On the question of how to ascertain the implicationof a status quo order passed by a court, in the case of Messrs Bharat Coking Coal LimitedTsupra), it was observed by the Supreme Court that the expression, 'status quo' is. undoubtedly a term of ambiguity and at times, gives rise to doubt and difficulty and in case any party has any doubt on the meaning and the effect of the status quo order, the proper course for such a. party would be to approach the Court that had passed the status-quo order, to seeJiC...clarifications.

¶30In the case at hand, while seeking to ride the wave of the aforesaid status quo order, parties have chosen to overlook one in'iportant . I factor, which is that a-status quo order operates on both-sides. The Supreme Court has passed orders requiring both sides to maintain status •W.P.(C) 4743/2011^ 5254/2011 & connected matters quo. Once such an. order of the Supreme Court is on record, the same not only binds all the parties to the adjudication,and all the parties, civil or judicial who are requiredto act in accordancewith the said orders, but it equally binds the High Court from interferingwith such an order, as the id order has been passed in litigationsbefore the highest Court of the sa land.

¶31The orders of the Supreme Court are on record. The status quo order is a clear signal to the High Court as well, to avoid granting any order, including an interim order, when the Supreme Court has directed for status quo to be maintained. In such circumstances,if this Court was to grant a stay order in favour of the petitioners/vendorsarrayed before it, it would be tantamountto negating the orders of the Supreme Couit, which require the parties to maintain status quo pending enactment of appropriatelegislation. If either of the parties were unclear about the interpretationof the status quo order, it was for them to have applied to the SupreiTie Court for clarificationsthereof. Additionally, tfie reliance placed by the petitioners/vendorson the Special ProvisionsAct seeking interim legal sanctity to the placement of goods by them on the pavements, by terming it as encroachment/unauthorized use, as recognized under the said Act and their contention that the Supreme Court had recognized the fact that the Special Provisions Act is the only Central law having primacy over other Statutes, ai'e also matters tfiat the W.P.(C) 4743/2011, S254-/2011 & connected matters Pfge 27 of 28 petitioners/vendorsought to have placed before the Supreme Court while seeking clarificationsof the status quo order. It would therefore be advisable for the petitioi1ers/vendo.rsas also the respondent/l\ID|v|Cl:o approach the Supreme Court and mal<e their submissions there as regards their grievances. However, as both parties insisted that then-arguments be taken note of and their submissionsbe placed on record, some pains have been taken to do the needful.

¶32In view of the aforesaidfacts and circumstances,this Court is of the opinion that it will not be appropriatefor it to grant stay orders in the face of the status quo order dated 15.07.2011passed'bythe Supreme Court.. It is reiteratedthat any such order shall be an anti-thesisto the ordeis of the SupremeCourt, which must be respectedboth, in letterand spirit. In such circumstances,the present petitions are disposed of by declining grant of any interim orders to the petitioners. However, liberty is granted to both the parties to apply to the SupremeCourt for a clarificationof the status quo order dated 15.07.2011 passed in the case of Gainda._Em (sujDr^. The parties are left to bear their own costs. (HIMA KOHLI) OCTOER^^H'.2011 JUDGI'f rkb VV.P.(C')47^3/2011^ 5254/2011 St. connected mailers Page 28 or 28

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on : 21.09.2011 Pronounced on: 24.10.2011 + w.p.rc^ 4347/2011, 4559/2011. 4593/2011. 4610/2011 4650/2011. 4651/2011, 4827/2011. 4923/2011. 5024/2011 5028/2011. 4775/2011. 5247/2011. 5254/2011. 5255/2011. 5257/2011. 5258/2011. 5261/2011. 5-262/2011. 5263/2011. 5264/2011. 5277/2011- 5292/2011. 5312/2011. 5317/2011, 5402/2011. 5403/2011. 5405/2011. 5408/2011. 5410/2011. 5411/2011. 5413/2011. 5418/2011. 5423/2011. 5444/2011. 5473/2011. 5484/2011. 5485/2011. 5497/2011. 5498/2011, 5503/2011. 5504/2011. 5505/2011. 5506/2011. 5507/2011. 5508/2011. 5595/2011. 5614/2011. 5615/2011. 5616/2011, 5618/2011. 5627/2011. 5630/2011. 5631/2011. 5643/2011, 5645/2011. 5654/2011. 5656/2011. 5711/2011. 5717/2011. 5718/2011. 5728/2011. 5729/2011. 5731/2011. 5732/2011. 5737/2011. 5738/2011. 5739/2011. 5743/2011. 5761/2011. 57S4/2011. 5785/2011. 5791/2011. 5794/2011. 5797/2011. 5798/2011. 5822/2011. 5911/2011. 5918/2011. 5928/2011. 5931/2011. 5933/2011. 5934/2011. 5935/2011. 5957/2011. 5965/2011. 5966/2011. 5967/2011. 5968/2011. 5969/2011- 5970/2011. 5974/2011. 6096/2011. 6100/2011. 6101/2011. SiCI2/2011.- S107/201J. 6108/211. 6114/2011- 6115/2011. 6116/2011. 6117/2011. 6118/2011. 6119/2011. 6120/2011. 6121/2011. 6122/2011. 6123/2011. 6144/2011. 6250/2011. 6270/2011. 6271/2011. 6449/2011. 6527/2011. 6528/2011. 6529/2011. 6530/2011. 6531/2011. 6532/2011. 6533/2011. 6534/2011. 6538/2011. 6555/2011. 6667/2011. 6668/2011. 6669/2011. 6670/2011. 6684/2011. 6701/2011. 5173/2011. 4739/2011. 5046/2011. 5051/2011. 5157/2011. 4649/2011- 4722/2011. 2601/2011. 2S02/2011. 3052/2011. 3181/2011. 3185/2011. 3189/2011, 3196/2011. 4340/2011. 4342/2011. 4343/2011. 4344/2011. 4345/2011. 4349/2011. 4350/2011- 4352/2011. 4354/2011. 4356/2011. 4358/2011. 4359/2011. 4360/2011. 4361/2011. 4362/2011. 4363/2011. 4364/2011. 4365/2'Oil. 4366/2011. 4367/2011, 4368/2011. 4369/2011. 4370/2011. 4371/2011. 4372/2011. 4373/2011. 4374/2011- 4375/2011. 4377/2011" 4387/2011. 4388/2011. 4389/2011. 4391/2011. 4392/2011. 4393/2011. 4395/2011. 4396/2011. •4398/2011. 4398/2011. 4399/2011. 4400/2011. 4402/2011. 4404/2011. 4405/2011. 4406/2011. 4407/2011. 4408/2011- 4409/2011. 4410/2011. 4412/2011. 4413/2011. 4414/2011. 5341/2011. 4847/2011. 4859/2011, 4887/2011. 4990/2011. W.P.(C)4347/2011 and cannectedmstters Page1 of8 Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. ^ ^ 5117/2011. 5129/2011. 5139/2011. ** * * 5144/2011, JL, 6708/2011. 6799/2011. 6824/2011, 6825/2011, 6826/2011. 6827/2011. 6896/2011. 6901/2011. 6902/2011, 6903/2011, 6904/2011. 6905/2011. 6906/2011. 6907/2011. 6908/2011. 6909/2011. 6910/2011. 6917/2011. 6919/2011, 6920/2011. 6921/2011. 6922/2011. 6932/2011 and 5420/2011. IM THE MATTERS OF MOHD. AZAD Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4347/2011 MOHD. ALAM .'.... Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4559/2011 KIRPAL SINGH Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4593/2011 SHAILENDER KUMAR Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4510/2011 SANJAY Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4650/2011 BABLU Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4651/2011 AjviAR NATH SINGH Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4827/2011 GANESH PRASAD Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4923/2011 BHUPAL SINGH Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5024/2011 SURENDER SINGH AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5028/2011 USHA Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4775/2011 RAKESH KUjVIAR AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5247/2011 RAM DASS Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5254/2011 VISHAMBAR JHA Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5255/2011 DINESH KUMAR Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5257/2011 ANJU Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5258/2011 RAJESH C GUPTA AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5261/2011 LAKHPATI AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5262/2011 SOHAN LAL AND ORS. ..... Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5263/2011 KEDARI Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5264/2011 ARUN KUMAR ALIAS LUCKY Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5277/2011 MITHU LAL Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5292/2011 MOHD. ZAHID Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5312/2011 SHAKEEL AHMED Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5317/2011 NAND KISHORE Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5402/2011 RINKU KUMAR GU