Sub Maj Ram Pal Anr v. U.O.I & Anr

ORDER

12.07.2010 In terms of the common judgment rendered today in Writ Petition (Civil) 9478/2007 titled "Wing Commander MP. Sethi (Retd.) & Ors v. Union of India & Another" along with eight connected writ petitions, this writ petition is dismissed with no orders as to costs. Application also stands dismissed. A copy of the judgment passed in W.P. (C) No. 9478 of 2007 be placed forthwith on the file. JULY 12, 2010 rk S. MURALIDHAR, J Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: May :11, '.01ll Decision on: July 17.. !.0 10 WJUT PETlTION (CIVIL) 947S/201l7 & CIVI API'L l7S5X/07 WlNCi COMMANDFR M.P. Sl·Tlll (Rl·:TD.) & 01\S ... Petitioners Through: Mr. Rakesh Tikku with Mr. Prakash Ciautam, Advocate versus lJN!ON OF lNDli\ & ANI< .... Respondents Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh, Advocate WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 9525/20()7 & CM APl'L 179::11/07 FX. N.K. KRfSHAN KUMAR & ORS .... Petitioner.~ Through: CoL K. Digambar Singh. Advoca1c versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR .... l\csponclcllts Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh, AdvocatL; WRIT PI~TITION (CIVIL) 954612007 & CM APPL 17954/07 CllANDRO DEVl .... Petitioner Through: CoL K. Digambar Singh, 1\dvocatc versus UN JON OF TNDlA & ANR .... Respondents Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh, Advocate WlUT PKITfiON (CIVIL) 9568/20()7 & CM APPL 171JX l/07 LX. IJONY. CAPT BALBlR SlNC)ll 10\DlAN .... l'etitioncr Through: CoL K. Digarnbar Singh, Advocate versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR .... Respondents Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh, Advocate WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 6447/2008 & CM APPL l2Jl3/HX JAGD!SII PRASAD .... Petitioner Through: Col K. Digambar Singh, /\clvocatc Page 1 of 3!> versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR --- I<espondcnts Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh, Advocate WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 6494/2008 & CM APPL 12181/08 VIJI~NDER SLNCill __ .Petitioner Through: Col. K. Digambar Singh, Advocate versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR .... Respondents Through: Ms . .lyoti Singh, Advocate WlUT PETITION (CIVIL) 6761/2008 & CM Al'l'L 13005/08 EX. IIONY. SUB MAJ RAM PAL & ANR ____ Petitioners versus Through: Mr. Rakesh Tikku with Mr. Prakash Gautam, Advocate UNION OF INDIA & ANR .... 1\espondents Through: Ms. Maneesha Dhir witl1 Ms_ l'reeti Dalal and Mr. K.P.S. Kohli, Advocate WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 736612009 & CM Al'PL 3210/09 DHVAYANTI versus ____ Petitioner Through: Col. K. Digambar Singh, Advocate UNION or fNDfA & ANR .... Respondents Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh, Advocate And WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 1403412009 & CM APPL 16083/09 I ~x_ SFP VIRENDFR SJNGJ I ____ Petitioner Through: Col. K. Digambar Singh, Advocate versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR . __ Respondents Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh, Advocate CORAM: JUSTICE S. MlJRALIDIIAR WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07,

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2.

¶3Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to sec the judgment'7 To be rcfened to the Reporter or not? Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest? .JlJDGEMI<~NT No Yes Yes

¶1The non-renewal or the licences in respect ot" the shops locau.:d in the shopping complex under the control or the Ministry ot" De knee. lJnion ol" india (Respondent No. l) in Cavour oC the Petitioners pursuant to a policy decision made effective fi·om 30 ' J\pril 2007. is the subject matter ot" the challenge in this batch of writ petitions. Background facts

¶2The Petitioners belong to categories or ex-servicemen (and their l~t111ily members) who died either in war and/or while being in service and/or having suf'f"ered battle casualties and/or discharge fi·om the anned f"orces and/or those armed personnel who retire after rcmlcring t"ull service. The case o I the Petitioners is that among various measures adopted by the Directorate General of Reselllement ('DGR ') was the allocation of the shops in the areas manned and managed by the Station Commander in various localities in Delhi such as S.P. Marg, Delhi Canll., J\rjun Vibar. Dhaula Kuan, Shankar Vihar etc.

¶3It is stated that with a view to streamline the allotrnents made of" the above shops in the shopping complexes, the Respondents have been issuing guidelines 1i·om time to time known as Standing Operating Procedure ('SOP'). ln terms or Clause 6 of the SOP issued on 10'1' J\ugust 2001. as and when any of the shops fall vacant, the Station Commander at Station lleadquarters was expected to give wide publicity through the DGR in local newspapers. The allotment of shops was to he done on yearly basis. Clause 11 of the SOP dated 1 Otli August 1.001 provided f"or priorities in the allotment of shops. Various parameters have been laid clown for allotment. On meeting such parameters a person was given a licence Cor a period of I I months subject to renewal. Clause 17 of the SOP dated 1 0' ' August 200 I reads as lmder: "17. Renewal of licence deed: 1Zencwa1 or licence deed will be done on the recommendation or residential associations, which will be obtained three months in advance from the date of expiry of licence deed by DDA & QMG, Station. HQ Ddhi Cantt. ll. the recommendations arc in favour of allottee, then tl1c Station Commander may renew the licence deed l·or the subsequent year. However, the licence deed 111ay be terminated at any time by the Station Com111ander at his discretion."

¶4According to the Petitioners, till the policy of 13 1li April 2007 which is challenged in this petition was announced, as a matter or practice, the licences were being renewed from time to time. Many of the Petitioners have been occupying the shops in their possession l"or over nine years. J n fact, the Petitioners including Wing Conunander M.l'. Sethi and two others in Arjun Vihar have been in occupation of their respective shops f"or over!. 1 years. It is stated that in tcnllS of Clause 17 or the SOP only where the Residents' Association did not favour any pa1iicular allottee of' a shop, was the renewal withheld. In terms of Clause 2S ofthe SOP a dchtulting allot1cc WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, Poge 4 of 35 has to be referred to the Estate Officer for the purposes or .initiation or eviction proceedings under the Public Premises (l ~viction and Unauthori/ed Occupants) Act, 1971 (' PP Act').

¶5lt is stated that 1982 onwards many of the Petitioners were allotted their respective shops and licence deeds were also executed. The licence deeds were last extended in the year 2000 and wne to expire in the latter part of 2007. It is stated that the Petitioners had legitimate expectation that the licence deeds may indeed be renewed. llowever. on 13' 11 April 2007 the new policy effective from 30Lh April 2007 was issued.

¶6CIa use 18 of the new policy reads as under: "'18. Renewal of licence deed: Renewal of licence.: deed will be done on the recommendation of residenlial associations, which will be obtained three months in advance from the date or expiry of licence deed by AQMC~. Station !lead Quarter, Delhi Cantt. If the recommendations arc in Cavour of allottee, then thc Station Commandcr may renew the licence deed for the subsequent ycar. llowcvcr, the licence deed may be terminated at any time by the Station Commander at his discretion. No extension bcyond five years will be given under any circumstance. The satltc person can apply after a gap of minimum threc ycars of' clear break (not running in any Army Colony or NCR)."

¶7In tcrms of the above Clause 18, thc right to gct ihc I iccnccs rcncvvcd immediately on the expiry of live years has been withdravm. The allottees are expected to apply again ai'Ler a minimum break oi' thrcc ycars. In tcnns WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, 64117/08, 6494/08, 6761/08, 7366/09 & 14034/09 Page!;, af 3!:> \~ or the revised policy, the Respondents issued letters to the Petitioners declining renewal or licences. The copies of letters requiring the Petitioners to vacate the shops under their occupation have been enclosed with the petition. S. Petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 9 [Wing Commander M.l'. Sethi (Rete!.), l•:x . .IWO J\.S. Chadha, Ex. GNR Narender Dev, l·:x. Naik lJnni Krishnan-TP. 1-:x. Sepoy Dharam Chand, Smt. Chandro Devi, l·:x. Subedar R.K. Pawar, Smt. Vimla Devi] in W.P. (C) 9478 of 2007; Petitioner Nos. I, 2. 5, 9. 12, 14, 15 and 17 jFx. N.K. Krishan Kumar, Lt. (Retd.) Colonel Rameshwar, Mrs. Vccna Muldiyar, Smt. Narangi Devi, Ex. Sigmn lshwar Singh, IIony. Capt. (Retd.) Dhanraj Sharma, Mrs. Shakuntla Dcvi and Smt. Lilawati I in W.P. (C) 9525 of 2007; Smt. Chandro Devi, wife or late N.K. lloshiyar Singh, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) 9546 of 2007; l~x. llony. Capt Halhir Singh. the Petitioner in W.P. (C) 956S of2007 were served vacation notices dated 23'd November 2007 requiring the said Petitioners to vacate the shops in their possession within one month. llowever, the CoUJi is inl(mncd by the Respondents that Chandra Dcvi. Petitioner No. 7 in W.P. (C) 9478 ol· ·2007 has already vacated the shop in her possession.

¶9Shobhawati Dcvi, the wife ofEx. llony Captain Satpal Yadav, Petitioner No. II in W.P. (C) 9478 of2007 made a representation to the Respondents requesting them to transfer the licence to the shop allotted to her deceased husband to her. On 3'd October 2007, the Respondents in reply to this representation dated 17' 11 August 2007 slated that there was no pol icy to · transt'er the allotted shop hom the original allottee to the spouse in utse o 1· the former's death. The licence Cor the shop allotted lo her deceast:d husband had already expired on 19'li August 2007. llowever, compassionate grounds she was allowed to continue till 3 1 '1 December 2007. This stand was reiterated by the Respondents by a communication dated l3 1li November 2007 in reply to the Petitioner's representation dated 1 7'1' November 2007.

¶10Shri Magan Lal, Petitioner No. 10 in W.P. (C) 947X or 2007 wh<ise licence expired on 27'li October 2007 and Shri Ilavman Singh, Petitioner No. 18 in W.I'. (C) 9525 of 2007 whose licence expired on 25 1h November 2007 received vacation notices dated 2ih November 2007 requiring them to vacate the shops in their respective possession within one month. Sht·i M.P. Singh, Petitioner No. 3 in W.P. (C) 9478 or 2007 received a similar notice on 2.'\ 11' November 2007 after his licence expired on 27 11' November 2007. The licence of Shri Jagdish Prasad, the Petitioner in W.P. (Civil) ()4117 or 2008 expired on 14 11 ' August 2007. flc was served a vacation notice by the Respondents on 21 '' May 2008 asking him to vacate the shop in his possession by 25' 11 June 2008. Similarly, the licence of Shri Vircndcr Singh, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) 6494 of 2008 expired on 19' 11 .January 2008. lie was served a vacation notice dated 3"1 May 2008 asking him to vacate the · 1 · · l 5111 s 10p 11s possession JY 2_ June 2008. llowever, the Respondents ini(mncd the Com1 that the Petitioner in W.l'. (C) 6494 or 2008 has already vacated the shop. The licence or Shri Rampal, Petitioner No. 1 in W.l'. (C) 6761 ol" 2008 expired on 20t 11 April 2008 and of Shri Kameshwar Prasad WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, Page 7 of 3S Singh, Petitioner No. 2 in W.P. (C) 6761 of 2008 on 28 1! February 2008. They were served vacation notices on 8 1t May and 24 111 April 2008, respectively, requiring them to vacate the shops in their possession by 16 September 2008. Smt. Dcvyanti Devi, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) T\(16 of" 2008 was issued a vacation notice on 15' 11 January 2009 when her licence had expired on 611t July 2008. She was required to vacate the shop by 2 d February 2009. ~

¶11The licence of Shri Virender Singh, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) HOY! oC 2009 expired on 31 ' 1 January 2007. However, by a letter dated 21 ' December 2006 the Respondents had cancelled his licence under para 15 or the licence deed due to subletting of the shop. By a letter dated 30 November 2007 he was asked to vacate the shop within 30 days. Consequently, the Respondents served an eviction notice dated 18 111 /\ugust 2008 on the Petitioner.

¶12Lt. Col. (Retd.) B.M. Kapoor, Petitioner No.4 in W.P. (C) CJ525 or 2007 was served a vacation notice on 19'1t December 2007 while his I iccncc had expired on i 11 July 2007. Similarly, Lt. Col (Retd.) D.K. Dcbnath, Petitioner No. 1 in W.P. (C) 9525 oC 2007 .was served a vacation notice dated 14 111 August 2007 when his licence expired on 24 111 March 2008. Petitioner Nos. 3, 6, 7, 11, 13 and 16 in W.P. (C) 9525 or /.007 have also been scrvcd with similar vacation notices, which arc impugned, afkr expiry of their licences. Page 8 of 3:, ( I The Petitioners' case

¶13It is submitted by the Petitioners that the very puq1ose or I)() R allocating shops in favour of the Petitioners was to enable them lo have some reasonable means of subsistence. It is slated that continued allotment was a rule and non-renewal an exception. Continued allotment automatically followed ifthcrc were no negative rcpmis rromtiJL: residents' associations. It is stated that primarily the l'l;titioncrs are sL:Iling groL:ery items, eatables, vegetables, limited items of ekctrical goods de. in t!JL:ir shops. These are made available to the residents of the localities where defence shopping complexes are located, at reasonable rates. The basic idea is to make available things of day-to-day use to the residents or these areas ncar their door steps. The very purpose of allocating these shops to various alloticcs was to enable the servicemen and their family members to earn a decent living.

¶14It is stated that the new policy made effective fi-om :l0' ' J\pril 2007 gives a complete go-by to this philosophy. 11 introduced a break in the continuity of their rehabilitation process with the Respondents pressurising the Petitioners to vacate the shops.

¶15J\t the initial date of hearing Le_ on 20 1h December 2007, this Court passed the following order: "Issue notice. Ms. Jyoti Singh, J\clvocatL: accepts notice on behalf of Respondents_ Counter aJlidavil shall he lilcd within two weeks. Rejoinder, if any, may be lilcd within two weeks thereaCLer. List on 8'h February 2008. CM APPL 17850/2007 (stav) f have considered the materials on record. The applicants' grievance is that they were allotted the premises by the Respondents as a measure of rehabilitation, on account of" their being ex-serviceman or being war widows. lt is contended that sudden change of policy has gravely and ineparably affected them. Learned counsel ICJr the Petitioners relied upon the documents. They suggest that Respondents took a conscious decision that the allotlllc!lt in case of rehabilitation was understood as not to the subject or later cancellation. llowever, leamed counsel for the Respondents has disputed the applicability of the documents. According to her, the letter pertained to allotment of premises in Regimental Areas. It is not disputed that the allotment or these spaces were given as a measure of rebabilitation to the Petitioners. The objective of the new Scheme, it is emphasized, is to ensure availability or these premises to as many beneficiaries as possible, having. regard to the limited resources available with the force. It is contended that a large number of" applications were liled and arc pending consideration. While the discretion of" public authority to <tllot the premises within its possession, control and ownership ancl the parameters for such treatment can never be clcnied yet the question here appears to be one oC balancing competitive disadvantages, as it were. The debate here is whether having allotted the premises, as a rneasun.: or rehabilitation, the Respondents can, aii.er some time reverse that process and insist that such alloUccs who admittedly were eligible for the benefit should return the premises and wait for three more years to claim allotment f"or the same and other such spaces. I am of" the opinion that while the Respondents' power to Ji·ame a policy l'oge 10 of 3.; ( I .r-cannot be questioned yet the considerations which the authority has to keep in this regard, i_c_ thc level ol· prosperity or income attained by the allollees who wcrc given premises earlier, the surriciency or such income to make them tide order the difficult situation and other objective factors can ce1iainly be gone into under J\1iiclc 226 of the Constitution. ln view of the above, the Respondents arc hcrcby restrained ii·orn taking any steps to disposscss the Petitioner during the pendency of this writ pctition_" Case of tlze Respondents 1 G. In the counter affidavit lilcd in W. P_ (C) 95!JG or 1007, which is morc or less similar to the counter affidavit filed in other petitions, thc Respondents have categorically stated that "the dominant purpose of thcsc shopping complex/centres is the welfare or the servicemen and their families residing in the vicinity thereof and NOT resetllelllenl or a war widow, a widow. battle casualty and ex-servicemen which is only ancillary rather than allot shop to outsiders_ It may he further t-e-emphasisccl that thc shops in the shopping complexes/shopping ccntrcs arc allottcd on contractual basis on the normal rental basis and no promise has been held out to the allottccs that their licence will be ncccssarily rcncwcd/cxtcndcd in pcrpciuity." 17_ The rationale for changing the policy as set out in the SOP dated I 0' ' August 2001 is attributed to the requests made by a 1argc numhcr of war widows. widows, battle casualties and ex-servicemen approaching the Respondents for allotment of shops in shopping cotuplcxes/shopping centres. It is stated that in a period of live months, 4 7 such applications 64117/08, 611911/08, 6761/08, 7366/09 & 14034/09 Page 11 of 3.'> were received but none of them could be entertained since the existing allotlees were continuing since inception and the number oC shops available was limited. The reasons for the change in the policy as introduced in the SOP dated 13th April 2007 are stated to be the Collowing:

(a) assisting those families registered in the waiting I ist for allotment of shops.

(b) illegal sub-letting of shops by the existing allollees whose licences have been kept renewed for a long duration.

(c) the fact that there is no increase in the number of' slropping complexes even while the demand for allotment keeps increasing.

(d) since the allotment of shops is a welfare measure, it is necessary to rotate the allocation so that a larger number of ex -servicemen arc benefi1.1ed.

¶18The Respondents claim that the changed policy was made known to all licencees including the Petitioners in June 2007. In the additional arlidavit tiled on 22m 1 February 2010, the Respondents have drawn a distinction between unit shops (Regimental Shops) and shops shopping centres/complexes which arc located in the "mam married complex". Enclosed with the affidavit is a copy of the 'Scales of Accommodation 1983 ('SOA 1983'). Regimental shops arc authorized by para 3.41 of the SOA 1983 and provide for trades such as tailor, boot maker (FJ3]:{), cycle repair and grocer (unit baniya and wet canteen). These unit shops "arc meant purely for troops and their f~tmilies as a welfare activity and an: located in unit lines wherein civilian population has limited or no access." 6447 jOB, 6494/08, 6761/08, 7366/09 & 14034/09 Page .1l of 3'>

¶19The additional affidavit proceeds to state that shops in shopping centres/complexes as described in para 3.42.1 of SO/\ 1983 and arc located at military stations "where no civil shopping complex exists within a reasonable distance Crom the main married complex. The trades can be selected. nut of categories like aerated water, barber, book and stationary, car and scooter repair, cloth, chemist a~1d druggist, dry cleaner, cycle, gas, furniture, restaurant, milk dairy, bakery, vegetable and fruits and other trades which meet the requirements of the troops and their l~tmilies." It is stated that these shops have a clientele of the dependent civilian population also.

¶20The Respondents point out that there arc two sub-categories of shops in shopping complexes/centres. One category is covered by para 3.42.1 ol" SO/\ 1983 which are created on defence lands fi·om government funds. The other category is shops created on defence lands using non public funds. On l!Jrli September 2008, the Ministry of Dclcncc ('Mol)') Clovcrnmcnt ol· fndia, brought out 'Guidelines lor running shopping centres/complexes and unit shops'. Para 8(b) of the guidelines states that the DcCcncc Shopping Centres/Complexes (Maintenance and Administration) Rules, 200(J ('DSC Rules 2006') framed by the MoD and issued on l3 !t .June 200CJ would he applicable to both categories of shopping complexes, i.e., those created with government funds and those with non public funds.

¶21The DSC Rules, 2006 make it clear that they do not apply to H.egimental shops created exclusively for military personnel and thci 1· WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, Page 13 of 3S families. Rule 2(c) defines a shopping complex to mean "a composite area comprising shops established on A-I or analogous defence land under till: management of the Am1y!Navy/Air Force but would not include Regimental shops created exclusively for military personnel and thc11· families." Under Rule 3(a) the existing allottees were allowed to continue till the expiry of their licence period and such of those in unauthorized occupation of the shops, i.e., where the period or licence has expired. would be given six months time to vacate in terms or Rule 3(c) railing which the !·:state Orricer would initiate action to evict them in accordance with law.

¶22Under Rule 7 no transfer was permissible except in case of dc:1nisc or the allottee, in which case it would be transferred to the dcpmdent/legal heir for the residual period of the licence. Under Rule 12, GO% or the shops in each shopping complex were to be reserved in the order or priority as under:

(i) war widows/widows of defence personnel kilkd while on duty. ( i i) disabled soldier

(iii) ex-servicemen

(iv) spouses/widows of ex-servicemen. The remaining 40% were to be allotted to the following:

(i) Government agencies including public sector undertakings and

(ii) civilians whose spouse or dependent family member do not own ::my shops in the complex/military station/cantonment. WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, 611117/08, 611911/08, 6761/08, 7366/09 & .14034/09 Pag" 111 of 35 Any unallotled shops in the 60% quota were to be considered !"or being given to the civilian category.

¶23Under Rule 13, allotment was to be given under licence for a period ol" three years. Fmther allotment was to be made "strictly under the Rules ii·amed herein." Under Rule 18, on termination of the licence, il" the shops were not vacated, action was to be initialed under the PP /\ct. lJndcr l~ulc 25(a) any matter not covered by the DSC :woG would be decided by the MoD in consultation with the Director General of the Ddence 1-:statcs and the lleadquaticrs ofihe Army/Navy/ Air Force.

¶24!\ J'urther additional aiTidavit was filed on 27' 11 Apri I 20 l 0 clari lying that the shops in Army Hospital, Raj Rif1e Centre, 13ase llospital, Pallavi Shopping Complex, Taurus CSD Canteen, Army Headquarters and Parade Ground arc Regimental shops to be administered by their respective commandants. These were different ii"om Station shopping complcx~:s where the shops allotted to the Petitioners were located. Statistics or the applications received for allotment of shops and the actual allotment.c.; made rrom 2005 till date have been set out to show that only l O'Yt, ol" tl1e applicants have been allotted due to unavailability ol· shops. The last aflidavit was iiled in response to new [acts stated in the Rejoinder by the Petitioners on 30th March 2009 listing out some of" the shops occupied by civilians.

¶25The Petitioners also filed an additional rejoinder aflidavil on 12'li May Page J~ of 3~ 2010 giving details of shops run by civilians in Delhi Cantonmciil. Photographs of some of these shops were also enclosed_ The basic contention or the Petitioners is that if there is a shortage or shops Cor allotment for those in the waiting list, then these civilians should be asked to vacate. Submissions of counsel

¶26This Cowi has heard the submissions of Mr. Rakesh Tikku, Col. 1<. Digarnbar Singh and Mr. Sanjay Rathi, learned counsel for the Petitioners and Ms. Jyoti Singh, learned counsel for the l<cspondents. 27_ The central plank of the submissions on behalf of the Petitioners is based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation. It is submitted that the aforementioned notices sent by the Respondents n;quiring the Petitioners to vacate the shops in question are arbitrary and unreasonable. The refusal by the Respondents to renew the Petitioners' licences is stated to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution when tested on the touchstone or the doctrine of legitimate expectations.

¶28There is both a procedural and substantive comj-Jonenl to the right asserted. The procedure followed here is that each o 1· the Petitioners has been given thirty days' advance notice to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises. This is exactly what the terms ol' the licence stipulate. However, it is contended that the Petitioners were not aware when such licence was issued that there would be no renewal afler live years and Page 16 of 3S therefore such requirement can only apply to those whose licences wct·c issued for the first time after the new policy dated 13' 11 April 7.007 came into force i_e_ 30'h April 2007. In other words a conditionality, oC mm-rencwal after live years, cannot be applied retrospectively to the l'etitioncrs. The procedure followed by the Respondents is attacked h1r its un!aimcss. It is submillcd by the Petitioners that had they known in advance that such a five-year rule would be applied then they could have mack alternative arrangements which according to them requires some time.

¶29The doctrine of legitimate expectation is invoked as regards the substantive content of the policy. lt is contended that, notwithstanding these were licences for a year at a time, as a matter of practice the licences wct·c being renewed year after year by following the pre-amended policy as expressed in Clause 17 of the SOP dated 1 0 ' August 2001. In other words, there was a legitimate expectation even this time around that their licences would be renewed. The hustration or this legitimate expectation is said to attract At1ic1c 14.

¶30Independent of the ground based on legitimate expcclatiotl, it ts submitted that the policy to restrict the initial licence period to live years. after the licence has already been renewed in terms of" the existing policy i.e. the SOP dated 10' 11 August 2001, is arbitrary since it runs contrary to the very object of providing rehabilitation to the ex-servicemen and their relatives who; having set up shops, cannot be expected lo suddenly wind up their business and move on. Given the restrictions as Lo the price at which they can sell their commodities, and the advanced age at which some arc, they cannot he expected to find alternative means or livelihood. They cannot be reasonably expected to have made substantial profits in the shol"l period that would help them to sustain themselves after losing their shops. Also, alternative commercial space in the same area, or any other area, would be unaffordablc. They would be back to being reduced to penury which will defeat the object of their being extended a wclf"arc measure fell· sustenance. A commercial shop has to be run on borrowings and it takL:s some time to even break even. ll cannot be abruptly stopped at the end or five years just about when it is possible to make some profits. lking m<alc to wait f"or three years thereafter before re-applying, only compounds the uncertainty and is based on a non-understanding of how tltc retail trade in goods works. It is submitted that the period of live years, which has been arbitrarily fixed, docs not sub serve the purpose and object of the wei f~tre measure and therefore is also irrational. Forcing the Petitioners to make way f"or other ex-servicemen who may be wailing in the queue, and then granting them shops for a maximum period or five years, does not help either group of ex-servicemen. It is SLtbmiltcd that there is no supervening public interest that justifies such a drastic change in the policy. The answer to the demand for allotment of such shops was perhaps to construct more shops or decrease the existing quota or 40°/r, i(Jr civilians instead ol" curtailing the licence period ofthc shops given to the ex-servicemen.

¶31The other limb of this argument is that there cannot be a discrimination between 'regimental' shops and shops in a commercial shopping complex as both arc after all as a measure ol"wclfare and arc on dcCencc land. Page 18 of 3'>

¶32Appearing for the Respondents Ms. Jyoti Singh. learned cmmscl !Irs\ submits that the cause of action in the present petition adrnittedly arises out or and seeks the continuation of a contractual agreement and therefi:m: a writ petition under i\Jiiclc 27.6 of the Constitution seeking such relief" is not maintainable. Secondly, it is submitted that the Petitioners have an efficacious remedy under the PP Act. Thirdly, it is submitted that the Petitioners have not come with clean hands and arc trying to mislead the Court that they have been allotted "regimental shops" as against shops in a shopping complex. It is pointed out that policy f(Jr allotment makes a clear distinction between 'regimental shops' and shops in a 'shopping complex'. While the former may be said to be allotted by way or rehabilitation. the shops in a shopping complex arc for the families residing in the vicinity where there arc no shops at a reasonable distance.

¶33Ms. Singh emphasized that the shops in question were given under licence deeds for tem1s of 11 months renewable at the discretion or the Station Commander. Tt is submitted that there is a growing demand fi·01n tbc very same categories of CX-scrviccmcn and their fami Jy llJClllbcrs. who have become eligible later for the allotment of shops on licence basis. !I is claimed that there is a waiting list of such prospective allottccs. (liven that the number of shops are limited, and in order to ensure equal treatrnen\, the policy or 30' 11 April 2007 has been devised. ft is pointed out that there arc other ex-servicemen equally deserving in the queue and cannot possibly be accommodated unless the current occupiers arc asked to vacate. It is denied that the non-refusal to renew the licences is either arbitrary or rnala l]de as WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, Page 19 of 3S alleged. It is further denied that any speciiic unequivocal promise was made or assurance given to any of" the allotlees that the shops would bt.: allotted Cor lire or in peqJetuity. 3!J. Statistics· giving dctai Is of allotment of shops in the shopping complexes have been produced by the Respondents which show that against R7 applications received in the year 2005 only 4 shops were allotted; against 37 applications received in the year 2009, 3 shops were allotted, and 7.6 applications have already been received for 2010, while there has been no allotment since there is no vacancy.

¶35With this background or racts, this Court IS called upon to examine whether the policy decision announced by the Respondents ellective 30 " April 2007 is arbitrary or unreasonable and whether the non-renewal or the licences in favour of the Petitioners is arbitrary or unreasonable. Preliminary objections as to maintainability

¶36The scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 ol" the Constitution to review a policy decision is limited. The Court normally does not inicrf"crc in the matters or policy except where it directly impacts on Cundamcntal rights. The right being asserted here is essentially the right to be treated fairly and reasonably. To that extent the judicial t·cvicw or the impugned actions of the Respondents is indeed permissible. Also, the scope of the proceedings under the PP Act is limited to showing why the continued occupation of the shops is not unauthorized and wily the occupier should not be asked to pay penal rates during such period or unauthori/ed WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, Page 20 of 3.'> occupation. A challenge cannot be raised in proceedings undn the PP /\ct to the validity or any policy change or to the impugned orders 011 the ground that they are arbitrary and violate Article 14. In other words the remedy under the PP Act is neither an cfflcacious nor an alternative remedy to the present petitions. The preliminary objections of tl1e ]{espondents as to maintainability of these petitions arc accordingly overruled. Legitimate expectation 3 7. Turning to the merits, the first issue to be considered is whether the impugned actions are rendered arbitrary in that they ii-ustratc the lcgiti ma tc expectations, both procedural and substantive, or the Petitioners thus rendering them arbitrary and unreasonable under Article I~') Our Suprcn1c Court has developed the doctrine of legitimate expectation largely m1 the basis of the decisions of the courts in l~ngland. In Council f~/' CiFil SerFice Unions 1'. Minister for CiFil Service 1984 AllER 935. it was contended by the Unions that an employee had a legitimate expectation that the Minister would follow the existing practice of consulting the Unions before thci r membership could be withdrawn. lL was explained that the procedural part of the expectation was that the appropriate pmccdurc. including an opporttmity of being heard would be followed, before th~ benclit or the advantage was withdrawn. The substantive pa1i was that a representation was made that the benefit or a substantive nature would either be granted or continued and not substantially varied. It could be a representation to the individual or generally to a class of persons. The Australian lligh Court in A.ttomey General for New South Wales v. Quin 1990 (64) /1ust LIR 327 apprehended that "to Strike down the CXeJ"C!SC o[" administrative power Page JI of 3S solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts adrif't on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover the notion or a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis f"or invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law." The House of Lords in Re Findlay 1984 (3) AllER 801 IlL rejected the argument that there was any substantive legitimate expectation that the policy relating to parole for certain category of prisoners could not be changed and required prior consultation. It was held that "the most that a convicted prisoner can legitimately expect is that his case be examined individually in the light of" whatever policy the Secretary of" Stale sees Iilio adopt provided always that the adopted policy is a law ll.tl exercise 0 r the discretion confcned upon him by the statute. Any other view would cnlai I the conclusion that the unfettered discretion conferred by statute upon the minister can in some cases be restricted so as to hamper, or even to prevent changes of policy."

¶38The above was the stage of development or the law when in Navjyoti Co-operative Group Housing Society v. Union of bzdia (1992) 4 ,\'CC 477 the Supreme Court adopted the principle to grant rcliel· to the l)etitionns in that case. The facts were that the existing list of co-operative societies l"or allotment of land was altered under a changed policy by reckoning the seniority with reference to the date of approval or the lined list by the Registrar. The Supreme Court accepted the argument that arTcctcd societies had a legitimate expectation that the past consistent practice would be Page}} of 3~ ( followed particularly since the Respondents failed to show any overriding public interest.

¶39In Food Cm]JOration of India v. /(amadhenu Cattle Feed Industries

(1993) 1 sec 71 the action of the appellant in reCusing to accept the Respondent's highest tender for purchase of stocks of damaged food grains was challenged. 1t was submitted that there could not be any subsequent negotiation to improve upon the highest bid and that the person of!Cring the highest tender had a legitimate expectation that the bid woul cl be accepted. Negativing the plea ofthe Respondent it was held that, --~. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enf"orceahle right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration or a legitimate expectation forms part or the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant !·actor requiring due consideration in a fair decision making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question or J~1ct in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be dctermi ned not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision or the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement or non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule or law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent." Page 73 of 3S r-.

¶40The doctrine was further developed in Union of" India v. llindustan Development Corporation (1993) 3 SCC 499 where it was explained in para 7.~ that: "The legitimacy of an expectation can be in fcncd only i r it is ({mndcd on the sanction of law or CLtstom or an cstablisltcd procedure follciwed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable Ji·om a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectablc. Fvcry such legitimate expectation does not by itself fi·uctify into a right and therefore it does not amount to -a right in the conventional sense." It was further explained in para 33: "The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway fi·om the administrative authorities as no crystaliscd right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation docs not require the fulfillment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words where a person's legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then decision-maker should justi1y the denial of such expectation by showing some overrating public interest. Theref(Jrc even if substantive protection of such expectation is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right to a patiicular person. lt simply ensures the circulllstanccs in which that expectation may be cknicd or restricted. ;\ case ol" legitimate expectation would ans~: when a body by representation or by past practice arous~:d ~:xpcclation which it would be within its powers to iltlfill. The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within those limits." WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, Page lll of 35

¶41After emphasising that the burden was on the person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation to satisfy that there has been a representation or a past practice that has given rise to such expectation, it must be shown that the decision of the authority was "arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest". It was observed: "If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the courts cannot interfere with the decision". Fvcn if the court was satis(icd that a case or legitimate expectation was made out, it can grant relief only where the failure to give an opportunity of hearing prior to such decision has resulted in failure ofjusticc.

¶42In Madras City Wine Merchants' Association v. ,\'tate of" TN (1994) 5 sec 509 the licence holders invoked past practice to claim a legitimall: expectation of renewal of bar licences umkr the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 read with the Tamil Nadu (Vending in Har) Rules 1992. 13e!"ore the bar liccncces could apply for renewaL a policy decision was taken not to renew their licences. It was held that even under the earlier policy, a licence under the Bar Rules was only for a period of one year and renewal was based on payment of 15% more than the "privilege amount at which the sale of the privilege was confim1ed the previous year". Renewal for the third year was on payment of 10% more than the privilege amount. It was held that "if there is a change in policy or in public interest the position is altered by a rule or legislation, no question of legitimate expectation would arise." lt was observed that the expectation that the licence would be renewed at best was at best "a hope". WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, Page 2.5 of 3.5

¶43The law regarding legitimate expectation was discussed in great detail thereafter in Pw~jab Communications v. Union of India (1999) 4 SCC

¶727The Cacts were that the /\sian Development Bank (' J\DH') agreed to lend to the Government of India US $113 million for providing digital wireless tclccom facility to 36,000 idcnti ficd villages in La stern U .1'. The appellant and another company were shmt-listcd after examination ol" the oilers ol" several Indian and foreign companies. I Iowcvcr, a high level committee thereafter disqualified the appellant to enable the calling of fresh tenders on the basis of the analog system. The Union of India took a policy decision not to avail the ADB loan. The previous tenders were accordingly cancelled. The appellant invoked legitimate expectation or a substantive nature to urge that that even if the government was runding the project on its own, the policy could not be changed and the original tender notification could not be abandoned. Negativing these arguments, it was held that: "change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on Wednesbury reasonableness (Associated Provincial Pictures Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbwy Coi]J (1948( 1 f(B 223 CA). We have noticed that in 1/industan Dewfopment Corporation case, also it was laid down that the decision maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and co11s relevant to the change in policy. It is, therefore, clear that the choice or the policy is for the decision-maker and not for the Court, Tl1e legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change in policy, which is the cause for c!cf"cating the legitimate expectation is inational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made''.

¶44The above law has been reiterated in a large number oC cases in different contexts. The most recent judgment being .Jashir Singh Chlzabra WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, Page 26 of 3S v. State of Punjab 2010 (2) SCALI:' 754, where the plea of legitimate expectation of being allotted residential plots only on the basis oC past practice of the Punjab Small Industries and Export Cmvoration I ,tel was negatived by the Supreme Comi.

¶45To complete this narration, it must be noticed that the Fnglish courts continue to redraw the contours of the doctrine. Laws Ll in R (on the application of Bhatt Mwphy (a firm) v. Independent Assessor [2008} EWCA Civ 755 pointed out the dinlculties in drawing the line between substantive legitimate expectation and ordinary judicial review or a new policy. He explained that while the latter might require application o I' the traditional WcdnesbW}' standard of review. substantive lcuitimate ::-, expectation would require a more involved consideration. I lc observed: "It seems to me, however, that on the f~tce oCitthe existence ora promise or practice of present and future substantive policy serves as a somewhat hagilc boundary by which to set limits to substantive legitimate expectations. Once set in place, even· policy of a public authority, not subject to a stated terminal date or terminating event, may no doubt be expected to continue in dTeet until rational grounds for its cessation arise. A pmmise of its continuance, if it points to no particular date ot-futm·e event to mark the end of the policy, represents little more than this ordinary expectation. And nothing is added by referring to a practice of the policy in operation ovtT time." (emphasis supplied) J ,aws I J proceeded to observe: "Authority shows that where a substantive expectation is to run the promise or practice which is its genesis is not merely a WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, ,r-- .. re11ection of the ordinary fact (as I have put it) that a policy with no terminal dale or terminating event will continue in eflecl until rational grounds for its cessation arise. Rather it must constitute a specific undertaking, directed at a particulat-individual or group, by which the relevant policy's continuance is assured." (emphasis supplied)

¶46The upshot of the above discussion, particularly in the realm of" policy making, is that the burden is on the Petitioners who claim lcgiti111atc expectation to show that there was a specific representation made that their licences would be renewed for an indefinite period notwithstanding Clause 17 of the earlier policy as this was the standard practice; that there was a legitimate expectation that the change in the policy restricting the maximum period to five years would be only after giving them an oppm1unity or being heard; that the changed policy has 1i-ustratcd the substantive legitimate expectation thus rendering the decision not to renew the licences arbitrary and unreasonable. 4 7. This Com1 finds that the Petitioners have not been able to, in the Cirst place, show that there is any specific representation either to any of them or to all of them generally that their licences would stand automatically renewed year after year by the Respondents. The mere Cact that as a matter of practice the licences were renewed does not cons'titutc the spcci Jlc representation by the Respondents to each or them that indeed their 1 icenccs would be renewed. The renewal, it must be recalled, was only ror a year at a time and was in accordance with the prevailing policy and Clause 17. In other words, the only 'representation' or 'assurance' to each or them was that at the most the licence would be renewed for one rnorc year at the ~~ I discretion of the Respondent. No challenge was laid to Clause 17 oC the SOP date I 0 h August 2001 which left it to the discretion of the Respondents to renew the licence at the end of a year. The reasons f(Jr the change in the policy as explained by the Respondents appear to this Court to constitute sufficient justification for such change. The scope ol.judicJal review of such policy change is indeed limited. Unless it is shown to be not ini(Jrmcd by any reasonable criterion or not being in public interest, the Court cannot and should not interfere. Given the fact that the number of shopping complexes is unlikely to increase, and the waiting list or applicants is a growing one, the concern of the Respondents that those ex-servicemen waiting in the expectation of allotment of a shop should also be accounted for, cannot be said to be an unreasonable one. Both groups of ex-servicemen, i.e, the present allottees and those awaiting allotlllcnt arc fi·om the same 'catchment'. The demand for shops far exceeds the supply There has to be a balancing of these two sets of 'expectations'. If the Respondents take a call and decide to change the policy so that the chances or those in the queue waiting for allotment of shops improves, the Court cannot be expected to judicially review such policy. ;\s explained in Madras City Wine Merchants', no question of legitimate expectation would arise if" there is a change in policy or the position is altered by a rule or legislation.

¶48The Petitioners have not questioned the DSC l{uks 700(J or the Guidelines issued in September 2008. It appears that each or these Petitioners has been a beneficiary of renewal or licence several times O\'Cr. Fach or them has been granted renewal f(Jr more than three years which is the maximum period of licence envisaged under Rule 13 of the J )SC Rules. 64117/08, 61194/08, 6761/08, 7366/09 & 14034/09 It has been made clear in Clause 8 of the September 2008 (iuidelines that the DSC Rules would apply to the shopping complexes covered by 3.41.1 of SO/\ 1983. Consequently, even procedurally, none of the Petitioner can harbour a legitimate expectation of being consulted be fixe a change in the policy.

¶49For the aforementioned reasons, this Court negatives the plea that the impugned changed policy as announced by the SOP dated 13'1t April 2007 fi·ustrates any legitimate expectation, either substantive or procedural, of the Petitioners and is therefore rendered arbitrary or unreasonable. Impugned orders neither discriminatory nor arhitrw)'

¶50The SO/\ 1983, ·the DSC Rules 2006 and the (iuidcl incs date !J ' ' September 2008 leave no manner of doubt that Regimental shops (unit shops) arc distinct and different than shops in shopping complexes and both sets of" shops arc not govemcd by the same conditions. The plea or the Petitioners that there is any discrimination on this scon; docs not rncrit acceptance. The classification of such shops into two distinct categories appears to be based on rational criteria subserving different objects. Regimental shops are essentially Cor providing daily needs or troops. Shopping complexes serve the civilian population as well. The f"actthat the DSC Rules 2006 provide a 40'Yr, quota f(n· civilians in shopping complexes (Rule 12 ), which Rule has not been challenged, is a pointer to the f"act tha! the shops in shopping complexes arc not meant exclusively (()I· ex-servicemen. The 60% quota for the ex-servicemen is indeed a wei f~u-c WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, r. measure and therefore, there cannot be any vested right or being allotted such shops. The fact that civilians have been allotted some of the shops is theref(lre consistent with the above provision in the DSC Rules 2006. The contention of the Petitioners that any shotiage in the shops available l"or allotment to ex-servicemen can be made Llp by asking tbc civilians to vacate the shops allotted to them is therefore misconceived.

¶51This Court is unable to find the decision of the Ecspondents to restrict the licence period in respect of shops in shopping complexes to five years with the oppmiunity of again applying after a break of three years to be either discriminatory or arbitrary. Also, any prejudice that may be caused to the Petitioners in whose cases the licences were renewed prior to tbc chang~.; in the policy has been neutralized by the fact that they have continued in possession for nearly three years thereailer (amounting to 111orc than two renewals) under the interim orders or this Court. J\s regards those Petitioners seeking transfer of the existing licence in their capacity as widows or ex-servicemen, they would be govcmed by Rule 7 ol" the DSC Rules 2006 and in any event, they too have continued to be in the premises far beyond the period of licence under the interim orders or this Court.

¶52Before concluding this portion of the judgment, this Court would like to observe that there are at present at least five documents that govcm the licence granted to the allottee of a shop in a shopping complex. 1-"irst we have the SO/\ 1983, para 3.42.1 of" which describes what a shopping complex is. Then there is the licence deed itself which sets out some or the WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, 6447/08,6494/08,6761/08, 7366/09 & 14034/09 Page31 of 35 ,--- ' ;- •. applicable terms and conditions. Then there are the DSC: Rules 200CJ. There appears to be some inconsistency between the Rules and the conditions of" the licence. Then we have the 'Guidelines' of 4' ' September 2008, Clause 8 of which in fact states that the DSC rules 2006 will apply to shopping complexes covered by para 3.42.1 of the SOA 1983. Lastly, the SOl's which arc issued hom time to time. In fact it is the SOP dated l3 ' J\pril 2007 that has given rise to these set of petitions. For the purposes or grant and renewal of licences there is some inconsistency in these five documents which require to be reconciled by the Respondents. /\!though the Petitioners have themselves not raised any objection on this score, this Court finds that any inconsistency between the DSC rules 2006 and the SOl' is not to the advantage of any of the Petitioners here as each oC them has a!n.:ady overstayed their respective periods of licence by many years. Neve11heless, it is imperative for the Respondents to reconcile these di!Tcrcnt documents and bring out a uniform set of Rules. ]:~•tension of time to vacate tlze shops

¶53The fi.u1her aspect to be considered is of the hardship !~teed by these Petitioners by relatively sudden change of policy. Considering that many of" the Petitioners have been getting their licences renewed Cor the past several years, the announcement made in June 2007 of a policy made cllective 30' April 2007, stating that there would be no renewal beyond fiyc years must have indeed come as an unpleasant surprise. The natme or retail trade is such that most shop keepers have to buy stock on credit and arc under constant pressure as to liquidity. Unless sufficient time is given f(.Jr vacating the shops, it will undoubtedly cause severe prejudice. It is understandable that finding alternative commercial space to run a shop may neither be easy Page 32 of 3!> nor aJTordable in the cases of the Petitioners bef(Jrc the Court. Ilowcver, g_iven the number of years they have enjoyed the benefit, the need to give the others in the queue a similar opportunity would outweigh such hardship. Having said that, with a change in policy having been made arter nearly six years, a time period of thi11y days to vacate the prcn1iscs cannot be said to be a reasonable one.

¶54Under Rule 3(a) of the DSC Rules 200CJ, the existing aliottees were allowed to continue till the expiry or their licence period and such or those in unauthori7ed occupation of the shops, i.e., where the period of licence has expired, would be given six months time to vacate in terms or Rule 3(c) failing which the Estate Officer would initiate action to evict them in accordance with law. The minimum time to vacate the shops in question having been set out in Rule 3(a) itself ought to be six months and thercCore the impugned notices giving the Petitioners' thirty days' tirne f'or the purpose were contrary to the above provision in the DSC Rules 200G. However, as a result of the interim orders the Petitioners have continued well beyond the six months' period.

¶55In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as far as the Petitioners before the Court are concerned, this Court is or the view that a further period of six months must be given to each oCthem to vacate: the: shops under their occupation. This would not include: suci1 oC thosl: Petitioners which have vacated the shops during the pendency oC the present case. WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07,

¶56It is accordingly directed that each of these Petitioners, exccpt those who have already vacated the shops allotted to them, shall be giYcn six months' time to vacate the shops in thcir respective occupation. In other words, thcy should hand over the shops on or bcl"orc 15t ' .January 7.0 11. This would be further subject to each of them filing an afTidavit bcfcJrc this Court underiaking that: (i) thcy will hand ovcr vacant and pcaccf"td possession of the shop(s) in their occupation on or bcf"orc 15 11 ' January 201 J.

(ii) that they will promptly pay the licence fee as and when it l~tlls due, (iii) and further they will not sublet the premises or induct any othcr person or entity into the shop(s) in their occupation. It is madc clcar that this unde1iaking should be filed within ten days ti·om today, i.e., on or bclcJrc 21st .July 2010, failing which it would be open to the Rcspondcnts to fmihwith initiate proeecdings under the l'J> Act Cor cviction oC thc Petitioners. Wherc such proceedings have alrcady been initiated and such o 1· those Petitioners file the above undertaking within the lime granted by thc Court, the PP Act proceedings would remain stayed till 15' 11 January 20 II or upon the Petitioners violating any of the terms of the undertaking. It is needlcss to say that where the Petitioncrs after giving the undcrUtking 1o this CoUli, violate any of the terms of the undertaking, they will bc liablc to be procccded with fmihwith both for contempt of comi and proceedings under the .PP Act.

¶57ll is made clear that the directions issued by the Court granting !imc !o the Pctitioncrs to vacate the shops under their occupation is l1mitcd only 1 o the Pctitioners before thc Collli who have not vacalcd thc prc111iscs and is not to bc Lreatcd as a precedcnt for any othcr allottcc. The allotmcnts rnaclc WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, 611117/08, 6494/08, 6761/08, 7366/09 & 14034/09 or shops in shopping complexes hereafter would strictly be in accordance with the DSC Rules 2006 and the other relevant instruments which have been refened to earlier, as amended from time to time.

¶58For all the above mentioned reasons and subject to the directions issued, the writ petitions arc dismissed. The interim orders stand vacated and the pending applications stand disposed or. .HJLY 12,2010 rk WP (C) Nos. 9478/07, 9525/07, 9546/07, 9568/07, ~~~ S. MURAl JDIJAR, .I Page 3'> of 3'>

("··. \~ IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: May 31, 2010 Decision on: July 12, 2010 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 6761/2008 & CM APPL 13005/08 EX. HONY. SUB MAJRAMPAL & ANR .... Petitioners versus Through: Mr. Rakesh Tikku with Mr. Prakash Gautam, Advocate UNION OF INDIA & ANR .... Respondents Through: Ms. Maneesha Dhir with Ms. Preeti Dalal and Mr. K.P.S. Kohli, Advocate CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR