Sanchin Gupta & Ors v. Delhi Subordinate Selection Board (Dsssb) Thr. Its. Chairman & Ors

JUDGMENT MANMOHAN. J : The presentbatch of writ petitionshave been filed challengingboth the Directorateof Education'sNotificationdated 8*^ May, 2006 and the Department of Urban Development'sNotificationdated 13*^ July, 2007 notifying Recruitment Rules for appointment to the post of Assistant Teachers (Primary) in the Government of NCT of Delhi and Municipal Corporationof Delhi as being unconstitutional,illegaland arbitrary.

¶2While the Governmentof NCT of Delhi has notified its Recruitrnent Rules, (hereinafterreferred to as 'RRs') by virtue of power conferred by Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution,Municipal Corporationof Delhi' has exercised its power under Section 98 and followed the procedure prescribedin Section480(2)of the Delhi MunicipalCorporationAct, 1957. It is pertinentto mentionthat both the RRs of Governmentof NCT of Delhi and MCD are identical.

¶3Both the RRs mandatorilyprescribe as essential eligibilitycriteria not only a minimum and maximum eligible age as 20 and 27 years WP (C) No. 7297/2007-Page4of39 respectivelybut also prescribepassingof Hindi subjectat secondarylevel and minimum50% marks in the seniorsecondaryexamination.

¶4It has been allegedthat the impugnedRRs are illegal,arbitraryand unconstitutional because they constitute a departure from the past regulationswith regardto three essentialcriteriasnamelyage, marks and language. Priorto the impugnedRRs, the age limitfor participatingin the AssistantTeachers (Primary)examinationconducted by the Respondent was 32 yearsfor male candidatesand 42 yearsfor femalecandidatesand study of Hindi as a subjectat secondarylevel was not mandatory. Under the old RRs 50% marks at senior secondary level was also not an essential eligibilitycriteria.

¶5Mr. Aman Lekhi, learnedSeniorCounselfor some of the Petitioners in the presentbatch of the writ petitions,submittedthat the Respondents have not given any reason for effecting such drastic changes in the essential eligibility criteria. He contended that neither any study was undertakennor data collected on the basis of which the changes in the new eligibilityconditionscould be justified. He submittedthat discretion empowersthe Governmentto do what it oughtto do and not what it likes, as it cannotact arbitrarilybut only in a legal and regularmannerand that too based on relevant consideration of facts and circumstances. According to him, a justification based upon prerogative cannot be advancedeven in the countryof its origin, as even in England, it does not confer unreviewablediscretion. While conceding that ordinarily, courts fVP (C) No. 7297/2007 Page5of39 f may not interferewith the questionof policy, he submittedthat exception is nevertheless made on the grounds of unreasonableness and arbitrariness - which arise in the present case.

¶6Mr. Lekhi further stated that MCD in its counter-affidavithad only given one justificationfor change of age namely that the then prevailing age criteria was contrary to Government's Memorandum dated 30 November,1988. He submittedthat the said Memorandumhad not been followed for twenty years and it had fallen into disuse. He further submitted that consistent usage contrary to the said memorandum suggested that the said memorandum had lost its force even without express repeal.

¶7Mr. Lekhi furthersubmittedthat the doctrineof legitimateexpectation was attracted in the present case as the prospectus of the two year ElementaryTeachers Education course expressly professed that it was "carefullydesignedto prepare teachersat elementarylevel in Delhi"and the said prospectuscontaineda minimumand maximumage of enrollment as 17 and 30 years respectively, thereby representing that aspirants between 19 to 32 years would be eligiblefor appointmentto the post of teachers in Delhi. In not taking that expectation into account, the Respondents acted unreasonably by ignoring circumstancesproximate and relevant for acceptable decision. He submitted that the doctrine so applied is not contraryto the statute and persistingwith change in age would render the very option of studying such a course futile. ' Page 6of39 \ y cfi

¶8Mr. Lekhi also referredto the Notificationdated 1®' November,1980 .which;givesva relax^ion of:ten:years to women-candidates:-Th^ said Notificationis reprodutedhereinbelowfor readyreference "GeneralAge-Fielaxationof. 10 Years for Women Candidates for.Recruitnient to Teachers Post / ; - - . •. In exercise.of the powers; vestedin him underR^le'4^ of the Deihi^SchoolEducationRules, i.973, the Administrator' is piea^ed'to prescribe for women candidates^^ relaxation:hr id':)^^S:in the-niaxinium^a^^^ .. in th& RecmitmentRuiesrfor recruits variouszpostsof teachersinpelhiSchools. — v • - women 6ahdidates fof apppihtment^to vac&ncies in tfieir . schools,i.cohsider.-suchcandidatesas per the revippdage-limJt-for woinen .candidates:" • / . ~

¶9-Accordingto,him, this Notificationis consistentWith Article the.Cbnstitotionof India and,the reason,adVanced^^ withdrawalr^ofthe-said relaxation'namely.that thersaid.:NQtificati(3h.JSSu^^^ under<Ruje-'43-of^lhe: IDelhi••ScRbol-^has m applicatibn.'to.gdvernmehtrsbhb^^^ baselessas both,gpverhm^^t, and Municipal.Corporationof Delhischoolsare coveredby^thesaid Rule. -

¶10:•AccPTdJngtq*.;^ it is-patently.,unreasonableto suggestthat a person having'stijdiedHindi at highet^hansecondary,level would,not be, farnillar^vith/ba^ic^ramrriaticarskills^soas to ef^^ students: The conditionof having-studiedHindi at secondarylevel, acco^rdingto^im, has-been held to be unreasonable by {h\s Cou&\H MrsrManju'Pal Vs. WP (C) No..72-97/2007 ' • - - - .Page.7 of39 , •• ^ H i O GovernmentofNCT of Delhi and Am. reportedin 2002 Vol. 2 Apex Decision Delhi 548.

¶11Ms. Deepali Gupta, appearing for some of the Writ Petitioners, contended that the age limit prescribed for the two year eligibility professional course (ETE/JBT etc.) was between 17-30 years and, therefore, those candidates who had secured admission in the said professionalcourseeitherat the age of 27 and beyondor at the age of 17 would be rendered ineligibleto compete due to the new prescribedage limit of 20-27 years.

¶12She furthersubmittedthat impugnedRRs are ultraviresthe National Council of Teacher Education Act, 1993, hereinafterreferred to as the NCTE Act, which had been enacted by the Parliamentin exerciseof its power under Entry 66 of List I of ScheduleVII to the Constitution.She referred to the Preamble of the NCTE Act which states :- "An Act to providefor the establishmentofa NationalCouncil for Teacher education with a view to achievingplanned and coordinate development of the teacher education system throughout the country, the regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher education systemandformattersconnectedtherewith."

¶13She furtherstated that in exerciseofpowersconferredunderClause

(d)(1) of sub-section(2) of Section32 read with Section12(d) of the NCTE Act, 1993 vide GazetteNotificationdated 4"" September,2001 the Council had framed 'The NationalCouncilfor TeacherEducation(Determinationof Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment of Teachers in Schools) ^ Regulations,2001' for recruitmentof teachers in all the schools run by Centralor StateGovernmentsand otherauthoritiesfor impartingeducation at pre-school, nursery, elementary (primary, upper primary and middle school),secondaryand seniorsecondarystages. She submittedthatonce the Regulationshad been framed under the NCTE Act, neitherthe State Governmentnor any authorityunderthe State had any poweror authority or jurisdictionto frame regulationsupon the said subject contraryto or inconsistentwith the NCTE Regulations. In this connection she relied upon the judgmentof the Apex Court in State of MaharashtraVs. Sant DnyaneshwarShikshanShastraMahavidyalaya&Ors. reportedin JT

(2006)4 SC201 whereinit has been held "In the presentcase, as the field i/i/as fully occupiedby Entry 66 of List I ofSchedule VII to the Constitutionand Parliament has enacted 1993Act, it wasnot open to the State Legislature to exercisepowerby makingan enactment. Such enactrnent, asperdecisionsofthis Court, wouldbe voidandinoperative.

¶14Consequently she contended that the impugned RRs being inconsistentwith Regulationsframed underthe NCTE Act, 1993 were ultra vires and unconstitutional.

¶15Mr. Raman Duggal, appearingfor anotherbatch of Writ Petitioners, also referred to the NCTE Act and submitted that the National Council of Teacher Education was the controlling and regulatory authority at the national level upto senior secondary teachers. He stated that in every State, there was a State Council of Educational Research and Training Page9of39 (SCERT) and one of its primaryduty was to bring about uniformityin the entire state in qualificationof teachers. He further stated that District Institutesof Educationand Training (DIET) had been set up to offera two year Diplomaof ElementaryTeacherTraining(ETE).

¶16Mr. Duggal referred in great detail to the 'Foreword of Diploma course in ETE' published by SCERT of Govt. of Delhi. The relevant portionof the Forewordis reproducedhereinbelowfor readyreference FOREWORD The State Councilof EducationalResearch and Training(SCERT), Delhi is an autonomousbody of the Governmentof NCT of Delhi established in 1988. It is the nodal agency recognized by the National Council of Teacher Education (NCTE) for admission, curriculum construction, course conduct, guidance. Examination and certification of the pre-service training programme for elementaryschoolteachers-the two yearsDiplomafor Elementary TeacherEducation(ETE)presentlybeingofferedin the nine District Institutes of Education & Training (DIETs) and four recognized private institutes in Delhi. ETE is a carefullydesignedprogrammebased on NCTEguidelines to prepareteachersat the preliminarylevelfor the schoolsofDelhi. The curriculumis reviewedperiodicallyby a CurriculumCommittee comprisingexpertswith long experiencein the area ofelementary education. The qualityofteachereducationbeingofferedat DIETs has receivedappreciationbypersonnelof the schoolsystemsthat receive our teacher trainees as teachers upon completion of the ETE programme. The ETE Programme consists of theory and practicalwork in DIETs, schoolsand the communitiesaroundthe schools. A varietyof activitiesundertakenin the DIETs such as morningassembly,sportsand culturalprogrammes,debates, work experience,art, etc. offerstudentsan opportunityto experiencea reflection of life in schools. DIETs are academic resource centers established to promote achievementof the twin goalsofuniversalizationofelementaryand adult education. Students of DIETs will have the opportunity to participatein manyactivitiesofDIETswhich are as under: • In-servicetrainingand orientationprogrammesfor teachers, headsofschools,administrators,instructorsandsupen/isors of adult education, communityleaders etc. m Action research and experimentation for improving classroompedagogyteaching, learning materials, material development,curriculaandcommunityinvolvementin school education. • Publications • Involvementin institutionalprogrammes & research both duringandaftertrainingas &when needs arise. While all DIETs offer curricularcontent of equivalentquality and engage in similarfunctions, each DIET has a unique history of developmentthat has generatedunique resources. Engagingin the activities of DIETs is a rich experience that can be fully appreciatedin lateryearsofprofessionaladvancement. The fourprivateinstitutesthatofferETE for female candidatesonly are recognizedby GNCT ofDelhiand NOTE and offera common curriculum with DIETs. ETE is a professional programme. Candidates selected for admissionare requested to take the programmewith seriousness and undergo two years of rigorouseducationalexperiencewith a commitment to become teachers of young children, rather than view it.as a means to a 'job'. Elementary education in Delhi is an area full of exciting opportunitiesfor learningand professionalgrowth. Those who are selected for admission must appreciate the unique opportunity being offered aver thousands of other aspirants and live up to expectationsto becomesomeofthe finestteachersin Delhi."

¶17According to Mr. Duggal the qualifications prescribed by the statutoryauthoritiesunder the NCTE Act have worked well for the last twenty-eightyears and therewas no reasonfor changingthe qualifications overnight. He contendedthat the action of the Respondentsin issuingthe impugned RRs was arbitrary, mindless and had adversely affected the vested rightsofstudentswho were pursuingthe ETE course. - Page11 of39

¶18Mr. Duggal submittedthat the 'son cannot be tallerthan the father' inasmuchas a studentcouldcompletehis ETE coursetill the age of 32 but could not sit for the exams conductedby the Respondentsbeyondthe age of 27 years. He contendedthat the intent behind the ETE course,which was the basic eligibilitycriteria, would stand frustrated if ETE graduates were not to be eligibleto be consideredfor the post of AssistantTeachers (Primary). He submittedthatthe new age criteriahas no nexuswith object soughtto be achievedby way of enactmentof the new RRs.

¶19Mr. R.K; Saini, Advocate appearing for some of the Petitioners stated that he was challenging the impugned RRs in so far as they prescribeda minimumeligibilityage of 20 years. He statedthat the basic educational qualification prescribed in the impugned RRs could be completedby the age of 19 years as the minimum eligibilityage for ETE entrance was 17 years. He submitted that prescribing a minimum qualifying age entailed loss of career time for an aspirant who was otherwiseduly qualified. He submittedthat such a restraintwas arbitrary and unreasonable.

¶20Mr. Alok Sangwan, appearingfor another batch of Writ Petitioners, pointed out that essential age prescribedfor primary teachers in other States was much higher. In Haryanathe maximumage limitwas 40 years, while in Jharkhand it was 35 years. He contended that Delhi has the lowest age slab i.e. between 20 to 27 years. 12 of39

¶21Mr. Jasbir Singh Malik, appearing fort'anotlier batoti of Writ Petitioners,submittedthatthe age restrictionbetween20 to 27 yearswas counterproductiveas it tendedto restrictcompetitionas weii as available talent.

¶22Mr Adarsh Saini. appearing for some of the Writ Petitioners, contendedthat the age limit prescribedin the new RRs was illegal and invalidas the earlierage relaxationgrantedto women candidatesupto 42 yearsof age had not beenwithdrawn. He referredto the abovementioned Notificationdated November, 1980 issued under Rule 43 of the Delhi School Education Rules.

¶23Ms. Manjusha Verma, appearing for some of the Writ Petitioners urged that the change in RRs could only be prospective and the Respondentshad no powerto givethem retrospectiveeffect.

¶24Mr. K. Venkatramani,appearingfor anotherbatch of Writ Petitioners impugnedthe RRs to the extentthat they prescribedminimum50% marks at seniorsecondarylevel. He submittedthatthe said criteriahad no nexus with the objectsoughtto be achieved. He statedthatthe basicdegreefor appointmentof a primaryteacherwas the ETE diplomacourse,for which no minimumpercentagehad been stipulated. Consequently,he submitted that the stipulation of minimum marks in senior secondary exams was arbitrary and irrational. %

¶25Mr. Tarun Sharma, appearingfor another batch of Writ Petitioners impugnedthe mandatoryconditionof passing Hindi subjectat secondary level. He contendedthat having a higher educationalqualificationcould never be a disqualificationfor gettinga post for which a lowerqualification is prescribed. In this contexthe also placed relianceon the judgmentof Mrs. Manju Pal (Supra).

¶26In reply, Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat,StandingCounselfor Governmentof NCT of Delhi took us throughthe entiregamut of recruitmentrulesframed by the Directorateof Education beginning from 28^*^ June, 1960 to the amendmentsof November,1984, 26^' May, 1993. 19^'June, 1998 and finally to the impugned RR dated 8*'^ May, 2006. She pointed out that the age limit for AssistantTeachers(Primary)was never more than 30 years. Accordingto her the changesin essentialcriteriaof RRs from 1960 were as follows "(i) In the 1960 Rules the post as a promotionalpost only with qualificationsBA or BSc from recognizeduniversity. Age below 30 years.

(ii)

17.11.84 As per 1984Rules. The education qualification i/i/as bachelor's degree with Englishas one ofthe subjectfrom a recognizeduniversitywith JB T/BTC Trained desirable B.Ed or its equivalent. Age below 30 years.

(Hi),

26.5.1993 The educational qualification was reduced to Higher secondary/senior secondary/intermediate with respective subject/language from recognized university/Board with JBT/ETE course. Age below 30 years. Page14 of39 us

(iv)

29.6.98 . . -.u Higher secondary/senior secondary/intermediate with respectivesubject/languagefrom recognizeduniversity/Board 2 Years JBT/ETE course.

(v)

08.05.06 Age - 20-27 years. Educational qualifications

(a) Senior secondary (10+2) or intermediate or its equivalentwith 50% marksfrom a recognizedBoard.

(b) Two years diploma certificatecourses in ETEJJBT or B.Edorequivalentfrom recognizeduniversity.

(c) MusthavepassedHindias asubjectat secondarylevel. Desirable Computer knowledge."

¶27She stated that the stand of the Directorateof Educationwas that the impugnedRRs had been framed after due deliberation,initiallyby the Geeta Sagar Committee which looked into certain complaints and grievancesof MunicipalCorporationof Delhi teachersand later on by the administrativedepartmentand services department. She further stated that the essential criteria fixed in the impugned RRs were in conformity with the Delhi Administration'sOffice Memorandumdated 30*^ November, 1988. According to her the said office memorandum deals with consolidatedguidelinesissued by the Governmentof NCT of Delhi and the said guidelinescomprehensivelydeal with as to how the promotionsare to be made. She pointed out that under Clause 3.5, review of RRs is requiredto be made everyfive years with a viewto effectsuch changes as are necessary to bring them in conformitywith changed positionincluding addition or reduction in the strength of lower or higher level posts. Under Page15of39 X") Clause 3(13), the RRs includingtheir amendmentare to be approvedat the level of administratorafter obtaining the concurrenceof Services^ll Department and UPSC. Sub-clause 4(5) stipulates that advice of Services-llDepartmentis binding on the department. Sub-clause4(12) indicatesthat in case of group Cand Dposts, proposalof framing of RRs is to be processed by the administrative department concerned for obtaining approval of the Chief Secretary, Lt. Governor after receipt of adviceof Services-llDepartment. She pointedout that in accordancewith Clause6(2.10)of the said OM the age limitfor groupCand Dpostswas to be between 18 to 25 years.

¶28Mrs. Ahlawatalso referred in extensoto the Governmentfile. She contended that the AdministrativeDepartment vide its note dated 2"^^ August, 2002 submitteda proposalfor amendmentof the RRs applicable to both the Directorateof Educationand MunicipalCorporationof Delhi; A chart was also prepared where the existing Rules and proposed amendments were mentioned. In Column No. 6, the existing age was shown as below 30 years while the proposedage was shown as below32 years for male candidatesand 42 years in the case of female candidates and that too relaxable in certain conditions. She further stated that the matter was thereafter discussed in various meetings with the Directorateof Education. In fact, in the meeting held on 8*'' December,2003, a proposal was mooted for amendments in RRs for increasing the percentage of: marks as eligibilitycriteriafor getting better and talented teachers so as to Page16of39 •vrx provide quality educationto students. The intent of proposed changes was also to provide better promotionalavenue for teachers working in Government of NCT of Delhi and Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Proposals for increase in age from 30 to 32 years in case of male candidatesand 42 years in case of female candidatesdid not find favour with officialson the groundthat as per Government'sguidelinesthe upper age limit for direct recruitment could only be 25 years as Assistant Teachers(Primary)was a group Cpost and as per Governmentof India Notification dated 21^^ December, 1998, with two years increase, the highest age could only be 27 years.

¶29She further pointed out that the Services Department in its note / dated 12^'' January, 2005 also dealt with the Notificationof Lt. Governor dated 1®* November, 1980 by observing that the said Notificationwas issued under Rule 43 of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 which rule applied only to private schools. She submitted that the teachers of Governmentschools are Governmentemployee and are guided by the terms and conditionsin the matter of age for appointmentto a post as is applicablein respectof other employeesof the Governmentas laid down by the Departmentof Personneland Training, Governmentof-Indiafrom time to time. Mrs. Ahlawat further stated that a fresh proposal was put up starting from page 37 of the note where minimum 50% marks were prescribedand knowledge of Hindi as a subject at secondarylevel was made mandatory. The proposal to enhance the age from 30 to 40 years Page17of39 o was again mooted. However,the ServicesDepartmentapprovedthe age limit proposal only between 20 to 27 years relaxable in case of SC/ST/OBC/PH/ExServicemen. The essentialqualificationof having 50% at seniorsecondarylevel and Hindi as a subjectat secondarylevel as well as the two yearsdiplomain ETE/JBTwere also suggested.

¶30The AdministrativeDepartment,Directorateof Education,was still of the opinion that a candidateshould have passed Hindi as a subject at secondary level and sought approval of Lt. Governor to insert it as an essentialeligibilitycriteria. At page 55 of the note file, the ChiefSecretary opinedthat as Hindi was a languageof communicationand learningfor all students in Delhi Schools, making Hindi as an essential qualificationat secondarylevel would help the studentsenormously. The Lt. Governor approvedthe amendmentand, therefore,the Notificationof 8*'' May, 2006 was issued amending the RRs. Mrs. Ahlawatcontendedthat the above facts would clearlyshow that the impugned RRs had been issued by the Respondents after due deliberation.

¶31Consequently, Mrs. Ahlawatsubmittedthat whilethe age limit in the impugned RR was in conformitywith the Governmentof India as well as State Governments OM with regard to age limit prescribed for Group C and Dposts, the minimum eligibilityconditionof 50% marks at secondary level and knowledge of Hindi as a subject were perfectlylegitimateand had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. Page18of39

¶32Mrs. Ahlawat lastly submitted that prescribing educational qualifications,and age limitswerethe prerogativeof the legislatureas well as the executiveand the courtsshouldbe slow to interferewith the same. In this connectionMrs. Ahlawatreferredto and relied upon Union ofIndia &Ors. Vs. ShivbachanRal reportedIn (2001) 7SLRpage 595wherein it has been held "6 Prescribingof anv aae limit for a oiven post as also dGcidinothG extentto which any rGlaxationcan bG pivGn ifan aoG limitis orGScribed.are essentiallymattorsof policy. It is, therGforG, opGn to thG GoyGrnmGntwhilG framinp ruiGS undGr the provisoto ArticlG309 of thG Constitutionto orGScribGsuch aoG limits or to prGScribG thG GxtGnt to which any rGlaxation nan bG aivGn. PrGScrintion of such limit or thG GxtGnt of relaxation to bG aivGn. cannot bG termed as arbitrary or unrGasonablG.ThG onlybasison which thG rGspondGntmovGd thG CGntral AdministrativGTribunal i/i/as thG GarliGr RuIgs of 1976 undGrwhich, though an age limit i/i/asprGscribGd,a limit had not bGGn placGd on thG extenfof rGlaxationwhich could bG grantGd. IfatallanychargGofarbitrarinGsscan bG iGviGdin such casGs, not prGscribingany basis for grantingrGlaxation whGn no limitis placGdon thG GxtGhtofrGlaxation,niightiGad to arbitrarinGssin thG exerc/se of powGr of rGlaxation. In any casG, thG RuIgs of 1976 havG been replacedby the RuIgs of 1985 which goyGrn dirGct rGcruitmGntto thG post ofAssistant DirGctorinthG prGSGntcase. OnG has, thGrGforG, to look to thG RuIgs of 1985 in ordGr to c/ec/de thG Gligibility of thG rGspondGntfor thG post of AssistantDirGctor \Ng, thGrGfore, do not agree with the findingofthe Tribunalthat the Rules of 1985 insofaras theyprescribethe extent of relaxationof agG limit, arG arbitraryor unrGasonablG " (Gmphasis suppliGd)

¶33She also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in J. Ranga Swamy Vs. GovernmentofAndhraPradesh &Ors. reportedin (1990) 1 see 288 wherein it has been held Page19of39 "Q It is nnt for tha court to consider the relevance of nuaiifications nrf^finribed for various posts. The post in question is that of a Professorand the prescription of a doctorate as a necessary qualification therefore is nothmg unusual.Petitioneralsostatedbeforeus that, to the bestofhis knowledge,there is no doctoratecourse anywherein India in radiologicalphysics. That is perhaps why a doctorate in nuclearphysicshas been prescribed.There is nothingprima facie preposterousabout this requirement.It is not for us to assess the comparativemerits of such a doctorate and the BARCdiplomaheldby the petitioneranddecideordirectwhat .'Should be the qualificationsto be prescribedfor the post in question.........." (emphasis supplied)

¶34Mrs. Ahlawat also referred to judgmentof Apex Court in Yogesh Kumar &Ors. Vs. Govt NCT of Delhi reportedin (2003) 3 SCC 548 which was a case where recruitmentto the post of Asst. Teachers in Primary Schools of MCD itself was involved. One of the qualification prescribed was that the candidate should possess Teachers' Training Certificate (TTC) as essential qualification for the post. Though the petitioners,who approachedthe court, did not possess TTC, they were holding B.Ed, degrees. Their contentionbefore the Court was that since they are holding higher qualificationthan TTC, they should be treated as eligible for the post. The writ petitions filed by those candidateswere dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court holding that such B.Ed, candidates were rightly excluded by the authoritiesfrom selection and appointmentas PrimaryTeachers. In appealthe SupremeCourt affirmed the decision of this Court holdingthat B.Ed, degree could not be treated as WP (C) No. 7297/2007, Page20 of39 a qualificationinighertlian TTC. What is importantfor us are tine following observations "5. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the impugnedjudgmenthas dealt with the above two arguments in great detail. In our consideredopinion,ithas,rightlycome to the conclusion that BEd qualification, although a well-recognised qualificationin the field of teaching and education being not prescribed in the advertisement, only some of the BEd candidates who took a chance to . apply for the post cannot be given entry in the field of selection. We also find that the Hiah Court riahtiv came to the conclusion that teacher training imparted to teachers for BEd course equips them for teaching higher classes. A specialized training' given to teachers for teaching small children at primaiv level cannot be compared with training given for awarding BEd degree. Merely ' because primarvteachers can also earn promotionto the posh' of teachers to teach higher classes for which BEd is O prescribed gualification. it cannot be held that BEd is a higher . gualification than " TTC. Looking . to the different nature of TTC gualification. the High Court rightlv held that it is not comparable with BEd degree gualification and the latter cannot be treated as higher gualification to'the former

¶8This last argument advanced also does not impress us at all. Recruitment to public services should be held strictly in accordance with the terms of advertisement and the recruitment rules, if any. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives many others who-could have competed for the post. Merelv because in the past some deviation and departure i/i/as made in considering the' BEd candidates and we are told that i/i/as so done because of.the paucity of TTC candidates, we cannot allow a patent illegality to continue. The recruitment authorities were well aware that candidates with qualification of TTC and BEd are available yet they chose to restrict entry for appointment only to TTC-pass candidates. It is open to the recruiting authorities to evolve a policy of recruitment and to decide the source from which the recruitment is to be made. So far as BEd qualification is concerned, in the connected appeals (Case Nos. 1726-28 of 2001) arising from Kerala which are heard with this appeal, we have already taken the view that Bed qualification cannot be treated as a qualification higher than TTC because the nature of the training imparted for grant of certificate and for degree is totally different and between them there is no parity Page21of39 whdtsoever. It is projected before us thdt presently more candidatesavailableforrecruitmentto primaryschoolare from BEd categoryand very few from TTC category. Whetherfor the aforesaid reasons, BEd qualification can also be prescribedforprimaryteachersis a questionto be considered by the authoritiesconcerned but we cannot consider BEd candidatesfor the presentvacanciesadvertisedas eligible.In ourview, the DivisionBench ofthe Delhi High Court was fully justifiedin comingto the conclusionthatBEd candidateswere rightly excluded by the authorities from selection and appointmentas primaryteachers. We make it clear that we are not called upon to express any opinion on any BEd candidates appointed as primary teachers pursuant to advertisementsin thepast and ourdecisionis confinedonlyto the advertisement which i/i/as under challenge before the High Court and in this appeal." (emphasis supplied)

¶35Mr. Amit K. Paul, learned Standing Counsel for Municipal Corporationof Delhi submittedthat the impugned RRs were a delegated legislation made by a competentauthority after following the procedure prescribedin the statute. In short, Mr. Paul submittedthat impugnedRRs are part of a statuteand the courtshould draw a presumptionin favour of their constitutionalvalidity. He submittedthat 'grammar of challenge' of the Petitioners was incorrect as their arguments have proceeded on the hypothesisthat the impugnedRRs were administrativeinstructions.

¶36He further submitted that the test with regard to unreasonableness qua delegatedlegislationwas laid down by the English Court in Kruse v. Johnson,

(1898) 2 QB 91 wherein Lord Russel of Killowen while upholdingthe validityofa municipalby-lawbanningsingingwithin 50 yards of dwelling houses observed as under . Page22of39. ( \ V, / " But, when the Court is called upon to consider the bye-laws of public representativebodies clothed with the ample authoritywhich I have described,and exercisingthat authority accompanied by the checks and safeguards which have been mentioned, I think the consideration of such bye-laws ought to be approached from a differentstandpoint. They ought to be supported if possible. They ought to be, as has been said, "benevolently"interpreted, and credit ought to be given to those who have to administer them that they will be reasonably administered. This involves the introduction of no new canons of construction. But, further, looking to the character of the body legislating under the delegated authority of Parliament, to the subject-matter of such legislation, and to the nature and extent of the authority given to deal with matters which concern them, and in the manner which to them shall seem meet, I think courts of iustice ought to be slow to condemn as invalid any bve-law. so made under such conditions, on the around of supposed unreasonableness "But unreasonable in what sense? If, for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, the Court might well say, "Parliament never intended to give authority to make sUch rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires". But it is in this sense, and in this sense only, as I conceive, that the question of reasonableness can properly be regarded. A bve-law is not unreasonable merely because particular Judges may think that it goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient or because it is not accompanied by a qualification or an exception which some iudges may think ought to be there. Surely it is not, too much to say that in matters which directly and mainly concern the people of the country, who have the right to choose those whom they think best fitted to represent them in their local government bodies, such representatives may be trusted to understand their own requirements better than judges. Indeed, if the question of the validity of bye-laws were to be determined by the opinion of Judges as to what ivas reasonable in the narrow sense of that word, the cases in the books on this subject are no guide; for they reveal, as indeed one would expect, a wide diversity of Page 23 of39 Judicial opinion, and they lay down no principle of definite standardby which reasonablenessor unreasonablenessmay be tested (ernphasis supplied)

¶37Mr. Paul submittedthat the test laid down in Kruse Vs. Johnson (Supra)has been adoptedby the IndianSupremeCourtin the caseof H.C. Suman & Ann Vs. RehabilitationIVIinistryEmployees' Cooperative House BuildingSocietyLtd., New Delhi& Ors. reportedin (1991) 4 see 485at page 499 whereinit has been held as under "In Kruse v. Johnson it lA^as held that in determining the validity of bye-laws made by public representativebodies, such as countrycouncils,the courtoughtto be slow to holdthata bye-law is void for unreasonableness. A bve-law so made ought to be supported unless it is manifestly partial and unequal in its operation between different classes, or uniust or made in bad faith, or clearly involving an uniustifiable interference with the liberty of those subiect to it. In view of this legal position the Notification dated October 27, 1987 deserves to be upheld as, in our opinion, it does not fall within any of the exceptions referred to in the case of Kruse v. Johnson." (emphasis supplied)

¶38He further contended that the onus to plead and prove that the impugned RRs were illegal and invalid was on the Petitioners,who in the present case, had failed to produce cogent and convincing evidence to show that the same were discriminatory and arbitrary.

¶39Mr. Paul contended that as the teachers are being required to teach children at the primary level in Delhi there is nothing irrational in the i. Page24of39 requirementof passing Hindi at the secondarylevel as it was the most popularlocallanguageas well as the main mediumof instruction. Mr..Paul stated that at the Primary Level, a teacher is required to teach all the classesfrom 1to Vwhich also includesimpartingeducationin the subject of Hindi for all the five years. According to him, the focus of language educationat this stage is to lay a strong foundationon which a child can build in future. While teaching Hindi to studentsof primaryclasses it is necessarythat the teacher be himselfaware of and well conversantwith the basic grammatical skills of the language such as alphabets, word formation,spellingand recognitionof writing symbols,sentenceformation and correction,singular-plural,masculine-feminine,gender, present-past-future tenses, synonyms, antonyms, usage of phrases, verbs, nouns, adjectivesetc. He contendedthatthere is an appreciabledifferencein the purpose,curriculumand manner in which the languagecourse of Hindi is structuredat the secondary,seniorsecondaryand higherlevel.

¶40Mr. Paul stated that it is only at the Class X that the basic grammaticalskills of the languagewhich constituteits essential building blocks are taught and tested. Focus at the higher levels is on report, writing,essays,letterwriting,studyof poetry,scriptures,differentforms of, the language as it stood in different times and practical use of the language etc. and it cannot be simplistically concluded by an empirical/comparativeevaluationthat study of Hindi at a higher level is greaterthan/betterthan or a substitutefor study of Hindi at the secondary ' Page25 of39 level. Neithercan it be assumedthat a person who has studied Hindi at the higherlevel would be equippedwith the skill set of Hindi prescribedat the secondary level (the skill sets, curriculum, methodology of study, importanceattachedto the study of the subject—all being different)and such a presumption in absence of an analysis of the course contents, teaching methodologyetc. would not be correct. In the case of Hindi language it is possiblefor a person to have not studied the same at the secondarylevel but only at the seniorsecondarylevel orat a higherlevel. Even across various levels the curriculum is different depending upon whether Hindi is studied as a compulsoryor an optionalsubject and at the higherlevels it is differentdependingalso upon whetherHindi is studied,at the secondary level or the senior secondary level. According to him, a person having working/functionalknowledge of Hindi at the higher level may not be equippedwith the knowledgeofthe grammaticalskillsand the manner in which they are taughtto the childrenat the secondary level. He submitted that whether Hindi at secondary level is suitable for teaching students at the primarylevel or Hindi at higher level is suitable for the said purpose,are all technicalquestions,the answers ofwhich best oughtto be leftto technical/specialist bodies and ought not to be adjudicated by courts.

¶41Mr. Paul submitted that in view of the different skill set acquired by the candidates at different levels and keeping in mind the fact that the small children need to be taught the. basic skills rather than scriptures the prescriptionof study of Hindi at a secondary level has a direct nexus with WT (C) No. 7297/2007 ' Page26of39 the objectivesought to be achieved and thereforethe said qualification cannot be said to be arbitrary.

¶42In rejoinder learned Counsel for Petitioners reiterated and reemphasizedtheirarguments. Mr. Sumit Kumar referredto the judgment of the Apex Court in CantonmentBoard, MHOW &Ann Vs. M.P. State Road Transport Corporationreported in (1997) 9 SCC 450 wherein it has been held "16. Coming to the conclusion of the apDlicabilitv of doctrine of desuetude Mr Lekhi. the learned senior counsel strongly relied upon the, decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation for City of Pune and Anr. y. Bharal Forge Co. Ltd. and Ors. [19951 3 SCC 434 and submitted that the proyisions of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act must be held to be of disuse as no grant as provided in Section 7 of the TaxationAct has eyer been made at any point of time after the enactment of the said Act in 1947. This contention is wholly unsustainable in law,in as much as we are not concerned with the question of grant to local authorities and Cantonment Boards as provided under Section 7 of the Taxation Act but we are concerned with the leyiabilityof tax on Motor Vehicles under Section 3(2) of the Taxation Act. It is nobody's case that no tax was being levied on Motor Vehicles which is used or kept for use under Section 3(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1947. That apart to apply the principle of desuetude it is necessary to establish that the statute in Question has been in disuse for long and the contrary practice of some duration has evolved. In other words to make the aforesaid principle applicable in the case in hand it is reouired to be established that the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act has been in disuse for a long period and that the imposition of tax on entry of Motor vehicles into the Cantonment limit has been in operation for a fairly long period, neither of these two ingredients has been satisfied in the case in hand and therefore the aforesaid principle of desuetude is of no application to the case in hand." (emphasis supplied) WP (C)No. 7297/2007 Page 27 of39 0( o

¶43Mr. Duggalsubmittedthatthe Respondentshad given no reasonfor Invokingthe OM of 1998 afteragap of 19 years. He reiteratedthat the NOTE Act governedthe entirefield and the Respondentshad no powerto lay down anyadditionalqualificationlikeage, marksor language.

¶44Beforeadvertingto the issuesat hand, it would be prudentto take stockof the legal positionand the principlesof law refen-edto by Counsel for the parties on either side. This would also help in defining the approachofthis Courtto the issuesat hand.

¶45Since the impugned RRs have been notified by the MCD and Governmentof NCT of Delhi by virtueof powerconfen-edunderSection98 of DMC Act and by virtue of proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution respectively,{weare of the viewthat the impugnedRRs are statutoryand legislativein character, in V.K. Sood Vs. Secretary.Civil Aviation& Ors. reportedin (1993)Supp 3SCC 9the Apex Court recognizedthis legal positionwhen it held "3 It would thus be clear that the rules made by the Presidentor ptuthnriradperson under proviso to Article 309 ( ; I^W madRhvthe Parll^meintand the power mnulafinn the recruitment and the conditions of sp.rvice or post. Thev are statutory and lepislative in character The statutoryrules thus made are subiect to the lawthat mav be made by the Parliament. " (emphasis supplied)

¶46It is further settled law that the ^courts must approach subordinate legislativeinstrumentswith considerableamount of caution. Presumption WP (C) No^,7297/2007 Page28of39 of constitutionalityand reasonablenessordinarilyattached to legislative enactment,appliesto statutoryrules also. In P.V. Mani&Ors. Vs. Union of India reportedin AIR 1986 Kerala 86 a Full Bench of Kerala High Court observed as under " It is therefore needless to add that the courts shall approach subordinate lepislative instruments wjth considerable amount of caution and examine them for absence of competence or reasonableness or fairness and other invalidating circumstances with almost the same Standards as legislative enactments are dealt with bv courts. The presumption of constitutionalitv. competence and reasonableness ordinarilvattaches to such instrumentslust as much as to legislative enactments, as is evident from the followingobservationsfrom "AdministrativeAgenciesand the Courts" by Cooper:- "Where the legislaturehas clearlydelegatedsuch authority, the onlyissue that can normallybe raisedas to the validityof the rule concern the question whether it is ultra vires as exceedingthe scopeofthe authoritydelegated,and whetherit is violativeof due process guarantees. These issues are not oftenpresentedand accordinglysuch regulationsare normally treated on the same basis as legislative acts. It is not that such instruments are absolutely immune from attack. But such attacks should be considered onlv on production of prima facie proof as to such invalidating circumstances. The court shall not assume that a subordinate legislative instrument is invalid for absence of competence or bona fides or fairness or reasonableness and cast the negative burden on the rule-making authority. It should be lust the other wav: the person who challenges the vires of a rule has to prove his challenge lust as much as a person who challenges a legislative enactment. If he fails in such attempt the challenge can onlv be thrown out " (emphasis supplied)

¶47In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka reported in

(1996) 10 SCO 304 para 13 it has been held that the test of the Page29 of39 arbitrarinessapplicableto the delegated legislation is differentfrom the one applicable to ,executive actions. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced for ready reference "13. It is next submitted before us that the amended Rules are arbitrary, unreasonable and cause undue hardship and, therefore, violate Article 14 of the Constitution.Although the protection of Article 19(1)(g) may not be available to the appellants, the rules must, undoubtedly, satisfy the test of Article 14, which is a guarantee against arbitrary action. However, one must bear in mind that what is being challenged here under Article 14 is not executive action but delegated legislation. 'The tests of arbitrary action which apply to executive actions do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order that delegated legislation can be struck down, such legislation must be manifestly arbitrary; a law which could not be reasonably expected to emanate from an authority delegated with the law-makingpower In the case of Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (SCR at p. 243) this Court said that a piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. A subordinate legislation mav be questioned under Article 14 on the around that it is unreasonable: "unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestiv arbitrary". Drawing a comparison between the law in England and in India, the Court further observed that in England the Judges would say, "Parliament never intended the authority to make such Rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires". In India, arbitrariness is not a separate ground since it will come within the embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution. But subordinate legislation must be so arbitrary that it could not be said to be in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution."

¶48Further, as the Rules are legislative in character they cannot be challenged on the grounds of malafides. In Capt B.D. Gupta v. State of U.P. reported in 1991 Supp (1) SCO 1 para 1 the Supreme Court held WP (C)No. 7297/2007 Page 30 of39 "M If the Rules were framed for making regular appointmentsin the Civil Aviation Department there was no reason why they should have been confined only to three posts which included the post of Director. Secondly, he pointed out that whereas the post of Director was not a promotionalone earlierand was, therefore, open to external candidatesas well, it vi/as made promotionalto suit Captain Singh. These circumstancesaccordingto us do not prove the mala fides. Admittedlv.the Rules are made underArticle309 nf the Constitution of India and are, therefore, a piece of laqi.^i^tinn It is well settled that nn legislation can be challenged on the around of mala fides (emphasis supplied)

¶49In our opinion,the doctrineof legitimateexpectation,referredto by the Petitioners,has no applicationto the presentcase as the Respondents have never representedor held out to any studententering into an ETE course,that he would be given employmentwith the Respondents.)In fact, ETE is a professionaltraining course and the candidatessecuring such degrees are free to pursue other career options all over India with other agencies as well. The course does not confer any vested right of employmentwith eitherthe Governmentor MCD. In view of the absence of any representationregardingemployabilitywith the Respondentsalone upon completionof a qualifyingcourse, the Petitioners'plea of legitimate expectation merits no acceptance.

¶50We are also of the view that the impugned RRs do not operate retrospectively. No candidate who has already been appointed as a teacher and who had acquired vested right of such appointment in accordance with the earlier Rules has been prejudicially affected by the Page31 of39 impugned RRs. The impugned RRs are effectiveonly from tfieirdate of Notification and the Petitioners cannot claim any vested right on the strength of an advertisementissued under old Rules which now stand withdrawn.

¶51As far as the doctrine of disuse, referred to by the Petitionersis concerned,we are of the opinion that the same has no applicationto the facts of the presentcase.^ From the judgmentsreferredto hereinabove,it would be apparentthat the said doctrineis applicableonly when there has been a statute in force for long, but the same has either not been applied or there is a practice contraryto the said statute for long. In the present case, when the old RRs were contrary to the Government of NCT of Delhi's Office Memorandum dated 30"" November, 1988, how can it be urged that the said OM was invaliddue to the doctrineof disuse, as in the first place the said OM was not applicable.

¶52We are also of the opinion that, the NOTE Act only lays down minimum qualification for a person to be employed as an Assistant Teacher (Primary). Consequently, it is always open to the Respondents to prescribe additionalqualifications. In this connection we may refer to the Functions of the Councilstipulated in Section 12(d) of the NCTE Actwhich reads as under "12. It shall be the duty of the Council to take all such steps as it may think fit for ensuring planned and co-ordinated development of teacher education and for the determination and maintenance of standards for teacher education and for WP '(C) No. 7297/2007 Page32 of39 %> the purposesof pefforuiingits functions under this Act, the Council may -

(d) lav down guidelinesin respectof minimum qualifications for a person to be employed as a teacher in schools or in recognized institutions." (emphasis supplied)

¶53In the presentcase, we find that there is neitherany inconsistency nor contradictionbetween the NCTE Act, NCTE Regulationson the one hand and the impugned RRs on the other hand. If the Petitioners' submissionswere to be acceptedthen the Respondentscould neverhave prescribedany qualificationwith regardto age as there is no stipulationin eitherthe NCTE Act or the Regulationswith regard to age. In fact, the new age, marks and languagecriteriaare additional/higherqualificationsand, therefore, the impugned RRs are not ultra vires the NCTE Act or Regulations.

¶54To our mind, like any other employer it is the prerogativeof the Respondentsto decidethe.agelimitand academicsuitabilityof candidates which they wish to employand so long as the same are not contradictory to the academiceligibilityas prescribedby the NCTE Act any challengeto the same, merely because it renderssome candidatesineligible,ought to be rejected. For several posts minimum and maximum limits of age are prescribed by different authorities along with the required academic qualifications. It may be possiblefor the candidatesto attainthe requisite academicqualificationseven at lesser or higher ages but that does not imply that the authorities are duty bound to consider all of them for 33 of39 employmentby framing rules to ensure that everyonewho secures the requiredacademicquaiiflcatlonat anyage is eligiblefor appointmentto the said posts. In our view, the mere completionof an eligibilitycoursegives no vestedrightor rightof considerationto acandidateenforceableagainst the State.

¶55Moreover,as rightly pointed out by iVIrs. Ahlawat prescribingof an age limit for a given post is a matter of policy and as held by the Apex Court in ShivbachanRai (Supra) it is open to the Governmentwhile framing rules underthe provisoto Article309 to prescribesuch age limits as it may deem necessaryand the same cannotbe termedas arbitraryor un-reasonable. In the presentcasewe alsofind thatthe new age limithas been fixed in accordancewith the Office Memorandumsissued by the Governmentof India and Governmentof NCT of Delhi, wherebythe age limitfor groupC&Dposts has been fixed between18 to 25 years. In fact, by the impugned RRs the Respondents have actually rectified their mistakeand broughttheir RRs in conformitywith the Government'spolicy. The Supreme Court in Yogesh Kumar (Supra) has held that merely because in the past their was some deviation and departure,the courts cannot allowa patent illegalityto continue.

¶56We also agreewith Mrs. Ahlawatthat the teachersappointedby the Respondentsare governmentemployeesand are to be governed by the terms and conditions applicableto other governmentemployees in the same category/groupas laid down by the Departmentof Personneland WP (C)No. 7297/2007 Training, Governmentof India from time to time. Consequently,the age limit stipulatedin the notificationunder Rule 43 of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 would not govern the recruitmentto the post of government teachers. In any event, as the impugnedRRs have been approvedby the Lt. Governor of Delhi who had issued the notification dated November, 1980, itwould mean that the said notificationstands impliedlyrepealed.

¶57As far as the under-aged candidates are concerned, we are of the view that it is open to the State government to stipulate a cut off age as it may like to recruit only candidates having sufficient maturity. In any event, the under-aged candidates suffer no prejudice as they would be eligible to apply for the post of Assistant Teachers (Primary) in the future.

¶58In our opinion, a cut off limit has to be prescribed along with eligibility conditions to select the best and the most suitable from amongst the available talent and so long as a uniform yardsticl< is applied for all, it cannot per se be claimed to be arbitrary or discriminatory. According to us far from being absurd or preposterous, fixing of age limit between 20-27 would only encourage young motivated, committed professionals to take ) up the challenge of teaching the small children.

¶59However, considering that the maximum age prescribed for the post of Assistant Teachers (Primary) for the MCD and NCT has been reduced from 32 years for males and 42 years for females to 27 years, we are of the view that this would cause hardship to candidates already enrolled in Page 35 of39 the ETE course, who might suddenly find themselves over-age and ineligible. With a view to ameliorate this hardship and as a one-time measure,followingthe ratio in the case of AnujJohn Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2005 III AD (DELHI) 614., it is directed that the respondentswould permit all those candidateswho have completedthe ETE course either in the year 2006 or 2007 or 2008 to appear in the examination conducted by the Respondents for the posts of Assistant Teachers (Primary)once each of the Respondents i.e. MCD and Govt. of NCT of Delhi provided they do not exceed the upper age limit of 32 years for males and 42 years for females and also fulfill all other eligibility conditions. This would also apply to candidates, who have already taken the examination as permitted by this Court. This relaxation will be independent of the relaxation applicable to reserved categories. However, the Relaxation granted by this Court shall cease to operate for the ETEE courses after 2008 i.e. commencingfrom 2009 as from SO**^ September, 2007 the maximum age limit for ETE course has been reduced from 30 years to 24 years.

¶60As far as the requirement of at least 50% marks in the senior secondary examination is concerned, we are of the view that the candidates selected have to shoulder the responsibility of imparting values I of academic excellence in young impressionable minds. Considering the nature of the responsibility to be thrust on the candidates, the requirement of 50% marks in the senior secondary examination is not a tough Page 36 of39 benchmark at all. Further Article 14 mandates that equals are to be treated alike but it does not prohibit classification. In fact, in State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar reported in AIR 1952 Supreme Court 75 it has been held that classification is permissible, if the same is founded on an intelligible differentia arid the said differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. We are of the view that the qualifications of 50% of marks in senior secondary examination fulfills the above test as it ensures that the best from amongst the young, dedicated and meritorious candidates are selected for the post of the teachers and the same cannot be faulted by the Petitioners.

¶61With regard to passing of Hindi subject at secondary level, we are in agreement with Mr. Paul, that even though a person may possess valuable skillsof the language which he may acquire at a higher level, yet absence of knowledge of the basic and rudimentary building blocks of the same may prove to be detrimental while teaching small children the basic alphabets of the same language in a simplistic yet interesting manner. Superior knowledge of scriptures or the ability to write reports, features complex essays or translate complex passages may not be an adequate substitute for the basic knowledge of grammar and the skill set which is exclusive to the secondary level and essential for teaching the same to the. children at the primary level. Moreover, on a perusal of the Government file, we find that the relevant considerations were discussed by the concerned authoritiesbeforeprescribingHindi as a compulsorysubject. ' Page37of39 \ V /

¶62In fact, the impugned languagecriteria is no longer res Integra. A CoordinateBench of this Court in Farzana Vs. Govt of NOT of Delhi & Ors. in WP (C) No. 8377/2007 has held as under "20. It is clear that in the present case we are concerned with the recruitment to the post of Primary Teachers in MCD. These teachers are required to teach students at primary level i.e. up to Standard V. These small children are to be given basic education in Hindi language. Rather, they are to be initiatedinto this language from scratch, namely, from alphabets and then into the basic grammar,for whichpurpose the teacheris requiredto be equipped in a specific mould. It is the case of the MCD that keeping this in mindthe prescriptionofstudyingHindilanguage at secondary level is provided in the recruitment rules "

¶63After discussing the case of Mrs. Ma/iyu Pal Vs. Government of NOT of Delhi & Anr. referred to by the Petitioners, this Court in Farzana came to the conclusion that the essential educational qualification of having passed Hindi at secondary level was perfectly legal, valid and not violative of Article of the Constitution. The observations of the Coordinate Division Bench are re-produced hereinbelow "21. We find sufficient justification/rational in providing for the aforesaid qualifying course at secondary level for the post in question. It is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and specific objective is sought to be achieved thereby for which sufficient justification/rational is given by the MCD. Once the respondents are able to satisfy such a rationality, further probe into a policy decision like this in prescribing these qualifications in the recruitment rules, which are of statutory nature, is not permitted as per the dictum noticed in various judgments in the foregoing paragraphs.

¶22We, therefore, are of the opinion that the rule in question meets the constitutional requirement and, is not violative of Article 14 thereof We accordingly find the petition bereft of any merit and, therefore, dismiss the same "

¶64To conclude, the language and marks criteria (namely passing of Hindi subject at primary level and minimum 50% marks in senior secondary examination) are upheld in their entirety. Even the age criteria WP (C)No. 7297/2007 Page 38 of39 V t (namely minimum and maximum eligibility age as 20-27 years respectively) is upheld but with a view to ameliorate the hardship of already enrolled students in ETE courses, it is directed that the respondentswould permit all those candidateswho have completedthe ETE course either in the year 2006 or 2007 or 2008 to appear in the examination conducted by the Respondents for the posts of. Assistant Teachers (Primary)once each of the Respondents i.e. MCD and Govt. of NCT of Delhi provided they do not exceed the upper age limit of 32 years for males and 42 years for females and also fulfill all other eligibility conditions. This would also apply to candidates, who have already taken the examination as permitted by this Court. This relaxation will be independent of the relaxation applicable to reserved categories. However, the Relaxation granted by this Court shall cease to operate for the ETE courses after 2008 i.e. commencingfrom 2009 as from 30*^ September, 2007 the maximum age limit for ETE course has been reduced from 30 years to 24 years. Except to the above extent, legality and validity of the impugned RRs are upheld and accordingly the entire batch of writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs. [MANFMOnXN] Judge. 1ANM0HANSARIN] XL. Judge. Augustifr 2008 rn Page 39of39

/ • , • . -1 V '' ''' ~ IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + Writ Petition (C) 7297 of 2007 Reserved on : if" August,2008 % Date of Decision; August2i^008 Sacinin Gupta &Others Petitioners Through IVlr. Ajay Kumar; Advocate Versus Delhi Subordinate Services Respondents Selection Board (DSSSB) Through Ms. AvnishAhlawat, Advocate Through its Chairman & Ors. WITH WP(C)No.7395/2007. WP(C)No.7522/2007. WP(C)No.7588/2007. WP(C)No.7589/2007. WP(C)No.7590/2007. WP(C)No.7611/2007, WP(C)No.7612/2007. WP(C)No.7613/2007. WPiC)No.7614/2007, WP(C)No.7656/2007. WP(C)No.7661/2007. WP(C)No.7682/2007. WP(C)No.7684/2007, WP(C)No.7687/2007. WP(C)No.7693/2007. WP(C)No.7695/2007. WP(C)No.7696/2007. WP(C)No.7697/2007. WP(C)No.7699/2007. WP(C)No.7704/2007, WP(C)No.7742/2007. WP(C)No.7743/2007. WP(C)No.7747/2007. WP(C)No.7748/2007. WP(C)No.7750/2007. WP(C)No.7751/2007. WP(C)No.7757/2007. WP(C)No.7760/2007. WP(C)No.7763/2007. WP(C)No.7764/2007. WP(C)No.7766/2007. WP(C)No.7841/2007. WP(C)No.7845/2007. WP(C)No.7846/2007. WP(C)No.7847/2007. WP(C)No.7848/2007. WP(C)No.7850/2007. WP(C)No.7852/2007. WP(C)No.7853/2007. WP(C)No.7854/2007. WP(C)No.7855/2007. WP(C)No.7856/2007. WP(C)No.7879/2007. WP(C)No.7896/2007. WP(C)No.7897/2007. WP(C)No.7902/2007. WP(C)No.7903/2007. WP(C)No.7904/2007. WP(C)No.7908/2007. WPfONo.7921/2007. WP(C)No.7934/2007. WP(C)No.7936/2007. WP(C)No.7946/2007. WP(C)No.8071/2007. WP(C)No.8107/2007. WP(C)No.8108/2007. WPfONo.8109/2007. WP(C)No.8110/2007. WP(C)No.8150/2007. WP(C)No.8218/2007. WP(C)No.8224/2007. WP(C)No.8233/2007. WP(C)No.8360/2007. WP(C)No.8387/2007. WPfONo.8411/2007. WP(C)No.8430/2007. WP(C)No.8463/2007. WP(C)No.8699/2007. WP(C)No.8700/2007. WP(C)No.8749/2007. WP(C)No.47/2008. WP(C)No.386/2008. WP(C)No.8420/2007, WP(C)No.9173/2007. WP(C)No.3127/2008. WP(C}No.l868/2007. WP(C)No.7842/2007. WP(C)No.3676/2008. WP(C)No.3677/2008. WP(C)No.3918/2008. WP(C)No.4774/2008. WP(C)No.4784/2008. WPfONo.5533/2008. WP(C)No.5537/2008. WP(C)No.5546/2008. WPfONo.5552/2008. WP(C)No.5708/2008. WP(C)No.5756/2008. WP(C)No.5782/2008. WP(C)No.5796/2008 Page1of39 Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. T Mr. R.K. Saini, Advocate in WP(C)No.7522/2007,7684/2007& 7856/2007. Mr, Alok Sangwan, Advocate in Mr. Siddiiarth Aggarwal, Advocate in Mr. Rajat Aneja, Advocate in Ms. Sarvesh Bisaria, Advocate in Mr. M. Rais Farooqui, Advocate in Mr. Ravi Kant Jain, Advocate in Mr. Firoz Aiann, Advocate in Mr. Devender Kumar Sharma Advocate in Mr. Sanjeet Kumar Trivedi, Advocate in Mr. H.K. Chaturvedi, Advocate in Mr. Madhu Sudan Bhayana, Advocate in Counsel for Respondents: For MCD Govt. of NCT/DSSSB/ Dept. of Education WP(C) No. 7297/2007 WP(C)No. 7848/2007. WP(C)No.7704/2007, 8463/2007. WP(C)No.7750/2007, 7751/2007, 7854/2007 & 7946/2007 WP(C)No.7763/2007 &7766/2007 WP(C)No. 7852/2007 WP(C)No. 8430/2007 WP(C)No. 47/2008 WP(C)No. 3676/2008 WP(C)No. 5708/2008 WP(C)No. 5756/2008 Mr. Amit K. Paul, Advocate. Mr. Mul<esh Gupta, Advocate. Ms. Smita Shanl<ar with Ms. Suparna Srivastava and Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocates. Ms. P.L. Gautam, Advocate. Ms. Nalin Tripathi, Advocate. Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal, Advocate. Ms. Avnish Ahlawat with Ms. Nidhi Gupta, Advocates. Ms. Reeta Kaul, Advocate. Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocate. Ms. Ruchi Sindhwani, Advocate. Mr. D.P. Kaushik with Mr. Sudhir Sharma, Advocates. Ms. Meera Bhatia, Advocate. Page 3 of39 / cn Mr. R.K. Saini, Advocate in WP(C)No.7522/2007, 7684/2007& 7856/2007. Mr. AlokSangwan,Advocatein 7760^^^^^^^ Mr. Siddliarth Aggarwal, Advocate in Mr. RajatAneja,Advocatein Ms. Sarvesh Bisaria, Advocate in Mr. M. Rais Farooqui, Advocate in Mr. Ravi Kant Jain, Advocate in Mr. Firoz Alam, Advocate in Mr. Deyender Kumar Sliarnna Advocate in Mr. Sanjeet Kumar Trivedi, Advocate in Mr. H.K. Chaturvedi, Advocate in Mr. Madhu Sudan Bhayana, Advocate in Counsel for Respondents: For MCD Govt. of NCT/DSSSB/ Dept. of Education WP(C)No. 7848/2007. WP(C)