Anil Kumar v. Ndmc & Ors

judgment.

¶4. To give a brief background of the dispute, learned counsel for the respondent/NDMCwalked'this Court through some prominent decisions of the Supreme Court rendered fronn time to time, whicti relate to pavernenl: W.P,(C) •4743/20J.J., S254/2011'Si connected nialXers Page 4-of 2.S #) squatliers/hawkers,starting from the decision in the case of SodMlAinyl) YS.±\IDNC.,&Ors. reportedas (1998) 2SCC 727, the interimorderdated

03.03.2005 passed by the' Supreme Court in ¥W..iPJ entitled Sndhir Madan (k Qr^.l5._!TO,the final judgment in the case of qiirlhir Madan fsupral reported as (2009) 17 SCC 597 and lastly, •judgment dated 08.10.2?010passed in the case of b. Learned counsel for the respondent/NDMCvehementlyopfiosed the prayer of the petitioners/ven'dorsfor grant of interim orders resl:innning the respondent/NDMCfrom removing them from the sites occurned L)y them till the enactment of an appropriate legislation, in terms ol the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the. case of Ganida lAan.1 .C^PJial-She particularly-referred to the observations made by the Supreme Court in paras 40 and 41 of the judgmentin the case of bodan Singh .(supra), which dealt with the imimediate eviction of unauthorized squatters/hawkersand laid emphasison the fact that in the said l,.isc, the Supreme Court had directed removal of unauthorizedsquatters/hawkers without awaiting final allotmentof sites to be allotted to eligibleclaimant.', at the places recommended by the Thareja Committee or suggested by NIDMC.

¶6Again, in the interim order dated 03.03.2006 passed in Sudliir Madan's case fsupra), the following observation made by the Su|)re Court was highlighted by the counsel for the respondent/NDMC;- W-P.(C) 4743/2011, connected malXers Ffige 5

7.U "While' we undertake this exfercise, we •direct the; Authorities to see to it that those persons, who are-carrying on hawking activities or who are squatting on public land without any authority, even in accordance with the present day scheme in force, are rernovec forthwith. This includes unauthorized hawking, squatting on public streets, footpaths and public parks, including playground. We direct the Delhi to take steps immediatelyin collaborationwith MLD aiu. NDMC with necessary assistance from Delhi Police lo clear the roads, streets, -footpaths, parks etc. by unauthorized occupants/squatters/hawkers." H 7: / As to the judgment dated 17.05:2007 rendered in the case of Sudhlr.Maclan.l5jilir^ ':nuch emphasis was laid by the counsel foi the •resppndent/NDMC on paras-lS-to 30 and 35, which,are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: - • "28. The Mew Delhi Municipal Committee has also , - submitted its Scheme. We have considered,the Scheme submitted before us. The area which falls undei MDMC : does not create problems such as those in the areas i " under MCD: However, in the said Scheme reference has been made to persons who do not have permission ' under Section 225 or licence under Section 330 of tfie • • NDMC Act-, 1994 but who are unauthorisedly continuing to carry on business as hawkers/streetvendors: They have been described as those who are "tolerated" in tlie •NDMic area. We falf to understand why any person wfio violates the law should be tolerated; Either they should ' • • . ' be compelledto obey the law or the law may be suitably • annended, if it Is found to create undue hardsfiip. Ihe problems need to be addressed by the legislature or tfie rulemaking authority. We, therefore,- observe tfiat if it is felt that the persons who fall in this category require special protection, the Act may be suitably amended to cover their cases or else number of such illegal squatters may increase from time to time. W.P.(C) 4743/2011, fk connected matters 29: There has been no serious objection to ..the Scheirie • sLibmittec! by NDMC which is a comprehensive schen'ie. Certain directions have, however, been sought Por Pioni this Court. We approve the Scheme submitted by NDMC. ' • "

¶30It is submitted before us that the Schemes whicP) have been approved by this Court must be subject to any'AVctor rules that may be framed in consonance-with IMational Policy on Llrban. Street Vendors. It goes without saying'that we have approved the Schen'ies as framed by MCD and NDMC. If the legislature intervenes, and' frames another scheme or regulations governing, such' Schemes, that-will certainly supersede ScheiTies prepared b.y MCD and NDMC.- It is well settled that any administrative action is always subject to law that may be Pramed by the competent legislature. ,

¶35Subject to the aPoresaid modiPications/changesin the Schemes submi,tted -by MICD and NDMC, the same are approved: The said authorities shall, how take appropriatesteps to implement the Scheme Porthwith. In .case oP any diPPicuity Paced by them in implementing the schemes/ they shall have the liberty to apply to this Court."

8.' Lastly, in the i'ecent judgment in the case oP Gainda I D.J'_a), leai"ned counsel for the respondeht/NDMC speciPically relied-.upon paras ;30, 32, 50 to 66 to state .that the Supreme Court was conscious of the fact that a structured regulation and legislation is urgently requiied l.o control and regulate the fundamental right of hawking. . She also pointed out that three tier disputes redtessal mechanism set out in the affidavit filed by the then Chairperson of ttie NDMC was taken note of by ' ' ''' the Supreme Court in para 72 of the aforesaid judgment and in para 73, it was then observed as below;- :w.p.(c) -4743/2011, connee!:ecJ matters Page 7 of2S "73. In paragraph 12, of the' afPiclavitit I'las been stated that there •shall be an Appellate Authority which shaJI attend to the redressa.l of grievances of squatteij:., hawkers, traders, residents or any other person by hearing appeals.against the decision of the Vending Committee(Main). Paragraph 12 of that affidavitis set out beiow:- ' •There shall be an Appellate /Authority. On -tlie forwarding. ot , petitions received by Chairperson, this Authority shall attend t,o - redressal of grievances of squatters, hawl<ei5, traders, residents or any. other person. Ihe •Authority' shall also hear appeals against the decision'of Vending Committee (l^lain). Decisions of this Authorityunless challengedbefore a Higher Forum or in any CpmpetentCourt, sliall be final. .This Authority shall be initiallyheaded by a peison appointed by the Chairperson having at least 10 , years legal or judicial background. There can be more than one men-iberin this Authority."

¶9After making the aforesaid observations,in paras 74 to 76 of the •judgment, the SupremeCourt went on td obsei'veas below-i- "74. In the said affidavit, which was affirmed before this Court on 24^'' August, 2010 it has been stated that NDMC shall coniply with the orders which would be passed by the adjudicatorymechanism contemplatedin the scheme and which has been approved by tliis Court for the NDi^C area, unless such orders are made subject •matter of challenge before'a higher forum or in any other competent Court. '75. In view of such schemes; hawkers, sqLiatters and vendors must abide by Dispute i-^edressal scheme mentioned above. There should not be ,any direct approach to this Court by way of h'esl'i petition or lAs, bypassing ttie Dispute l-<edressal M.ecfianisin provided in the scheme. W{.P.(C). 4743/2011, a connecled matters Page G of 23 7e. However,;before 30^'^ June, 2011, the appropriate Government is to enact a law on the basis.oP tiie I3.ill mentioned above, or on the basis oP any amendment tliereqP so that the hawkers may pi'ecisely l<now tlie^ contours of their rights."

¶10It was thus sought to Ije contended on behaiP oP respondent/l^DIMCthat there can .be no vacUum as Par as regulation oP trade of streethawkers/vendorsin the NDMC jurisdictionis concernedand the failure on the part oP the legislatureto abide by the timelineset out by the Supreme Court in the case oP GaindcM^ani_(^l3lJ.l,by putting in place a statute on or before 30.06.-2011,cannot,be,interpreted by the petitioners/vendors to mean that they can continue their trade unhindei-ed at any place Of their choice in the NDMC jurisdicl.ion,in an •unregulated manner and without any obstruction or objection Prom the " IMDI'^IC. • •

¶11•• Learned counsel for the respondent/NDMCparticularly rePeried to paras 74 and 75 of the aforesaid judgment to state that the dispute redressal scherhe, noticed by the Supreme Court in para 7b was tlie one that was legally functioning in NDMC jurisdiction and which was taken note of by the Court in the preceding para 74. In other words, she.stated that the scheme as set out in the .affidavit dated 24.08.2010, filed by tlie then Chairpei'son of NDMC before the Supreme Court in .Gajnda Kam's case..,.(s.up.ra)_, was the one which was finally approved by tlie Su|.jren"io Court. She further submitted that assuming, without admitting,, that tlie WiP.^C] ay'^3/2011, & conneci:ed tnal.ters Page 9 of2H I ' dispute reclressalschemeset out by the NDMC had lapsed on 30.6.2011, •as clahmed by the petitioners,then the NDMC Act provides an adequate ' •i^aiibacic to ensure orderiy managementof vendors in the aiea. jpBLilic • referencewas rnade in this regard to tine provisionscontainedin Sections 221, 224, 225 and ,226 of the said Act; •12,- It was further argued by the counsel for the respondent/NUMCthat the applicationfiled by the NDMC before the SuprenieCourt in .luly 2(J11 •praying inter alia for extension of time to regulate hawkers/squattersin the NDMC area, as per the scheme mentionedin the judgmentin GaiLLLla Ram's r.ase fsupral, till the enactmentof a law by-the legislaturein that regard, had not yet been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court at the time of passing of the status quo order dated 15.07.2011 and similarly, the other application filed by one, of the hawkers/vendorspraying inter ' alia.for restraining the. respohdent/NDMCfroiTi granting Telitjazarirights to, the winners of the'-lucky draw of lots for allotment, which was to be held on

12.05.2011 or any date thereafter, was also pending consideration before the Supreme Court. Hence, no finaiil:y could be •attached to the order dated 15.7.2011 which can only be considered an iriterinTmeasure' till the final disposal of the aforesaid applications or the enactment of a legislation.

¶13• On merits, learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC referred to the affidavit dated

01.08.2011 filed by the Director (Enforcement), NDMC, •-•W.P.fc; 4:74.3/2611, a connected matters wherein it was stated' that .pursuant to the public notice issued by the NDl^^C inviting applications under the NDMC Urban Streel: Vending Scheme in the year 2007, the .respondent/NDI^IChad received 43b7 •applications.The documents required by the applicants for registration under the'Scheme included a proof oP age, documentary prooP/aPlidavil/ Por the purpose oP annual income, proof oP residence, prooP msuppuit nP special categorieslike-handicapped,Kashmiri migrants etc. and prooP uP squatting'inthe NDMC area, if any."In para 4 oP the aPoresaid aPhdavit, the following ciiteria approved/adoptedby the Vending Committee to shortlist the eligible applicants is set out:-"4. That the criteria approved/adoptedby the Vending ; Committee to shortlist the eligible applicants is as underi-

(i) The applicants should be resident of Delhi witPi his., name registered in electoral'rolls as per abstract oP •photo E-Roll or ERO certiPicate.

(ii) The applicantshould be a major, viZ; with over .1.8 years of age as per valid birth certiPicate or age certiPicate or school certiPicate etc.

(iii) The applicant should be a needy as per incoirie records of DC (Revenue) or as vulnerabilityrecords of Government oP NCT of Delhi (Samajilc Suvidha Sangairi: , vulnerable and most vulnerable-category).

(iv) The applicant should be fegistei'ed as per NDMC. Street Vendors Scheme. The policy veriPication oP tPie applicant should be available.

(v) The applicant of his dependent fairiily member should not be employed or should not have any other tehbazari/yending or any other business premises in Delhi as per record veriPication oP NDMC/MCD. V\r.P.(C} 47-'i3/2t}ll, a. connected matters Page 11 of 2B •V (\/j) Preference' will be. given to applicants who. oire physically handicapped,or widows or senior citizens above' 60 years or Kashmiri-migrants or SC./SI (necessary certificate to be submitted and relaxation may be given in the above criteria)." ,14. /AS' per the -respohdent/NDMC, the category-wise list oP eligible shortlisted applicants-in terms of the aforesaid criteri.a totalled to .3878 applicants. The ' affidavit dated

01.08.2011 states' diat respondent/NDMChas identified 183. new spaces, in addition to the 20J remainingspaces identifiedby .the Thareja'Committeein the NDMC area, which, were available' foi' allotment, lihus taking the total number of availablespaces to 386. Kwas furtherstated,thatdue to factors like de-listing of the l-''arliament.Street .on security grounds, construction ol •riyovers and Metro Stations at various locationsin the NDMC jurisdiction, the number of authorized.te/-;t»sza/7squatters has changed Troin 34b to . 404 in nuimber. The number of applicants, who the respondent/Nt)MC •claims, are vending unauthorisedlyat Connaught Place, Saroj.ini Nagar, Parliament Street and Janpath areas and in whose, favour, stal.us, quv .. orders are operating, is stated to be-323 in number. The affidavitasserts tha-t simply because the names of the petitioners, who are registei-e.dwill) • the'NDMC, figure in the eligibility list drawn by the respondent/NDMC, cannot be treated as pi-oof of their regularly vending in tlie NDMC area and nor does it confer' oh them any enforceable vested right to ensure a vending space for themi in the NDMIC area, which is directly dependent on W.P.(C) 4-743/2011, St connecl:ed matters Fage 12 of 2tf ¥ the number of spaces available. Thus, it was contended that neither l:he possessionof any number of challans, nor the absence thereofcan make a difference, for the reason that challans cannot forin the basis for the petitionersto claim any vested legal right to squat at a given spacc-,.

¶15"counsel for the res|i)ondent/l\lbi^Ca,sseited that the .present petitions are not maintainable inasmuch as the petitioners have an .equally efficacious alternate ' remedy of approaching the a|.)pellate authority constituted by the Chairperson, NDMC, for redressal of their •grievances and failure on their part to have approached the. Vending Committee.isnot on accountof the fact that the said Committeeincluding ^the appellateauthorityis not functioning,but because they have foi.ind it more convenientto bypass the aforesaid forum and approach tins L.oi.ii l. directly, which is not permissible. She stated that extensive measures havel'beeintaken by the respondent/NDMCto constitute tfie adjudicatoiy mechanism by way of a three tiei" system in the following rnanner;-

¶1Vending Sub-Comrnittee (Site of Spaces),

¶2Vending Sub-Committee (Heath and Hygiene) and , '

¶3Vending Sub-Committee (Enforcement).

¶16She stated that the creation of the aforesaid three Vending SliI.i-Comrnittees, Vending Committee

(Main), as also of tfie appellate authorily which was constituted to redress grievances of squatters, hawkers, traders, residents or any other person against tlie decision (jf W.P.[C) 4-743/2011, 52S4./20X1 & connected matters c V the Vending Committee(iviain), was placed before the Supreme.Courtfor considerationand the said three tier adjudicatol'ymechanism was duly approved in th^ jiirlgmentof Gainda Pvam ("supra).

¶17' Per contra, learned counsels for the petitioners/vendois, -who appeared on 'dirrerent dates, vehemently opposed the aforesaid stand taken by the respondent/NDMCand assertedthat the scheme rio..itcd by the respondent/NDMCfor_regulatingvending activities in its jurisdiction had lapsed on 30.06.2011in the absenceof the enactmentoP a legislation •as per directionsof the SupremeCourt in the case of Gajnd^aniXsujJra^^^ and as on date, there is no^scheiriein existence. It.was canvassed that the implication of the-aforesaid order of status quo passed by the SupremeCourt on 15.07.2011can only.meanthat irrespectiveof the fact w.hether the 'squatting is legal or illegal, the same be permitted to continue'on an 'as is where is' basis, and, such status-quo is to be ' maintained by all the parties.tilla law is framed by. the legislature. IS. Mr. • B.B.. Sawhney, Sr. Advocate appearing for petitioners/vendorsubmittedthat in the case of Gainda Karn '-he Supreme Court had directed that the appropriate government must enact a law on or before 30.05.2011 so that the hawkers may precisely know the contours of their fights, hence dispute redressal mechanism provided for in the scheme mentioned in the aforesaid •judgment coi.ild operate only upto 30.06.2011 and thereafter, the said scheme would W.P.(C} 4743/2011, connected matters ' Page 14 oP 2ii • autornaticallystand lapsed. H.e stated that no other lnterpretal:ioncan be given to the orderdated 15.07.201,i,directingmaintenanceof statusquo, in view of the qualifying'words,"as it is obtainingtoday''.. He argued Lhat if. the scheme was continuing to operate, aS' claimed by the learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC,then there was no good reason for the respondei-rt/NDlviCto have refrained fi-orn holding,a draw of loLs,. which •was slatedTor tine same day, i.e., 15.07.2011,and that fact of Lhe matter is tliat^eventhe respondent/NDMChad understood the status quo order to mean that there is no scheme in.place after 30.6.20.11,for the.reason '.thatjn para 68-of the aforesaid judgment in the case of Gaijid,a_,K,am {supra), ail the writ petitionsand the interim applicationsfiled before l;he SupremeCourt were-dfsposedof with clear and specificdirectionsthat the problei-in of hawking .and street.vending could be regulaled by the .schemes framed by the.NDMC aTrd MCD only upto 30.06.2011 aru.l not iih'ereaften.. It was asserted op' behalf of the petitioners/vendors that as on date, the ,directions of the Supreirie.Court that status quo Is to be maintained by the parties can only be given one interpretation, which is that till a lavy is ultimatelyenacted by the Parliament,irrespective of Lheii legal status; all the petitioners/vendors would be permitted to conLinue squatting/hawlongat .tiie,sites that have been occupied by .tl-)em. '19. ' Insofar.as the composition of the dispute redressalmechaiiism is concerned. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners submitted tlial" contrary to understanding ol;. the respondent/MDMC, ttie sctieme .W.P-('cj 47-43/2011, 5254/2011 ffi connected matters Page. 15.of 28 L. j-eproclLicedat paras 72 and 73 in the judgmentin the case oP GaiitcIa_iia!n '(supra), was not the one which was actually recognized by the Supieme .Courl:, ahcl rather it is the-disputeredressalscheme mentionedin para 7b ^of the aforesaid judgment i.e.; '' a scheme for urban street vendors for NDMC area-as formulated in the year 2006, which was uH;imately approved 'by the Supreme Court on 17.05.2007, in the 'case of Sudhir• •Madan (supra), which 'is the scheme which finds meniiiOn specificallyin the following"para ,74 and is the one approved by the Supreme Court.. It •was contended'thateven otherwise,the National CapitalTerritoryot Delhi Laws (Special Provisions)-Act, 2011 (hereinafterreferred to as "Speciiali -ProviBBOPTis /ActO comes to the rescue of the petitioners for the reason ^that sob-clause(2)"of Section 3 of the Special Provisions Act mandates ^maintenance;Of status quo as. on^Ol.01.2005, notwithstanding any ,'judgment;,decree or order of any•court, in respect of encroachmentor unautliorized development. Thus, it was submitted' on belialf oP the petitioners/.vendorsthat they were entitled to grant oP interim protection till the enactment of a legislation tO'regulate hawking/vending activities in ."Urbaii stre'ets in Delhi on the basis of the National Policy on Urban Street ,\/ehciors, 2009 framed dh 17.06.2009 and the Special Provisions Act. i •;20. With reference . to Special Provisions Act, learned Senior Advocate ' for the - petitioners stated that phrase, "unautliorized development" used in the definition clause "has to be seen-in the same context as ttie one in which the phrase "encroachment" has been defined, ' W.P.CC) 47^3/2011, & connected matters Page 16 of 28 •' •wherein it is nnentionedthat putting up of temporary, semi-l:ernpora.ryor •permanent'structurefor'residential use or commercial'use or any oilier ';use;^andthe-pi&cementof goods oh the pavements by the pelilionersis liable;to be tenoned as unauthorizeduse for maintainingstatus quo.under the Special Provisions /-\ct: Much emphasis was'laid on the avennenLs :made'by the-respondent/NDMCin its interim,application-filed before the •SupreineCourtin Gainda'flanYscasej^iJiaj.in July 2011, to submit tliat the .respondent/NDMC,itself had stated in the said application that tlve scheme had lapsed and therefore,- the only interpretationthat can be, given'-to, the status order .passed by the Supreme-Court on •15.07.2011 Can be that no scheme woCild exist after 30.06.20.1.1 and Vthusi-thet)enefitof the Special ProvisionsAct ought to be extendedto l;he -•petitioners.. l-ie subimitted that" the phrase ;street vendors'-has been -clearly defined under the National Policy,on Urban Street Vendois,- 2009. •Reliance was placed in the case of Patri Vvaijar 'mCH Town -l-lalL-8. Ors., reported as' (2009) 12 SCC 475 and the provisionsof the Special.Provisions/Act to submit that even the Supreme •Court had recognized the fact that the Special, ProvisionsAct is the only Central,law governing.the field^ and it would have priiTiacy over other - Statutes and administrative orders. It is thus stated that the provisions :0f the NDMC Act cannot be invoked by the ,respondent/l\ID|viCas the said. Act is hot, in consonance with /Article 96 of the Constitution of .i.ndia and •'furthermore, Special Provisions /Act being valid till end of W'.P'.(C)^-7'-43/2011r 525-'l/20il 8i connected matters . • Pat/e. 1 7 of in December2011; no orders in derogationof the provisionsoi^ iJie said Act can be passed. . , .'

¶21Mr. ' S.K.'. Tripathi, Advocate appearing for some of. iLlie petitioners/vendorssought to embellisli the submissionsof |v|r.Sawfiney,. ^Sr.Advocate and .relied on the'orders passed in WJP.(C) ;lL449/.Z01.ll. entitled iMhhri -Ismail vs:.• IMDMC :&._Qr5.'to urge that tlie ^;Appellate /Autiibrity" constituted under the dispute -redressal mechanism ior the ' NDMC area/has not been functioning,which fact he stated is borne out from; a perusal'ofthe order dated 08.03.2011 passed, in the aforesaiid' case; wherein the Court,took notice of the claim of the petitioner/vendor ' therein-to the ei'fect that inspite of orders passed by tlie Appellate Authority allowing squatting at a particularsite, till a final determination by the A/ending Con-irnitteeas to-his eligibility,the respondent/NDMC.and the police were disturbing his activities. In the aforesaid order, the stateiTient of the counsel for the respondent/NDMC was reirorded to the effect that the-appellate authority, whose order was being relied upon.by •the petitionertherein, was'constituted initiallyfor the MCD areas aru.i later started functioning for the NDMC areas as well for the reason that at that time, there was no separa'te-.appeilate authority for the MDI^IC ar'eas, but subsequently, in accordance with the scheme approved by the Supreme .Court, Chairperson,. NDMC had constituted a separate appellate .authority fdi'• the IMDMC areas.- 'Therefore^ appellate . autl-ic.)rity appointed earlier had ceased to have jurisdiction qua tfie NDMIC areas. Tl. W.P.(C) 4743/2011^ & connected ntafsters Page 10'of 28 was thus contended on behalf of the petitioners/vendors that the. aforesaid order clearly indicates that the appellate authority in the NUMC areas is not functioning.

¶22Reliance was also placed on the minutes of the meeting of tlie Vending Committeedated 11.03.2010,to claim that if the fact of wfiether there was actual squatting/vendingwas verified by the Cornn-iitteeand if the names of the petitioners/vendorsfigured in the eligibilitylist prepared by the respondent/NDMCfor holding the draw of lots, then it did not lie in the rhouth of the respondent/NDMCto claim that the petitioriers,wito had been verified and found to be eligible, were not entitled to S(|uat at various sites in the MDMC area after 30.06.2011. 23'. In rebuttal, counsel for respondent/NDMC disputed tlie contentions of the petitioners/vendors and while reiterating her earlier submissions, asserted that the petitioners did not have any legally enforceable right, created on the basis of the eligibility list drawn by NDMIC, for claiming, grant of interiiri orders in their favour. .She again i referred to paras 68, 69, 75, 76 and 78 of the judgment iii tlie case of Gaindci Ram. fsupi'al, to empliasize that when the aforesaid paras are read collectively, it is clear that petitioners cannot claim an entitlement to any inteiirn orders as sought by them in tfie |)resent proceedings. She further stated that even otiierwise, tfie S|.)ecial i^rovisions /Act relied upon by petitioners' has duly recognized Vif.P.(C) 4743/2011, & conneci.ed matters Page 19 (tf 2f} schemes prepared by the local authorities in the National Capital "feniLory of Delhi for regulation oP urban street vendors. To substaiitiate the said submission, she drew the attention oP this Court to the preamble oP^ tlie aPoi'esaid /Act, which mentions the fact that all the sctiemes prepai'ed by the-local authorities in National .Capital Territory oP Delhi, Por regulation .of urban street vendors in accordance with the IMational P'olicy on Urban Street Vendors,

20.09 and the i^aster Plan for Delhi

202.1, liave been implemented and further that more time is required for proper .implementation of schemes regarding . hawkers and urban street vendors.

¶24/-\ specific reference was made by the learned counsel Poi* ttie respondeht/NDMC to Section 2(l)(c) of the Special Provisions Act, which defines the phrase "encroachment" to claim that it does not covei" the petitioners herein, who are squatters. Further reference was made to the provision of Section 3 of the. Special Provisions /Act, wliich contains a non obstante clause, to state that status quo with regard to ttie encroacPwrienI; or unauthorized development as on 01.01.2006, mentioned in the said provision, was in . the context of definition of tlie phrases "encroachment" and "Gnauthorized development" set out in ttie definition clause a't Sections 2(l)(c) and 2(l)(i) respectively of LPie S|:ieciai Provisions /Act and thus, the petitioners/vendors did not qualify under tlie aforesaid enactment for claiming protection as none of the ingredients set out in the provisions of the aforesaid enactment are found to exist in theii" W.IK(C) 4743/201I, ffl connected iriaiters Page 20 uf 2U-case,' It was submitted-that the Special' Provisions Act, whicli came into •! efPect in the year 2007 and has been extended PronM time to lime and lastly, .till-December 20li, does not give perni'ission to pei"5ons t(i re-sLart ,• any-activity, once •they have, been removed by the civic aLithoril;y and similarly;'the-Scl'ieme of 2009 do.es hot .entitle the registrants to s(:|uat -unless they have been allotted a specific site. In support of the albresaid \subi'Tiissio:n, reliance was place on .the judgment in ttie case ot M.CD,_vs, •Gurriam-Kaur reported as (1989} 1 SCC 101. For tlie purpose of ' interpreting the -meaning of the phrase, "structure", rePerence was iriade to the 'jlidgitie.nt of the Supreme Court in the case oT Hun.iU.IJ.al - Qori20ration.of .Greater Boinbav -Bi. Qrs. vs: Indian Qil CoriiomUgn M-eported.as: AIR 1991'SCi 686. For the purpose of understandingthe •expression;'status quo', referencewas made to'the judginentin the case ^of Me.ssrs'Bharat Cokihci Coal Limited vs. State of Biha.iiik-Ql5..reported as , 19>8> (Supip) see 394 to submit that in ordinary legal connotation,the term "stat-usq.l/o'implies the existing state of things at any giveii point oT ti'me. , ... -25, ' /-\s fbr the National Policy on ^.Urban Street Vendors, .counsel lor tlie ;respondent/NDMC stated that both, the 2004 policy and the 2009 policy, find ^mention in the decision of the Suprenie Court in the case ot Gaiiida 'P\am (supra^ and it was only after taking into consideration the saitl . 'policies, did the Court directed institutibnalization of uii;)an si ieel A/e.nding through legislation. It was further stated that at the l.ime oF W.p'.(C) 4743/2011, a connected hwClers , 1 • I : • •cleliA/ering the judgment dated 8.10^2010, the Scipreme Court took notice of the. NCT ol?-Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) /Act, 2009, whicl'i was valid Lipto 30.12.2010', • apart-from noticing the Model Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation ot Street Vending) i3ill, 2009 introduced by the Government of India, jviiriistry of Housing Urban Poverty /Alleviation.She'stated that nothing new is now being subniitted by -the petitioners/vendors h.ei-ein, for the present petitions l.o be entertained for any purppse-whatsoever and all the grievances• raised by the' petitioners• can easily' be • addressed before Vending Corhmittee/appeJIateauthority under the'scheme relating to urban street M ; .vending in the NDMC are^, which. Pora continueto remainfunctional,even after 30.6.2011. . -26.' This Court has heard these matters at length since 17.8.2011, on •'differeht dates. Various counseis for the petitioners/vendorsand tiie ^Standing'Counsel fof the respondent/NDMChad addressed the Court, Their respective arguments-have been taken note of. Both' sides have niade strenuous efforts' to explain what the status quo oidei ddted

15.7.2011• passed by the Supreme Court in the. case ot' .Gmnda •ftani,Cs.upi:a)ih-iplies. The leitmotirof the arguments addressed on behalf •of the petitioners/vendors, is that the status quo ordei" read witfi the ••qualifying.wGl'ds^ "as it is obtaining today", suffixed to the order, can only be read to iiiiply that as on date, i.e., 15.7.2011; there was no scheme operational in the NDMC areas to i'egulate vending activities and till a law 4743/2011} & conriecled malters Page 22 of 2B ', o is ultimately enacted by tine legislature, all the petitioners, irrespective of their legal status, can continue squatting/hawking at different sites that have been occupied by them. It is also asserted that in the teeth of the status quo orders passed by the Supreme Court, the respondent/NDMC in collusion with the police authorities, is threatening to illegally remove the petitioners/vendors from different sites, which is detrimental, adverse, harassing and belligerent to those, who have been found eligible by the respondent/NDMC for being allotted specific tehbazari spaces within the NDMC jurisdiction, but are being threatened due to lack of further action in this regard which is pending at the end of the respondent/NDMC. The second limb of submissions made by the learned counsels for petitioners/vendors was that the Special Provisions Act would additionally come to rescue of the •petitioners/vendors, which also requires maintenance of status quo as existing on 01.10.2006, till the end of December, 2011. .

¶27On the other hand, the main thrust of the arguments addressed'by the counsel for the respondent/NDMC was that as the legislature has failed to enact an appropriate legislation in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gainda Ramfsupra), the subsequent order dated

15.7.2011 directing parties to maintain the status quo, as it is obtaining on the said date can only imply that the state of affairs as existing on date are not to be-disturbed, until the rights of the parties can be finally determined through legislation. It was submitted that while W.P.(C) 4743/2011, & connected matters \ \ ) ') passing tlie status quo order on 15.07.2011, the Supreine Court was conscious of the fact that the l^arliament had . yet to enact a comprehensivelegislation to regulate urban street vending and in such circumstances/it goes withoutsaying that it was the intent of the Court that the entire dispute redressal mechanism as recognizedin the case of .Gainda_riaDi(sLLi2j;a).would continue to remain, in operation, so as to regulate the urban streetvending iii.the NDMC area, till the legislationin that'regard is enacted. Further, it was' stressed, that the Special ProvisionsAct did not provide any protectiveumbrella to the petitioners, whose squatting activities •neither ' fell-under definition of "encroachment",nor under "unauthorizeddevelopment", it v/vas furtliei asserted that even otherwise pending .an appropriate.legislation, Uie NDMC Act'wa-y availableas'a fall bade option and the relevantprovisions in the said enactmentwould continueto regulatestreet vending activity in the NDMC area and the petitioners/vendorscould not claim a vested liyht to squat at any site of their own.

¶28From the above^ it is apparent that arguments and counter argumentshave been raised by both sides on their respectiveversions of the meaning and the effect of the status quo order dated lb.7..Z()11 passed by the Supreme Court. It is also very apparent, that the meaning -sought to be attributed by both sides as to the implication of ttie said status quo order, is diairietricallyopposed to each other. Not only this, both sides are at a tangeht on the factum of the pendency or otfierwise of i/V.P.fc; 5254/20.1.1 & connected matiers Page 24 of 'ZU .1 Lhe interim applications filed before the Supreme Court-by both, the applicants/vendorsand the respondent/ND|viC,for clai-ifications,on which the aforesaid order came to •be .passed as if is Lhe stand ot the respondent/NDMCthat the•aforesaid applications were not disposed o( while passing the order dated 15.7.2011. The parties are poles ai.>art on •the question of import of the status quo order, and the effect oP the observations made by the Supremie•Court in the case ot Gmjida R^-nisupjiaJ,as regards the approval of NDMC scheme. They are also at loggerheads on the composition of the adjudicatory mechanism in Lhe NDMC jurisdictionand the manner of its functioning,as also Lhe ideiiLiLy of the scheme which is validly operatingin the NDMC areas for regulating urban street vending, which had all been sul^ject matter of consideration bef^ore the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. The otlier issues agitated by the parties-, starting from the interpretationof tlie various observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, ..l/r-j the Formulation of the scheme as approved by the Suprenie Court in Lhe case of Sudhir Madan fsupra), Lo tlie composition of Lfie disfiuLes redressal mechanism and its validity as also the meaning of tlie status • quo order, are all in a turmoil as both the parties have stoutly defended their respective stands which .are completely at variance witl'i eacli other. The only comimon ground shared by'the parties is the factuin of |..)assinq of recent judgment dated

08.10.2010 in case of Goi.rida .flafnCsuiDi'ia,)and the subsequent status quo order dated 15.7.20l;l. passed V\I.P.(C) 4743/2011, ft cdnnecl:ed niBlXers Pfsge 25 'U-r 28 by the Supreme Court.

¶29The rountainheaci of the dispute in the present cases therefore remains the status quo order dated

15.7.2011 passed by the SuiJi-eme Court. Tlie issue whicli is sought to be agitated before ttiis Court is tliat having regard to the status quo order/ whether a stay order ought to be granted by this Court in favour of the'petitioners/vendors as |:jrayed for by them, irrespective-of •their legal status, thus forbidding tiie respondent/NDMC from threatening and/or removing tlieiri from the different sites occupied by them in the NpMC areas. In other woi'ds, this Court is being called upon to exan'iine tiie meaning, scope and effect of the status quo. order dated

15.07.2011. On the question of how to ascertain the implication of a status quo order passed by a court, in the case of Messrs Bharat Coking Co a I.Limited fsupra), it wa-s observed l'.iy the' , SupreiTie Court that the expression, "status quo' is undoubtedly a terni of ambiguity and at times, gives rise to doubt and difficulty and in case rfny .party has any doubt on the njieahing an-d tlie effect of tfie status C|;U(.) order, the proper course for such a party would be to approach tlie Court that had pass'ed the status quo order, to 5ee.l<;,clarifications.

¶30In the case at hand, while seeking to ride the wave of the aforesait.l status quo order, parties have chosen to overlook one ini|.iortant factor, which is that a status quo order operates on'botli sides. "I he Supreme Court has passed orders requiring both sides to rnaintain status 47^3/2QXl, 5254/20X1 connected matters quo. Once such an, order of the,Supreme Court is on record, the san;ie not only binds-all.the parties to the adjudication, -and all the pai'ties, civil or judicial who. are requii'ed to act ih accordance with tine said orders, but It equally binds.the Hlgh'^Court frorh interfering with such,an order, as the said order has been passed in litigations before the highest Court of the land. 31-The orders of the-Supreme Court'are on i'ecord. Ttie status ciuc) order is a clear signal to the High' Court as well, to avoid granting any order, including an interim order, when the Supreme Court tias directed, for status quo to be maiiitained: .In such circumstances, if this Court was to grant a stay order in favour of the petitioners/vendors arrayed before . it, it would be. tantamount-to negating the orders of the Supreme Court, which require the parties to n'laintaln status quo pending enactment of appi-opriate .legislation. If either of the parties were unclear ahoi.il; tlie •intei pietation of the status quo order,.it was for them to have applied to the..Supreme Court for clarifications thereof. Additionally, the reliance placed by the petitioners/vendors on the Special ProvisionsAct seeking inteiim • legal, sanctity to the placement of goods by tlierr) on the pavements, by terining it as. encroachn'ient/unauthorized use, as lecognized under the said Act and their contention that the Su|;)rcme Couit had lecognizedthe fact that the Special ProvisionsAct is the only Central law having primacyover other Statutes, are also matters that tlie W.P.(C) 4743/ZOli, & CQnhectsd makers •1 • I . Page 1.7 af 2S petitioners/vendors ought to liave placed before the Supreme Court wtrile seeking clarifications oP the status quo order. It would tlierefore be advisable for the petitioners/vendors as also respondent/NDMC to approach Supreme Court and rnak,e their subniissions .there as regards their grievances. ' l-lowever, as both parties insisted l.hat Iheir arguments be taken note of a.nd their submissions be placed on record, some pains have been taken to do the needful.

¶32In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is (jf the opinion that it will not be appropriate For it to grant stay ordei's in tlie lace of the status quo order dated 15.07.2011 passed by tlie Supreme Court. It is reiterated that any such ordei" stiall be an anti-thesis to tlie orders oT the Supreme Court, which must be respected both, in letl:er and .spirit. In such circumstances, present petitions are disposed of by declining grant oP any interim orders to the petitioners. However, liberty is granted to both the parties to apply to tine Supreme Court for a clarification of the status quo order dated

15.07.2011 passed in the case oP Gainda Kam .(.supi^.. The parties are lePt to bear their own costs. • Q I OCTOERpl'i,2011 rkb COS¥ [ EXAMmm ^743/2011, 525^1/2011 Si connected manors JtJDGIf Psye 23 itf 2S

-\ IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on : 21.09.2011 Pronounced on: 24.10.2011 + w.P.rc^ 4347/2011. 4559/2011. 4593/2011. 4610/2011. 4650/2011. 4651/2011. 4827/2011. 4923/2011. 5024/2011. 5028/2011. 4775/2011. 5247/2011. 5254/2011. 5255/2011. 5257/2011. 5258/2011. 5261/2011. 5262/2011. 5263/2011. 5264/2011. 5277/2011. 5292/2011. 5312/2011. 5317/2011. 5402/2011. 5403/2011. 5405/2011. 5408/2011. 5410/2011. 5411/2011. 5413/2011. 5418/2011. 5423/2011. 5444/2011. 5473/2011. 5484/2011. 5485/2011. 5497/2011. 5498/2011. 5503/2011. 5504/2011. 5505/2011. 5506/2011. 5507/2011. 5508/2011. 5595/2011. 5614/2011. 5615/2011. 5616/2011. 5618/2011. 5627/2011. 5630/2011. 5631/2011. 5643/2011. 5645/2011. 5654/2011. 5656/2011. 5711/2011. 5717/2011. 5718/2011. 5728/2011. 5729/2011. 5731/2011. 5732/2011. 5737/2011. 5738/2011. 5739/2011. 5743/2011. 5761/2011. 5784/2011. 5785/2011. 5791/2011. 5794/2011. 5797/2011. 5798/2011. 5822/2011. 5911/2011. 5918/2011. 5928/2011. 5931/2011. 5933/2011. 5934/2011. 5935/2011. 5957/2011. 5965/2011. 5966/2011. 5967/2011. 5968/2011. 5969/2011. 5970/2011. 5974/2011. 6096/2011. 6100/2011. 6101/2011. 6102/2011. 6107/2011. 6108/211. 6114/2011. 6115/2011, 6116/2011. 6117/2011. 6118/2011. 6119/2011. 6120/2011. 6121/2011. 6122/2011. 6123/2011. 6144/2011. 6250/2011. 6270/2011. 6271/2011. 6449/2011. 6527/2011. 6528/2011. 6529/2011. 6530/2011. 6531/2011. 6532/2011. 6533/2011. 6534/2011. 6538/2011. 6555/2011. 6667/2011. 6668/2011, 6669/2011. 6670/2011. 6684/2011. 6701/2011. 5173/2011, 4739/2011. 5046/2011. 5051/2011. 5157/2011. 4649/2011, 4722/2011. 2601/2011. 2602/2011, 3052/2011. 3181/2011. 3185/2011. 3189/2011. 3196/2011. 4340/2011. 4342/2011. 4343/2011. 4344/2011. 4345/2011. 4349/2011. 4350/2011, 4352/2011. 4354/2011. 4356/2011. 4358/2011. ^4359/2011. 4360/2011. 4361/2011. 4362/2011. 4363/2011, 4364/2011. •4365/2011. 4366/2011. 4367/2011. 4368/2011. 4369/2011. 4370/2011. 4371/2011. 4372/2011. 4373/2011, 4374/2011. 4375/2011. 4377/2011" 4387/2011. 4388/2011. 4389/2011, 4391/2011. 4392/2011. 4393/2011. 4395/2011. 4396/2011. -4398/2011. 4398/2011. 4399/2011. 4400/2011. 4402/2011, 4404/2011. 4405/2011. 4406/2011. 4407/2011. 4408/2011, 4409/2011. 4410/2011. 4412/2011. 4413/2011. 4414/2011. 5341/2011. 4847/2011. 4859/2011. 4887/2011. 4990/2011. W.P.(C) 4347/2011 and connected, matters Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. 5063/2011, 5089/2011. 5099/2011. 5114/2011. 5115/2011. 5117/2011. 5129/2011. 5139/2011. 5144/2011. 6708/2011. 6799/2011, 6824/2011. 6825/2011. 6826/2011. 6827/2011. 6896/2011. 6901/2011. 6902/2011. 6903/2011. 6904/2011. 6905/2011, 6906/2011. 6907/2011. 6908/2011. 6909/2011, 6910/2011, 6917/2011. 6919/2011. 6920/2011. 6921/2011. 6922/2011. 6932/2011 and 5420/2011. THE MATTERS OF MOHD. AZAD Petitionerin W,P.(C)4347/2011 MOHD. ALAM Petitionerin W.P.(C)4559/2011 KIRPALSINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C)4593/2011 SHAILENDERKUMAR PetitionerIn W.P.(C)4610/2011 SANJAY Petitionerin W.P.(e)4650/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4651/2011 AMAR NATH SINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C)4827/2011 GANESH PRASAD Petitionerin W.P.(C) 4923/2011 BHUPALSINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5024/2011 SURENDERSINGH AND ORS. Petitionersin W.P.(C) 5028/2011 Petitioner in W.P;(C) 4775/2011 RAKESH KUIMAR AND ORS. Petitionersin W.P.(C) 5247/2011 RAM DASS Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5254/2011 VISHAMBARJHA PetitionerIn W.P.(C) 5255/2011 DINESH KUMAR Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5257/2011 Petitioner In W.P.(C) 5258/2011 RAJESH CGUPTA AND ORS. Petitionersin W,P.(C)5261/2011 LAKHPATIAND ORS. Petitionersin W.P.(C) 5262/2011 SOHAN LAL AND ORS. ..... Petitionersin W.P.(C)5263/2011 KEDARI PetitionerIn W.P.(C) 5264/2011 ARUN KUMAR ALIAS LUCKY Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5277/2011 MITHU LAL Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5292/2011 MOHD. ZAHID Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5312/2011 SHAKEELAHMED PetitionerIn W.P.(C) 5317/2011 NAND KISHORE PetitionerIn W.P.(C) 5402/2011 RINKU KUMAR GUPTA Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5403/2