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Padam Singh v. N.D.M.C. and Ors

Court
High Court of Delhi
Decided
24 October 2011
Bench
Hima Kohliauthor
Case no.
W.P.(C) 5630/2011

Judgment

judgment, till the appropriate government enacts a law Pur regulating ui ban sti'eet hawkers arid street vendr)rs. Jt was stateil that siniply because the-legislature has not enacted a law in this regard on oi helnie I

30.06.2011, as directed in the aloresaid judgment, it caniinl lie I contended by the petitioners/vendorsthat there exists a vacuum ani.l the Sciid Vcicuum cdu no longer be Pilled u|:) by continuing to lecjulnle (he • activitiesin the NDMC jurisdictionin the manner as set on!, in the , aPocesaid judgment. 'I-lo gn/e a brief backgroimdof Lhe dL^pute, learned culiirsel I,,, resr>onden,:/MDMCwa"<ed tf"s Court rhroogl,,orne pron,lr,en,:decisionsof SupremeCourt rendered froir, tin,e to tirr.e, whiet, relate to irn oi'iiecl eil I) a \/ (• W.P.(CJ^7^3/20JJ, 525^/2011 8. P-nye 4-of .iff squatlers/l'iawkers,slarting iTorn l:he decision in U'le case ol Sodqn 1. vs. NDIYIC repditedas (11.99e) 2SC.C 727, Ihe. inl.eiinioi dci d.iLcd

03.03.2006 -passed by ti'ie .SuiDi'eine Louit in .iH"-.-/-- enUUed ^idhir Madan (k dne final judgnienl:in l.lin case uf 5Mdhir Marian (SLlPml reported as (2009} 17 SCC 597 and.iaslly, the judgrnenl;dated 08.10.2'010passed in tlie case oP GaindiLJASi^U'^uiJin).

¶5I_earned counsel Tor the lespondent/NDMCveheinenUyopposed th.-> prayer ot the petitioners/vendoi-sToi-grant oP interim orders ie.slininin!:! the respondent/MDMCProrn removing ttien'i Prom tlie sites ocnipied Ijy ttiem till the enactment oP an appropriate legislation, in teinis nl tin., directions issued iTy the Supreme Coui't in the. case oP ba.incla ,|^.Lim (supI"a)- She particularly rePerred to tlie observations made by the Supreme Court in paras 40 and -1.1 oP Ihe judgment in the ca.se ()i '.jyLli:iii Sii'igh .(s.upra.), whicPi dealt witPi tlie immediate eviction oP i.inaniIloi i/ed squatters/l'iawlcers and laid ernijPiasis on tlie Pact that in llie said car.e, [In.: Supreme Coui't had directed removal oP unautPiorized squai.Lers/havvkei withoLii: awaiting Pinal allotment oP sites to be allotted to eligilile riaimant.'; at tlie places recommended by I.Pie I'lia'reja Committee or suggesled by the IMIJMC.

¶6Again, in the interim order dated

03.03.20OG passed in Sudliir .MiiC.ljii_5_Cc!se_X5JJi^ the Pollcjwing observation rnacJe by the .'.iiipiemi.'. Couit was highligPited by the counsel Por'the respondenP/i\IDM(..:: •• "I'CJ 4743/2011, 525^1/20X1Ik connerl.eil lualXers fViye 5 iff .Z'.fr -, il "While we Lindertake Lhi3 exercise, we direcl: ll'ie Aul;horil:ie5 to see to il 1:I"id1: those peisoiis, wlio riic •carrying on hawking activities or who ore squatting on public land wittiout any authority, eveii in accordaiH:e with the present day scheme in Force, are reinovct Porthwith. Tliis includes unauthorized hawking, squatting on public streets, footpattis and public |iail<s, including playground.We direct the Delhi Adininisti...itioii to take steps iminediatelyin collaboi'ationwith ML.I) niii MDMC with necessary assistance trom C^ell.ii I'olice to clear the roads, streets, footpaths, paH<s etc. I.)y LI na utI'l0lized occu |.")a nts/ sc| i.1a1.1ers/ liawke1s. K

¶7As to the judgment dated ;l.7.0S.2()C)7 rendered in the case or Sydhir..Madjin.lsupraLmLich emphasis wris laid by the counsel lor the respondent/NDMC on paras 28 to 30 and .:15, which are 1eproduc:ei.l hereinbelow for ready reference "28. Tlie New Dellii Municipal Cornniittee has al.s(,) subniitted its Scheme. We tiave considered ttie Sc:heme submitted before lis. Tlie area wtiich falls under l\li..)M(. does not create prot'lems sucfi as those in ttie arf:n;', under MCD. l-lowever, in the said Scheme reference has been made to persons who do not tiave permission under Section 225 or licence under Section .3JU of the MDMC Act, :l.994 but wfio are unauthorisedly conlinuiuq to carry on business as hiawk.ers/street vendors. lli(.'.y have been described as those wlio are "tolerated" in the •IMDMC area. We fail to Linderstand why any person who violates the law sliould be tolerated. Eitlier tfiey slioiild be coiripelled to obey tfie law or tlie law may be suitably amended, if it is found to create undue liardship. The problems need to be addressed by the legislature or' the rulemaking authority. We, therefore, observe Ihat if il is felt that the persorrs wfio fall in ttiis category iec|iiiic special protection, Lfie /-\ct may be suibably ameniJetl to cover their cases or else tlie number cif sucli ille.cial squatters n'lay increase from time to time. yl-743/201X, 525^:1/20 1..I !h coju,e,:!.ed Page 6 nf 2.(1.

¶29There has been no serious ohjecLioii l.o Liie bciicine SLibrnitlied by NDMC which is a cornprel'iensive .scllenle,. Certain directions have, however, been sougtit tor from this Court. We approve the Sctierne submitted l.iy NDMC. '

¶30It is submitted before us ttiat ttie Schemes whic.h have been approved by l.ltis, Court must be subijecl: to any /Act or rules ttiat inay beJiamed in consonance wilh the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors. It goes witl'iOLit saying that we have approved the Schemes as Prarned by IMCD and NlJMC. IP the legislature intervenes and' fraiTies another scheme or regulations govei niny such Scl-ien-ies, that will certainly .su|3ersede llio Schen'ies prepared by MCD and IMIDI^IC. It is well settleiJ ttiat any adrninisti-ative action is always subject to law •that may be Prarned by the competent legislature. 35-Subject to the aforesaid modiPications/ctianges in the Schemes submitted .by MCD aiid NDMC, the sanin are approved. The said anttiorities. siiall now tal<e appropi'iate steps to irnfilement the Sctierne Poi'iTiwith. In case oP any diPPiculty Paced by thein in im|"jlementing the schemes, ttiey shall tiavG tiie liberty to apply to ttiis Cou rt." y. . Lastly, in the recent judgrneni in ttie case 'oP Gaiiida Kani (supra), learned counsel Por the resporielent/NDMCspecifically iT^liod Lipoii paia;: 30, 3^', bO to 6b to .state ttiat the Supreii'ie Court was consciou;. of tin.: tact that a structured regulation aiuj legislation is urgently rei|uiicd I.) control and regulate the Pundainenlalright oP hawking. Slie also poinled out that the three tier disputes redressal mechanism set (jut. in the aPPidavit Piled by the then Chairpersonc,P the NDMC was taken note uP hy the.SupremeCourt in para 72 oP tlie aPoresaidjudgmentand in paia 71, ii was then observed as below WJ .{CJ 4?4J/20II, lf2L!>4/20:i1 ®co/Toecfej/mailers I'fige Ill "73. In paragraph 12 or Ijie'aPridavitil; has been sl;al:ed Lhal: there shall be an /Appellate /Authority which shall attend to the redressal of grievances oT squatters, hawkers, traders, residents or any othei' |:iersoi'i by healing appeals against the decision oi" the Venclihq Coniniittee (Main), i^aragraph 12 oP ttiat aPPidavit Is sol. out below;- There shall be an /\|:ipellate /Authority. On the Porwai'ding oP petitions received by the Chairperson, this /\utliority shall atteiiLl l.o redressai oP grievances oP squatteis, iiawkeis, traders, residents or any other person. Ihn /Authority shall also Piear appeals against Ihe decision oP Vending Comihittee

(Main). Decisions oP this /Authoiity unless challenged bePoi'e a l liyhei Forum oi' in any Conipetent Court, stiall be Pinal. Tliis Authority stiall be initially Pleaded by a iierson appointed by the Chairperson having at leasi: J U years legal or judicial background. Thei'e can iie more than one member In ttiis Auttiority." I • 9. /APter mai-dng the aPoresaid observations. In paras 7A lo /(.i oP I i judgiTient, the Supreirie Court went on Lo obsei've as belowc- "74. In the said aPPidavit, wliicPi was aPPiiined this Court on 24'-'' /August, 2010 it has been stated tlial I\II3MC si'iall comply witPi tlie ordei'S wtilch would lie passed by tPie adjudicatory mechanism conternrilal.et.l in the scheme and whicPi I'las been appixived by this Cuuil. Por the I\II3MC area, unless sucti orders are made sul.ijecl matter oP cPiallenge LiePore a higlier Porurn or' in any other coinpetent Court'. 7b. In view oP sucPi scliemes, ' tiie hawkeis, squatteis and vendors must abide by tlie Dispute P^edressnl sctienie mentioned above. T-Piere should riol. be any direct approacti to this Court by way oP Pi'esh petition oi I/As, bypassing tlie Dispute i<eclressal i^leclia provided in i;he sc Pi erne.. mf.P.(C)^743/2011, 5254-/20X1Aconneci.e.c!nwUers Fri-ge .rf2S

¶76Mowevei"', befoi e. 1!0"' June, 2UJ.1, Uie Govei-nn-ientis to enact a law on the basis ot the. .. mentioned above, or on the basis ot any arnendm.^nt ^ tliereof so that the hawkeis may precisely know i.. contours ot their rights." ;10. It was tlius .sought to be cuntended on behair nl tlx.. respondent/IMDMCttiat ttiere can be no vacLiuiri as hai as leynlaiion ol trade of street hawkers/vendorsIn the NDMC jurisdictionis concernerla the failure on the part of the legislatureto abide by the timeline by the Supreme Court in the case of :GajndiL_limaiiB=ii:jra).,by pufl.ing in place a statute on or before 30.06.2011, cannot be inteipreterl by lhe petitioners/vendors to mean lhat they can continue tlieir bade unhindered at any place of Iheir clioice in Lhe I\IL.)I^1L. Jui isllu..lion, in .m unregulated mannei" and witliout any obstinctioii or ol.)Je(..lion hoin llic. M13MC.

¶11Learned counsel for the respondeni/MDMCparticularly lefeiied b) paras 7-~l and 75 of ttie aforesaid Jridgmeiit to state that the dispule redre.ssalscheme, noticed by lhe .Supieme Coi.irt in para 7'.. was lhe one that was legally functioning in IMDMC jurisdiction and whi(.:h was lalcen note of by the Court in Lhe pieceding para 7'-l. l,n other words, slu:'. slated tlnat Ltie scheme as set out in the affidavit rJated .Z'-l .Of.i.ZO1.0, filed by Llie then Cl'iairperson of NDMC before the Supreme Court in Clai.iidQ Kami; cg.se (supra), was the one whicfi was finally approved by Lhe .'-.iipiemi^ CourL. Sl-ie fuilher submitted l.l'iat assuming, wiLlioiiL admlLLing, lhat l.lu^ W.r.fcj 525--J/2(JXX ft cnnn^cleAl rriaMsfi; I'agn ff of J'B dispute redressalsciiemeset out by the NDMC had lapsed on 30.r..V()11, 05 claimed by the petitioners,then the NDMC Act provides an adequate Pa 11back to ensure orderly managementoP vendors ii'i the area. Spr-MjlK. rePerencewas made in this regard to tlie pi-ovisionscontained in ..••oiJJ '221, 224, 225 and ,226 oP the said Act. s Purtherai-gued by the counsel Por the re5pondent/Nt)M( Ihat It wa the application Piled by the NDMC bePore the Supreme Court in ."Inly 2t) II praying inter alia Por extension oP time to regulate hawkei5/s(iual.i.eis in tl'ie NDMC area, as per the scheme mentioned in Uie judgment in Gdindd l-'^am's case (supra), till the enactment oP a law by the legislature in regard, had not yet been Pinally disposed oP by the Supreme Couit at the time oP passing oP the status quo oixler dated 15.07.201.1. and similaily, the other application Piled by one oP the Piawkers,/vendorspi'aying iiUr.i alia Por restraining the respondent/NDMCProm granting lehbazan riijlits to ttie winners oP tlie'lucky dravA/ oP lots Por allotment, which wr.is to he. Iield on

12.05.2011^^ or any date theieaPter, was also peni.liiig consideration bePore the Supreme Court. ' Hence, no Pinallty c(,)uli,l he attached to the order dated

15.7.2011 whicli can only be consii.leicd an interim measure till the Pinal disriosal oP tlie aloresaid application.'.; m lhe enactment oP a legislation.

¶13On merits, learned counsel Por the respondent/NI^MIC rePei i ed to the aPPidavit dated

01.08.2011 Piled by the .Director (EnPorcement),' Nl.iMIC,

¶11W.P.(C) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 S, connp.cJed /riaffers P'ai.fe. 10 i.tf 7H ; -\ / wherein ii: was stated that pursuant to tlie' puLilic notice issued by the; IMDI^-IC inviting-cipplications under tlie MDMC Urban Street VeuiliuLi Scheme in the year 2007, the respondent,/MDMC I'lad received d.lb/ applications.Tiie documents required by the applicants for registiation under the Scheii'ie included a pruol^ oT age, docurnBiitary proot/aflidavil Poi' the purpose oP annual incori'ie, [noor oP residence, prooP in suppi.ut nl special categories like handicapped, Kashniiri migrants etc. aiid iiruoP ol squatting in the IMIDMC area, iP any. In para 4 oP the aPorcsaid aliidnvit, the Pollowing criteria approved/adopted by the Vending Co.mmillf:e to shoi'tlist the eligible applicants is set out;-"4. Tliat the criteria ap|Ti"oved/adopted by llie Vending Committee to sliortlist tlie eligible applicants is a.s under;-

(i) Ttie applicants siiould tie, resideiit oP Dellii witli I'lis name registered. in electoral rolls as pei" atjsti a(;;L "I ppioto E-r-<oll or l£r<0 certiPicate.

(ii) TPie applicant should be a n'lajor, viz. witti ovei' in years oP age as i:jer valid birtPi certificate oi age certiPicate or scItooI certiPicate etc.

(iii) T|-ig applicant sliotild be a needy as per ir records oP i.JC (l-ievenue) or as vulnerability recoi'ds "I Governmeni: oP i\ICT oP Dellii (Sania]il<; Suvidha .Sangam: vulnerable and most vulnerable categoi'y).

(iv) The apfjlicant slioLild be registered as pei" l\ll."iMi.: Street Vendors Scheme, 'i'he policy veriPication oP i.hc icant should be available.

(v) The applicant or his dependent Parnily membe.i should not be en-iployeii oi' stiould not liave any othei tehbazari/vending or any otl'ier business pi-emises in l.:)elhi as per record veriHcation oP NDMC/MCD. W.r.(C} 47^13/203 X, '5Z5-!/201X Sk niR'l.iers Paije III trf 7.1? i (\/i) Preference will be .given Lo applicEinlis who-are i physically handicapped or widows or senioi' above years • oi" Kashmiri migranLs or '--C/bI (necessary certiPicate to be subiriitted and relaxation may be given in the above criteria)." I • 14, /-\s per the respondent/iMDMC, the category-wise list oP cligil)le ; shortlisted applicants in tern'is oP the aPoresaid criteri.a Lotalled lo J!'./!'. applicarits. Tiie aPPidavit dated OJ..OH..ZOJ.J. stale..:) LIihI. tlic I respondent/NDMChas identiPied 103 new spaces, in addition to the ! remainingspaces identiPied by the Thareja Committee in the IMI.iML. niea, ! which were available' Por allotment, thus taking tlie total ni.imbei ol i I . availablespaces to 386. -It was Purtherstated that diie to Pactors lil'.e de ; listing oP the Parliannent Street on securily grounds, construction ol ; Plyovers and'MetroStations at various locations iri the IMIDML jurisdiction, i the number oP authorized tehbazari squatters has changed Irom l"!!'.- to ! i 404 in number. The number oP applicants, who ttie respondt^iit/NI'M(.. ; claims, are vending unauthorisedly at Connaught Place, Saiojini Nngar, Parliament Street and Janpatti areas a,ni:l in wtiose' Pavour, qiic orders are operating, is stated to be-323 in number. Tlie aPPidavit asserts thai; simply because the naiTies oP the i;)etitioriers, wlio ai e registei OLl wilh I tlie NDMC, Pigure in the eligibility list drawn by the re5|.")ondenl./NI->M(,., i cannot be treated as prooP oP their regularly vending in tlie NDMC area and nor does it conPer on them any enPorceable vested lighit to ensure a i vending space for ttiem in the NPJMC: area, whicPi is directly depeiu. W.P.(C) 4-743/2011, 5254/2011 Si connerj.e.ii inal.lei s Page 1.2 ttl' 2(f Lhe number of spaces available. Thus, il: was conLended UiaL neilh.M-llu^: possessionoT any number of challons, nor l;he absence Lhereof can make 3 dirrerence, Tor \:he reason Lhal challans canriol: form l.he Liasis loi Ihn pebdoners to claim any vested legal right to squat at a given s|.)a(.e.

¶15Counsel tor the respondent/NDMC asserted that the pic.sent peUtions are not maintainable inasmuch as the fjetitioneis liav/e .,.in equally etficacious alternate rerne(.ly of approaching ttie. ap|)ollntc. authoi'ity constituted by Lhe Cliairperson, MDMC, Por redressal nl llu-ii grievances and Pailure on their part to have approached the Vending Committee is not on account oP ttie Pact that the said Commil.teeimJurling the appellateauttiorityis not Punctioning,but because they have loiind il more convenient to bypass the aPoresaid ioruin and approach this (...nuit. directly, which is not permissible. She stated that extensive mea.sui(-: I tiave been taken by ttie respondent/NDMC to constitute ttie ad.judhaloiy i meclianism by way oP a tPiree tiei'' system in the Pollowing mnniicr:' .1.. Vending .Sub-Committee (.Site oP Spaces), 2-Vending Sub-Committee (lleath and l-lyqiene) and .'3. Vending Sub-Committee (EnPoi cerneril). .1.6. Stie stated that the cieation oP lhe aPoresaid three Vending .Sulv Committees, Vending Con"irriittee

(Main), as also oP tlie a|.".i|.)ellal:eaiilborily whicli was constituted to redre.s"s ttie grievances oP iJ ie S(.|ilal Ici s, hawl';ers, traders, residents or any ol.tiei person against l.he dei.i.sion oP W.P.fCJ 4?'yl3/2011, 525^^ / 20 il 81 cm in ect.iPA.I luaijers f'.ffye A.'t itf /.It the Vending Con-wriittee(Main), was placed before Uie SiJpierneLoiiit loi considerationand the said three tier'adjudicatoryrnechanisn, was duly approved in the judgment of GainclallajII_(iLy.l2raJ..

¶17Per contra, learned counsels Tor the petitioners/vendois, who appeared on different dates, vehemently opposed the aforesaid stand taken by the respondent/NDMCand asserted that the sc.liemc floahTd liy the respondent/NDMCfor I'egulating vending activities in its jui-is(,liclion had lapsed on 30.06.2011 in the absence of the enactment of a leyislation as per directions of the .Supren'ieCourt in the case of and as on date, there is no^ scheme in existence. .U; was carivassed Ifial the in-iplication of the aforesaid order of status quo passed by the Supreme Court on 15.07.20:1.1can only.n-ieanthat irrespective ol' the larl wl-)ether the 'squatting is legal or illegal, tfie-san'ie be r^ermitled to continue' on an 'as is wfiere is' basis, and such status qui> is to lie. maintained by all the parties till a law is framed by ttie legislature.

¶18Mir. B.B. Sawtiney, .Sr. Advocate appearing foi' Ihn petitioners/vendors subn'iitted ttiat in the case of Galnda P.cirn (supia), the Supreirie Court had directed that tfie appropiiate government mu.';l. enacl a law on oi" before

30.OG.2011 so ttiat the liawkers may I'jreciscly f.nnw the contours of their rights, lience tfie dispute redressal mii;(:1lailisin provided for in the scfierne mentioned in ttie aforesaid judginenl. could operate only upto

30.06.201:1. and thereafter, tlie said scheme would WJ\(CJ yf7^!3/2Vll, .f. cannecljsd nuiUers Fnye J.4 or 7iC auLoinalJcallystand lapsed. He stated that no other interpretation'...nii ho given to tlie order dated 15.07.2011, directing maintenance of .s/;a/.'/'v(///o, in view of ttie qualiryingwords, "as il is obtaining today". He aigued liial if the scheme was continuing to operale, as claimed by l;tie lenined counsel for the respondent/MDMC,tiien tliere was no good rea.:^;on lor the respondent/NDMC to have refrained from tiolding a di'aw of lois, which was slated for the sarne. day, i.e., J b.0/.^!0.1.1, aru.l ttiat fact of l.he inciltei is ttiat even the responderit/IMDMC fiad understood ttie sial.iis quo oidnr to mean that there is no scheme in place after 30.6.2011, for the reason tfiat in para 68 of the aforesaid judgment in the case of Uaititla Kain (supra), all ttie writ petitions and the interim applications filed heloie the Supi'cnie Court were dis|:'osed of witfi clear and specific dir'ectioiis Ihat tin:' problem of hawking and street vending could be regulated by the schemes framed by the-MDF^'IC and i^'ICD only upto

30.06.20.11 and nol. thereafter. It was asserted on belialf of the petitioneis/vendoi s ll ial a.': on date, the directions of the Sufirerne Court ttiat sLiU.is (]u<i is lo lie maintained by the pai"ties can oiily be given one interpi etation, ttiat till a law is ultimately enacted by the Paiiian'ient, irrG.?pective legal status, all ttie petitioners/N/endors woukJ be fjerinitted io C(i squatbng/hawking at the sites that have been occupied by tlieiri. .ly. Insofar as the composition ol the dispute redressal mec.lia COn(..eiiIcl, leai ned Senior /Aclvocate for' ttie |")elitlorier,s siibi contrary to ttie understanding of the iespondent/NDMC, II 4743/201.1,S.7^4/20.U.mcannecf.edn,^U:^rs Page :ri o^f 2H 1ei.i M . . repi'ocli-iced at paras /2 and 73 in ti)e judgrDent in ttie cjse o('Gcjiljdp. jlairt (supra), was not the one wliich was actually recognized by tlie Si i|.ii f;n ir - Court, and rather it is the dispute redressal scheme mei]tiuneLi in |)rirn 7,'> , oF the aforesaid judgment i.e., ' a sclieme for urban street ven(Joi.s loi ,? NDMC ai'ea as formulated in tlie ycziar .2006, whicfi was ull imnle.ly • approved by the Supreme Court on 17.05.2007, in tlie ca.se of .'Judliir Madan (sLipj'a}., \A.'hich is tlie scheme wfiicfi finds mention spe(.:ifitTilly in tl"ie following para 74 and is the one approveei by tlie Su|;ii-enie C^miil. II was contended that even otherwise, tlie IMationai Capital Teiiitory of t.ielhi . Laws (Special -i^rovisions) Act, 201J. (hereinafter I'eferred l:o as 'Spe!ir:iiriill IP'rovisiioiiis Aclf^) comes to tfie I'escue of the petil.ioners for the rerison ttiat sub-clause

(2) of Section 3 of Uie Special Provisions Act mandol.fs maintenance of staCus quo as on

01.01.2006, notwithstanding any judgment,• decree or order of any coLirt, in respect of encroaclimeiit oi uriautfiori7ed development. Tlnis, it was submitted on behalf of Ihe petitionei s/vendors tl'iat ttiey v\/ere enl.itled to grant of interini prefer! ion till tlie enactment of a legislationto legulate Ilawl'dng/vendinciactiviliesin urban streets in Delhi on the basis.of tlie National Policy on Url.ian Sti r-id Vendors, 2009 tramed on .17.06.2009 e,ncl the Special Provisions Act.

¶20With reference to the Special•Provisions Act, learned Snnioi Advocate for the petitioners stated that the phrase, "unaul.lmri/od development"used in the definition clause has to be seen in ihe •.anie contextas the one in which the phiase ''encroachment"has been defined. .1 ! wherein il: is n'lentioned l:hat puLting u|:) of leinporary, serni-keniijcirai y or permanent structure for resideirtial use or coirirnercial use or riny dthcr-use, and the placement of goods on the pavements Iny tlie petitioner.'-, is liable to be termed as i.inauthoi'ized use for maintaining status guo nnc.loi tine Special l^rovisions Act. .Mucti eiriiiihasis was laid on tlie avei nlonl.s made by the respondent/NDI^'IC in its irileiirn applicatiori filed tinfuio Iho Supi-eme Court in Gaiiida Flam's case ('supnil in July 20:1..1., to submit llinl tfie respondent/NDi^lC itself had stated in the said application tliat. Hip scheme had lapsed and ttierefore, the only interpretation tliot i::aii fio given to the stal:us quo ordei' passed by the Supi'erne (':onit on

15.07'.2011 can be that no scheme would exist aftei" 3'0.t)(.i.2(.) 1.1 and thus, the benefit of the Special Provisions Act ought to be extein.loMl lu the * petitioners. He submitted thai: the'. phi-ase "sti'eet vendors' has l)een clearly defined under the National Policy on Urban Street Vendirrs, 20()'..J. Reliance was placed in tlie case of .Pati;i Vyapar Mandal Delhi (;J(g,yd.) vs, MCD._lown Hall Ors. reported as (200i9) 12 SCC 475 nml 1110 provisions of the Special Provisions Act to submit that even the Siipiomr; Court had recognized the fact that the Special ProvisionsAct i;.: I.lie only Centi-al law governing the field and it would have primacy ovoi nlhr-:r Statutes and administrativeorders. It is thus stated that the i-rcvisinns .of the MDMC Act cannot be invoked by the respondent/MDMCas the '.aid Act is not in consonancewith Article 96 of'tlie Constitutionof .in.Jia and furthermore, the Special Provisions Act being valid till tlie end of • December ^011, no orders in derogalion of the provisiuns of l.he sniil /\i.:l. ; can be passed. j

¶21Mr. S.K. Tripal:l"ii, Advocate appearing •for s.ome of (tlie ' petitioners/vendors sought to embeliisti Ihe submissions oP Mr..'invvhncy, Sr.Advocate and relied on tl'ie orders passed in W"P'"(C) 1449/,21^.11.1 entitled Mohd. Ismail vs. NDMC {jc Ors. to nrqe tliat the "Appollal.e /Authority" constituted under ttie dispute redressal mechanisni ini the l\IDI"^IC area, lias not been functioning, w|-iich fact he stated is boi no oul (rom a perusal of the order dated 03-CJJ.2011 passed in tl'ie nloi ('..snid' case, wherein tl'ie Court took notice of tlie claim oP tlie petitioner/vein lor therein to the effect ttiat inspite of orders •passed by the Appellaie Authoi-ity allov^ing squatting at a particular site, till a final deteririinni ion by the Vending Committee as to his eligibility, tlie resrjoiideiit/MnMK.:and the police were disturbing his activities. In the aforesaid order, the -Statement of the counsel I'or the respondent/NDMC was recoided 'In IIle effect that the appellateauttiority,whose.orderwas being iclied ui.ion by the petitioner therein, was constituted initiallyfor the MCD aieas and Intei started functioning for the NUMC areas as well for tlie reason flial. at that time, there was no separate-appellateauthorityfor the IMDMC ai oas, but subsequently,in accordance with tlie scheme approved by the .Supreme Court, the Chairperson,.IMDMC had constituted a separate appellaie authority NDMC a,eo,5. THercfoie, the ' ap|.ellnle n,.MlH"iLy appointedearlierhad ceased to hove jtiri.,dlctionqua the Mi:)|v|C E"o,-r." ii • was Lhus contended on behcilT of the |:ietitioners/venilois aforesaid ordei* clearly indicates ttiai; Ll'ie appellate authoiity in iJie NI.-'ML-areas is not Functioning.

¶22Reliance was also placed on the niinutes oF tl'ie n)eoting dl l.hn Vending Comn'iittee dated 1J..0Z'.20.I0, to claim that iF tl')e lai.'t oF whethci theie was actual squatting/vending was vei iFied Fjy ttie CU")iiinlitl.e.o nnd il tlie names oF tlie petitioners/vendoi's Figured in the eligitjility lisi pri-ipnicd by tFie respondent/NDMC Foi" liolding tlie di'nw oF lots, then it (.lid nnl lie in tlie moLith oF the respondent/NDMC lo claim that the petitioneis, whn lind been veriFied and found to be eligible, wei'e not entitled to .si|unt at various sites in the NDMC area after .?i0.0S.;:^01..l..

¶23Iri i'ebuttal, counsel for the i""e5|_iondenr/NDMC disi.uited IJie I contenl:[ons of tFie petitionci's/vcndors ani.i while reiterating her eaiiini' submissions, asserted tfiat tl'ie petitioner's did not have any lc;gally ; enforceable rigfit, created on tlie basis oF tlie eligibility list (.Irawn liy : NDMC, For claiming, grant oF interim ordeis in ttieir favoui". Shr.> again ; referred to paras 58, 69, 75, 76 and 78 of the judgment in tlie ca.'.c; i.)f i Gaiiidn Rain fsupra"), to enipliasizG tliat when the aforesaid paias aic! i t read collectively, it is clear ttiat the petitioners cannot (,:laini an entitlement to aiiy interim orders as sougtit by theiri in l.lie |)ir:.^ent proceedings. .She fui'tFier stated tliat even otFierwise, Ilie .' .pecial Pi ovisions Act relied upon by tlie petitioners has duly I'ecfjgnizeiI (.he 4/'13/20X.!,

51.5^h/2011 fl, c.X"t,recfe./ nraff.erF .19 itl' :ift schemes prepared by the local auLhorities in the National Capital Icirilory ot Delhi for regulation oP iii'ban street vendors. To substantiate Iho! said SLilDmissioi'i,she drew the attention ot this Court to the preamble np Ihe. aPoresaid /Act, which mentions tlie Pact that all the sclien'ies prer.iared by the local authorities in the National Capital Territory (.)P Delhi, I'oi .regulation oP urban street vendors iii accordance with the National I'olii.y on tJrban Street Vendors, 2009 and the l>1astei-Plan Por Dellii 2i.)2 \, have been in-ipiemented and Purther that more time is required Por |)r(.)pei implemeritation oP tPie schemes regarding liawl<e::rs and urtiaii .''.IigcI vendoi'S. 7/-]. A speciPic rePei'ence was made by - the teari'ied counsel Pni-ttie respondent/NDMC to Section 2(;t)(c) oP the Sfjecial Piovisioris Act, whit.li dePines the phi'ase "encroactiment" to claim ttiat it does not covei the petitioners liereii"), who are squatters. I~urttier rePerence was niade to l.lic: provision oP Section 3 oP tPie Special l-'ruvisions Act, which conlain.s a non obstante clause, to state that st.ntus qt.n> witPi regard to tlie enc.ioat.hmp.nl 01' unauthorized developri'iei'it as on 01..01.2006, mentionec.! in llir: .',aid provision, was in. the context oP the dePinition oP , l.iio pliia.si.^s enci oaclirnent" antl "Linautiiorizecl df!velciprnsrit" set out in Ilie ilciPiiiilion clause at Sections 2(.l)(c) and 2('.i.)(i') respectively oP [Pie .Sppi iai l-'rovision.5Act and thus, the petitioners/vendors did not qualiiV under the aPoresaid enactment Por clainiing protection a.s none oP tlie ingiedienl;,:.;el out in the provisions oP the aPoresaid cnactrnent are Pound to exist in their .(Cj ^1/^3/20.1j, 525'l/:i(1XX3i C(r/r;Feci'e</n^^!;lers faye Kti' J.U case. II: was submilitecl Lhat Lhe Special F'rovisions AcL, which crime iiiln eTfecL in the year 2007 and l')a? I.Teen extended ,Proiri tin'ie to Lime nni.l lastly, till Decembei" 2011, does not give permission to persons l(,) i c-si nrl; any activity once they have been I'ernoved by ttie civic aiill'ioi il.y and' siniilarly, tl'ie Sctieme ot 2009 does not entitle tlie registrants to .'.(inal, unless ttiey have been allotted a specific site.. .In si.ipport oP tlie aPniesaid submission, reliance was place on the judgment in tlie case of MCU vs. Gurnani Kciur reported as {19SJ!9) SCC

¶101' l-or ttie j)ur|:)(oP interpreting the meaning oP the phrase, "structui'e", rePer'eni.:e was made to the judgment oP the SLipreme Court in the case oP .Municipal • Corporation oP Greatei" Bombay & Ors. vs. Indian Oil Corpoi atiui i LLlI. reported as AIIR 1991'SC

¶686l-or the purpose oP understaiidiiK.) Ihr.! expression, 'status quo', rePerence was made to tlie juclgmenl in tlie (.a;;e of" Messrs Bharat Coking Coal Limited vs. State of Bihar 8(. Qis. I'epoi led as 1907 (Supp) SCC 394-to submit that in ordinary legal connotation, the terni "status Lyuo' implies tlie existing state oP tPiings at any given point oP tiine.

¶25As Por tlie National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, counsel Id lhe respon.dent/NUMC stated tliat both, tlie 200'-l policy and the p'ulii.y, Pind mention in the decision oP tlie Supi'enie Couit in tlie case <'P GaiiiLla ILtUU—fsLipi'a) and it was only aPter taking into coiisideiatioii the s'aid policies, did' the Court directed Lhe instituLionali^al.inri oP uihan .'-.iMmi vending through legislation. It was iHirther stated that at the lime oP W.l .{C) 4743/ J..01 525^^/ 21111 connei;/.ei/ 2J. of .'Jy.! delivering tine judgment dated .8.J.0.2010, tlie Supreme Loui L[.uol< rmlice oP tlie NCT of Delhi Laws (Special l-'rovisions) /Act, 2009, which was valid upto

30.12.20;I0, apart Prom noticing tlie Model Street Vendors Cl^'rotection oP Livelihood and Regulation oP Street Vending) l\'.ill, 70U'.-) introduced by the Government oP ]ndia, Mlinistry oP Mousing !.'i Poverty Alleviation. She stated tliat notliing new is now Irjeirig sul by the petitioners/vendors, herein, Por tlie present petitions to hp entertained Por any purpose-whatsoever and all tl'ie grievances raised l.jy the petitioners can easily" be • addressed bePore tlie Vonding Committee/appellate authority under' Ihe sctieme relating to urL)an sIi(U)t vending in the MDI^C area, whicin Pora continue to remain Punctional, oven aPter 30.6.2011.

¶26Tl'iis Court has heard tliese matters at length since

17.f.i.20l I., on diPPereriL dates. Vai'ious counsels Por the ijetitioners/venclois and the Standing Counsel Por the respondent/MDMC liad addressed the Coi.iil. .Their respective arguments have been taken note oP. Dotli sides have made strenuous ePPorts to explain what the status ciuo order daled

15.7.2011 passed by tlie Supreme' Court in the case c;P Gpairicla KaLnCsupxa)i.mplies. Ihe leitmotif oP ttie arguments addressed on behnlP oP the petitioners/vendors is that the status guo. order read with ttie gualiPying.words, "as it is obtainingtoday", suPPixed to the order, can only be read to imply that as on date, i.e., 15.7.2011, there was no srlieme operationalin the MDMC areas to regulate vending activitiesand till n Inw W.P.(C)^l7^>3/201i,S254/2011« con.,ec/e,/ .z.2 :j,f U.' is ulLimately enacted by the legislature, ail the petitioners, irrespective of their legal status, can continue squatting/hawking at different sites that have been occupied by them. It is also asserted that in the teeth of the status quo orders passed by the Supreijie Court, the respondent/MDMC in collusion with the police authorities, is threatening to illegally remove the petitioners/vendors from different sites, which is detrimental, adverse, harassing and belligerentto those, who have been found eligible by the respondent/NDMC for being allotted specific tehbazari spaces within the NDMC jurisdiction, but are being threatened due to lack of further action in this regard which is pending at the end of the respondent/NDMC, The ^second limb of submissions made by the learned counsels for the petitioners/vendorswas that the Special ProvisionsA\ct would additionally come to the rescue of the petitioners/vendors,which also requires maintenance of status quo as existing on 01.10.2006, till the end of December) 2'011.

¶27On the other hand, the main thrust of the argumentsaddressedby the counsel-for the respondent/NDMCwas that as the legislature has failed to enact an appropriatelegislation in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gam^_a_RiLQi(.sui2ral,the subsequentorder dated 15.7.2011 diiecting parties to maintain the status quo as it is obtaining on the said date can only [,mply that the state of affairs as existingon date are not to be-disturbed,until the rights of the parties can be finally determined through legislation. It was submitted that while W.P.(C}4743/zoii,525^/2011&connectedmatters pgg^23 of28 passing tine status quo oi"cier on 15.07.2011, the Supreme L.ouit wnri conscious of Itie Tact ti'icit the 1-^arliament • liaci yet Lo eiiru-i a coniprel'iensive legislation to regulate, urban street vending and in .sni;:li circumstances, it goes without saying that it was tlie interit of the (:oUrt that ttie entire dispute redressal mechanisiri as recognized in Ilie ca.se ol Gainda Ramfsupra') would continue' to reinain in operation, .sf.) as In i'egulate ttie urban street vending in.ttie NDMC aiea, till tl'ie leyislation in tliat regard is enacted. Furl.her, it was stressed tliat the ..'ipecial Provisions Act did not provide any protective umbrella to tlie loel.il iihk:rs, wtiose squatting activities neittier fell undei" llie (Jeri "encroachment", nor under "unauthorized develo|;.iment". Jt was asserted tliat •even ottierwise pending an appropriate legislal.ion, Uie NDMC Act wa,s available as a fall back option and tlie relevant provisions in the said enactment would continue to regulate street vending aclivil.y in the NDMC area and the petitioners/vendors could not claim a vestcnl i to squat at any site of their own. I

¶28rroiTi the above, it is apparent that ai-guinents and couni.ei I a-rgumentstiave been raised by bothi sides on tfieir respectiveveision.';of I• the meaning and the effect of the status quo order dateij l,;),7^:()ll I: passed by the Supren'ie'Court.It is also very apparent, that the meaning : sought to be attributed by both sides as to the implication of the said -•,taLu-s guo order, is dianietricallyopposed lo each other. Not only this, both sides are at a tangenton the factum of the pendencyor ollierwiscof . ^ conn.a.e. I the interim applications Piled IjeTore Lhe Supi'eme Court Ijy t)olh, the i j applicants/vendorsand the respondent/l\ID|viC,Poi' clariPications,on wliicli ; the aPoresaid order came to - be |:iassed as it is tlie stand r.iP tlie respondent/MDI^IC tliat the aPoresaid applications were not dispio.'i(.''.d oP wl'iile passing the order dated 15.7.2011. Tlie parties are poles apait on •the question of import oP the status quo order, and tlie ePPecl. oP I.he observations made by the Supreme Court in tlie case uP Liaindcj PxamfsuprcO as regards the approval oP NLjMC sctieme. Tliey ai e also at logger-heads on the cornposition oP the adjudicatory meclianism in the MDMC jurisdiction and the manner oP its Punctioning, as also tlie irientity oP tlie schemie which is validly operating in the NIDMC areas Por regulal.iny urban street vending, wliich had all been.subject matter oP coirsidei ati(ni L'jePore tlie Supreme Court in the aPoi^esaid case. TPie ol.her jssue.s agitated by the parties, starting Piom tPie interpretation oP the voiions observations made by tlie Suprenie CoLirt in the aPoi'esaid iudgmenl, the Poimulation oP tl'ie sctieine as approved by the .Supreme Courl in the case oP SuclJilr_!^i^_(^i2raJ,, to l;lie composition oP the di.spiil.o.:; lediessal meclianism and its validity as also the meaning oP tlie '-.tah.is quo 01 del, aie all in a turmoil as both ttie parties have stoutly deieiuicd their respectivestands wliich are completelyat variance with ear.h niher. The only .common ground shared by the paities is the Pactum oP pas;;ing of the recent judgment dated 08.10.2011) in the case oP Uainda RaPlKsupiiOand the subsequentstatus quo order dated l!x7.201.1 pass.^l 5254/2UJ..t« connectednu.Uers 25 .r by iilie Supreme Lourt.

¶29The rountainhead oT Lhe di-spuLe in Ltie pre.senl; cases Ihen^ldi (•! remains Llie status quo order doled

15.7.2.0.1.1 parsed l..)y lhe .'..iiipremr: Couil. The issue wliich is souqi-il: l,n i:)e ntjiL'alied before l.liis Com I. i'. Iliril having l ecjard to l:he status quo oi"der, wliether a stay order onqhl l.i i i.)i;! granted by this Court in tavoui' of tl'ie petil.ioners/veiidors as prayed I'oi hy thern, Irrespective, of tlieir legal status, tlius foii/'iddinu lhe respondent/NDMC fron"! ttireatcning and/or I'ernoving them finm lhe different sites occupied by tfien-i in the NDMC areas. I.n othei" vvoid.-;, thi:; • Court is being called upon to exarnirie tue meaning, sctjpe and eifcM I of the status quo order dated 15'.07.201;C On the question of how lo ascertain tfie implication of a statirs qu oi'der passed by a com I., in lhe ca.5e of Messrs Bharat Coking Coal.Lini[fe;l_(5n|nmj it'was observed hy thr: Supieme Court that tlie expression, 'stciUrs quo' is undouL)tedlya leim nf ambiguityand at tinies, gives iise lo doubt and difficull:yam.l in .:ase any party, has any doubt on -lhe ryeariing and ffie effect of the .slnlus (|un oi-der, the proper course for such a parfv would be to approach IJk-Com t that had passed the status quo ordei', to ^oel?.clarification5. • -^0. h-i i.he case at hand, while seelcing h) ride the wave of lhe afoiDsaid status quo order, tfie parties have cho..,,, to overlook ene impmlani factor, which is that a status quo order operates on boll, sides. |he •SupremeCourt has passed nrdeis lequirinqhuth sides to maintainslalus -.--re; qi.io. Uiice slicIt an order of l;lie SLipreirie CourL is on record, l.ho : not only binds all the parlies Lo Liie adjudicaLion, and all l:lie pai Litis-, civil 01 judicial who are required to act iii accordance v\/ith the saic.l ordci s, biii, it equally binds tl'ie High Court troin interPeiirig vA/ith sucl'i an order; as thc' said order has been passed in litigations bef^jre the higliest Coin t ,of the Ia n d. • '''S oideis of the• Supren'ie Coui't'are oi'i I'ecord. llie slaliis (|uii 01 del is a cleai signal to the Higlr Court as well, to avoi(.l qranling any order, including an interin', order, when the Supreme Couit has diif:clcd for status quo to be maintained. In such circumstances,if this Court was to giant a stay oidei in favour of the petitioners/vendors.arrayed bnfiiir) it, iL would be tantamountto negating the orders of the Supieme Cnui t, which letjuiie the paities to maintain status quo pendinq eilactmoMit oT appropriate legislation. IP either of the parties were unclear r niterpretationof the status quo order, it was Por tbeir, to have '•lie oupieme Couit Por clariPications tPiereoP. Additionally, the reliancc placed by the petiUoners/vendorson the Spedal Provision:,-A,:t saoiun,, iPleiiiii ieyal sanctity to ihe plnceineiit oi' goods l:,y II,cm on ll". Paven-.ents, by l:emvng it as. ei.croachrnent/oriaothori.ednso,' ,-,s i-ecogi,ized under the said Act an,.I th,eir contention that the S,.""'on,c Couit had ,-ecognlzedthe fact tl,ot the Special ProvisionsAct is llio only centrallaw having primacyover otherStatutes,a,e also rnaiteisibal the applied to . peCiLioners/venclorsoughl: to hrn/e placed before Lhe Supreme CoiiK while seeking clariricaLions oP Lhe sLatos quo order^ j[; would l.here((.in hn advisable for Llie petitioners/vendorsas also the i-espondeiil./l\ll)M(.: lo approach the Supreme Court or,d uiake Lheir SLibmissious Ihe.n as regards their grievances, l-lowever, as both parties insisted thai lh(Mr cu-guments be token iiote oP and their submissionsbe piaf:ed on recrMd, some pains iiave been taken to do the needrul.

¶32In view of Lhe aforesnidfeels and urc:,nr,stances,this C.nn.l is nIMI.n opinion U-iat it will not be appiopiiatetor it to grantstay ordeis in IIh: la, n Of W-ie staltisquo order dated :tS.07.;ia;|l passed t;y the Cnp,enuM nnrt. It is reitei-atedthat any such order shall he an anti-thesisto the n.dms of the SupremeCourt, which must iae respected.both,in ietl.erand splril. hi such circumstances,the present petitions are dispnserl of by dn, I an^ inteiiinoideis to the petitioners, l-lowever,lltiori.y i.s i.itani.ed to both the parties to apply to the SupiemeCourt for aclarificationof the stc.itUS quo order dated IS 07 ;^f)1 l r.nrr.^i • ---J j-a.oed in the case of Gainda Kam (.sy.B.ra)- The partiesare left to bear tiieirown costs. rk h I (9-^' OCTOtTl^j.^'( , 2011 (ll-IIIIIMIA IKOillliL.ii) xJ7>0/.20IJ, - T cnn;,ecf.eJ /na(;e,.

Case details

Parties and counsel

\ IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on : 21.09.2011 Pronounced on: 24.10.2011 + W.P.fC) 4347/2011. 4559/2011. 4593/2011. 4610/2011. 4650/2011, 4651/2011, 4827/2011. 4923/2011. 5024/2011. 5028/2011, 4775/2011. 5247/2011. 5254/2011. 5255/2011. 5257/2011, 5258/2011. 5261/2011.. 5262/2011. 52S3/2Q11. 5264/2011, 5277/2011. 5292/2011. 5312/2011. 5317/2011. 5402/2011, 5403/2011. 5405/2011. 5408/2011. 5410/2011. 5411/2011. 5413/2011. 5418/2011. 5423/2011. 5444/2011. \ i 5473/2011, 5484/2011. 5485/2011. 5497/2011. 5498/2011. 5503/2011, 5504/2011. 5505/2011. 5506/2011. 5507/2011. ^ 5508/2011, 5595/2011. 5614/2011. 5615/2011. 5616/2011. 5618/2011, 5627/2011. 5630/2011. 5631/2011. 5643/2011. 5645/2011, 5654/2011. 5656/2011. 5711/2011. 5717/2011. 5718/2011, 5728/2011. 5729/2011. 5731/2011. 5732/2011. !5737/2011, 5738/2011. 5739/2011. 5743/2011. 5761/2011. 5784/2011. 5785/2011. 5791/2011. 5794/2011. 5797/2011. 5798/2011, 5822/2011. 5911/2011. 5918/2011. 5928/2011. 5931/2011, 5933/2011. 5934/2011. 5935/2011. 5957/2011^ 5965/2011, 5966/2011. 5967/2011. 5968/2011, 5969/2011. 5970/2011. 5974/2011. 6096/2011. 6100/2011, 6101/2011. 5102/2011,—6107/2011.. 6108/211. 6114/2011. 6115/2011. 6116/2011, 6117/2011, 6118/2011. 6119/2011. 6120/2011. 6121/2011, 6122/2011. 6123/2011. 6144/2011. 625Q/2Q11- 6270/2011, 6271/2011. 6449/2011. 6527/2011. 6528/2011. \J 6531/2011. 6532/2011. 6533/2011. , 6538/2011, 6555/2011. 6667/2011. 6668/2011. 6669/2011, 6670/2011, 6684/2011. 6701/7nii 5173/2011. 4739/2011, 5046/2011, 5051/2011^ Sl«;7/:>nii llllAuil 3052/2Q11 g.185/2011, 3189/2011. 3196/?011. 434Q/?fi11 4342/2011 4404/2011 4407/2011. W.Rfcj«47/20i3 snri matters Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. 5063/2011, 5089/2011, 5099/2011. 5114/2011. 5115/2011. 6799/2011. 6824/2011, 6825/2011. 6826/2011. 9XUO/ JLr 6827/2011. 6896/2011. 6901/2011. 6902/2011. 6903/2011, 6904/2011. 6905/2011. 6906/2011. 6907/2011, 6908/2011. 6909/2011. 6910/2011. 6917/2011. 6919/2011, 6920/2011. 6921/2011. 6922/2011, 6932/2011 and 5420/2011. THE MATTERS OF MOHD. AZAD Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4347/2011 MOHD. ALAM Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4559/2011 KIRPAL SINGH Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4593/2011 SHAILENDERKUi^iAR Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4510/2011 SANJAY Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4650/2011 BABLU Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4651/2011 AMAR NATH SINGH Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4827/2011 GANESH PRASAD Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4923/2011 BHUPAL SINGH Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5024/2011 SURENDERSINGH AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5028/2011 USHA Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4775/2011 RAKESH KUMAR AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5247/2011 RAM DASS Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5254/2011 VISHAMBARJHA Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5255/2011 DINESH KUMAR Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5257/2011 ANJU Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5258/2011 RAJESH C GUPTA AND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5261/2011 LAKHPATIAND ORS. Petitioners in W.P.{C) 5262/2011 SOHAN LAL AND ORS. ..... Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5263/2011 '"^^^ARI Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5264/2011 ARUN KUMAR ALIAS LUCKY Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5277/2011 MITHU LAL Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5292/2011 MOHD. ZAHID Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5312/2011 SHAKEELAHMED Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5317/2011 KISHORE Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5402/2011 ^ Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5403/2011 KAUR Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5405/2011 RATI^ KUMAR RAO AND ORS Petitionersin W.P.(C)5408/2011 NABI HASAN 5410/2011 HARENDfrPRASAD Petitionerin W.P.(C)5411/2011 BHUPINDERsTnGH Petitionerin W.P.(C)5413/2011 .U.NATHAKUr^RA.ESH W.P.{C}4347/2011 and connected matters A ANIL KUMAR AND ORS. .... Petitionersin W.P.(C) 5484/2011 SUNDER SINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5485/2011 DHARAM VEER SINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5497/2011 MAHESH PAL SINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5498/2011 RAJ RANI Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5503/2011 DULI CHAND Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5504/2011 SHANTA RAI^ Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5505/2011 MAHENDER PAL Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5506/2011 PAWAW-K4JMARSii^IGH P-et4tior!^ti44:UAC-R.-(X^>S5^ TAR

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