Ram Raj v. Ndmc and Anr

judgment. ^1, To give a. brieP background oP the dispute, learned counsel respondent/MDMCwalked this Court through sorne'prominent dec.isii, ttie Supreine Court rendered Pr'om time to time, wtiicti relate 1o i.ir W.P\(C) 4-74-3s:i54/'2011 /it conneci-ed nj^liers P'Hge. 4-' i!'f -IB squaders/hawlcers,starting from tiie decision in the case ol' budgn L.ingh YS,,,.NDMC&Oi:s,,reported as (199K) 2 SCC 727, the interim order dnted

03.03.2006 -passed by the .Supreme' Court in VtfJP'..(C) .lliivyi'!:))/.l/yrd entitled .Sndhir l^iadan Ors. ^s. I^ICD, the Pinal judgment m tiio nl cmrlhir Marian (sUDi-al reported as (2009) •!? SCC 597 and.inslly, du, judgmentdated 08.10.2010passed in the case ol^ Gaindajlain(supia.). Learned counsel for ttie respondenl:/l\lDMCvehementlyoppo.srul the prayer dP the petitioners/vendorsfor grant of interim orders ie.sriaininij die respondent/NDMCfrom removing theni from tl'ie sites o.xii| ned hy litiem till the enacti'nent of an ap|:")ro|:)riatelegislation, in i.eim.. nl l.lu direcdons issued i-iy the' Supreme Court in the. case of bainda jUim (siJQra)- She paiticularly-referred to the observations ma(,lo, by Ihr- • Supreme Court in, paras 40 and of the judgmentin the case of Spdan Singh (sup!:a,),, which dealt with tl'ie immediate evicUon of unaiilhoii/ed squatters/hawkersand laid emphasison die fact tliat in the said llu! Supreme Courl; had directed removal of unauthorizedsqual.ters/liawl<nii, wiLhout awail:ing final allotmentof sites to be allotl;ed to eligibleclaim,•ml!; at tfie places recommended by tfie Thareja Committee or suggeslod hy the MIDMC.

¶6/Again, in tfie interim order dated 03.03.2.00G i.Jassed in Sudliii Madari's case (supra), the following observation made by Ihe. Court was highligfited by the counsel for flie respondenl"/l\ir.iM(."• " fCJ 4743/2011, 5254/2011 Si coniiecCed malXBrs Fttye 5 itf .'ri''!'!' "While•we undertake this e>^l!rci5e, we direct l.he : Authorities to see to it that those persons, who aic •cai'rying on hawking acLiviti6'.s or who aie sc|Li'-il.tingon public land without any auttiority, even in accoi'dcinij.j with the present day scheme in Porce, are removrn rorthwith. This includes unauthorized I'lawking, squatting on pulDlic streets, footpaths and pulilic |iail<s, includingplayground.We direct the Delhi AXdrninistial.ion to take steps immediatelyin collaborationwith Ml-i) nnii NDI^IC with necessary assistance Prom Uell.ii I'ulice to tlear the roads, streets, footpaths, paii<s etc. by unaUttiorized occu|Dants/sc|u.atters/fiawkei"s."

¶7As to the judgrrvent dated 17,05.2007 rendered in Hip case ol Sudhij;l^laclail_Csui2Il-l'much emphasis was iaid by the coun.nfT.I Idi Hh-respondent/NDMC on paras 28 to 30 and 35, which am ieprodu.icul I'lereinbelow for ready reference.- "28. The New Delhi Municipal Committee has al.so submitted its Scheme. We have considered tlie Schenx'^ submitted before us. The area which falls undei l\IIJM(. does not create problems such as those in tl'io area;. Under MCD. However, in the said Scherne reference lias been made to persons who do not liave permission under Section 225 or licence under Section 330 of tlie NDMC Act, 1994 but wfio are unauthorisedly conllnuinri to cari"y on business as liawkei's/streetvendors. Ihe.y have been described as those who are "tolerated" in l.he qxJDMC area. We fait to under'stand wliy any per'son wl violates the law should be tolerated. Eitfier tfiey shou be con"ipelledto obey ttie law or tfie law may be suilaLily amended, if it is found to create uridue hardship. problems need to be addressed by the legislature oi-tin"; rUleiTiaking authority. We, therefore, observe lhat if il is felt that the persons w.fio fall in tfiis category lei'iuiie special protection, the /Act may be suitably ameiitled to cove.r their cases or else tfie number of sur:l'i illegal squatters may increase from time lo time. m.P.(€) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 & connecl:ed msUers Page, ft <'f 211. V .t: 29-There has been no serious objection l:o l;Iie ,^'(-honle sLibrnitliecl by NDMC which is a comprel'iensive scheint'.. Certain directions have, however, been sought Tor Irorn this Court. We approve the Scheme subinittecJ tiy MDMG. '

¶30It is submitted before us that tl'ie Scheme.s which have been approved by this Court must be subject to any Act or rules that may be framed in consonancewitii th^ iXiationaj Policy on Urban Street Vendors. It goes without sayiiig that we have approved the Schemes a:'; fi-arned by MCD and NDMC. .IT the legislature intervene.s and' framies anotiier scheme or regulations govei'iiiug sijch Schemes, that will certainly supersede l.ho Schen'ies pi'epared by MCD and NDIMC. .I.t is well settletJ that any administrativeaction is always subject to-ldvv that niay be h-amed by the competent legislature.

¶35Subject to-the aforesaid modificatioris/ctiangesin the Schemes submitted -by 1"^IC.D and NDMC, the? saints are approved. The said authoiities shall now lai<e appropriatesteps to implement the Scheme forfhwiLh. In Case of any difficulty faced by ttiem iii implementing bhe schemes, they shall tiave tfie liberty to apply to thi.s Court." 8-Lastly, in the recent judgment in the case of GaiJidi;!..KLirji (SLipid learned cotinsel'for the respondent/NDMC specifically I'elied Li|)on p-iia.'. '30, 3?., 50 to 66 to state that tlie Supreme Court was consciou.'; of the. fact that a structured regulation and legislation is urgeritly rotiunod hi control and regulate the fundamental right of tiawking. She als(.) rioinlerl out that the three tier disputes redressal mechani.sm set ()ut in Ihe affidavit filed by'the then Chairperson of tlie MDMC was taken note ol hy ( tlie Supi'eiTie Coui"t ih para 72 of the aforesai^djudgment and in pnin 7 l, il was then observed as below V\/.P.{C] •4743/2011, 525-^/2011 & connected msU.ers Paife 7 of 20 r. "73-In paragraph 12 of the; arficlovitii: has been slalcd that there shall be an /Appellate /Authority which shall attend to the redressal of griev/ahces of sc|uat;ter.s, hawkei's, traders, residents of any Other persoi'i^ by heafinq•appeals against the decision ot the Vending Con-imittee(Main). Paragraph 12 of that afHdavit is sol. OLit below:- n'here shall be an Appellate /Autl'ioiify. On the 'forwarding of petitions received by the •Chairpei'sorv, this /\utlioril:y stiall attend lo •redressal of grievances oi" squatters, hawkeis, traders, residents or any other person. Mm •/Authority shall also fiear appeals against ihe 'decision of Veriding Cornriiittee (Main). IJecrsions ('of this /Authorityunless challenged before a l-iigher M"orum or in any Competent Court, sliall be linal. ,tliis.Authority sfiall be initially headed by a igerson 'appointed by the Chairperson Itaving at least JO i'years legal or judicial'background. Tiiere can be 'moi"e thaii one. membei' in this /Autfiority."

¶9APter iriakihg the aforesaid observations, in paras-74 lo 70 c judgn:ient,the Supreme Court went on to observe as belowc- "74. In the said aTPidavit, wfiicti was affirmetJ I'leloie this Court on 24'-'' August, 2010 it has been stated that 1\II:)MC si'iall comply with the orders wfiicl'i would lie ; passed b,y tlie adjudicatory mechanism conternplal.edIn the scheme and which has been approved by this Couil for i;he NDMC area, Uhle.ss such orders are. made subject matter of challenge before a higher fon.im oi" in any othei" competent Court.

¶75in view of such schemes/ tt)e hawkers^ squat.tei's ahd 'vendors must abide by' ttie Dispute Kedcessal •schelTie mentioned above. There should not be any difed: approach to this Court by way of fresh petit.ioi) or .t/As, bypassing tlie Dispute F^edi'essal Mechanirnn provided in the sclierne-. V\(.F.(C) 4-743/2011, 5254/2011 ft connected maU:ers Faye. vS' 23 i y • 76:' IHowever; before 30'" June, 2011, Uie apijroijrial.y Government is to enact a law on the basis oP the I3ill n~ientionecl above, or on the basis oP any anienc.ln)'':; tl'ierebP so that the hawkers may precisely know contours of their rights."

¶10It was thus sought to be contended, on behnlP,- ul tin?: respondent/MDMCthat there can be no vacuum as Par as iegulation n! trade oP street'hawkei"s/vendorsin the MDMC jurisdictionis conceine(.l.md the failure on the part of the legislatureto abide by the tirnelinp. .•.c.t (juI, by ttie Stiprei'neCourt in the case oP Gainda P\am (^upL^L '-'V jHilUiig in place a statute on or before 30.06.2011, cannot be interpreted,by the pekitionsi-s/vehdoi-s to mean that ttiey can continue 'their Undo unhindered at any place oP their choice-in the NDMC iuri.sdii::lion,in an unregulated manner and without any obstruction or objection Ironi Ihi^. ;l\IDMC. ' • • •

¶11Learned counsel Por the respondenli/NDMCpaiticularly releiied lo paras l'-\ and 7!5 of tfie aforesaid Judgment lo state that tl'ie di.';r)ute redressal scheme, noticed by the Supreme Coui't in pai'a lb wa.s the one tliat was legally functioning in NDMC Jurisdictior) aiid whii.:h was tril<:en iTOte oP by the Court in the preceding para 74. In otl'ier woi'tls, slie stated that the scheme as set out in the afPidavit dated 24:00.20 1.0, Piled by Ihe then Chairpersoii of MDMC bePore the Supreine Court in Gaiiida Kani's case..,,(sLjp.ral, was the one which was Pinally appi'oved by the .Suprr.!m(^. Court. She Purther subiriitted that assuming, witliout admitting, Urnl. the. V\f.p'.(c)4~43/ZO.t 1,:525^1/2011 & connscied rns/.ters P'aife 9 iff 211 I / "j • clispute reclressalscheme set out by the NDMC had lapsed on 30.h.:'!01.1, 05 claimed by the petitioners,then the IMDMC /-\ct• provides an adoMuat-- Faliback to ensure orderly managementoP vendors ii'i the area. Specilu. reference was made in this regarclto the provisionscontained in .scciions 221, 22-^1, 225 arid ,226 of the-said Act.

¶12It was further argued by the counsel for the resporidcnt/NI.^M'--Ihnt the applicatiohfiled by the NDMC before the Supreme Court in .Inly 2U 1I prayii-ig inter alia for extension of time to regulate l'iawker5/5(luatteisin ttie NDMC area, 'as per the sctierne mentioned in the judgmentin Gaiijdj [--Yarn's rase fsuora), till ttie enactment of a law by the legislature in that regard, had not yet been finally disposed of by the Supren'ieCouiL at the time of passing'of the status quo order dated 15.07.2011 and similarly, the other application filed by one of the liawlcers/vendorspraying inlc.i alia fol-restraining the i-espondent/NDMCfrom granting Tehtjazarirights to the wihhers of theducky draw of lots for allotment, which was to he held on •12.0.5.2011• or any date thereafter, was also peiK.ling consideration before the Supreme Court. Hence, no finality c(.iuli.l Lie attached to^ the ,ordei-dated 15.7.2011 which can only be consideied an • interim measure'till the final disposal of the aforesaid application.'.;ni' Ihe enactment of a legislation. i; On n'leiits,, learned counsel for the respondent/MDMC relerred to the affidavit dated 6l.08.2011 filed by the Director (Enforcement), Nl.iMC, m/.P.(CJ 4743/201X, 5254/2011 &. conhecl.ed in!3U:ers Paitfe AO of 7It l' y •>-, i V,f wherein it was stated that pursuant to the public notice issued by the IMDMC inviting applications under the MDI^IC Urban btieet Vending Scheme in the year 2007, the respondent/lMDMC had received ddG/ applications.The documents required by the applicants foi iegi..ti..ition under the Scheme included a prool= of age, documentary prooJ'/riHidavil. Por the purpose oT/annual income, proof oP residence, prooP m&u|,ipi.)il.nl special categoiieslike handicapped,Kashmiii migiants etc. uiid iJioi P squatting in the NDMC area, IP any. In para 4 oP the aPorosaid alhdavit, the Pollowing criteria approved/adopted'by the Vending Commiltec! to shortlist the eligiiDleapplicants is set out;-"4. That the criteria approved/adopted by the Veiidmij ComiT)ittee to shortlist tPie eligible applicants is o.'. under;-

(i) The applicantsshould be^ resident of Uellii. witli his name registered in electoral rolls as pei' absl.i<-.u.t "1 phpto E-Flo11 or ERO certificate. ' .

(ii) Ttie applicantshould be a n'lajor, viz. witPi ovei" 11'. years of age as per valid biiTl'i certificate oi uge certihcate or school certificate etc. "(iii) The applicant should be a needy as per ir recoi'ds of DC (Pvevenue) or as vulnerabrlil:yrecords of Government oP IMCT oP Delhi (Samajik Suvidha Sangam: vulnerable and most vulnerable category). •(iv) The applicant should be registered as per I\1DM(. Street Vehdoi's Scheme. The policy verification of the applicant should be available.

(v) The applicant or his dependent Parnlly meniljc;!' should not be employed or sfiould not fiave any othcM tehbazari/yeinding or any other business premises in Qell'ii as per record veriPiCation oP NDMC/MCD. V\f.P.(C)4743/201:1/S254/2011 R connected maU:ers PatKr! J 1 <\}'f J (\/j) Preference will be, given to applicahts who ' ai e physically' handicapped or widows or senioi' above GO years •or Kashmiri migranLs or SL./bI (necessary certificate to be submitted and relaxation h'lay be given in the aloove criteria)." .;L4. /-\s per the respondent/NDMC, the category-wise list oT cligihio shortlisted applicants in terms of the aforesaid criteria,totalled lo JM/M applicants: The affidavit dated

01.08.2011 states' Uiat the respondent/NDMChas identified183. new spaces, in addition to the ,^0.. remainingspaces identified by the Thareja Committee in the MtiMt.. niea, which were' available-for allotment, lihus taking the total numl.)ei oI availablespaces to 386. -It was furtherstated that due to Pactoi's lil'.e d". listing of the Parlianient.Street on security grounds, con.:-.Liu(..tion nl flyovers and'MetroStationsat various locationsin'the MIDMC jurisduiion, the number of authorized.(.-e/-;baza/7squatters has changed from .i'lft tn 404 in nun-iber. The nun-iber of applicants, who the respondent/Ml)M(.. claims, are vending uhauthorisedlyat Connaught Place, Sarojiin Mngai-, Parliament Street and Janpath areas and in whose, favour, -sldlu::' quo orders are operating,is stated to be-323 in number. The affidavitasserts that simply because the names of the petitioners,who are registeiodwilh the NDMIC, figure in the eligibility list drawn-by tlie res|:)(jndcnl./lMl'Ml., cannot be (-reated as proof of their regularly vending in tlie NI.)M(... area . and nor does it confer on them any enforceable vested right to ensuie a vending space for them in the NDMC area, which is directly dependentnn W,P.(C} 47-(S3/2011, 5254/2011 St co/rnecf.scf mailers ''Htfe :L2 of 2if -wv • y.. j I Lhe number or spaces available. Thus, it was contended thai; neitho.r llu:: possessionof any nuniber of chalians, nor the absence tl'ierenf can n a difference, for the reason that chalians cannot Torrn the basis for petitionersto claim any vested legal right to squat at a given spiat-e.

¶15Counsel Tor the resii)ondent/IMDMC asserted that tl)e petitions are ndt. maintainable,inasmuch as the petitioners I equally effitacidus alteimate ' temedy of approaching the r authority constituted by the Chaii-person, NDMC, Tor redi'es.sal grievances and failure on their part to have approached tlie Comn-iitteeis hot on account of the fact ttiat ttie said Committee i the appellate authorityis not functioning,but because they fiave more convenient to bypass tfie aforesaid foruiri and d|j|ji0i.-iLh 1.1 directly, which Is not permissible. She stated that extensive.i have been taken' by the respondent/NDMCto. constitute tfie adj rnechahisrn by way of a three tier system in the following rnannci-:

¶1Vending Sub-Comrnittee (Site of Spaces),

¶1Vending Sub-Comniittee (fleath and Hygiene) and ,3. Vending Sub-Con-)mittee (Enforcenient). nkn III e.';ent lave an pl'iollate of Iheii Vending is Couit. easui OS ii.atoi y

¶16She stated, that the creation of the afoi'esaid three Vciriding Sub' Committees, Vending Committee (M.ain), as also of tfie appellate aulJiorily vvhicfi was constituted to' redress tfie grievances of l.fie squalloi,';, hawkei's, traders, residents or any other pei'son against l.he dei.i.sion of V\I.P.(C) 47.43/2011, 52S4/2011 & caiinecfed /natters S-'.;n/e 13 ofy.fl I •; / the Vending Committee(IMain), was placed liiePore the Supremecouit loi considerationand the said three tier adjudicatoi-y mechanism wfis duly appi'Qved in tl'ie judgrnent of Gainda Flahi (supLaJ.-

¶17Per cohtra, learned counsels Tor the petitioners/vendois, who appeared on difterent dates, vehemently opposed the ai'oresaid st,.nid •taken by the respondent/NDMCand asserted that the scht.mc Moi.il'..d 1) the respondent/NDMCror_regulating vending activities in its junsdiition had lapsed on 30..06.2011in the at)senceoP the enactmentof a legislatu as per directionsoP the SupremeCourt in the case oP G^ida,}ian!..(syi and'as on date, there is no^ scheme in exister)ce. J,t was canvassed l.lial the 'in-iplication of the 'aPoresaid order oP stdl.vs quo passetl hy tlic! SupremeCourt on 15.07.2011can only,meanthat irrespectiveoP l:ho. lact •whether the 'squatting is legal or illegal, the san-ie be permil.led to continue dh ani'as is where is' basis^ and such sLcitus quo is i.o he maintainedby all the parties till a law is framed by the legislaU.ire. 18-Mr. • B.B.. Sawhney, Sr. /Advocate appearing lui' petitioners/vendorsubmittedtti&t in the case oP (^iLldt>:i)i -•'Supreme Court had directed that tPie appropriategoverniTientmust enrii.l a law oh or before 30.06.2011 so that the hawkers itiay precisely loiow the contours of th-eir rights, tience the dispute redressal iviechriiiisin provided Por in l:he scheme mentioned in tfie aPoresaid judgmcnl. ciuuhl operate only upto 30.-06.2011 and thereaPter, tPie said sclieme, would W.P.(C) 4743/201 jJ 5254/2011 fft conneCt.ed matters Page 14 iff I' X-;, ^ V automaticallystahd lapsed. He stated that no ol:her.Interpretationtn... l.« given to tlie orderdated 15.07.2011,directingmaintenanceol sfeU/.'vc/i/m, in view oP ti-)e qualiryingwords, "as it is olDtainingtoday", tie argued ih.ii ir the scheme was continuing to operate, as^ claimed by l:he learned counsel foi' the respondent/ND|viC,then there was no good reason lor the respondent/MDMCto have i-efrained from holding a diaw of lot..,, wim.h was slated Por the same day, i.e., :l 5.07.2011,and that Pact oP the mailer is that even the respondent/NDMChad understood the urn' uriler 'to mean that thei'e is no'schemein .place.aPter 30.6.2011, Poi tlu.. u. .i..an that in para 68'of the aPoresaid judgment in the case oP Gaiijda Kam .[^uiDraJ, all the.writpetitionsand the interim applicationsPiled bePorn the SupremeCourt were disposed oP with clearand speciPicdii eetion..Ih.il tin, problem oP hawking .and street vending could be regulnled by the •schemes Pramed-by the NDMC atid MCD only upto 30.0G.20;1;l aud n.,1 thereaPter. It was asserted on behalP oP the petitioners/vendois lP:al rv; on date; the directions oP the Supreme Court that sL^itus (]U(i is lo l.)(>. maintained by the parties can only be given one interpretation,.which rs tPiattill a law is ulti'iriatelyenacted by the Pai'lian'ient,ii ie.spective legal status, all the petitioners/vendorswould be perrnitterl to c squatting/hawkingat the sites that have been octupied by tPieiTi Tl. ;1.9. IhsoPar as, the coinposition oP the dispute redressal niec concerned; learned .Senior Advocate Por tPie petitioneis siibmill.('.(.l contrary to the understanding op the respondent/NDMC, l.he sc.he W.r.fC) 474-3/201.t} 5254/20X1 & cumnecled lUBtters np I hf'.i VfHjf.'. .t.'f 0-f 2B . reproducedat paras 72 and 73 in the judgment in the case of' Gajiida llajn (supra), was.not the one winlch \A/as actually recognized by tlie Su|.iinnie Court, and rather it is.the dispute redressal scheme meritioned in I'lnra 7.'. oF the aforesaid j,udg|-nenti.e., 'a scheme for urban street ven(.k)i.s ioi l\ID|VIC area as formulated in the year .2006, which was ullimaloly-approved ioy the Supreme Court on 17.05.2007, in the case ol .judliii Madap (supra)., v)/hich is the scheme wl'iich Finds n'lention spe(.:ili(ally in the following para 74 and is the one approved by ttie Su|;)reme (...:iniil. II was contended that even otherwise, the National Capital lerritory ol t.'elhi l_aws (Special Provisions) Act, 2011 (hereinafterreferred to as 'Specimill IProviisiioimsAclf) comes to tl'ie rescue oF the p(3titioners Foi' the leasun that sub-ciause (2) of Section 3 of ttie Special Provision.s Act niaMdato.:-; maintenance of status quo.as on 01.01.2006, notwithstanding any judgment,• decree or order oF any court, in respect oF enci oai.,.lim(:Mitoi unautFioiized development. Thus, it .was submitted on behalF nl Ihe petitioners/vendoj'S tliat ttiey •\A/ere entitled to grant oF intei irn prolcclion till the enactment Of a legislation to regulate hawking/vending activities in urbai"! streets in I3elhi on the basis oF the National Policy on Url.)an .'il.i eel. Vendors, 2009 Frahied on 17.06.2009 and the Special Provisions Aci..- .

¶20With refei'ence to the Special Provisions Act, • leaiired .Si''.nii)i Advocate For ttie petitioners stated that tF.ie phrase, "unauti n)ri/ed development" used in the definition clause has to be seen iri Ihe coritext as ttie one in which the pFirase "encroachment" ha.s been derinod, W/.P.fC) 4743/2011, 5254/2011 ft connectesi matters Pn.i/e .O' "i" •'''.'''t ;) : wherein It Is h-iehtioned that putting Up of temporary, semi-tehipoi aiy oi •permanent structure tor residential use or con-irnercial use ur aiiy othoi • use, and the' placementot goods on the pavements by the. |)etltloncrsis liable to be terhied as unauthorizeduse for n-iaintainii'igstatus (|nu undei the Special Provjslons Act. Much emphasis was laid on the <ivc.inK.nt.. •made by the respondent/NDMCin its interlin application Piled boPuie Ihe SupremeGburt in Gainda RanVs case.jsu.Qra).in July 20IJ., to sul.) the respondent/NDMCitself had stated In the said applicatio scheme had lapsed and therefore, the only Interpretationthat can l:.o , given to the 'status quo order passed by tire Supreme -C.ouit on

1.5.07.2011 can be that no scliehie would exist after J0.0(.i.2(.)1.1 <iihI thus, the benefitof the Special Provi.5lQn5Act ougtit to be extendcnlto l.ho petitioners-He submitted that the phrase ^street vendors' has been clearly defined Under the i^ational Policy on Urban Street Vendors, 200'..). Reliance was placed ih tlie case of Patri Vyaid !.•' -.('•! '-Q^-1 ^ Mm Town l-lali'. L\ Ors. reported as. (2009) 12 SCC 475 and the provisioiisof the Special ProvisionsAct to submit that even the .Supic.nu'. Court' had recognized the fact that the Special Provi.slonGAct i;:: lhi> only 'Central law governing the field and it would have primacy ovei nlhei Statutes and adhiinistrative oi'ders. It is thus stated that Llle-i.H'ovi.sioii.s of the NDMC A>ct cannot be invoked by the respondent/NDMC as the '.aid /Act is riot in consonance witli /Vrticle 9fj of tlie Constitution of .l.ndia .ind furthermore, ' tlie Special Provisions Act being' valid till tlie end of W.P.(CJ ^•?'43/2UXX,,525'^l/2011 & connecCed mailers Page :i 7 of lit >v; y', •December2011, ho orders in clerocjal;iohoP the provisionsof the ;.ai(i Aol can be passed.

¶21Mi-. S.K. ' Tripathi, /Advocate appearing Tor some oF jtiie petitioners/vendorssought to embellish the submissionsoP Mr.Snwhncy, Sr.Advocate and relied on the orders passed in W"l|-»,.(Cj i449/..«.i):ll..ll. • onii-iiori Mnhrf Tqmail vs. NDMC Lk__.Qr5. to urge that tiie "Ar)pollate •Authoiity" constituted under the dispute redressal mechanism ioi Uie NDi^C area, has not been functioning,whicti Pact lie stated is l.iorne oiil ProiTi a perusal oP the oi'der dated 08.0J.20.L1 passed in

1.1 ic. .lioi("...iiiid •case, wbefeih the Court took notice oP the claim oP the petitioner/vcuidor therein to the dPPect that inspite oP orders passed by tiie Appcllale Authority allowing squatting at a particularsite, bll a Pinal detorminnlion by the Vendihg Committeeas to-bts eligibility,the respondenlVMl and ti'ie police wei'e distui'lDing his activities. In the aPoiesaid oidci, the statement of the; counsel for the respondent/NlDMCwas recordei.l to the ePPect that the appellateauthority,whose order was being relied upi)n by the petitionertherein, was constitutedinitiallyPor the MCD aieas and Inlei started runctioning,Por the MDMC areas as well for tlVe reason that at Mint time, .there was ho separate-.appeilate autliority Por the NDML. areas, hut subsequently, in accoixlance with the scheme approved by tlie .Supreme Court, ti'ie Chairperson,. MDMC tiad constituted a sepaiate a|.)pellrile authority Por •the MDMC areas. TPierefore, the ap|)ellate authority appointed earlier liad ceased to Ivave jurisdiction qua the. MDMC.'. arcn.s. II W.P.fCJ 4743/2011, !S254/201:l Si connected /naf.fscs Page JU'vf 28 • X: / J was Ihlis conteiSded on behalF oP the petitioners/vendoi!^IhnI thn aforesaid order clearly indicatesthat the appellateauthority iii the MDIMl. areas is not Functioning.

¶22Reliance was also placed on ttie niinutes of the nieel.iiu.| ol thn \/ending Coplrnitteedated 11.03.20.10,to claim that iP the l^act of whothei there was actual squatting/vendingwas verified by the Committeeand il the names of the petitioners/vendorsfigured in the eligibilitylist |,)i(-.;p.iiod by the respohdertt/MDMCfor holding the draw of lots, then it did nol lie m the mouth of the respondent/MDMCto claim that die petitioners,wh.. had been veriPied'and Pound to be eligible, were not entitled to sgiiat at various sites in the NDMC area after 30.05.2011. •

¶23In rebuttal, counsel for the respondent/MI'3MC elispub>.d I.Ik; contentiohs of the petitioners/vendorsand while reiterating hor earlier-submissions, asserted that the petitioners did not have any legally enforceable right, created on the basis of the eligibility list drawn l.iy NDMC, for claiming,grant of interiiri orders in their favour. .Shr.; again referred to para.s 68, 69, 75, 76 and 78 of the judgrneiit• in tfie ua.-.n of Gainda Rain ,fsupraL to empliasize tliat when the aforesaid paras are read collectively', it is clear that the petitioners cannot (.;laiin an entitlement to any interim orders as souglit by them in tlie iMosent proceedings. SPie further stated that even otl'ierwise, tfie .'..pecial Provisions Act relied upon by tlie petitioners' tias duly recognized Ihe. m.P.CC) 4743/2011^ 525-<f-/2Uil cannecr.ed ihaliers 1 .y o/' '.IH <11 J schemes prepai-ecl by tine local authorities in tl'ie'National Capital rciiilory ot Delhi for regulation oP urban street vendors. -To SLibstantiate Ihe said submission, she di"ew the attention oT tliis Coui't to the pi'ernrible nt Hk'. aroi-esaici Act, which mentions the Tact that all the scherries prepnied by the local authorities in the National Capital Territory oT Uallii, lor .regulation of ui'ban street vendors ih accordancewith the National I'olii.y Oi-i Urbai-i Street Vendoi's, 2009 and the Master i-Man Por IDelhi 'JS)'? I, have been in-iplennented and further that more time is required I'or piopf!!' implementation of the schemes regarding hawkers and Urban r.trfiol vendors.. ' : •

¶24/-\ specific 'reference was made by tfie leai'ned counsel foi the respondent/NDMCto Section 2(:L)(c) of the Special ProvisionsAct, which defines the phrase '^encroachment"to claim that it does not cover the petitionershei-ein, who are squatters. Furtherreferencewas n'lade l.o Uh; provision of Secldon .3 of the Special ProvisionsAct, wliicli contain;; a obstante clause, to state that status quo with regard to tfie ericroaci or unauthorized.developmentas on 01.01.2006, mentioned in Hie .';aid provision, was in . the context of the definition of I.l ie pi ii "encroachment" and "unauthorized development" set out in the dclinilion clause at Sectibns 2(l)(c) and' 2(l)(i) respectively of ttie .Special PiTjvisions Act and thus, the petitioners/vendors did not qualify undi.,'.r tl'ic; aforesaid enactment for claiming protection as none of tlie iikji edient;; .sel out in the provisions of the aforesaid enactment are foLind to exisf In their l/y.RCC; 474i.J/.70.'f..j, 52S^!/201X & connected n)al:l:e.rs Paye 20 of /.H '• .1 / case: II; was SLrbrnitted that the Special Provisions Act, wliich en effecl: in the year 2007 and has been extended Prom tiirie to tinif-.! lastly, till Decernber 2011^ does not give permission to persons lo id• si rni: any activity, once they have beeri removed by Lhe civic nultunity rini.i slhiiiarly, the SGtieme oT 2009 does not entitle the registrants l.o ijhiess they have been allotted a speciHcsite. In support of the nloicsaid stilDmissiOn, reliance was place on the judgrnent in ttie case ol MLU vs. GLirnani.^Ur reported as', (1989) 1 SCC 101. For the purpose of interpi-etingthe meaning of the phrase, "structure",retereni;ewas mndc. to the judgrhent, of the Supreme Court in the case ol Municipal r_ni-poration of Greater Bombay Ors. vs. Indigii.OlXgi:PP-ra^i'-'!'"-LlI. reported as AlK 199:11SC 686: For Lhe purpose of understandingHim expression,^status qLio', referencewas made to tlie judgrnonlin the i.l:,e of FLe^sj:^JiEn:cLL.Q2kil!J_Q2MJjJIlMcL^^ ' 19S7 (SiLlipp) SCC 394 to submit that in ordinary legal conn(.)tation,l.ln'. term 'statusquo' implies'theexisting state of things at any given point ol tjme.-

¶25As fbi" the 'National Policy on Ui-ban Street Vei'idoi's, coun,s-el lur the respondent/NDMCstated that both, the 2004 policy and the 200'.'.) P'olicy, find mention in the decision of the Supreme Court in ttie case ol Licijn.da flam fsupra) and it was only after tal<ing into consideration the '.aid policies^ did the Court directed the institutionaiization of iiibnii .••;lir:nl i vending through legislation. It was further stated that at the tiine (.,)f W.P.(CJ 4743/2a.tl} 5254/20.11 « connected niaU.er.^

2.1. of 2>.l I • i , I A; n delivering the ju'dgmehi: dated 8.10.2010, the Supreirie Court took ru.ititn oP the NCT of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2009, which was valid upto 30.':i.2.2010, apart rrom noticing the Model Street Vendor.s (Protectian-of Livelihood and Regulatior) oP Street Vending) P-iH, introduced by the Government oT India, Ministi'V ol ilousiny Uil.)aM Poverty Alleviation.She sliated that nothing new is now beii'iy r;;ul)mille(.l by the petitiorrers/vendorsherein, Por tlie present peUlion;. to hf entertainedPor any put-pose-whatsoeverand all the grievancesraised Ijy ^the petitioners; can easily' be ' addressed before tPie Vfinding Committee/appeilateauthority under the scheme relating to urban si ieel. vendingin the NDMC area, which Pora continueto ren'iain Punctioiial,even aPter 30.6.2011...

¶26This'Courthas heard these matters at length since 17.f.L.H.)lI, mi diPPerent dates.. Various counsels Por the petltioners/vendoisand Ihe ,Standing'Counselfor the respondent/NDMChad addressed th(?. (.ouil. ,Their respectivearguments have been taken note oP. Botir sides hove made strenuous ePPorts to explain what the status quo oidei' dated • 15.7.20ii passed by the Supreme Court in the , case oP Gainda •RamCsuiara),timj-Jlies. The-/e/Tmof/ToP the arguments addressed on behal! oP the petitioners/vendorsis that the status quo order read willi the .. qualiPying.'words,"as it is obtainingtoday", suPPixed to the ordei', can only be read to imply that as on date, i.e., 15.'7.2011, there was no scheinr; operationalih the NDMC areas to regulate vending activitiesand till a law W.P.(CJ47-^13/20X1^S254/301J. ffi connected niaiCers Page 22 tffJn >'V J'" V,, V-;' • r~ i.-; is ultimatelyenacted by the legislature,all the petitioners,irrespectiveof their legal status, can continue squatting/hawkingat differentsites that have been occupied by them. It is also assertedthat in the teeth of the status quo orders passed by the SupremeCourt, the respondent/NDMCin collusion with the police authorities,is threateningto illegallyremove the petitioners/vendorsfrom different sites, which is detrimental, adverse, harassing and belligerentto those, who have been found eligible by the . respondent/NDIviCfor being allotted specific tehbazarispaces within the NDMC jurisdiction,but are being threateneddue to lack of further action in this regard which is pending at the end of the respondent/NDMC. The second limb of submissions made by the learned counsels for the petitioners/vendorswas that the Special ProvisionsA\ct would additionally come to the rescO.e of the •petitioners/vendors, which also requires maintenajnce of'status quo as existing on 01.10.2006, till the end of December, 2011.

¶27On the other hand, the main thrust of the argumentsaddressed by the counsei-for the respondent/NDMCwas that as the legislature has failed to enact an appropriatelegislation in terms of the decision of.the Supreme Court jn the case of Gainda RamCsum),,the subsequentorder • dated 15:7.2011 directing parties to maintain the status quo as it is I ^ \ obtaining on the said date can only imply that the state of affaiis as existingon date are not to be-disturbed^until the rights of the parties can be finally determined through legislation. It was submitted that while W.P.(C)474-3/2011,S254/2011&. connectedmatters Page 23 of23 , I ' 1 I. > passing the status quo order on .15.07.2011, the Supreme Con,I wns conscious•of tlie fact tlnat tlie Parliament had yet to enacl comprehensivelegislation to regulate url^an street vending and in su..h circumstances, it goes without saying that it Was the intent of the Court that the entire dispute redressal mechanism as recognized in lire (.a-i.. ol Gajncla^EBDiCsUiiralwould continue to remain in-operation, so as h, regulate the urban streetvendi'rigin,the I^DMC area, till the legislatlm,in that regard is enacted. Further/ it was stressed that the ;-;pecial .ProvisionsAct did not provide any protectiveumbrella to tlie p whose squatting activities neittier fell under the '^e^croachm0nt^^1orunder "unauthorizeddevelopment", it was asserted that•even 'otherwise pending ah appropriate legisi; MDMC /-\ct was availableas a fall back option and the lelevunl. i.i in the said ehacthiehtwould continueto I'egulatesti eet vending .k.I \ .") the MDMC atea and the petitioners/vendorscouid not (.laim a vc-.ti-d lighl ' to squat at any site of their own. )n I; I'.s, I of

¶28From the above, it is. apparent that arguments rnid ceuntei argumentshave been raised by buth sides on their respectivevoisiuns iif the nieaning ai-id the effect of the status quo order dateiJ l.;r.1.1 passed by the Supreme'Court. It is also very apparent, that the meaning souglit to be attributed by both sides as to tfie implication ol the .•m-ikI 1 status quo order, is diametricallyopposed l;o eacfi other. IMol. only thi:,, both sides are at a tangeht on the facturn of the pendency or i.Wherwise,of W.P.(C)yj-743/2011,.525^1/20X1ffi connecS:ed/natf.ers f'nge Z'l tn' .lU -kV .1> the inteiim applications filed before the Supreme Court Liy bolh, tiie applicants/vendorsand the'respondent/NDMC,for claM Pication., on which- 'the aforesaid order carne to-be passed as it is tiie ..-.tdn. respondent/NDMCthat the aforesaid applications were not disjio.-.f^d oi while passing the, order dated 15.7:2011. The parties are poles npnit on the question of import of the status quo order, and tlie eirect of the observations made by the Supreme CoUit in tlie ca-.e Eara.(SJAPJa).as regards the approval of NDMC scheme. They arc also ot .loggerheadson the cohiposition of the adjudicatory rnech,.inism in

1.1 u.. NDMC jurisdictionand the manner of its functioning,a^ aL'O the i ' of tf,e scheme which is validly operatingin the NDMC areas for regulating .urban street vending, which had all been subject matter of consuleintmn ' before Uie Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. Ihe othc.i agitated by the parties-, starling from the interpretationof the various observationsmade by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgmoni,..l,o the formulation cif tfie scheme as approved by the Supiemc Coi.iit case of Si.id|-iir Madan (supra)., to tlie composition of the d redressal mechanism and its validity as atso the iriQaning ol tht; '-.tuliis quo order, ai-e all in a tUrrrioil as both tfie parties have stoutly delended their respectivestands which .are co.nipletelyat variance with i-v:H.,h othei. The only .coiTilTioh ground shared by the pai ties is the factum (.il pns.sinq of the recent judgment dated 08.10.2011) in tlie case of Cuinda Rarn(supra.)and the subsequentstatus quo order dated 1S.7.2(.).1.1 pns.sed V]f.P'.{C) yi743/:i011r 5254/20X1 a connected nwl.fers Pnge. 25 'if/' /J'! ; by bie Supreme Court.

29.-The fountainhead oP the. dispute in the pre.sent cri-'jos Uif.nMoM. remains the sWiiis quo order dated'15.7.20.11 passed by the ouprcn,o Court. The.issuewhich is sought to be agitated bePoi-e tlirs L.i.uiit i. Ih.il having regard to,l:he status quo order, whetherasl..ay order mighl l.n he granted by this Court in Tavour oT the petitioners/ventlorsa.-:, piuyed by them, irrespective."or .their, legal status, thus forbidding Ihn respondent/MDMC h'o'rn threatening and/or removing them ri..m Uk. ,differentsites occupied by them in the NDMC areas. In other wo. ds,.this Coui-t is being called upon 1:0 examine tpe meaning, scope and r.llciI "1 the status quo order dated 15.07.2011. On l:he question of h^w i.n Dscertain the'implicationof astatus qu.^ order passed by a court, in lhe case nf Messrs BharatCokJng CoM^IlIllL^'ilwas obseivedby Uk, SupreiTieCoUrt that the expression,'staius quo' is undoubtedlya leim o! ambiguityand at times, gives rise to dmibt and difficultyand m any party has any doubt on .the n^eaning and the effect of lhe slafu:, quo order,'the proper,course for such a parfv would be to approach l.lu^ (.oiiii tliat had passed the status quo order, to soeifyclarifications. . 3C). In the case at hand, wliile seeking 'o ride tfie wave of lhe alni i'.r,,iiil status quo order, the parties have chosen to overlook factor-, which is that a status quo order operates on Supreme Court fias passed orders requiring both sides to ma c i [ -W.P.CCJ 4743/2011, 525^}/20:tl a, connncSed insliers l-'nge. 2f> Iif 2 If j. quo. Once such an order of l:he Supreine Court is on rec(^r.;l, tiie. soiiu-. not only binds all the parties to the adjudication,and all the |.)aili(^.s, civil or judicial who are required to act in accordancewith the said order;, l)Ul it equally binds the High Court trorn inl-erPeringwitli sucli an ordci, ;r. Ihe said order has been passed in litigationsbePore the highest (..oui land-

¶31The orders oP the-Supreine Court'are on record. 1he sla order is a clear signal to the Higir Court as well, to avoid gra ne Couil. has diiei.lnd order, including an interim order, when the Supreme Por status quo to be maintained: .In such circumstances, il' to grant a stay order in Pavour of the petitioners/vendorsaiiayed bcloie it, it would be tantamountto negating the orders oP the Su|iieme (.din I, which require, the parties'to maintain status quo pending eilac.lmeiil ol appropriate legislation. IP either oP the parties were uncleai nhnul llu! interpretation oP the status quo order, it was Por tPvein to Piave applied lo 1;he Supreme Court for clariPications tliereoP. Additionally, I.he leliaiu.e placed by tPie petitioners/vendors on tPie Special Provisions Acl see.kiiui interiiT\ legal sanctity to the placement oP goods by i.hcm on Mm paveiTients, by terming it as. encroacl'in'ient/unauthori^ed u'.,(!, .as recognized under the said Act and tlieir contention ttiat l.he .Supieme. Court had recognized the Pact that the Special P-'rovisions Act i.S' Ihe only Central law having primacy over other Statutes, are also mnlleis Ihal Ihe iV.P.(C) 5254/20X1 Si con'hected fnaiJ.-ers (,) ( 111 o a 11 y \N a s Pntjp. 27 u/' f it rs/ o Lilioners/vehdors ought to tiave placed LoePore the Supreme C^oiiil whilt; seeking clarifications oP the status quo order. j.t would thernloi-e he advisable Tor the petitioners/vendors as also tlie res|:)on(.lent/l\ll'M(: lo approacl'i bhe 5:iuprerne Coui't ai'id make their submissions Ihc.io n.s regai'ds tlieir grievances. However, as botti [parties insisteiJ l.hal Iheii ai.gurnents be taker) note oP and tiieii' submissions be fiiaced on rrM.oid, some pains liave been taken to do the iieedPul.

¶32[n view oP the aPoresaid Pacts and cii'cui'nstances, l;liis Criui 1 is nl' the opinion that it va/iI! not be appropriate Por it to grant stay oideis in IIk-: la( c. oP the status quo order dated

15.07.20.1.1 passed by tlie Gu|:.iionn- (louii. It is reiterated that any sucli ordei' shall be on anti-tPiesis lo the oi dor-; oP ttie Supreme Court, wliicl'i must'be respected botti, in lelter and .spirit. In SLicl'i circumstances, the present petitions are disposed oP by diM.lining grant of any interim orders to tPie petitioners, hlowever, liberty i.s (.|i anted to both the parties to apply to the Supreme Court Por a clariPical ion oP thr^ status quo order dated

15.07.2011 passed in the case oP GjaiULla Kam Csy.l2i::^.- The parties ai'e lePt to bear their own costs. OCTOtTR.'9^ rkb 2011 ^743/2011, 525^!/2011 S. connerXed (IHIIIMIA IICU'IIIILJI) .ltiP)(-:i 2 If ffl''

H rs IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on : 21.09.2011 Pronounced on: 24.10.2011 + W.P.fC^ 4347/2011. 4559/2011. 4593/2011. 4610/2011 4650/2011. 4651<^20H, 4827/2011. 4923/2011. 5024/2011 5023/2011. 4775/2011. 5247/2011. 5254/2011. 5255/2011 5257/2011. 5258/2011. 5261/2011. 5-262/2011. 5263/2011 5264/2011. 5277/2011. 5292/2011. 5312/2011. / AwrjLJL. 5317/2011. 5402/2011. 5403/2'011. 5405/2011. 5408/2011. 5410/2011. 5411/2011. 5413/2011. 5418/2011. 5423/2011. 5444/2011 5473/2011. 5484/2011. 5485/2011. 5497/2011. 5498/2011 5503/2011. 5508/2011. 5504/2011. 5595/2011. 5505/2011. 5614/2011. 5506/2011. 5615/2011. 5507/2011. 5616/2011. 5618/2011. 5627/2011. 5630/2011. 5631/2011. 5643/2011 5645/2011. 5654/2011. 5656/2011. 5711/2011. 5717/2011. 5718/2011. 5728/2011. 5729/2011. 5731/2011. 5732/2011, 5737/2011. 5738/2011. 5739/2011. 5743/2011. 5761/2011. 5784/2011. 5785/2011. 5791/2011. 5794/2011. 5797/2011. 5798/2011. 5822/2011. 5911/2011. 5918/2011. 5928/2011. 5931/2011. 5933/2011. 5934/2011. 5935/2011. 5957/2011. 5965/2011. 5966/2011. 5967/2011. 5968/2011. 5969/2011. 5970/2011. 5974/2011. 6096/2011. 6100/2011. 6101/2011, 6102/2011. S107/201J. 6108/211. 6114/2011. 6115/2011. 6116/2011. 6117/2011. 6118/2011. 6119/2011. 6120/2011. 6121/2011. 6122/2011. 6123/2011. 6144/2011. 6250/2011. 6270/2011. 6271/2011. 6449/2011. 6527/2011. 6528/2011. 6529/2011. 6530/2011. 6531/2011. 6532/2011. 6533/2011. 6534/2011. 6538/2011. 6555/2011. 6667/2011. 6668/2011. 6669/2011. 6670/2011. 6684/2011. 6701/2011. 5173/2011. 4739/2011. 5046/2011. 5051/2011. 5157/2011. 4649/2011. 4722/2011. 2601/2011. 2602/2011. 3052/2011. 3181/2011. 3185/2011. 3189/2011. 3196/2011. 4340/2011. 4342/2011. 4343/2011. 4344/2011. 4345/2011. 4349/2011. 4350/2011. 4352/2011. 4354/2011. 4356/2011. 4358/2011. 4359/2011. 4360/2011. 4361/2011. 4362/2011. 4363/2011. 4364/2011. 4365/2011. 4366/2011. 4367/2011. 4368/2011. 4369/2011. 4370/2011. 4371/2011. 4372/2011. 4373/2011. 4374/2011. 4375/2011. 4377/2011" 4387/2011. 4388/2011. 4389/2011. 4391/2011. 4392/2011. 4393/2011. 4395/2011. 4396/2011. •4398/2011. 4398/2011. 4399/2011. 4400/2011. 4402/2011. 4404/2011. 4405/2011. 4406/2011. 4407/2011. 4408/2011. 4409/2011. 4410/2011. 4412/2011. 4413/2011. 4414/2011. 5341/2011. 4847/2011. 4859/2011. 4887/2011. 4990/2011. W.P.(C}4347/2011 and connectedmstters Page lof8 Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. 5099/2011, 5114/2011. 5115/2011 ^ 5117/2011, 5129/2011, 5139/2Q11" 5144/9nn 670S/2011 6799/2011, 6824/2011. 6825/2011. 6826/201 j 6827/7ni"^ 6896Z2m:_69gi^201i:6907/2011; 6903/2011! 6904/.mi !! 6907/2011. fiQ08/2011. fiQOOOnit; 6910/2011,—6917/2011. 6919/2011, 6920/2011. 6922/20ii fiQ32/2011and ^420/2011. . ^^Zl/ZOll, m THE i^ATTERS OF Mnun •• Petitionerin W.P,(C)4347/2011 KTRPAI I^etitlonerin W.P.(C)4559/2011 MKPAL blNGH Petitionerin W.P.rC) 4593/2011 SHAILENDERKUMAR Petitionerin W.P.(C)4610/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4650/2011 Petitioner in W,P.(C) 4651/2011 AMAR NATH SINGH Petitionerin W.P.(C)4827/2011 RHNpfi^c?T^^u^ Petitionerin W.P.(C)4923/2011 bhUPAL bllMGH Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5024/2011 SURENDERSINGH AND ORS. Petitionersin W.P,(C) 5028/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4775/2011 RAKESH KUMAR AND ORS. Petitionersin W.P.(C) 5247/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5254/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C). 5255/2011 ivi,\uSHKUM/-.R Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5257/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5258/2011 RAJESH CGUPTA AND ORS. Petitionersin W.P.(C) 5261/2011 lAKHPATIAND ORS. PetitionersIn W.P,(C) 5262/2011 SOHAN LAL AND ORS. Petitionersin W.P.(C)5263/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5264/2011 ARUN KUMAR ALIAS LUCKY Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5277/2011 Mnun Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5292/2011 MOHD. ZAHID Petitionerin W.P.rC) 5312/2011 SHAKEELAHMED — Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5317/2011 Petitioner in W.P.(C) 5402/2011 RINKU KUMAR GUPTA Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5403/2011 HARJEET KAUR Petitionerin W.P.(C) 5405/2011 NARESH KUMAR RAO AND ORS Petition