Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Bharti Realty Ltd

order, grant the consent, applied for subject to such conditions and for such period as nnay be specified in tlie order, or refus.e such consent: Provided that it shall be open to the State Board to cancel such consent before the expiry of the period for which it is granted ;or.refuse further consent after such expiry if the conditions subject to which such consent has been granted are not fulfilled:! Provided further that before cancelling a consent or refusing a further consent under the first proviso, a reasonable Opportuhity of being heard shall be given to the perspn concerned.

(5). :

(6) I

(7) ! 31A. Power to give directions-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, but subject to the provisions of this Act and to any directions that the Central Governnnent may give in this behalf, a Board may, in the exercise of its powers and performajnce of its functions under this Act, issue any directions in writing to any person, office or autljiority, and such person, officer or authority shall be bound' to comply with such directions. Exp!a nation.- hereby declar under this sect LPA 895/2010 & connected matters For the avoidance of doubts, it is 0d that the power to issue directions ion includes the power to direct-3-0

(a) the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or process; or

(b) the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water or any other service.

¶7Witii, reference to the Water Act as originally framed in the year 1974 and as amended in the year 1988 and with reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act, the learned Single Judge has opined that the I legislative amendments!carried out in the original Water Act were intended to expand the scope of the Water Act. The learned Single Judge has highlighted that the expression 'establish any industry, operation or \process or any treatment and disposal system or any extension or addidon thereto, which is.lil<ely to 'X discharge sewage or trade effiuent'm clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 25 made it clear that the-requirement to obtain previous consent to establish aiiy industry, operation or process was no longer restricted to tradfe effluent being discharged but would also encompass if 'sewage effluent' was discharged and with reference ; to the definition of 'sewage effluent', as per Section 2(g), has held I that the same would iinclude sewage of any kind, including domestic sewage. The ilearned Single Judge has also noted the expanded definition of 'jtrade effluent' as per Section 2(k.) of the Water Act. Noting the; definition of the words 'operation' and 'process' in para 12 of; the decision, and thereafter noting the ^ decisionsthat purposive!constructions-needsto be followed where the mischief which e)j:isted before passing the statute was detected and was interided to be remedied, the learned Single Judge has concluded that coiiective operation .or process of LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters! Page 21 of38 bathingin tiie bathroom\and such processesas tal<e place in the toilet and cooking and washing in the kitchen wouldbe operations .and processes contemplated by Section 25(l)(a) of the WaterAct forits applicabilityto residentialcomplexes. This is tiie conclusion arrived at in para 16, but in the immediate next para i.e. paia 17, the learned Single Judge: has lodged a caveat by stating that he r was not answering the question with reference to single storeyed constructions. • .

¶8With referende to the commercial complexes i.e. Commercial Shopping Complexes and Shopping Malls, the learned SingleJudge has held th^t the definitionof 'trade effluent'as per Section 2(k) would encompass all kinds of non-domestic sewage and has thus held that|these buildings would be governed by clause (a) of Sub-Section|l of Section25 of the WaterAct.

¶9As regards the very act of constructing a building, in paras 19 and 20, the lealrned SingleJudge has held that the very act of constructing a commercial shopping complex, shopping mall or a residential complex iwould make applicable clause (a) of Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 aind for which the. reasoningof the learned • I : Single Judge is that construction of commercial shopping or I residential complexes is;likely to have impact on water pollution because large quantities|of water are used during constructionanci are also discharged. . ' •

¶10Since, in all the cases, DPCC rose from the slumber after buildings were com|pleted and put to use, the learned .Single I Judge opined that DPCC could not levy penalties-and tor which remedial action, as per the learned Single Judge, was as provided LPA 895/2010&connected matters : ' ' I 3:2^ in Sub-Section 5 of Section 25 of .the Water Act.

¶11The argument;of DPCC that the power to give directions under Section 33A of tlie Water Act has been negated by the learned Single Judge, with reference to various decisions cited which hold that the power to levy penalty has to be expressly conferred by the statute.:

¶12Pertaining to the Water Act, the learned Single Judge has summarized the legal position, in para 29 as under:- "29. The discussion so far on the legal position under the Water /Act in relation to the petitioners may be summarized thus:

(i) Section 25 (1) of the Water Act is intended to coven not just 'industry' which discharges 'trade :effluent' but any 'process or operation' that results in a discharge of 'sewage' not limited to trade effluent.

(ii) The words 'operation or process' occurring in Section 25(l)(a) have to be given the widest possible meaning and scope. This approach is consistent with the SOR of the 1988 amendments to the Water A\ct which make it clear that the legislative intent was to expa;nd the scope of the regulatory powers pf the state PCC. The principle of ejuscfem] generis is therefore inapposite in the context.

(ill) Commercial shopping complexes, shopping malls and even residential complexes are covered !by Section 25(l)(a) of the Water Act. ;

(iv) The liabiliity under the, Water Act does not get exempted only because the sewage LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters j Page 23of38 discharged from such complexes joins the main municipal sewerage system which may onmay not be treated in keeping with the water pollution norms.

(v) The pollution caused . by discharge of domestic sewage from a residential complex or trade effluent from a commercial complex or industry during the construction phase as well as at any stage after the complex becomes functional would attract the various provisions of the Water Act. ;

(vi) With the buildings . in question having already; been constructed without obtaining prior consent to establish, the direction of the DPiCC that ,those who had failed to obtain prior consent to establish should now apply f9r such consent is a direction that is not capable of being complied with. Instead the DPCC should invoke the powers under Section! 25(5) of the Water Act, issue show cause ; notices setting out the conditionalities required to be 'coiTiplied with within a time frame and upon failure to do so, i;nvoke the powers to issue directions under Section 33A Water Act.

(vii) The Water Act is in a separate domain and its provisions will have to be complied with notwithstanding that the MCD has the • power ito lay down a separate set of regulations and bye-laws for use of water. Where an applicant has not been communicated any decision of the QPCC for four months after the making of an application, the deeming provision of Section 25(7) would kick in and it would be deemed that the consent to establish has been granted. In such circumstances. Section 25(1) of the Water Act cannot LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters' Mof 38 obviously thereafter be dnforced.'

¶13Discussing the; applicability of the Air Act, as.conceded to by learned counsel for! the parties at the hearing of the appeal, I the learned Single Judge has inadvertently referred to the pre-annended provisions of th'e Air Act, though the learned Single Judge , has referred and noted ithe fact that the Air Act of 1981 was amended in the year 1988. I

¶14Pertaining to nesidential.complexes, the learned Single Judge has noted the unajnended Section 21 of the Air Act which did not have the word 'establish' and had only the word 'operate' in Sub-Section 1 thereof,; and thus the learned Single Judge has held that no permissio'n from DPCC is needed to establish residential complexes, but on the'same reasoning as followed in paras 19 and 20 pertaining to the Water ,Act, has held that during construction phase of residential complexes, permission under the Air Act has to be obtained. Qua. shoppingcomplexesand shopping malls, it has been held that under the Air Act, for these connplexes, to operate them, prior permission has to be obtained as also during construction phase.

¶15The learned Single Judge has summarized the position under the Air Act, in para i41 as under:- "41. The position under the Air Act may be summarized:

(i) A collective reading of Section 21(1) of the Air Act with leads this commercia mall would Section 21(1) of the Air Act.' LPA 895/2010& connected matters Section 2(a), 2(b) and 2(k) thereof Court to the conclusion that a shopping complex or a shopping be covered within the scope of Page 25 of 33. 5M

(ii) The definition of 'air pollution' under Section 2(a) read with Section 21(1) of the Air Act, and the fact that the . commercial shopping complexes or: shopping malls are going to be used for a trade activity, is sufficient to attract the provisions: of Section^21(1) ofthe Air Act.

(iii)As far as; a purely residential complex is concerned, oh the present wording of Section 21(1) of the Air Act,, there is no requirement of obtaining the prior consent of the DPCC to operate. i ' .

(iv)During the construction phase and after the complex becomes functional, every , building, whether it is a commercial shopping complex or a shopping mall or a residential complex, will have to comply with the norms under the Air Act and the Water Act and for that matter the EPA.

(v) Where the construction of a commercial shopping confiplex or shopping mall has been allowed to be'completed without a prior consent to operate, the DPCC can inspect the building, issue a show.cause notice requiring time bound compliance with the conditionalities imposed by it under the Air Act failing which it can issue directions under Section 31A Air Act."

¶16A perusal of Section 25 of the Water Act would reveal, I on a bare reading thereof, that without the previous consent of the . State Pollution Board, 'no person could establish or take any steps to establish anv industry, operation or process which is likely I . ' to discharge sewage or trade effluent. Thus, even if sewage effluent as defined in Section 2(g) was discharged from any LPA'895/2010&connected matters ; Page 26 ol" 38 ' industry, operation or process Intended to be establisi'ied, tine requirement of prior consent would be necessary and to this extent the view taken by the iearned Single Judge is correct. : 17. But, what would; encompass 'any industry, operation or processl :

¶18The Water Act does not define, 'industry', 'operation' or 'process'. As held in the decisions reported as 1993 (3) SC 2529 Commissioner of income tax Orissa vs. i^/s.N.C.Budiiiraia 6i Co. . and 2010 (32,0) ITR 420 (Dpihi) Ansai Housing & Construction Ltd. 1/5. Commissioner of income Tax, the ordinary dictionary meaning of 'industry' or an 'industrial undertaking' would not include the activity of construction. The word .'operation' is defined, as noted ^by the learned Single Judge, in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Lesie Brown Ed.|) as follows; "operation; An action, deed; exertion of force or influence; working, activity; an act of a practical or technical nature,: e5p one forming a step in a process." ;

¶19The same dictionary defines 'process', as noted by the ' learned Single Judge, as under;- "process : The acti;on or fact of going on or being carried on; a contir^uous series of actions, events or changes; a systematic series of actions or operations directed at a particujlarend." • j '

¶20As noted herein above, applying purposive construction, the learned'Single judge has held, in para 15, that the two words 'operation'; and 'process' have to be given their widest amplitude and m^eaning. The purposive construction LPA 895/2010&connected matters • 3^ ^7 applied by tlie.learnedSingleJud'ge is that widestannplitudeneeds to be given to Section 25(l)(a) of the Water.Act. I

¶21The error committed by the learned Single Judge is to mechanically note the-definition of'o/7eraf/b/7'and 'process', ignore the sweep of the span of the two words, We do so. Operation is defined as Ian activity or an act of a practical or technical nature, with ennphasis of the acts forming 'a step in a process'. The word 'process'\s a going on action or a continuous series of actions 'directed at a particular end'. Thus, an operation I would be a working or Ian. activity, where the core of the act constituting, the activity! is of a .practical or technical natijre especially one forming a step in a process, and since process is an "" I . ' ^ going on action or a continuous series of action directed at^ ' particular end, the conjoiint reading of an operation and a process or even if the two have to be read disjunctively would mean that I • , the expression 'establish or tal<e any steps to. establish any industry, operation or process, or any treatment and disposal system or any extension or addition thereto, which is lil<ely to discharge sewage or trade would mean to ta]^.stejD5_lC'. establish anv industry, establishment or undertaking where IJie operation or process i.e. activity is of a practical or techiijc^ nature, at the core of which are ongoing-acts, in a series, direct_ed at a particular end. Tljius., the act of ablution in the toilet or ' , washing vegetables and dishes in the kitchen of a residential complex, within the precinctsof residentialflats, by no strt^tch ot imaginationcan be called or labeled as an operation or a process.

¶22The view taken by the learned Single Judge pertaining LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters ' to shopping malls and conimercial shopping complexes on the applicabilityof the Water ^ct is accordingly upheld and the view taken pertaining to the applicabilityof the Water /Act to residential housing complexes is incorrect.

¶23A building where shops would be made and in which shops goods or services would be sold as also shopping malls would be buildings where Operation and or process is carried on for the reason they would ;be places where the activity carried on is of a practical or a technical nature and at the core of which activity would be ongoing acts, in a series, directed at a particular end i.e. if goods are purchased and sold, the sale and purchase of goods; and if service is rendered, the rendition of service directed ^^towards a particular end. If from these buildings sewage is discharged, since sewage effluent as defined in Section 2(k) of the Water Act means effluent from any sewage system, if these buildings:are intended to; be established, necessary permission would be required from the Board under the Water /Act.

¶24With respect to the decisions reported as 1993 (3) 5C 2529 Commissioner of Income Tax Orissa vs. M/5.l\I.C.Budhiraia,& Co, and 2010'(320) ITR 420 (Delhi) Ansai Housing (S-Construction Ltd. vs. Commissionerof income Tax, where it has been held that constructinga building per-se is not an industrialactivitythe view taken by the learned Single Judge that constructinga building, ; whether to be used for ai residentialpurpose or to be used for a ^ commercialshopping connplex or for shopping malls would be ar industrialactivity; running contrary to the aforesaid judgmentsis incorrect. i LPA 895/2010& connected matters : 3S

¶25The reasoning of the learned Single Judge to expand the scope of Section 25(l)(a) of the Water Act; that the object of the Water Act was. to control water pollution in its widest amplitude and hence thfe reasoning that while constructing buildings, water is used and sometimes discharged thus requiring a wider meaning to be :given, ignores that the Environment ' (Protection) Act 1986 deals with this larger issue in the context of 'environment' therein being defined to include water, air and land and the inter relationship which exists amongst them and human beings and other living creatures, plants and micro-organisms. • The said Act and the Rules framed under the said Act are wide enough to cover exploitationof water and the impact thereof on /•^^environment and we see no vacuum in the fight against environmental degradation, by understanding the various expressions and their meaning in Section 25(l)(a) of the Water Act as adopted by us. | . . I

¶26A word on purposive construction. It simply means that while adopting a purposivpapproach. Courts should seek to give effect to the true purpose!of legislation and must keep in view all material that bears on thd background against which a legislation •, was effected and where more than one construction is possible, I the one which eliminates the mischief identified should be , favoured. But, where only one construction is possible, the Court - is not to strain bacl<ward5 and then bend forward followed by leaning to the left and the;n to the right to appropriate a space not intended to be appropriated by the legislation. The Water Act ' requires prior permissionito establish any industry, operation or I LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters i Page3iOof3o process which is lil<ely to discharge sewage or trade effluent. It is not intended to apply to iail and sundry establishnnents. It is restricted to only when a building^ housing an industry is sought to be established or a building in which an operation or a process is intended to be carried on where effluent or trade effluent would be • discharged. :

¶27To sunnmarize the position under the Water Act the position may be summarized thus: 'Section 25(1) of the Water Act i ... . . would apply where a building is proposed to be constructed to set ' ^• • ' . • up an industry or carry on 'an operation or a process as explained in para 21 above and this jwould mean that the Water Act would not apply to buildings housing residential apartments/units. It I ^^^ould apply to all other buildingswhere effluentor trade effluent ^is discharged, be they wheire manufacturing activity is carried on, I sale or purchase of goods is carried on or services are provided.

¶28Pertaining to the Air Act, there is a material difference in the language-used in Section 21 of the said Act, vis-a-vis the language used in Section 25 of the Water Act. Whereas the Water Act requires a permission |to establish any industry, operation or process, the Air Act restricts its span to prior permission being necessary only where it is intended to establish or operate any industrial plant. i . . 29. Since the learned Single Judge has referred to the .unamended provision and has ignored the amendments carried out to the Air Act in the; year 1988, we note that as per the amended Section 21, the dbligation to obtain the consent of the State Pollution Control Board is only to establish or operate any LPA 895/2010& connected matters Lj 0 industrial plant in an Air ;Pollution Control Area. Section 2(l<) ; . defines an 'industrial plant' to mean any plant used for any - I industrialortrade purposesjandemittingany air pollutant.

¶30The learned Single Judge lias read the unarnended Section 21 of the Air Act to! mean that prior consent is needed to operate an industrial plant. Since the decision of the learned Single Judge has not noted the language of the amended Section •where the words 'establish or' have been inserted prior to the word 'operate', we need to re-look into the issue.

¶31Highlighting the definition of the words 'industrial plant' as defined in Section .2(l<) of the Air Act, the learned Single Judge hgis noted that the definition expands the meaning of the words .^industrialplant'to includekbuildingused for atrade purposeand "^with reference to Section 21 of the Air Act has held that a building where trade is carried on the prior consent would be required to operate the building. ; ,

¶32Since the learned Single Judge has noted the unamended Section and since the amended Section requires prior consent even to establish an industrial plant in an Air Pollution Control Area; agreeing with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that in view of the extended definition of the e?<pression 'industrial plant', which includes a building where trade is carried on, the inevitable! conclusion has to be that prior consent /Under the Air Act would be 'needed where a building is proposed to be constructed wherefrom: trade would be carried on and since from a shopping mall and!from a commercial shopping complex trade is carried on, we hold that prior consent under the A,ir A\ct . • LPA 895/2010&connected matters i' u would be required when icomnnercial shopping complexes and shopping malls are established i.e. at the commencement of the process of establishment • i.e. before the building construction activity commences. ; •

¶33As noted herein above, the learned Single Judge has held construction per-se as requiring prior permission, both under • the Water Act and the AiriAct, and thus the learned Single judge has held that under the AiriAct, consent during construction phase would have to be obtained.;

¶34For our reasoning herein above pertaining to the \l\later Act, the said reasoning of:the learned Single Judge pertaining to the Air Act is overruled, but would make no difference to the final ^conclusion arrived at by usi pertaining to the applicability of the Air Act when construction activity commences in respect of shopping malls and commercial shopping complexes for the reason, prior consent tp establish the same is required on the language of Section 21 of the Air Act in view of the expanded definition of the expression 'industrial plant'. But, for residential complexes, we hold that neither to establi$h nor to operate, (in fact the concept of 'to operate' is not even applicable to a residential complex), any permission is required under the Air Act. .

¶35The learned Single Judge has held that neither the language of Section 33A ;of the Water Act nor the language of .Section 31A of the Air Act contemplates the power on the State Pollution Boards to levy any penalty. ,36. The learned Single Judge has noted the decisions reported as 1975 (2) SCC 22 Khemka & Co. (Agencies) Pvt. Ltd. vs. LPA 895/2010&connected matters \ • . St^tp. of Maharashtra, 1994 (4) SCC 276 IJCSynthetics CementWorks vs. CommercialTaxes Officer 1997 (6) SCC 479 India Carbon ltd, i/s. State of Assam to opine that power to levy penalty has to be conferred by a substantive provision in the enactnnent.

¶37We concur with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in paras 58 to 54 of; the innpugneddecision and thus do not elaborate any further, but would additionally highlight that the power to iss-ue directionsunder Section 33A of the.Water Act and the power to issue directionsunder Section 31A of the /Air Act, on their plain language, does not confer the power to levy any penalty. We would further highlightthat under ChapterVII of the Water Act, and under Chapter Vr of the Air Act penalties and procedureto levy the sarpe have been set out. /-\ perusal of the provisionsunderthe Water Act would reveal that penaltiescan be levied as per procedure:prescribed and only Courts can take cognizanceof offences under the Act and levy penalties,whether by way of imprisonmentor fine. Similar is the position undei the Air Act. The legislaturehaving enacted specificprovisionsfor levy of penaltiesand proceduresto be followed has specificallymade the offencescognizableby Courts and the powerto levy penalties, under both Acts has been vested in the. Courts. The role of the PollutionControl Boards is to initiate proceedings before the Court r of Competent Jurisdiction land no more.

¶38We would be failing not to note that on the issue of a delegateenot being empowered (by law) to further sub-delegate the delegated power, learned counsel for DPCC conceded to said LPA 895/2010& connected matters • position and tinus we leave undisturbed the view taken by the learned Single Judge,on the subject. 29, Since our reasoningaforesaid results in the finding, by way of interpretingthe provisionsin the WaterAct and the Air Act, as requiringprior consent:to establishand operateshopping malls and commercialshopping;complexesand the provisionsbeing not applicable to residential; complexes, we declare void actions initiated by DPCC pertaining to residential complexes and we ~ further hold that said wr|it petitions are allowed in tenns of the, prayers made. The impUgned decision(s) by the learned Single Judge(s) qua residential:complexes is set aside. Qua shopping malls and commercial shopping complexes, since we have held that prior permission is: required under both Acts to estdblisli shopping malls and conrimercial shopping complexes as also to operatethem and noting:that even DPCC was not too sure of the legal position and thus' misinformed a few applicants that no permissionwas requiredand qua most persons permittedthem to commence and complete construction of shopping malls and commercialshoppingcomplexes,the questionwhich now needs to be answered is: Whether, pertainingto the Water Act, Sub-Section 5 of Section 25 is the answerto what needs to be done and in the absence of a similar pj-ovision in the Air Act, what action needs to be directed to be taken. ; ^ 40. The language of Sub-Section 5 of Section .15 of the • Water Act makes it plain clear that the only solutionto a situation of a building being constructedto establishan industry,operation or process without obtaining prior consent of the State Pollution LPA 895/2010& connected matters; Control Board is the po\A/er of the Board to serve upon the person I : • . concerned a notice imposing such conditions as might have been imposed on an application seeking prior consent; and we find that the learned Single Judge .has correctly so opined and has rightly issued the direction that the only way out, pertaining to the Water Act, is to permit DPCC to inspect the shopping malls and the shopping commercial complexes and if it is found that pertaining to discharge of sewage from these buildings any steps are required to prevent watfer pollution, DPCC would be authorized to issue notices requiring the owner of the building to take steps in terms of the notice : issued. Pertaining to the Air Act, notwithstanding there being no similar provision, but the concept of a post decisional hearing may be made applicable with 'the modification that no heating would be required inasmuch as there is no decision, but DPCC should be empowered to inspect the shopping malls and .the shopping commercial complexes and pertaining to air pollution, if any deficiencies are found, to notify the same to the owner; requiring corrective action to be taken. Needless to state, if the owners of the buildings do not take corrective action, DPCC would, always have the power to file criminal complaints before the Courts of Competent Jurisdiction, which Courts would alo;ne have the power to impose fine and additionally impose sentence of imprisonment upon the offending persons. ;

¶41On the issue:of Air Pollution, we would like to pen a post-script pertaining toishopping complexes and shopping malls for the reason the only pctivity of air pollution in these buildings LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters ' Page 36 of38 < would be through the air conditioning plants and generators installed to supply electricity to the buildings in case of power cuts, for the reason the trade of sale and purchase of goods in these complexes does not entail any activity which causes air pollution. We find that pertaining to DG sets, pernnissions in any case have to be obtained from DPCC if the capacity of the DG set. is beyond a prescribed: wattage and thus DPCC may suitably reconsider all shopping • complexes and shopping malls where consent of DPCC has been obtained with respect to DG sets installed as also air-conditioning plants installed in the buildings, for if for the DG sets and air-conditioning plants, sanctions" have already been obtained, nothing further remains to be got sanctioned under the Air Act.

¶42In a few cases, we find that since DPCC was not permitting the buildings to be occupied, under protest, the owners paid the penalty to DPCC and have immediately approached the Court seeking refund and the same has been ordered for the reason neither under the Water Act nor under the Air Act there exists any power in DPCC to levy penalty or impose conditions of furnishing bank guarantee. The decision of the learned Single Judge is correct in directing the bank guarantees to be discharged and penalties levied to be refunded for the reason the said act of DPCC is ultra-vires its power under the two statutes and the levy of penalty is without any authority of law. In the decision reported as 1997 (5) SCC 536 Mafatlal Industries Ltd. 6( Ors. vs. UP! & Ors.,- under writ jurisdiction refund can be directed where the levy is without jurisdiction and the same would include a penalty levied LPA 895/2010 & connected matters ! Page37of3S3 without any jurisdiction. In the instant case the penalty levied is unconstitutional being not sanctioned by any power vested ii DPCC either under the Water Act or the Air Act. The impugned decisions where penalty levied has been directed to be refundec are upheld.

¶43The appeals fil objections filed are allow above.

¶44We leave the parties to bear their own costs.

¶45All interim orders stand vacated. f lUAi^Y 23" 2012 LPA 895/2010 & connected matters Bd by DPCC are dismissed and the cross 5d in terms of paras 27, 33, 34 and 39 [MA\i JUDGE ^ATDBHA ^ JUDGE

i % IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % ludament Reserved on : lanuarv 2012 ludament Pronounced on: 23'^ lanuarv. 2012 LPA 710/2011 DELHI POLLUTION CONTROLCOMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dlnesh Jindal, L.O. \ versus BHARTI REALTY LTD Respondent Through Mr.Dushyant Manocha and Ms.Tarunima Vijra, Advocates CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHARANI PRADEEP NANDRAIOG. I. For orders see LPA No.895/2010. —r-7 (PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) JUDGE (WATIBHARANI) JUDGE JANUARY 23. 2012 dk % IN THE HIGH COURT OF IMEW DELHI iLidament Reserved on : 16"' lanuarv 2012 ludament Pronounced on: 23''^ lanud'ry, 2012 + LPA:895/2010 DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through: Mric. Mohan Rao and Mr.LokeshSharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. versus : SPLENDOR LANDBASE LTD Respondent Through: MrJ.B.B. Gupta, Ms.Mandeep Kaurand Mr;.Harsh Hari Haran, /Advocates LPA 1/2011 & CiVi:|\lo.6781/2011 (Cross Objections DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE /Appellsmt Through Mr.C. Mohan, Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. versus ; 5ACHDEVA BUILDON PVT LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, Advocate for R-1 Mr.Neeeraj Chaudhari, CGSC with Mr.Akshay Chandra and Mr.Khalid Arshad, Advocates for UOI LPA 6/2011 & CM'iMo.6779/2011 (Cross Qbiectioris) DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. LPA 895/2010& connected matters versus VARDHMAN PROPERTIES LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, Advocate for R-1 LPA 7/2011 & No. DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COIMMITTEE Appellant • Through Mlr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharrna, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. versus ' VARDHMAN PROPERTIES LTD & ORS ..... Respondents Through Mir.SanjayGoswami, Advocate for R-1 LPA 8/2011 & CiVi iMo.6782/2011 (.Cross Objections:] DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharrna, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. versus VARDHMAN PROPERTIES LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Anil Sapra, Sr. Advocate with Ms.Urvi Kbthiala, Ms.Praneeta Vir and Mr.Sanjay G:oswaini, Advocates DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharrna, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L-,0, versus ! MANISH BUILDWELL PVT LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, Advocate for R-1 LPA 895/2010 & connected matters; ; LPA 10/2011 , ' DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindai, L.O. versus ; MANI5H BUILDWELL PVT LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, /Advocate for R-I LPA 11/2011 DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma,. Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O, versus VARDHMAN LAND DEVELOPERS PVT LTD & ANR Respondents Through None LPA 22/2-011 & CiVi 'Mo.6824/2011 (Cross Objections) DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE /Appellant Through Mf.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharrna,, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh JindaJ, L.O. versus | PANI</ivJ BUILDWELL LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, A\dvocate for R-1 Mr.Neeeraj Chaudhari, CGSC with Mir.Akshay Chandra and Mr.Khalid Arshad, , Advocates for UOI LPA 23/2011 & CM iMQ.6832/2011 (Cross Qijiectic DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant LPA 895/2010connected matters Page 3. of Through Mr.C. Mohan Rso and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with-Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.Q. versus RAJESH PROJECTS INDIA PVT LTD & 0R5 Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswanni, Advocate for R-1 Mr.Neeeraj Chaudhari, CG5C with Mr.Akshay Chandra and Mr.Khalid Arshad, ' Advocates for UOI LPA 24/2011 & CM Mo.8168/2011 (Cross Qbiections) DELHI POLLUTION cjDNTROLCOMMITTEE Appellant •Through Mtj.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.LokeshSharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. versus ! .. BEST REALTORS (INDIA) LTD & ORS ..... Respondents Through Mii.Sanjay Goswami, Advocate for R-1 Mti.Ne