Nirmal Singh & Anr v. Vijay Bhalla

ORDER o/o 2B.1,L.2OLL L Order impugned is the order dated t2.07.201,1 wherein the application for leave to defend filed by the petitioner in an eviction petition filed under Section 14 (1Xe) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA) had been dismissed. Record shows that the landlord Vrjay Bhalla had filed this eviction petition under Section 14 (1Xe) of the DRCA seeking eviction of the suit property which comprises of a shop on the ground floor of property No. 43, Bhalla Building, G.B. Road, Delhi rented out at a monthly rent of Rs.525/-. Contention of the petitioner is that he is doing the business of generators from a rented premises bearing \o. 47, G.B. Road,...Putli where he is paying rent of Rs.18,000/- per month. This fact is not in dispute and the lease deed substantiatirig this submission is on record. His contention is that his two sons, the elder son is carrying on the Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. i-/" f business of cutting tools while the younger son is doing the business of generators; all three of them are carrying on their business from the aforenoted. rented premises. These rented premises are not sufficient to accommodate their business need. His need for aforenoted accommodation is bonafide, genuine and germane. Eviction petition had accordingly been filed. In the application for leave to defend, it was stated that there are several triable issues which have arisen. The most vehement argument urged before this Court is that the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands; he has sold other shops in this three storeyed building of which he is admittedly the owner to other persons and the last sale had in fact been effected in August , 2008; this eviction petition has been filed only one year later and as such reflects the malafides of the landlord who is actually seeking eviction only for the reason that he is able to sell this shop at an exalted rates. Further contention of the tenant is that the petitioner also has one big shop in the upper mezzanine floor; the petitioner has deliberately nct file<i. the site plan. This is the second contention urged before this Court; no further argument has been raised. These arguments have been retuted. Record has been perused. Record shows that admittedly the landlord is the owner of three storeyed building bearing No. 43, G.B. Road, Delhi. It is also an admitted case that there are bhree shops on the ground floor; of which one shop had been sold by the landlord to the petitioner/tenant in the year, 2002; the second shop is the disputed shop on rent with the petitioner. In the eviction petition this has been detailed; ? {9 f further contention of the landlord being that after the sale. of this shop to the petitioner, the shop in between wall of the other shop has also been broken open to make it into one large shop; further the tenant has dismantled the mezzanine floor which has also created an extra space for him. The third shop on the ground floor of these premises is in possession of anothertenant namely one Paramjit Kaur. It is not in dispute that the landlord is himself carr5ring on his business from 47, G.B. Road, Delhi which is a rented premises; his need for the aforenoted premises which is a shop on the ground floor from where he can carry on the business of generators along with two sons thus is clearly a bonafide need. The second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that in August, 2008, the landlord had sold one shop which in turn has diminished his bonafide neecl and in fact reflects his malafides is certainly an argument not worthy of merit. This eviction petition has been filed in October, 2009 which is more than 13 months of last sale effected of the shop which was on the first floor in favour of one Ashok Kumar Chitlagiya on 12.06.2008 who was an old tenant. It has also come on record. that another shop of the building has been sold to Vinod Chopra who was also admittedly an old tenant; another shop on the first floor had also been sold to Ashok Sehgal who was also an old tenant. AII these shops were admittedly not on the ground floor. Contention of the petitioner before this Court is that to avoid unnecessary litigation, he was in fact pressurized to sell these shops which he has done so, last of which was in June, 2008. This submission of learned counsel for the petitioner has force; it cannot be urged that merely because the landlord has D f effected a sale in June, 2008 of a shop on the first floor where admittedly there was a.n old tenant living and in the circumstances explained hereinabove; t3 months later, the need of the landlord for the shop on the ground floor for running his business of generators which he is admittedly doing along with his two sons is not a bonafide need. This argument has no force. The second contention of the tenant that the landlord has a big shop in the upper mezzanine floor has also not been borne out. Although this has been stated in para 'L' of the application for leave to defend; this has been vehemently denied; the site plan has been filed by the landlord in the trial Court but the learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out that this has deliberately not been filed in this Court. Be that as it may, the landlord in support of his case had filed photographs in the trial Court showing that the upper ground floor is in fact in possession of the petitioner and this has also been specifically averred by him in his eviction petition which finds mention in para L7 to which there is no answer in the application for leave to defend. B Tbe bonafide need of the landlord and he having no other alternate accommodation and carrying on business from a renied accommodation where he is paying Rs.18,000/- per month i.e. 47, G.B. Road, Delhi has clearly been averred in the eviction petition. A wholesome reading of the eviction petition shows that there is no alternate accomrnodation with the landlord and that is why he is seeking eviction of the present shop from where he wishes to run his business of generators along with his two sons. ) t'' In this context, the Apex Court in the case of Prativa Deui (Smtr v. T.V. I(rishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 has held as under:- "The landlord is the be complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the Iandlord how. and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. Now, that is a lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. We fail to appreciate the High Court giuing such a gratuitous aduice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the Landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. The High Court was. in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in adjudging the.bonafides of the claim of the landlord u/sec. 14 (1) (e) of the Act. While considerinq availability of alternative accommodation. the Court has to consider not merel_v whether such accontmodation is available but also whether the landlord has a \eqal riqhi to such accomntodation. The appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 1 G)G) ctf the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances. The Apex Court in the case of Ga_va Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava.

(2001) 2 SCC 604has further held as under:- "We have no doubt that the for decidinq as to the bona fides o4 the reauirement of the landlord is the date of his application for euiction. The antecedent dal,s maJr perhaps have utiliUr for him to reach the said crucial dat:e of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account forjudging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow-process system subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the Iandlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any worh lest, joining any new assignment or starting any nerv work would be at the peril of D t? forfeiting his reguirement to occupy the building. lt is a stark reality that the Ionger is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction ofa tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longeuity of the Iitigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. AII that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, u4just to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through al| the preuious levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. Thejudicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the Lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate terntini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject-matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subseguent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused." 1,L No triable issue has arisen and this has been rightly recorded in the impugned order. Petition is without any merit. t2 Dismissed. NOVEMBER 28,2O1-L A INDERMEET KAU&J b

.t- $-31 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + RC.REV. 47312011 & CM No. 21-4361201'1 NIRMAL SINGH & ANR Through versus VIJAY BHALLA Through ..... Petitioners Mr. Virender Mehta and Mr. Jagjit Singh, Advs. ..... Respondent Mr. Gautam Gupta, Adv. r CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR