Vakil Ahmed & Ors v. State

SURESH KAIT, J

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + CRL.M.C. 2425/2011 VAKIL AHMED & ORS ..... Petitioners STATE CORAM: Through Mr. Abdul Sattar/ Adv. versus ..... Respondent Through Ms. Rajdipa Behura/ APP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT 0 R DE R % 23.08.2011 _3 1. On the complaint of respondent No.2 Yogesh Garg/ FIR No.756 dated 26.08.2006 under Sections 323/34/342/506 Indian Penal Code/ 1860 was registered against the petitioners at PS 0.1. Estate. Ld.APP submits that Section 308 was added subsequently during the investigation. Accordingly/ the charge-sheet under Sections 323/34 /342/506/308 Indian Penal Code/ 1860 has been filed against the petitioners. 2. Ld. counsel for the petitioner submits that both the parties have arrived at a settlement vide MOU dated Nil. As per the said MOU/ on 25.08.2006 a dispute had risen between the parties "j Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. tr regarding use of toilets which resulted in a quarret as a result of which, both the parties sustained injuries. Cross FIR No.756/2006 dated 26.08.2006 and FIR No.758/2006 was lodged on the instance of petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 under Section 323/342/506/34 IPC at PS O.I. Estate. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since these two are cross cases against each other, therefore, with the intervention of a common friend and people of the locality where they both reside, have settled their grievances and arrived at a settlement with their free will and without any pressure. In this manner both parties do not want any action to be taken against each other in their respective FIRs. Further, they aim to co-operate with each other in respect to quashing the FIR against which case is presently pending before the trial court. 4. Ld. APP for State has referred the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manoj Sharma vs. State & Ors. Cri.A.1619/2008 decided on 16.10.2008 and submits that vide this judgment the Division Bench of both the lordships Hon'ble Justice :j Altamas Kabir and Hon'ble Justice Markandey Katju have written dissenting views, whereby, it has been observed as under:- /110. A perusal of Section 320 shows that offences under Section 471/ 34 and 120-8 !PC (with are mentioned in the FIR in question) cannot even be compounded with the permission of the Court In fact Section 320(9) Cr.P.C expressly states that no offence shall be compounded except as provtded by this Section. It apparently therefore/ that except for Section 420 !PC which can be compounded with the permission of the Court in vtew of Section 320(2/ the other provisions mentioned in the FIR in question could not be compounded even with the permission of the Court It prima facie/ seems to follow that the offences mentioned in the FIR were not compoundable except in relation to the allegations about Section 420 !PC 11. There are other provisions in the !PC e.g. Section 498A which apparently cannot be compounded even with the permission of the Court in view of Section 320 (9) Cr.P.C 12 Howevet; this was creating a lot of difficulty and hardship to the public and hence a way out was found by this Court in B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana 2003 (4) SCC 675 [JT 2003 (3) SC 277 AIR ,· .. 2003 SC 1386] In that decision this Court referred to its own earlier decision in Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra 1977 (4) SCC 551 in which it was held (vide para 8) that the power under Section 482 should not be exercised when there is an express bar in some other provision of the Code. The Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) also referred to the decision in Surendra Nath Mohanty vs. State of Orissa AIR 1999 SC 2181 which held that since the offence under Section 326 !PC is not compoundable the High Court cannot compound the offence. 13. Despite the above decisions this Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) relying on its own decision in State of Karanataka vs. L. Munisw