Nand Kishore v. N.D.M.C. and Ors

HIMA IICOHLI, J.

¶1This common judgment .shall dispose of the petitions filed by the petitioners/vendors as issues raised in these writ petitions are common. For the sake of convenience, facts of W.P.(C) 4743/2011 are taken note of.

¶2The focus of the. lengthy arguments addressed by both sides revolves around an order dated 15.07.2011 passed by the Supreme Court on some miscellaneous applications presented in W"P,.(C) 1699/19S7 entitled Gainda Ram Sl Ors. vs. NDMC 8i. Ors.', which matter was decided on 08.10.2010 by issuing exhaustive directions. Before proceeding to deal with the respective .arguments addressed by the learned counsels for petitioners/vendors and respondent/NDiMC, • it would be appropriate to set out the aforesaid order dated 15.07.2011, which is the bone of contention and is reproduced hereinbelow:- "Heard learned counsel for the applicants and perused the record. : 4743/201.1, 5354/2011 & connected matters Since judgmenl: of this Court has so far not been implemented, inasmuch as appropriate legislation has not been enacted by the competent legislature, we direct the parties to maintain the status quo as it is obtaining today."

¶3Tt was submission of learned counsel foi respondent/NDMCthat the aforesaidorder issued by the Supreme Court, calling upon the parties to maintain status quo as obtaining on 15,07.2011, can only be interpreted to mean that the extensive directions issued earlier, on 08.10.2010, in the case of Gainda Ram fsupra) reported as (2010) 10 see 715 shall continue to remain in operation, including the adjudicatory mechanism provided for by the NDMC in the scheme presented by it before the Supreme Court and approved in the said -judgment, till the appropriate government enacts a law for regulating urban street hawkers" and street vendors. It was stated that simply because the legislature has not enacted a law in this regard on or before

30.06.2011, as directed in ai-'oresaid judgment, it cannot be contended by the petitioners/vendors that there exists a vacuum and the said vacuum can no longer be filled up by continuing to regulate vending activities in the NDMC jurisdiction in the' manner as set out in the. aforesaid judgment.

4.- To give a brief background of the dispute, learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC walked this Court through some prominent decisions of the Supreme Court rendered from time to time, which relate to pavement W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connected matters squatLers/hawkers,startingfrom tine decision in the case of Sodan Sinqji vs. NDI^IC &Ors. reportedas (1998) 2 SCC 727, the interim order dated

03.03.2005 passed by the Supreme Court in W.P.CC). 169'9/19S17 entitled Siidhir Madan R Ors. vs. MCD, the final judgment in the case of Sudhir Madan fsupra) reported'as (2009) 17 SCC 597 and lastly; the ' judgmentdated 08.10.2010passed in the case of Gajnda Ram (supr^^

¶5Learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioners/vendors for grant of interim orders restraining the respondent/NDMC from rennoving them from the sites occupied by tliem till the enactment of an appropriate legislation, in terms of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in tha. case of Gainda Ram fsupral. She particularly referred to the observations made by the Supreme Court in paras 40 and 41 of the judgment in the case of Sodan Singh .(supra),, which dealt with the immediate eviction of unauthorized-squatters/hawkers and laid emphasis on the.fact that in the said case, the Supreme Court had directed removal of unauthorized squatters/hawkers without awaiting final allotment of sites to be allotted to eligible claimants at the places recommended by the Thareja Committee or suggested by the MDMC.

¶6Again, in interim order dated

03.03.2006 passed in Sudhir Madan's case fsupra), following observation made by the Supreme Court was highlighted by the counsel for the respondent/NDMC;- !/l/.P.{CJ 4743/2011, 5254/2011 E, connect.ed matters • "While we undertcike this exercise, we diiect l:he Authorities to see to it that those persons, who are carrying on hawldng activities"or who are squatting on public land without any authority, even in accordance with the present day scheme in force, are removed forthwith. This includes unauthorized hawking, squatting on public streets, footpaths and public parks, Including playground.We directthe Delhi Administration to take steps immediatelyin collaborationwith MCD and NDMC with necessary assistance from Delhi Police to clear the roads, streets, footpaths, parks etc. by unauthorized occupants/squatters/hawkers."

¶7As to the judgment dated 17.05.2007 rendered in the case of 511rihir Madan fsLIDra1. much emphasis was laid, by the counsel for the respondent/NDMC on paras 28 to 30 and 35, which are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference "28. The New Delhi Municipal Committee has also ^ submitted its Scheme. We have considered the Scheme submitted before us. The area which falls under NDMC does not create problems such as those in the areas under MCD. However, in the said Scheme reference has been made to persons who do not have permission under Section 225 or licence under Section 330 of the NDMC Act, 1994 but who are unauthorisedly continuing to carry on business as hawkers/street vendors. They have been described as those who are "tolerated" in the NDMIC area. We fail to understand why any person who violates the law should be tolerated. ' Either they should be compelled to obey the law or the law may be suitably amended, if it is found to create undue hardship. The problems need to be addressed by the legislature or the rLilemaking authority. We, therefore, observe that if it is felt that the persons who fall in this category require special protection, the Act may be suitably amended to cover their cases or else number of such illegal squatters may increase from time to time. \f.P.(C) 4743/2011,.5254/2011 & connected matters ' 29 Thei'p has been no serious objectionto the Scheme submitted by NDI^C which is a comprehensivescheme. Certain directionshave, however, been sought for from this CoLirt. We approve the Scheme submitted by IMDi^lC.

¶30It is submitted before us that the Schemes which have been approved by this Court must be subject to any Act or rules that may be framed in consonancewith •the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors. It goes without saying that we have approved the Schemes as framed by MCD and NDMC. If the legislature intervenes and frames another scheme or regulations governing such Schemes, that will certainly supersede Schemes prepared by MCD and NDMC. It is well settled that any administrativeaction is always subject to law that may be framed by the competent legislature.

¶35Subject to the aforesaid modifications/changes in the Schemes submitted by MCD and NDMC, the same are approved. The said authorities shall now take appropriate steps to implement the Scheme forthwith. In case of any difficulty faced by them in implementing the schemes, they shall have the liberty to apply to this Court."

¶8Lastly, in the recent judgment in the case of Gainda Ram fsupra^ learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC specifically relied upon paras 30, 32, 50 to 66 to state that the Supreme Court was conscious of the (act that a structured regulation and legislation is urgently required to control and regulate the fundamental right of hawking. She also pointed out that three tier disputes redressal mechanism set out in affidavit filed by the then Chairperson of the NDMC was taken note of by the Supreme Court in para 72 of the aforesaid judgment and in para 73, it was then observed as below W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connected matters Page 7 of 2.0 "73 In paragraph 12 of the affidavitit has been stated that there shall be an Appellate Authority which shall attend to the redressal of grievances of squatters, hawkers, traders, residents or any .other person by hearing appeals against the decision of the Vending Committee(Main). Paragraph 12 of that affidavitis set out below There shall be an Appellate Authority. On the forwarding of petitions received by Chairperson, this Authority shall attend to redressal of grievances ,of squatters, hawkers, traders, residents or any other person. The Authority shall also hear appeals against the decision of Vending Committee

(Main). Decisions of this Authority unless challenged before a Higher Forum or in any Competent Court, shall be final. This Authority shall be initially headed by a person appointed by the Chairperson having at least 10 years legal or judicial background. There can be more than one member in this Authority."

¶9After making the aforesaid observations, in paras 74 to 76 of the judgment, the Supreme Court went on to observe as belbw;- "74. In the said affidavit, which was affirmed before this Court on 24'^'"' August, 2010 it has been stated that NDMC shall comply with orders which would be passed by the adjudicatory mechanism contemplated in the scheme and which has been approved by this Court for the NDMC area, unless such orders are made subject matter of challenge before a higher forum or in any other competent Court. . ,

¶75In view of sucin schemes, hawkers, squatters and vendors must abide by the . Dispute Redressal scheme mentioned above.- There should not be'any direct approach to this Court by way of fresh petition or lAs, bypassing Dispute Redressal Mechanism provided in the scheme. W.P.('C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connected matters

¶76However, before 30^'^ June, 2011, the appropriate Government is to enact a law on the basis of the Bill mentioned above or on the basis of any amendment thereof so that the hawkers may precisely know the contours of their rights." ;I0. It was thus sought to be contended on behalf of respondent/NDMCthat there can be no vacuum as far as regulation of Lrade of street hawkers/vendors in the NDMC jurisdiction is concerned and the failure on the part of the legislature to abide by the timeline set out by the Supreme Court in the case of Gainda Ram fsupra), by. putting in place a sliatute on or before 30.06.2011, cannot be interpreted by the petitioners/vendors to mean that they can continue their trade unhindered at any place of their choice in the NDMC jurisdiction, in an unregulated manner and without any obstruction or objection from the NDMC.

¶11Learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC particularly referred to paras 74 and 75 of the aforesaid judgment to state that dispute redressal scheme, noticed by the Supreme Court in para 75 was the one that was legally functioning in NDMC jurisdiction and which was taken note of by the Court in the preceding para 74. In other words, she stated that the scheme as set out in the affidavit dated 24.08.2010, filed by the then Chairperson of NDMC before the Supreme Court in Gainda Ram's case.isLjp.ra)., was the one which was finally approved by the Supreme Court. She further submitted that assuming, without admitting, that the m.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & caimected matters clispuL-e reclressalscheme set out by the NDMC had lapsed on 30.6.2011, as claimed-by the petitioners,then the NDMC Act provides an adequate rnllback to ensure orderly managennentof vendors in the area. Specific referencewas made in this regard to the provisionscontainedin Sections 221, 224, 225 and 226 of the said Act. 12, ' It was further argued by the counsel for the respondent/NDMCthat the applicationfiled by the NDMC before the Supreme Court in July 2011 praying inter alia for extension of time to regulate hawkers/squattersin tlie NDMC area, as per the scheme mentioned in the judgment in Gainda •• Ram's case (supral, till the enactment of a law by the legislature in that regard, had not yet been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court at the time of passing of the status quo order dated 15.07.2011 and similarly, the otlier application filed by one of the hawkers/vendors praying inter ciiia for restraining the respondent/NDMC from granting Tehbazari rights to the winners of the lucky draw of lots for allotment, which was to be held on

12.05.2011 or any date thereafter, was also pending consideration before the Supreme Court. Hence, no finality could be attached to the order dated

15.7.2011 which can only be considered an interim measure till tl'ie final disposal of the aforesaid applications or the enactment of a legislation.

¶13On merits, learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC referred to the arridavit dated

01.08.2011 filed by the Director (Enforcement), NDMC, W.P.(CJ 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connecl:ed matters • Paqe 10 of 28 wherein it was stated that pursuant to the public notice issued by the NDMC inviting applications under the NDMC Urban Street Vending Scheme in the year 2007, the respondent/NDMC had received 4367 applications.The docunnents required by the applicants for-registration under the Scheme included a proof of age, documentary proof/affidavit Tor the purpose of annual income, proof of residence,pi oof in suppoit of special categorieslike handicapped,Kashmiri migrants etc. and proof of squatting in the NDMC area, if any. In para 4 of the aforesaid affidavit, the following criteria approved/adoptedby the Vending Committee to shortlist the eligible applicants is set out;-"4. That the criteria approved/adopted by the Vending Committee to shortlist eligible applicants is as under;-

(i) The applicants should be resident of Delhi with his name registered in electoral rolls as per abstract of photo E-Roll or ERO certificate.

(ii) The applicant should be a major, viz. with over 18 years of age as per valid birth certificate or age certificate or school certificate etc.

(iii) The applicant should be a needy as per income records of DC (Revenue) or as vulnerability records of • Government of NCT of Delhi (Samajik Suvidha Sangam: vulnerable and most vulnerable category).

(iv) The applicant should be registered as per NDIMC Street Vendors Scheme. The policy verification of the applicant should be available.

(v) The applicant or his dependent family member should not be employed or should not have any other, tehbazari/vending or any other business premises in Delhi as per record verification of NDMC/MCD. W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & conneicted matters

(vi) Preference m\\ be given to applicants who are physically handicapped or widows or senior citizens above years or Kashmiri migrants or SC/ST (necessary certificate to be submitted and relaxation may be given in the above criteria)." .14. As per the respondent/NDMC, the category-wise list of eligible shortlisted applicants in terms of the aforesaid criteria totalled to 3878-applicants. The affidavit dated

01.08.2011 states that respondent/NDMChas identified 183, new spaces, in addition to the 203 remaining spaces identified by the Thareja Committee in the NDMC area, which were available for allotment, thus taking total number of available spaces to 385. It was further stated that due to factors like de'- listing of the Parliament Street on security grounds, construction of flyovers and Metro Stations at various locations in the NDMC jurisdiction, the number of authorized tehbazari squatters has changed from to 404 in number. The number of applicants, who the respondent/NDMC claims, are vending unauthorisedly at Connaught Place, Sarojini Nagar, . Parliament Street and Janpath areas and in whose favour, status quo orders are operating, is stated to be 323 in number. The affidavit asserts that simply because the names of the petitioners; who are registered with Lhe NDMC, figure in the eligibility list drawn by the respondent/NDMC, cannot be treated as proof of their regularly vending in the NDMC area and nor does it confer on l:hem any enforceable-vested right to ensure a vending space for them in the NDMC area, which is directly dependent on l/V.F.{C)4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connected maiters l:he number of spaces available. Thus, it was contended that neither the possessionof any number of challans, nor the absence thereof can make a difference, for the reason that challans cannot form the basis for the pel-Jtioners to claim any vested legal right to squat at a given space.

¶15Counsel for respondent/NDMC asserted that present pel:itions are not maintainable inasmuch as the petitioners have an equally efficacious alternate remedy of approaching appellate authority constituted by the Chairperson, NDMC, for redressal of their grievances and failure on their part to have approached Vending Committee is not on account of the fact that the said Committee including the appellate authority is not functioning, but because they have found it more convenient to bypass the aforesaid forum and approach this Court directly, wluch is not permissible. She stated that extensive measures have been taken by the respondent/NDMC to constitute the adjudicatory iriechanism by way of a three tier system in the following manner:-

¶1Vending Sub-Committee (Site of Spaces),

¶2Vending Sub-Committee (Heath and Hygiene) and

¶3Vending Sub-Committee (Enforcement).

¶16She stated that the creation of the aforesaid three Vending Sub-Committees, Vending Committee (i^iain), as also of the appellate authority which was constituted to redress grievances of the squatters, liawkers, traders, residents or any other person against the decision of W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 ffi connected matters Ihe Vending Committee (Main), was placed before the Supreme Court for consideration and'the said three tier adjudicator'/ mechanism was duly approved in the judgment of Gainda Ram (supra).

¶17Per contra, learned counsels for the petitioners/vendors, who appeared on different dates, vehemently opposed the aforesaid stand taken by the respondent/NDMC and asserted that the scheme floated by the respondent/NDMC for regulating vending activities in its jurisdiction had lapsed on 30.06.2011 in the absence of the enactment of a legislation as per directions of the Supreme Court in the case of Gainda Ram (supra) and as on date, there is no scheme in existence. It was canvassed that implication of the aforesaid order of status quo passed by Supreme Court on 15.07.2011 can only mean that irrespective of the fact whether squatting is legal or illegal, same be permitted to. continue on an 'as is where is' basis, and such status quo is to be maintained by all the parties till a law is framed by the legislature.

¶18Mr. B.B. Sawhney, Sr. Advocate appearing for petitioners/vendors submitted that in the case of Gainda Ram (supra), Supreme Court had directed that the appropriate government must enact a law on or before 30.06.2011 so that the hawkers may precisely know tlie contours of their rights, hence dispute redressal mechanism provided' for in the scheme mentioned in the aforesaid judgnnent could operate only upto

30.06.2011 and thereafter, said scheme would W.P.(C) 4743/2011^ 52S4/2011 & connected matters Page 14 oT28 6? automatically stand lapsed. He stated that no other interpretation can be given to the order dated 15.07.2011, directing maintenance of status quo, in view of the qualirying words, ''as it is obtaining today". He argued that, it the scheme was continuing to operate, as claimed by the learned counsel For the respondent/NDMC, then there was no good reason for the respondent/NDMC to have refrained from holding a draw of lots, which was slated for the same day, i.e., 15.07.2011, and that fact of the matter is that even the respondent/NDMC liad understood the status quo order to mean tliat there is no scheme in place after 30.6.2011, for the reason tliat in para 58 of the aforesaid judgment in the case of Gainda R.am Csupral, all the writ petitions and the interim applications filed before the Supreme Court were disposed of witli clear and specific directions that the problem of hawicing and street vending could be regulated by the schemes framed by the NDMC and MCD only upto 30.06.2011 and not thereafter. It was asserted on behalf of the petitioners/vendors that as on date, the directions of the Supi'eme Court that status quo is to be maintained by the parties can only be given one interpretation, which is that till a law is ultimately enacted by the Parliament, irrespective of their legal status, all the petitioners/vendors would be permitted to continue squatting/hawking at the sites that have been occupied by them. .19. Insofar as the composition of the dispute redressal mechanism is concerned, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners submitted that contrary to the understanding of the-respondent/NDMC, the scheme W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 J?i connec!:ed matters reproducedat paras 72 and 73 in the judgmentin the case of GmnclaJlaD:i (supra), was not tlie one wliicii was actually recognized by the Supreme Court, and rather it is the dispute redressal scheme mentioned in para 75 of the aforesaid judgment i.e., a scheme for urban street vendors for MDIMC area as formulated in the year 200S, which was ultimately approved by the Supreme Court on 17.05.2007, in the case of Sudhjr Madan. (supra), which is the scheme which finds mention specifically in the following para 74 and is the one approved by the Supreme Court. It was contended that even otherwise, the National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as 'SpecSaS Pirovisiouts Act') comes to the rescue of the petitioners for the reason tliat sub-clause

(2) of Section 3 of the Special Provisions Act mandates maintenance of status quo as on

01.01.2006, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or oi'der of any court, in respect of encroachment or unauthorized development. ThLis, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners/vendors that they were entitled to grant of interim protection til! the enactment of a legislation to regulate hawking/vending activities in urban streets in Delhi on the basis of the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, 2009 framed on 17.06.2009 and the Special Provisions Act.

¶20Witii reference to Special Provisions Act, learned Senior Advocate for petitioners stated that phrase, "unauthorized development" used "in the definition clause has to be seen in the same context as the one in which the phrase "encroachment" has been defined, l/l/.P.fCj 4743/2015254/2011 & connected matters wherein it is mentioned that putting up oF temporary, semi-temporary or permanentstructure for residential use or commercial use or any other use, and the placementof goods on the pavements by the petitionersis liable to be termed as unauthorized use for maintainiiig status quo under the Special Provisions Act. Much emphasis was laid on the averments made by the respondent/NDMCin its interim applicationfiled before the Supreme Court in Gainda Ram's case fsupra) in July 2011, to subniit that the respondent/NDMC itself-had stated in the said' application that the scheme had lapsed and therefore, the only interpretation that can be given to status quo order passed by the Supreme Court on . .1.5.07'.201:J. can be that no scheme would exist after

30.06.2011 and thus, the 'benefit of the Special Provisions Act ought to be extended to the petitioners. He submitted that phrase 'street vendors' has been clearly defined under the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, 2009. Reliance was placed in the case of Patri Vvapar Mandal Delhi fRegd.) vs. MCD Town Hall 8c Ors. reported as

(2009) SCC and |:3rovisions of the Special Provisions Act to submit that even the Supreme. Court had recognized the fact that the Special Provisions Act is the only Central law governing field and it would have primacy over other Statutes and administrative orders. It is thus stated that the provisions of the NDMC Act cannot be invoked by the respondent/NDMC as the said Act is not in consonance with /-Vrticle 96 of the Constitution of India and furthermore, Special Provisions Act being valid till end of }/l/.P.(C) 4-743/2011, 5254/2011 & connecteii matters December20:1.1, no orders in derogationof the provisionsof the said Act Crin be passed'. 2L. Mr. S.K. Tripathi, Advocate appearing .for some of petitioners/vendorssought to embellish the submissionsof Mr.Sawhney, Sr.Advocate and relied on the orders passed in W.P.(C) 1449/2011 entitled Mnbd. Isnnail vs. NDMC & Or5._ to urge that the "Appellate Authority" constituted under the dispute redressal mechanism for the MDMC area, has not been functioning, which fact he stated is borne out from a perusal of the ordei" doted 08.03.2011 passed in the aforesaid case, wherein the Court took notice of the claim of the petitioner/vendor therein to effect that inspite of orders passed by the Appellate Authority allov\;ing squatting at a particular site, till a final determination by the Vending Committee as to his eligibility, the respondent/NDMC and tlie police were disturbing his activities. In the aforesaid order, 5i;ritement of the counsel for the respondent,^NDKC was recorded to the effect t.lirit the appellate a.uthority, whose order was being relied upon by tlie petitioner therein, was constituted initially for the MGD areas and later started functioning for the IMDMC areas as well for the reason that at that time, there was no separate appellate audiority for the NDMC areas, but subsequently, in accordance with the scheme approved by the Supreme Couit, tlie Chairperson, MDMC had constituted a separate appellate auLliority for • the MDMC areas. Therefore, appellate authority appointed earlier had ceased to have jurisdiction iiua the NDMC areas. It Mr.P.(C} 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connected matters was thus contended on behalf of tl'ie petitioners/vendors that aforesaid order clearly indicates that the appellate authority in the NDMC • areas is not functioning.

¶22Reliance was also placed on minutes of the meeting of the Vending-Committee dated 11.03.2010, to claim that'if the fact of whether thei-e was actual squatting/vending was verified by the Committee and if the names of the petitioners/vendors figured in the eligibility list prepared by the respondent/MDMC for holding the draw of lots, then it did not lie in the mouth of the respondent/MDMC to claim that the petitioners, who had been verified and found ^to be eligible, were not entitled to squat at various sites in the NDIMC area after 30.06.2011.

¶23Tn rebuttal, counsel for the respondent/NDMC disputed the contentions of the petitioners/vendors and while reiterating her earlier submissions, asserted that the petitioners did not have any legally enforceable right, created on the basis of the eligibility list drawn by NDMC, for claiiTiing.grant of interim orders in their favour. She again referred to paras 68, 69, 75, 76 and 78 of the judgment in the case of GamdcLJiani..{^l2r.aLto emphasize that when the aforesaid paras are lead collectively, it is clear that the petitioners cannot claim an entitlement to any interim orders as sought by them in the present proceedings. She further stated that even otherwise, the Special Provisions Act relied upon by the petitioners has duly recognized the ^ W.P.CO 4743/2011, 5254/2011 fi connectedmatters tg 2B schemes prepared by the local authorities in the National Capital Territory of Delhi for regulation of url^an street vendors. To substantiate the said submission, she drew the attention of this Court to the preamble of the aloresaid Act, which mentions the fact that all the schemes prepared by local authorities in IMational Capital Territory of Delhi, for • regulation of urban street vendors in accordance with the IMational Policy on Urban Street Vendors, 2009 and the Master Plan for Delhi 2021, have Ijeeii implemented and further that more time is required for proper inipjementation of tl"ie schemes regarding hawkers and Lirban street vendors. 2''i. A specific reference was made by learned counsel for the respondent/IMDMCto Section 2(i)(c) of the Special Provisions Act, which defines the phrase "encroachment" to claim that it does not cover the petitioneis herein, who are squatters. Further reference was made to the firovision of Section 3 of the Special Provisions Act, which contains a non obstante clause, to state that status quo with regard to the encroachment or unauthorized development as on 01.01.2006, menldoned in the said provision, was in context of definition of the phrases "encroachn-ient"and "unauthorized development" set out in the definition clause at Sections 2(l)(c) and 2(l)(i) respectively of the Special ProvisionsAct and thus, the petitioners/vendorsdid not qualify under the aforesaidenactmentfor claiming protectionas none of the ingredientsset out in the provisions of the aforesaid enactment are found to exist in their 4743/2011, 52S4/2011 &connected niattv.rs case. It: was submitted that tlie Special Provisions Act, which came into effect in the year 2007 and has been extended from time to time and lastly, till December 2011, does not give permission to persons to re-start any activity once they have been removed by the civic authority and Siniilarly, the Scheme of 2009 does not entitle the registrants to squat unless they have been allotted a specificsite. In,support of the aforesaid submission, reliance was place on the judgment in the case of MCD vs. GLM:nam.J<aLn: reported as (1989) 1 SCC 101. For the purpose of interpreting the meaning of the phrase, "structure", reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Coi-Qor^LQQ^Greater Bombay & Ors. vs. Indian Oil Coroorafinn Itd. reported as AIR 1991 SC 686. For the purpose of understandingthe expression, ^status quo', reference was made to the judgment in. the case ol" Mejisrs^DjhajiaLCoking..^^^ Liniitedvs. State of Bihar R, Drg reportedas 19S7 (Supp) SCC 394 to submit that in ordinary legal connotation,the term quo' impliesthe existingstate of things at any given point oP time. 2j. As foi the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, counsel foi' the respondent/NDMC.statedthat both, the 2004 policy and the 2009 policy, find mention in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gainda .!laoi.._(sLiBra)and it was only after taking into consideration the said policies, did the Court directed the institLitionalizationof urban street vending through legislation. It was further stated that at the time of i/l/.P.(C)4743/2011,.'>254/201181 connectedmatters ' Page 21 of28 delivering l;he judgment dated 8.10.2010, the Supreme Court took notice of the NCT of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2009, which was valid upto

30..12.2010, apart from noticing Model Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street .Vending) Bill, 2009 introduced by the Government of India, Ministry of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation.She stated tliat nothing new is now being submitted by the petitioners/vendors herein, for the present petitions to be entertained for any purpose whatsoeverand all the grievancesraised by petitioners can easily be addressed before Vending Committee/appellate authorit:yunder the scheme relating to urban street vending in the NDMC area, which fora continueto remain functional,even after 30.6.2011.

¶26This Court has heard these matters at length since 17.8.2011, on diffeient dates. Various counsels for the petitioners/vendors and the Standing Counsel for the respondent/NDMC tiad addressed the Court. Their-respective arguments have been taken note of. Both sides have made strenuous efforts to explain what the status quo order dated

15.7.2011 passed by the Supreme Court in case of Gainda R5.ni(.supra)implies. The leitmotif of the arguments addressed on behalf of the petitioners/vendors is that the status quo order read with the qualifyingwords, "as it is obtainingtoday", suffixed to the order, can only be lead to imply that as on date, i.e., IS.7.2011, there was no scheme operational in the NDMC areas to regulate vending activities and till a law M/.P.(C)4743/2011, 5254/2011 i& connected matters Patje 2.2 of 28 M is ulLimately enaclied by the legislature, all the petitioners, irrespective of their legal status, can continue squatting/hawking .at different sites that have been occupied by them. It is also asserted that in the teeth of the status quo orders passed by the Supreme Court, the respondent/NDI^C in collusion with the police authorities, is threatening to illegally remove the peLitionersA/endors from different sites, which is detrimental, adverse, harassing and belligerent to those, who have been found eligible by the respondent/NDMC for being allotted specific tehbazari spaces within the MDMC jurisdiction, but are being threatened due to lack of further action in this regard which is pending at the end of the respondent/NDMC. The second limb of submissions made by learned counsels for petitioners/vendors was that the Special Provisions Act would additionally come to rescue of the petitioners/vendors, which also requires maintenance of status quo as existing on 01.10.2006, till the end of December, 2011. P.7. On tl'ie other hand, the main thrust of the arguments addressed by the counsel for the respondent/NDMCwas that as the legislature has failed to enact an appropriate legislation in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gainda.Ranil^pra), ttie subsequent order dated 15.7.2011 directing parties to maintain the status quo as it is obtaining on the .said date can only imply that the state of affairs as existing on date are not to be disturbed, until the rights of the parties can be finally determined through legislation. It was submitted that while W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 &connected matters passing tine status quo order on 15.07.2011, tlie Supreme Court was conscious of tine fact tlnat tine Parliament had yet to enact a-comprehensivelegislation to regulate url^an stree: vending and in such circumstances, it goes without saying that it was the intent bfthe-Court that the entire dispute redressal mechanism as recognizedin the case of GG!!nda_J:^aLTi(suQralwould continue to remain,in operation,.so as to regulate the urban street vending in,the MDMC area, till the legislationin H that regard is enacted. Further, it was stressed that the Special ProvisionsAct did not provide any protectiveumbrella to the petitioners, wliose squatting activities neither fell under definition of "encroachment",nor under "unauthorizeddevelopment". It was further asserted that even otherwise pending'an appropriate legislation, the NDMC Act was availableas a fall back option and the relevantprovisions in the said enactmentwould continueto regulatestreetvendingactivity,n the NDMC area and the petitioners/vendorscould not claim avested right to squat at any site of their own.

¶28i-rom the above, it is apparent that arguments and counter argumentshave been raised by both sides on their respectiveversions of the meaning and the effect of the status quo order dated 15.7-.2011 passed by the Supreme Court. It is also very apparent,that the meaning sought to be attributed by both sides as to the implication of the said status quo order, is diametricallyopposed to each other. IMot only this, , both sides aie at a tangenton the factum of the pendencyor otherwiseof \W.P.(C)4743/2011,5254/201:t&connectedmatters p^ge24 of28 lha interim applications filed before the Supreme Court by botli, the • npplicants/uenclorsand the respondent/NDMC,for clariflcations,on which tiie aforesaid order came to be passed as it Is the stand of the . respondent/NDMCthat the aforesaid applicationswere not disposed of while passing the oixierdated 15.7.2011. The partiesare poles apart on the question of import of the status quo. order, and the effect of the oljservations made by the .Supreme Court in the case of Gainda Ramlsupra),as regards the approval of NDMC scheme. They are'alsoat loggerheads on the composition of the adjudicatory mechanism in the NDMC jurisdictionand tlie manner of its functioning,as also the identity of the scheme which is valfdiyoperatingin the NDMC areas for regulating urban streetvending, which had all been subject matter of consideration • before the Supreme Cotirt in the aforesaid case. The other issues agitated by the parties, starting from the interpretationof the various observationsmade by the Supreme Court in the aforesaidjudgment,,to tlic formulationof the scheime as approved by tile SupremeCourt in the case of SudM;_.MadcULisuBral,to the composition of the disputes redressal mechanism and its validity as also the meaning of the status quo ordei-, are all i,i a turmoil as both the parties have stoutly defended their respectivestands which are completelyat variancewith eaci, other^ The only common ground shared by the pa,"ties is the factum of passing of the recent judgment dated 08.10.2010 in the case of Gainda llamCsuBiaJand the subsequentstatus quo orderdated 15.7.2011passed W.P.<C,.743n«ll, S2S4/2ai, a matter. ' by Lhe SuiDreme CourL

¶29The roLintainheacI of the dispute in the present cases therefore remains the status quo order dated 15.7.2011 passed by the Supreme Court. The issue which is sought to be agitated before'this Court is that having regaixl to the status quo order, whether a stay order ought to be granted by this Court in favour of the petitioners/vendorsas prayed for by . th(-MTi, irrespective of their legal status, thus forbidding Iespoiident/NDMC from threatening and/or removing them from the differentsites occupied by them in the MDMC areas. In other words, this Court'IS being called upon to examine the meaning, scope and effect of the status quo order dated 15.07.2011. On the question of how to a.S(.eitain the implicationof a status quo order passed by a court, in tlie case of Messj-s BharatCddnq Coal Limited fsunraV it was observedby the Supreme Court that the expression,\status quo' is undoubtedlya term of aniljiguityand at times, gives rise to doubt and difficultyand in case any parly has any doubt on the meaning and the effect of the status quo order, the proper course for such a party would be to approach the Court that had passed the status quo order, to seek.,clarifications.

¶30In the case at hand, while seeking to ride the wave of the aforesaid status quo .oiclei, the parties have chosen to overlook one important, factor, which is that a status quo order operates on both sides. The SunreiTie Court has passed orders requiring both sides to maintain status 4743/20.11, 5254/201JI &connected niaiters quo. Once such an order of the Supreme Court is on record, the same not only binds all the parties to the adjudication, and all the parties, civil .or judicial who are required'to act in accordance with the said orders, but it equally binds the High Court from interfering with such an order, as the said order has been passed in litigations before the highest Court of the Ia n d. 31-Itie orders of the Supi'erne Court are on record. The status quo order' is a clear signal to tlie High Court as well, to avoid granting any order, including an interim order, vA/hen the Supreme Court has directed for status quo to be maintained. In such circumstances, if this Court was to grant a stay, order in favour of the petitioners/vendors arrayed before it, it would be tantamountto negating Llie orders of the Supr-erne Court, which require the parties to maintain status quo pending enactment of appropriate legislation. If either of the parties were unclear about the interpretationof the status quo order, it was for them to have applied to the SupreiTie Court for clarifications thereof. Additionally, the reliance placed by the petitioners/vendorson the Special ProvisionsAct seeking interim legal sanctity to the placement of goods by them on the pavements, by terming it as encroachment/unauthorizeduse, as recogni-/ed under the said Act and their contention that the Supreme Court had recognizedthe fact that the Special ProvisionsAct is the only Central law having primacyover otherStatutes,are also mattersthat the W.p.iO4/.<K3/20.ii1, 5254/2011&connectedmatters Page 27 of28 pe(;il:ioners/vendorsought to have placed before the Supreme Court while seeking clarifications of the status quo order. It would therefore be advisable for the petitioners/vendorsas also the respondent/NDMCto approach the Supreme Court and make their submissions there as regards their grievances. However, as both parties insisted that their ' arguments be taken note of and their submissionsbe placed on record, some pains have been taken to do the needful.' '• I.n view of tl'ie aforesaidfacts and circumstances,this Court is of the opinion that it will not be appropriatefor it to grant stay orders in the face •of the status quo order dated 15.07.2011passed by the Supreme Court. It is leiteratedthat any such order shall be an anti-thesisto the orders of the SupremeCourt, which must be respectedboth, in letterand spirit. In such circumstances,the present petitions are disposed of by declining grant of any interim oixlersto the petitioners. However, liberty is granted to botn the parties to apply to the SupremeCourt for a clarificationof tlie status quo order dated 15.07.2011 passed in the case of Gainda Ram (supraj. [he parties are left to bear their own costs. ocroERpri,20ii rkb V\/.P.(C)4743/2011,5254/2011&cannecte.dmatters 28 of28

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on : 21.09.2011 Pronounced on: 24.10.2011 + W.P.fCl 4347/2011. 4559/2011. 4593/2011. 4610/2011. 4650/2011. 4651/2011. 4827/2011. 4923/2011. 5024/2011. 5028/2011. 4775/2011. 5247/2011. 5254/2011. 5255/2011. 5257/2011. 5258/2011. 5261/2011. 5262/2011. 5263/2011. 5264/2011. 5277/2011. 5292/2011. 5312/2011. 5317/2011. 5402/2011. 5403/2011. 5405/2011. 5408/2011. 5410/2011. 5411/2011. 5413/2011. 5418/2011. 5423/2011. 5444/2011. 5473/2011. 5484/2011. 5485/2011. 5497/2011. 5498/2011. 5503/2011. 5504/2011. 5505/2011. 5506/2011. 5507/2011. 5508/2011. 5595/2011. 5614/2011. 5615/2011. 5616/2011. 5618/2011. 5627/2011. 5630/2011. 5631/2011. 5643/2011. 5645/2011. 5654/2011. 5656/2011. 5711/2011. 5717/2011. 5718/2011. 5728/2011. 5729/2011. 5731/2011. 5732/2011. 5737/2011. 5738/2011. 5739/2011. 5743/2011. 5761/2011. 5784/2011. 5785/2011. 5791/2011. 5794/2011. 5797/2011. 5798/2011. 5822/2011. 5911/2011. 5918/2011. 5928/2011. 5931/2011. 5933/2011. 5934/2011. 5935/2011. 5957/2011. 5965/2011. 5966/2011. 5967/2011. 5968/2011. 5969/2011. 5970/2011. 5974/2011. 6096/2011. 6100/2011. 6101/2011. 6102/2011. 6107/2011. 6108/211. 6114/2011. 6115/2011. 6116/2011. 6117/2011. 6118/2011. 6119/2011. 6120/2011. 6121/2011. 6122/2011. 6123/2011. 6144/2011. 6250/2011. 6270/2011. 6271/2011. 6449/2011. 6527/2011. 6528/2011. 6529/2011. 6530/2011. 6531/2011. 6532/2011. 6533/2011. 6534/2011. 6538/2011. 6555/2011. 6667/2011. 6668/2011. 6669/2011. 6670/2011. 6684/2011. 6701/2011. 5173/2011. 4739/2011, 5046/2011. 5051/2011. 5157/2011. 4649/2011. 4722/2011. 2601/2011. 2602/2011. 3052/2011. 3181/2011. 3185/2011. 3189/2011. 3196/2011. 4340/2011. 4342/2011. 4343/2011. 4344/2011. 4345/2011. 4349/2011. 4350/2011. 4352/2011. 4354/2011. 4356/2011. 4358/2011. 4359/2011. 4360/2011. 4361/2011. 4362/2011. 4363/2011. 4364/2011, 4365/2011. 4366/2011. 4367/2011- 4368/2011. 4369/2011. 4370/2011. 4371/2011. 4372/2011. 4373/2011. 4374/2011. 4375/2011. 4377/2011" 4387/2011. 4388/2011. 4389/2011. 4391/2011. 4392/2011. 4393/2011. 4395/2011. 4396/2011. •439872011. 4398/2011. 4399/2011. 4400/2011. 4402/2011. 4404/2011. 4405/2011. 4406/2011. 4407/2011. 4408/2011. 4409/2011. 4410/2011. 4412/2011. 4413/2011. 4414/2011. 5341/2011. 4S47/2011. 4859/2011. 4887/2011. 4990/2011. W,P.(€)4347/2011 and connected matters Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. O 5117/2011. 5129/2011. 5139/2011. J.-T/ 5144/2011. 6708/2011. 5799/2011. 6824/2011. 6825/2011. 6826/2011. 6827/2011. 6896/2011. 6901/2011. 6902/2011. 6903/2011. 6904/2011. 6905/2011. 6906/2011. 6907/2011. 6908/2011. 6909/2011. 6910/2011. 6917/2011. 6919/2011. 6920/2011. 6921/2011. 6922/2011. 6932/2011 and 5420/2011. JEEWiATTERS OF MOHD. AZAD Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4347/2011 MOHD. ALAM Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4559/2011 KIRPAL SINGH Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4593/2011 SHAILENDERKUMAR Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4610/2011 SANJAY Petitioner in W.P.(e) 4650/2011 BABLU Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4651/2011 AMAR NATH SINGH Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4827/2011 GANESH PRASAD Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4923/2011 BHUPALSINGH Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5024/2011 SURENDERSINGH AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5028/2011 USHA Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4775/2011 RAKESH KUMAR AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5247/2011 RAM DASS Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5254/2011 VISHAMBARJHA Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5255/2011 DINESH KUMAR Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5257/2011 ANJU Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5258/2011 RAJESH C GUPTA AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5261/2011 LAKHPATIAND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5262/2011 SOHAN LAL AND ORS. ..... Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5263/2011 KEDARI ..... Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5264/2011 ARUN KUMAR ALIAS LUCKY Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5277/2011 MITHU LAL Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5292/2011 MOHD. ZAHID Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5312/2011 SHAKEELAHMED Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5317/2011 NAND KISHORE ..... Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5402/2011 RINKU KUMAR GUPTA Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5403/2