Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Anush Finlease & Construction Pvt Ltd

order, grant the consent applied for subject to such conditions and 'for such period as may be specified in the order, or refuse such consent: Provided,that it shall be open to the State Board to cancel such consent before the expiry of the period for which it is granted or refuse further consent after such expiry if the conditions subject to v\i'hich such consent has been granted are not fulfilled: Provided further that before cancelling a consent or refusing a further consent under the first proviso, a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be given to the person concerned.

(5),

(6)

(7) \ • • 31A. Power to give directioRS - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, but subject to the provisions of this Act and to any directions that the Central Government may give in this behalf, a Board may, in the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under this Act, issue any directions in writing to any person, office or authority, and such person', officer or authority shall be bound to comply with such directions. ^ Explanation.- For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that the power to issue directions under this section includes the power to direct-LPA 895/2010 & connected matters JL

(a) the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or process; or

(b) the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water or any other service. ^

¶7With reference to the Water Act as originally framed in the year 1974 and as amended in the year 1988 and with reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act, the learned Single Judge has opined that the legislative amendments carried out in the original Water Act were . intended to expand-the scope of the Water Act. The learned Single Judge has highlighted that the expression 'establish any industry, operation or process or any treatment and disposal system or any extension or addition thereto, which is iilcely to discharge sewage or trade effluent'm clause (a) of Sub-Section

(1) ^ of Section25 made it clearthat the-requirementto obtain previous consent to establish any industry, operation or process was no longer restricted to trade effluent being discharged but would also encompass if 'sewage effluent' was discharged and with rerPerence to the definition of 'sewage effluent' as per Section 2(g), has held that the same would include sewage of any kind, including domestic sewage. The learned Single Judge has also noted the expanded definition of 'trade effluent' as per Section 2(k) of the Water Act. Noting the definition of the words 'operation' and 'process' in para 12 of the decision, and thereafter noting the vJ' decisionsthat purposiveconstructionneeds to be fojlowed where the mischief which existed before passing the [statute was detected and was intended to be remedied, the learned Single Judge has concluded that collective operation or process of LPA 895/2010&connected matters Page Z1 of 315 bathing in the bathroom and such processes as tal<e place m the toilet and cooking and washing in the kitchen would be operations and processes contemplated by Section 25(l)(a) of the lA/aterAct for its applicability to residential complexes. This is the conclusion arrived at in para 16, but in the immediate next para i.e. para 17, the learned Single Judge has lodged a caveat by stating that he was not answering the question with reference to single storeyed constructions.

¶8With reference to the commercial complexes i.e. Commercial Shopping Complexes and Shopping Malls, the learned Single Judge has held that the definition of 'trade effluent' as per Section 2(k) would encompass ail kinds of non-domestic sewage and has thus held that these buildings would be governed by clause (a) of Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 of the Water A\ct,

¶9As regards the very act of constructing a building, in paras 19 and 20, the learned Single Judge has held that the very act of constructing a commercial shopping complex, shopping mall or a residential complex would make applicable clause (a) of Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 and for which the reasoning of the learned Single Judge is that construction of^ commercial shopping or residential complexes is likely to have impact on water pollution because large quantities of water are used during construction and are also discharged.

¶10Since, in all the cases, DPCC rose from the slumber after buildings were completed and put to use, the learned Single Judge opined that DPCC could not levy penalties and for whicri • remedial action, as per the learned Single Judge, was as provided LPA895/2010&connectedmatters Page 22 of33 in Sub-Section 5 of Section 25 of the Water Act.

¶11The argument of DPCC that the power to give directions under Section 33A of the Water Act has been negated by the learned Single Judge, with reference to various decisions cited which hold that the power to levy penalty has to be expressly conferred by the statute.

¶12Pertaining to the Water'Act, the learned Single Judge has summarized the legal position, in para 29 as under:- "29. The discussion so far on the legal position under the Water /Act in relation to the petitioners may be summarized thus:

(i) Section 25 (1) of the Water Act is intended to cover not just 'industry' which discharges 'trade effluent' but any 'process or operation' that results in a discharge of 'sewage' not limited to trade effluent.

(ii) The words 'operation or process' occurring in Section 25(l)(a) have to be given the widest possible meaning and scope. This approach is consistent with the SOR of the 1988 amendments to the Water Act v\/hich make it clear that the legislative intent was to expand the scope of the regulatory powers of the state FCC. The principle of ejusdem generis is therefore inapposite in the context.

(iii) Commercial shopping complexes, shopping malls and even residential complexes are covered by Section 25(l)(a) of the Water Act.

(iv) The liability under the. Water Act does not get exempted only because the sewage LPA 895/2010&connected matters discharged from sucli complexes joins the main municipal sewerage system which may or may not be treated in l<eeping vj'ith i the water pollution norms.

(v) The pollution caused by discharge of domestic sewage , from a residential complex or trade effluent Ijrorn a commercial complex or industry during the construction phase as well as at any stage after the complex becomes functional would attract the various provisions of the Water Act.

(vi) With the buildings in question having already been constructed without obtaining prior consent to establish, the direction of V the DPCC that those who had failed to - obtain prior consent to establish should now apply for such consent is a direction that is ^ not capableof being compliedwith. Instead W the DPCC,should invoke the powers under Section 25(5) of the Water Act, issue show cause notices setting out the conditionalities required to be complied with within a time franrie and upon failure to do so, invoke the powers to issue directions • under Section 33A Water Act.

(vii) The. Water Act is in a separate domain and its provisions will have to be complied with notwithstanding that the MCD has the • power to lay down a separate set of regulations and bye-laws for use of water. ' Where an applicant has not been communicated any decision of the DPCC for four months after the making of an application, the deeming provision of Section 25(7) would kick in and it would be deemed that the consent to establish has been granted. In such circumstances. Section 25(1) of the Water Act cannot LPA 895/2010&connected matters Page24 of38 > obviously tliereafter be enforced."

¶13Discussing tlie applicability of the Air Act, as conceded to by learned counsel for the parties at the hearing of the appeal, the learned Single Judge has inadvertently referred to the pre-amended provisions of the Air Act, thoutlh the learned Single Judge has referred and noted the fact that the Air Act of 1981 was amended in the year 1988.

¶14Pertaining to residential complexes, the learned Single Judge has noted the unamended Section 21 of the Air Act which did not have the word 'establish' and had only the word 'operate' in Sub-Section 1 thereof, and thus the learned Single Judge has held that no permission from DPCC is needed to establish residential complexes, but on the same reasoning as followed in ., p^ras 19 and 20 pertaining to the Water Act, has held that during ^ co:nstruction phase of residential complexes, permission under the Air Act has to be obtained. Qua shopping complexes and shopping malls, it has been held that under the Air Act, for these complexes, to operate them, prior permission has to be obtained as also , during construction phase.

¶15The jearned Single Judge has summarized the position under the Air Act, in para 41 as under:- "41. The position under the Air Act may be summarized:

(i) A collective reading of Section 21(1) of the Air Act with Section 2(a), 2(b) and 2(k) thereof leads this Court to the conclusion that a commercial shopping complex or a shopping .mail would be covered within the scope of Section 21(1) of the Air Act. LPA 895/2010 & connected matters 3>i

(ii) The definitionof 'air pollution'underjSection 2(a) read, with Section 21(1) of the Air /[\ct, and the fact that the commercial shopping complexes or shopping malls are going to be used for a trade activity, is sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 21(1) ofthe Air Act.

(iii)As far as a purely residential complex is. concerned, on the present wording of Section 21(1) of the Air Act, there is no requirement of obtaining the prior consent of the DPCC to operate.

(iv)During the construction phase and after the complex becomes functional, every building, whether it is a commercial shopping complex or a shopping mall or a residential complex, will have to comply with the norms under the Air Act and the Water Act and. for that matter the / EPA.

(v) Where the construction of a commercial shopping complex or shopping mall has been allowed to be completed without a prior consent to operate, the DPCC can .inspect the building, issue a show cause notice requiring time bound compliance with the conditionalities imposed by it under the Air Act failing which it can issue directions under Section 31A Air Act."

¶16A perusal of Section 25 of the Water Act would reveal, on a bare reading thereof, that Without the previous consent ofthe ^ State PollutionBoard, 'no person couldestablishor take any steps to establish any industry, operation or process, which is lil<eiy to discharge sewage or trade effluent. Thus, even if sewage effluent as defined in Section 2(g) was discharged from any LPA 895/2010& connected matters Page26of3i5 3^- industry, operation or process intended to be established, the requirement of prior consent would be necessary and to this extent the view taken by the learned Single Judge is correct.

¶17But, what would encompass 'any industry, operation or processl

¶18The Water Act does not define, 'industry', 'operation' or 'process'. As held in the decisions reported as 1993 (3) 5C 2529 Commissioner of income Tax Orissa 1/5. Ivi/s.N.C.Budiiiraia & Co. and 2010 (320) ITR 420 (Delhi) Ansai Housing & Construction Ltd. vs. Commissioner of income Tax, the ordinary dictionary meaning of 'industry' or an 'industrial •undertakirig' would not include the activity of construction. The word 'operation' is defined, as noted by the learned Single Judge, in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Lesie Brown Ed.) as follows: "operation: An action, deed; exertion of force or influence; working, activity; an act of a practical or technical nature, esp one forming a step in a process."

¶19The same dictionary defines 'process', as noted by the learned Single Judge, as under:- ' "process ; The action or fact of going on or being carried on; a continuous series of actions, events or changes; a systematic series of actions or operations directed at a particular end." 20'. As noted herein above, applying purposive construction, the learned Single Judge has held, in para 15, that the two words 'operation' and 'process' have to be given their widest amplitude and meaning. The purposive construction LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters oF 38

1.3 t applied by the learnedSingleJud'ge is that widestamplitudeneeds to be given to Section 25(l)(a) of the Water Act.

¶21The error committed by the learned Single Judge is to mechanically note the definition of 'cperaf/o/?'and 'process, and ignore the sweep of the span of the two words. VVe do so. Operation is defined as an activity or an act of a practical or technical nature, with emphasis of the acts forming 'a step in a process'. The word 'process'\s a going on action or a continuous series of actions 'directed at a particular end'. Thus, an openation •would be a working or an activity, where the core of the act constituting, the activity, is of a practical or technical nature especially one forming a step in a process, and since process is an cioinq. on action or a continuous series of action directed aL^ particular end, the conjoint reading of an operation and a process or even if the two have to be read disjunctively would mean that the expression 'establish or tal<e any. steps to establish any industry, operation or process, or any treatment and dibposa! system or any extension or addition thereto, winch is lil<^ely to discharge sewage or trade e/77t/e/?f'wouldmean to t^^srtejDS^. establish anv industrv. establishment br undertaking where__yie operation or process i.e. activity is of a practical or .t^^L!!]jlLC^ nature, at the core of which are ongoing acts, in a series, diR^c^. at a particular end. Thus, the act of ablution in the toilet or washing vegetables and dishes, in the kitchen of a residential complex, within the precinctsof residentialflats, by no stretch of imaginationcan be called or labeledas an operationor a piocess.

¶22The view taken by the' learned Single Judge pertaining LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters. Page/.8oF-.8 to shopping malls and commercial shopping complexes on the applicabilityof the Water Act is accordinglyupheld and the view taken pertainingto the applicabilityof the Water Act to residential housing complexes is incorrect.

¶23A building where shops would be made bnd in which shops goods or services would be sold as also shopping mails would be buildings where operation and or process is carried on • - .for the reason they would be places where the activity carried on is of a practical or a technical nature and at the core of which activitywould be ongoing acts, in a series, directed at a particular .end i.e. if goods are purchased and sold, the sale and purchase of, goods; and if service is rendered,the renditionof servicedirected towards a particular end. If from these buildings sewage is discharged, since sewage effluentas defined in Section 2(l<) of thfe Water Act means effluent from any sewage system, if these buildings are intended to be established, necessary permission would be required from the Board under the Water Act.

¶24With respect to the decisions reported as 1993 (3) 5C 2529 Commissioner of Income Tax Orissa vs. M/s.N.C.Budhiraj^ Co. and 2010 (320) ITR 420 (Delhi) Ansa! Housing & Construct^.' Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, where it has been held that constructing a building per-se is not an industrial activity the view taken by the learned Single Judge that constructing a building, whether to be used for a residential purpose or to be used for a commercial shopping complex or for shopping malls would be an industrial activity; running contrary to the aforesaid judgments is incorrect. , LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters

¶25The reasoning of the learned Single Judge to expand the scope of Section 25(l)(a) of the Water Act; that the object of the Water Act was to control water pollution in its widest amplitude and hence the reasoning that, while constructing buildings, water is used and sometimes discharged thus requiring a wider meaning to be given, ignores that the Environment (Protection) Act 1986 deals with this larger issue in the context of 'environment' therein being defined to include water, air 'dnd land and the, inter relationship which exists amongst them and human beings and other living creatures, plants and micro-organisms. The said Act and the Rules framed under the said Act are wide enough to cover exploitation of water.and the impact thereof on environment and we see no vacuum in the fight against environmental degradation, b\y understanding the various expressions and their meaning in Section 25(l)(a) of the Water Act as adopted by us.

¶26A word on purposive construction. It simply rvieans that while adopting a purposive approach, Courts should seek to give effect to the .true purpose of legislation and must keep in view all material that bears on the background against which a legislation was effected and where more than one construction is possible, the one which eliminates the mischief identifie[i should be favoured. But, where only one construction is possible, the Court • is-: not to strain backwards and then bend forward followed by leaning to the left and then to the rightto appropriate a space not intended to be appropriated by the legislation. The Water Act requires prior permission to establish any industry, opeiation oi LPA 895/2010& connected matters 3^ process which is likely to dischargesewage or trade effluent. It is not intended to apply to all and sundry establishments. It is resti'icted to only when a building, housing an industry is sought to be established or a building in which an operation or a process is intended to be carried on where effluent or trade effluent would be discharged.

¶27To summarize the position under the Water Act the position may be summarized thus; 'Section 25(1) of the Water Act would apply where a building is proposed to be constructed to set up an industry or carry on an operation or a process as explained in para 21 above and this would mean that the Water Act would not apply to buildings housing residential apartments/units. It would apply to all other buildings where effluent or trade effluent is discharged, be they where manufacturing activity is carried on, sale or purchase of goods is carried on or services are provided.

¶28Pertaining to the Air Act, there is a material difference in the language used in Section 21 of the said Act, vis-i:^vis the language used in Section 25 of the Water Act. Whereas the Water Act requires a permission to establish any industry, operation or process, the Air Act restricts its span to prior permission being necessary only where it is intended to establish or operate any industrial plant.

¶29Since the learned Single Judge has referred to the ^ unramended provision and has ignored the amendments carried out to the Air Act in the year 1988, we note that as per the amended Section 21, the obligation to obtain the consent of the State Pollution Control Board is only to establish or operate any LPA895/2010&connectedmatters Page31of33 industrial plant in an Air Pollution Control Area. Section 2.(k) defines an 'industrial plant' to mean any plant used tor any. industrial or trade purposes and ennitting any air pollutant.

¶30The learned Single Judge has read the unarnended Section 21 of the Air Act to nnean that prior consent is needed to operate an industrial plant. Since the decision of the. learned SingleJudge has not noted the.language of the amended Section iwhere the words 'establish or' have been inserted|prior to the word 'operate', we need to re-look into the issue.

¶31Highlightingthe definition of the words 'industrial plant' as defined in Section ^(k) of the Air Act, the learned Single Judge has looted that the definition expands the meaning of the words 'induitrialplant'to includea buildingused for atrade purposeand with reference to Section 21 of the Air Act has held that a building whene trade is carried on the prior consent'would be required to operate the building.

¶32Since the learned Single Judge has noted the unarnended Section and since the amended Section requires prior consent even to establish an industrial plant in an Air. Pollution Control Area,, agreeing with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that in view of the extended definition of the expression 'industrial plant', which includes a building where trade . is carried on, the inevitable conclusion has to be that prior consent under the Air Act would be needed where a building is proposed to be constructed wherefrom trade would be carried on and since from a shopping mall and from a commercial shopping complex trade is carried on, we hold that prior consent under the Air /Act LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters• Page 32 of38 would be required when commercial shopping complexes and shopping malls are established i.e. at the commencement ot the process of establishment i.e. before the building construction activity commences.

¶33As noted herein above, the learned Single Judge has held construction per-se as requiring prior.permission, both under the Water Act and the Air Act, and thus the learned Single Judge has held that under the Air Act, consent during construction phase would have to be obtained.

¶34For our reasoning herein above pertaining to the Water Act, the said reasoning of the learned Single Judge pertaining to the Air Act is overruled, but would make no difference to the final c conclusion arrived at by us pertaining to the applicability of the A\ir Act when construction activity commences in respect of shopping malls and commercial shopping complexes for the reason, prior consent-to establish the same is required on the language of Section 21 of the Air Act in view of the expanded definition of the expression 'industrial plant'. But, for residential complexes, we , hold that neither to establish nor to operate, (in fact the concept of 'to operate' is not even applicable to a residential complex), any permission is required under the Air Act. . 35. The learned Single Judge has held that neither the language of Section 33A of the Water Act nor the language of Section 31A of the Air Act contemplates the power on the State • Pollution Boards to levy any penalty:

¶36The learned Single Judge has noted the decisions reported as 1975 (2) SCC 22 Khemka & Co. (Agencies) Pvt. Ltd. vs, LPA 895/20108iconnected matters Page 33 of;'8 3^ \ state of Maharashtra, 1994 (4) 5CC 776 /.K.Synthetics Ltd. & Birja Cement Works i/5. CommercialTaxes Officer1997

(6) SLC 479 India Carbon Ltd. i/s. State of Assam to opine that power to levy penalty has to be conferred by a substantive provision in the enactment.

¶37We concur with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in paras 58 to 64 of the innpugneddecision and thus do not elaborate any further, but would additionally highlight that the power to iss.ue directionsunder Section;33A of the Water /Act and the power to issue directionsunder Section 31A of the Air /Act, on their plain language, does not confer the power to levy any penalty. We would further highlightthat under ChapterVII of the Water Act, and under Chapter VI of the Air Act penalties and procedureto levy the same have been set out. A perusal of the provisionsunder the Water Act would reveal that penaltiescan be levied as per procedure prescribed and only Courts can take cognizanceof offences under the Act and levy penalties, whether by way of imprisonmentor fine. Similar is the position under the Air Act. The legislaturehaving enacted specificprovisionsfor levy of penalties and proceduresto be followed has specificallymade the offences cognizable by Courts and the power to levy penalties under both Acts has been vested in the Courts. The role of the Pollution Control Boards is to initiate proceedings before the Court of Competent Jurisdiction and no more.

¶38We would be failing not to note that on the issue of a delegatee not being empowered (by law) to further sub-delegate the delegated power, learned counsel for DPCC conceded to said LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters Page 34 of ^8 position and thus we leave undisturbed the view taken by the learned Single Judge on the subject. 39_ Since our reasoning aforesaid results in the linding, by way of interpretingthe provisionsin the \A/aterAct and the Aii A\ct, as requiring prior consentto establishand operateshopping malls and commercialshopping complexesand the provisionsbeing not applicable to residential complexes, we declare void actions initiated by DPCC pertaining to .residential complexes and we further hold that said writ petitions are allowed in ternris of the prayers,made. The impugned decision(s) by the learned Single Judge(s) qua residential complexes is set aside, (pua shopping malls and commercial shopping complexes, since we have helc that prior permission is required under both Acts to establisli shopping malls and commercial shopping complexes as also to operatethem and noting that even DPCC was not too sure of the l^gal position and thus misinformed a few applicants that no permissionv\/as requiredand qua most persons permittedthem to commence and complete construction of shopping malls and commercialshoppingcomplexes,the questionwhich now needs tcD be answered is: Whether, pertainingto the Water Act, Sub-Section 5 of Section 25 is the answerto what needs to be done and in the absence of a similarprovision in the Air Act, what action needs to be directed to be taken.

¶40The language of Sub-Section 5 of Section 25 of the Water Act makes it plain clearthat the only solutionto a situation of a building being constructedto establishan industry,operation or process without obtaining prior consent of the State Pollution LPA 895/2010connected matters Control Board is the power of the Board to serve upon the person concerned a notice imposing such conditions as might have been imposed on an application seeking prior consent; and we find that the learned Single Judge has correctly so opined an issued the direction that the only way out, pertaining Act, is to permit DPCC to inspect the shopping malls and the shopping commercial complexes and if it is found that pertaining to discharge of sewage from these buildings any steps are required to prevent water pollution, DPCC would be authorized to issue notices requiring the owner of the building to take steps in terms of the notice issued. Pertaining to the Air Act, notwithstanding there being no similar provision, but the concept of a post decisional hearing may be made applicable with the modification that no hearing would be required inasmuch as there is no decision, but DPCC should, be empowered to inspect the shopping malls and the shopping commercial complexes and pertaining to air pollution, if any deficiencies are found, to notify the same to the owner requiring corrective action to be taken. Needless to state, if the owners of the buildings do not take corrective action, DPCC would always have the power to file criminal complaints before the Courts of Competent Jurisdiction, which Courts would alone have the power to impose fine and additionally impose sentence of imprisonment upon the offending pe.'-sons.

¶41On the issue of Air Pollution, we would like to pen a post-script pertaining to shopping complexes and shopping malls for the reason the only activity of air pollution in these buildings j has rightly to the Water LPA 895/2010 & connected matters Ps je 36 of 38 Ui J would be through the air conditioning plants and generators installed to supply electricityto the buildings in case of powei. cuts, for the reason the trade of sale and purchase of goods in these complexes does not entail any Fictivity which causes aii pollution. We find that pertainingto DG sets, permissionsin any case have to be obtainedfrom DPCC if the capacityof the IDG set is beyond a prescribed wattage and thus DPCC may suitably reconsider all shopping complexes and shopping mails where consent of DPCC has been obtained with respect to Du sets installed as also air-conditioningplants installed in the buildings, for if for the DG sets and air-conditioningplants, sanctions have already been obtained, nothing further remains to be got sanctioned under the Air Act. 42: In a few cases, we find that since DPCC was not permittingthe buildingsto be occupied,under protest,the owners paid,the penalty to DPCC and have immediatelyapproachedthe Court seeking refund and the same has been ordered for the reason neither under the Water Act nor under the Air Act there exists any power in DPCC to levy penalty or impose conditionsof furnishing bank guarantee. The decision,of the learned Single • ' Judge is correctin directingthe,bankguaranteesto te discharged and penaltieslevied to be refundedfor the reason the said act of DPCC is ultra-vires its power under the two statutes and the levy of^penaltyis withoutany authorityof law. In the decisionreported as 1997 (5) SCC 536 MafatlalIndustriesLtd. &Ors. i/5. UO! &Qrs., • under writ jurisdictionrefund can be directed where the levy is without jurisdictionand the same would include a penalty levied LPA 895/2010&connectedmatters without any jurisdiction. In the instant case the penalty levied is unconstitutional being not sanctioned by any power vested ir DPCC either under the Water Act or the Air Act. The impugned decisions where penalty levied has been directed to be re^fundec are upheld.

¶43The appeals filed by DPCC are disnnissed and the cross objectionsfiled are allowed in terms of paras 27, 33, 34 and 39 above.

¶44We leave the parties torbear their own costs. •

¶45All interim orders stand vacated. JUDGE ~-r LPA 895/2010 & connected,matters HH

H > * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % ludament Reserved on : lanuarv 2012 ludament Pronounced on: 23'''' lanuarv. 2012 LPA 866/2011 DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dlnesh Jindal, L.O. versus ANUSH FINLEASE & CONSTRUCTION PVT LTD Respondent Through Mr.Ajay Kunnar and Mr.Naveen Tayal, Advocates CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE f^RATIBHARANI PRADEEP NANDRAIOG. I. For orders see LPA No.895/2010. (PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) JUDGE (J^VW—^— (PRATIBHA RANI) JUDGE JANUARY 23, 2012 dk Iv^ * IM THE HIGH COURT- OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI ' %, ludament Reserved on : 16"' lanuary 2012 ludament Pronounced on: '23'''^lanuarv, 2012 + • LPA 895/2010 - DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through: Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dineshjindal, L.O. versus SPLENDOR LANDBASE LTD Respondent Through: Mr.B.B. Gupta, Ms.Mandeep Kaur and Mr.Harsh Hari Haran, Advocates LPA 1/2011 & CN lS!o.6781/2011 {Cross Obiections) DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE /Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L,0. versus 5ACHDEVA BUILDON PVT LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, Advocate for R-1 i Mr.Neeeraj Chaudhari, CGSC with Mr.Akshay Chandra and Mr.Khalid Arshad, Advocates for UOI LPA 6/2011 & CM IMo.6779/2011 (Cross Obiections) DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. LPA 895/2010& connected matters " PageloF33 w versus VARDHMAN PROPERTIES LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, Advocate for R-1 LPA 7/2Q11 & CiVi .No.6780/2011 (Cross Objections) DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. versus VARDHMAN PROPERTIES LTD & ORS ..... Respondents . Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, Advocate for R-1 LPA 8/2011 El cm Mo.6782/2011 (Cross Objections) DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, 1,0. versus VARDHMAN PROPERTIES LTD & OFIS Respondents Through Mr.Anil Sapra, Sr. Advocate with Ms.Urvi Kothiala, Ms.Praneeta Vir and Mr.Sanjay Goswami, Advocates LPA 9/2011 DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L-.O. versus MANISH BUILDWELL PVT LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, Advocate for R-1 LPA 895/2010 &connected matters DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE ..... Appellant ! , Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dlnesh Jindai, L.O. versus MANISH BUILDWELL PVT LTD & 0R5 Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswanni, A^dvocate for R-1 LPA 11/2011 DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O'. versus VARDHMAN LAND DEVELOPERS PVT LTD&ANR Respondents ^ Through None LPA 22/2011 & CM No.6824/2011 (Cross Objections) DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh ShariTia, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. versus PANKAJ BUILDWELL LTD & ORS Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswanni, Advocate for R-l Mr.Neeeraj Chaudhari, CG5C with Mr.Akshay Chandra and Mr.Khalid Arshad, ^ Advocates for UOI LPA 23/2011 & CM IMo.6832/2011 (Cross OtQiectiionis) DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant LPA 895/2010& connected matters Page 3' of Through Mr.C. Mohan P\SO and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates withHVIr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. versus RAJESK PROJECTS INDIA PVT LTD & 0R5 Respondents Through Mr.Sanjay Goswami, Advocate for R-1 Mr.Neeeraj Chaudhari, CGSC with Mr.Akshay Chandra and Mr.Khaiid Arshad, ' Advocates for UOI LPA 24/2011 & CM Mo.8168/2011 (Cross Qbiections DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE Appellant Through Mr.C. Mohan Rao and Mr.Lokesh Sharma, Advocates with Mr.Dinesh Jindal, L.O. versus BEST REALTORS (INDIA) LTD & ORS Responde