M/S Evian Projects Ltd v. M/S Anghaila Housing Pvt Ltd

judgment misreads and wrongly applies Cotton Corporation of India r/w other case law, by treating various Benches of the Delhi High Court as ONE Court, or the "same Court", in order to avoid the prohibition of Section 41(b).

Whether the Court actually disregarded the fact that the Delhi High Court actually comprises different coordinate and superior Benches, by way of Single an Division Benches, and whether it could have merged all of Delhi High Court into one category called "same court", and the "stayed" various matters pending before benches that are coordinate to it. K. Whether the Division Bench could have directed a Single Judge Bench, to decide whether or not stayed matters pending before other benches coordinate to it and superior to it, must continue or not. L. Whether injunctions u/s 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, are maintainable when no injunction has been apparent on the record despite their having been brought to its notice by way of Review Petition RP 414/2012." Apart from the above questions of law the following two grounds were also raised in the Special Leave Petition;

"K. Because S 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, applies when an injunction is sought. No such injunction was sought with regard to the said matter u/s 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act. L. Because S 41 (d) bars injunctions/ restraints on any person from instituting or prosecuting any criminal matter, yet the impugned judgment includes a prohibition on these as well."

There is therefore nothing to be clarified; it is a view taken by this court on the provisions of section 41(b) and (d) of the Specific Relief Act, unambiguously expressed. The applicant's contention that the order passed on 24.04.2012 is a nullity in law, void ab initio and non est in our view, cannot be re-agitated in these proceedings after the dismissal of Review Petition and the SLP.

¶11The applicant, as was brought to our notice by the respondents in the course of the arguments, had already filed a review petition (Review Petition No.414/2012) before the Division Bench consisting of Sanjeev Khanna, J., and one of us (R.V. Easwar, J.) which was dismissed by order dated 20.07.2012. That was before the SLP was dismissed on

19.09.2012. The relevant part of the order dismissing the earlier review petition is as follows:

"C.M. No.12266/2012 and R.P. 414/2012

There is delay of 56 days in filing of the review application. Before issuing notice on the application for condonation of delay, we have heard Ms. Indira Unninayar, learned counsel for the applicant on merits. Having considered her contentions, we do not find any ground for review as postulated under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973, is made out. Accordingly, we are not inclined to issue notice on the application for condonation of delay and the review application. The application for condonation of delay and review application are dismissed."

The present applications for "modification" and "clarification" represent one more attempt by the applicant to revive his challenge which had met with a fatal end with the dismissal of his Review Petition by this Court and SLP by the Supreme Court. He has thus indulged in multiplicity of proceedings on the same issue, a luxury to which no litigant is entitled. Several hours of judicial time have been spent in these attempts. One is tempted to think that these are nothing but attempts to brow-beat the court into submission. The Division Bench in its order dated 24.04.2012, in paragraph 73(v) has observed that "in case immediate orders are required, the parties (including the respondents) can approach the learned single Judge for appropriate directions or permission to continue with the pending proceedings or initiate new proceedings". A window has thus been left open to the applicant in case of any difficulty and in case immediate orders are required. The avenues available to the

applicant to seek redressal from this Court are, therefore, not closed once and for all for him; viewed in this light, it appears that the present applications are needless. The applicant has also been unfair to the court by not disclosing that an earlier review petition filed by him had been dismissed before he approached the Supreme Court with an SLP; this fact was not known to this court till it was pointed out on behalf of the respondents, who also filed a copy of the order dated 20.07.2012. In these circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the applications for "clarification" and "modification" are nothing but an attempt to ask for another review, disguised as applications for "clarification" and "modification". The present applications have given rise to several connected miscellaneous applications, thus burgeoning the court's docket with no productive purpose. Constitutional means of challenging an adverse order or judgment rendered by a court are permitted, but the conduct of the applicant in filing repetitive applications even after the order adverse to him had attained finality amounts to obsessive cantankerousness which has to be seriously viewed. We therefore dismiss the applications with costs of Rs.25,000/- which shall be paid to the Delhi Legal Services Authority within 15 days and compliance reported to this court.

¶12Both the applications are dismissed. Suo motu contempt proceedings:

¶13On 11.10.2013 this Bench was hearing certain miscellaneous applications filed by the applicant Mr. Deepak Khosla seeking, inter alia, early hearing of CM No.2392/2013 (application for "clarification"). While hearing arguments in that behalf, he made a reference to "dedh Bench" (i.e., Hindi equivalent of one-and-a-half Bench) while describing the Division Bench consisting of Sanjeev Khanna, J., and one of us (R.V. Easwar, J.,). In the order passed by this Bench on that day, it was noted as follows: - "Addressing arguments on these applications, Mr. Deepak Khosla, who appears in person, submits that the order dated 24th April, 2012 passed by the Division Bench comprising of Hon"ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev Khanna and Hon"ble Mr. Justice R. V. Easwar can be described as Dedh Bench order (One and half) and this is quite apparent from the fact that in the order dated 24th April, 2012 Justice R. V. Easwar has not given his own comments. Mr. Deepak Khosla also submits that the judgment has been authored by Justice Sanjeev Khanna and the same has been just co-signed by Justice R.V. Easwar but Justice R.V. Easwar has not responded since May, 2013 to certain aspects of the law which had crept into the order dated 24th September, 2012 and this leads him to believe that Justice R.V. Easwar has not subscribed to some of the views in the said order. Mr. Deepak Khosla further submits that in his previous applications, he has already spelled out grievance to this effect.

The present Special Bench has assembled today for hearing these applications. While addressing arguments on these applications, Mr. Deepak Khosla has raised the aforesaid contentions.

This Court will take a view on the said plea raised by Mr. Deepak Khosla of describing the Division Bench as "Dedh Bench" at the time of final disposal of CM APPL. No.2392/2013 and other applications which are listed for hearing on 22nd November, 2013."

Since in our view the applicant has committed contempt of court in describing the Division Bench consisting of Sanjeev Khanna, J., and one of us (R.V. Easwar, J.) as "Dedh Bench" – a prima facie contemptuous remark calculated to denigrate the dignity of this court – we issue show-cause notice to Mr. Deepak Khosla, the applicant herein, as to why proceedings should not be initiated against him for committing contempt of court.

¶14Mr. Deepak Khosla shall file his reply to the show-cause notice of contempt within 15 days. Relist the contempt proceedings as "Court of its own motion" on 25.04.2014. (R.V. EASWAR) JUDGE

(KAILASH GAMBHIR) JUDGE MARCH 28, 2014/hs

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: 14th March, 2014 % Date of Decision: 28th March, 2014 + C.M. No.16860/2013 & C.M. No.2392/2013 IN LPA 16/2012 DEEPAK KHOSLA ..... Appellant Through: Appellant in person. versus MONTREAUX RESORTS PVT. LTD. & ORS. .....Respondents Through: Mr. Raman Kapoor, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Anand M. Mishra, Advocate. CORAM: MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR MR. JUSTICE R.V. EASWAR R.V. EASWAR, J. 1. C.M. No.16860/2013 is an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking "modification" of the order dated 24.04.2012 passed by a Division Bench consisting Sanjiv Khanna, J. and one of us (R. V. Easwar, J.) in LPA No.16/2012. C.M. No.2392/2013 is again an application under Section 151 CPC seeking "clarification" of the above order passed by the Division Bench. When these applications were earlier placed before this Bench, it was felt by this Bench that it would be appropriate to place these applications before the same Bench which heard the Letters Patent Appeal; they were accordingly placed before the same Bench which decided the LPA. However, since by orders dated 10.01.2014 and 28.02.2014, Sanjiv Khanna, J. recused himself from hearing the applications, they were again placed before this Bench. Accordingly arguments were heard on both the applications. The submission in the "modification" application is that the opening sentence of paragraph 73(v) of the order dated 24.04.2012 be modified. The said paragraph open as follows: - "73(v) Till the decision, there will be stay of the pending proceedings or initiation of new proceedings before the High Court and in the District Courts." The application for modification states that the appellant is not interested in such protection and to this limited extent the said paragraph may be modified. It is claimed that the respondents cannot possibly have any objection to this since they themselves are praying for certain matters to be proceeded with (against the appellant) and that in any case the modification is eminently warranted because of the change in circumstances, that is to say that the appellant-applicant is now a member of the Bar w. e. f. 30.07.2013 and is, therefore, statutorily entitled to appear for others and if that is so there can be no bar against appearing for himself. It is also clarified in the application for modification that the application is without prejudice to the basic position taken by the appellant-applicant that the order dated 24.04.2012 is a nullity in law, void ab initio and non est. It is accordingly prayed that the opening sentence of para 73(v) reproduced above may be deleted. 2. In the application for clarification, the gist of the contention is that Section 41(b) and (d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preclude this Court from injuncting the prosecution of proceedings other than before a subordinate Court if those proceedings are of a criminal nature and though the impugned order refers to the statutory provisions, it has nevertheless proceeded to ignore the true purport of those provisions in injuncting the applicant in the manner directed by the Division Bench. The prayer in the application is that the Court should clarify that in light of the statutory bar placed upon the Court by Section 41(b) and (d) of the Specific Relief Act, the impugned order staying all proceedings between the parties does not extend to original criminal proceedings or proceedings in a criminal matter, or proceedings arising therefrom nor is the Division Bench right in staying proceedings pending before any Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. A list of the cases which according to the applicant should not be affected by the order passed by the Division Bench is given in Annexure-2 and 3, Annexure-2 being a list of criminal matters and Annexure-3 being a list of matters pending before the coordinate Bench of this Court. 3. In support of the application for modification, the applicant who appeared in person contended t