Bhagwan Mahaveer Educational Society & Ors v. Rajesh Jindal & Ors

order it is apparent that a settlement took place in the court itself when ^ the matter was listed before the,learned Single Judge. The settlement appears to have been motivated on the, reason that.in any case elections had become due, to be held in April 2010, and the warring groups were advised by the court to settle the matter. The settlement recorded is that elections would be held within 15 days and, defendants No.2,, 3 and 4 would be treated as members of the plaintiff No-.l society. The settlement also envisages, probably by way of goodwill, that after election would be held, plaintiff No.2 .would, be offered the post of Vice-President and plaintiff No.4 would be treated as .a member of the'governing body of .the plaintiff No.l society. , ' -

11.~ Election -process cohimenced after order" dated

19.5.2010 was passed and in terms thereof the'suit stood decreed as settled. The Election Officer invited nominatipns to be filed and pertaining to the nomination filed by'Rekha FAO(OS)518/2011 & RFA(OS) 111/2011 v.-Page 5 of .22 f' I ' :-v-; : r/ ' Jindal defendant No.3,' whose membership,, was disputed by plaintiffs No.2 to 4, plaintiff No.2 Sushil Kumar Jain filed an objection on 4.6.2010 qua the authenticity of Rekha jindal's signatures on the nomination form. He never questioned right of Rel<ha Jindal to contest the election by alleging that she was not a member of the plaintiff No.l society.

¶12Highlighting that from the aforesaid, it is apparent that plaintiff No.2 was aware that Rekha Jindal could contest, election as a member of plaintiff No.l society and from which it could safely be inferred that the source had tc be th'e ,- consent order dated 19.5.2010, RFA(OS)No.58/2010 was filed challenging the consent order dated

19.5.2010, which had , disposed of suit, on' the ground that .the counsel concerned was never authorized to have the suit decided on a consent; stand taken was that by way of an interim solution counsel had agreed that election may be held to the officer bearers of plaintiff No.l society and for which defendants No.2, 3 and 4 be treated as members of the plaintiff No.l society. Stand taken was that in spite of consent being by way of an interim arrangement, the suit itself was decreed.

¶13The said appeal'was' withdrawn with liberty to seek review of the consent orcjer dated

19.5.2010 and as a consequence thereof, RA.No.9418/20ld was filed.

¶14Not disputing that counsel for the plaintiffs had given . consent for elections to be held, with defendants ,No..2 to 4 being treated as members of the plaintiff No.l society, it was pleaded, in the review application that when order was dictated, learned counsel remained under an impression that FAO(OS)518/2011 & RFA(OS) 111/2011 ' Page-6 of.22 X'!.i.aSir V ^ n the .court was recording a proposal pertaining to an interim arrangement and when language of the order showed the suit to be disposed of, counsel protested but the protest was ignored. In para 5 it was pleaded:- t "That it was also informed that during aforesaid process of recording broad proposals in.the order, as soon as the Ld. Counsel for plaintiffs realized that, -this Hdn'ble Court had proceeded to. dispose off the entire suit proceedings, he objected to the sqme but his objections were not taken note off by this Hon'ble Court and he was advised . to take appropriate legal remedies as may be available under the law as the other (sic) had already been dictated."

15.- The Review Application was filed under the signature of, Shri Neeraj Grover Advocate, inasmuch as plaintiffs withdrew the vakalatnama in favour of Shri Shiv Charan Garg Advocate, who had appeared on 19.5.2010. .It may be noted that plaintiff No.3, Sh.Subhash Chand Jain did not seek review and as a co-plaintiffabides by the consent order, meahihg thereby plaintiff No.3 stands by the correctness of what was recorded . in the order dated 19.5.2010.

¶16It is asserted in the Review Application that Order XXlll Rule 3 CPC envisages a suit to be disposed of on a written agreement, under the signatures of the parties, and since no such written agreement under the signatures of the plaintiffs was filed, order dated ,19.5.2010 was contrary to law. It was jiighlighted that consent given by the counsel was for an interim arrangement and not for the suit to be disposed of. It was pleaded, as noted hereinabove in para 5 of the FAO(OS)518/2011 &RFA(OS)111/2011 , Page'7 of 22 I '• ii, 'h. <1 > application,that the, learned Single Judge forced down the throat of the plaintiffs,a compromisewhich was not agreed to. •

¶17It was also pleaded that the plaintiffs had .never given any'authorityto their counseland in fact, had not consented to any compromise, which we presume would mean that according to the plaintiffsthey never consented^even to ah ' interim arrangement being worked out.

¶18Dismissing RA.No.9418/2010,the learned Single Judge has held that the vakalatnamaexecuted by plaintiffsNo.2'to. 4 in favour of Shri Shiv Charan Garg Advocateauthorizedhim to act and plead and thus the counsel was fully competentto enter into a compromiseon behalfof the plaintiffs.

¶19Learned SingleJudge has noted various decisionswhich relateto the authorityof a counsel to enter into a settlement on behalf of his client. . • , . 2,0. We need not note the said authorities,inasmuchas Shri T.K.Ganju, learned Senior Counsel, who appeared for the appellantsconceded to the said position i.e. that given the languageof a vakalatnamaexecuted by a client in favour of the counsel,the counselconcernedmay have the authorityto bind his clients by way of a settlement, but sought to urge that the settlement had to be in writing and signed by or on behalf of the parties.

¶21Thus, we highlightthat the issue debated at the hearing of the two appeals was: Whether law mandates-that every compromisebetweenthe partiesto a suit has to be.in writing and signed by or on behalfof the litigatingparties? FAO(OS)518/2011&RFA(OS) 111/2011 -l' - V' i:. -1

¶22Before answering the aforesaid' question, we need to highlight that all the plaintiffs have not sought review, Plaintiff No.3' Shri Subhash ' Chand Jain abides by settlement arrived at. It is only Sushil Kumar Ja.'in' and Jogi Ram Jain who challenge the compromise recorded as per order dated l9.5.2010. • . -

¶23That . both of them claim ho , knowledge of cohipromise as they had never instructed the counsel to so, compromise needs an explanation from Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, who on 4.6.2010 i.e. after 15 days of the order dated

19.5.2010, With reference to the nomination filed by Rekha Jindal had questioned the genuineness of her signatures on the nomination papers. He never took the stand'that Rekha Jindal could not contestthe election'asshe was not a member of plaintiffNo.1 society. That plaintiffNo.4 Shri Jogi" Ram Jain was present in court on 19.5.2010 is^evidenced by. the fact that a gate pass stahds.issued in his name by the Registry of this Court to enable him to enter the precincts of the Delhi High Court.

¶24Indeed, learned counsel for the appellants/conceded that Shri Jogi Ram jain had entered the court premises on

19.5.2010, but claims he having left due tb^ urgent work by the time the suit reached for hearing. 25,. A plausible explanation does exist vis-a-vis Jogi Ram Jain to disclaim knowledge of-any settlement, •but as regards Sushil Kumar Jain, in the teeth of his having filed an objection on 4.6.2010 to the nomination by Smt. Rekha Jindai, we find no explanation given, by him as to why did he not question the •FAO(OS)518/2011 & RFA(OS)'111/2011 •' • '• , f • V r-v/ election process being initiated. in which Rekh,a.:.Jindal was permitted to. contest the election, if he knew nothing of the order dated 19.5.2010. .

¶26Before, dealing , with the legal issue raised, as afore-noted, i.e. whether every compronnise pertaining to a suit needs to ,be in writing and under' the signatures, of the litigating parties, or a person authorized on their behalf, we need to note an undisputed fact. • 27. Plaintiff No;l society had needed money to purchase land. It was in touch with a public sector bank for loan to be advanced. The loan was advanced and at'that stage, second defendant, along, with defendant No.l stood guarantee. Defendant No.3 Rekha Jindal, is the wife of defendant No.l, and thus there are traces of said two persons being inducted' as members of plaintiff No.l society, inasmuch as guarantors, they had a stake to ensure correct utilization of the funds by plaintiff No.l. ...

¶28But, this is just an ancillary fact noted by us to highlight the' backdrop in which dispute pertaining to membership of defendants No.2 to 4.needs to be considered..

¶29It is obvious that when the suit was listed, the.aforesaid., facts were noted by. the learned Single Judge, and probably . there was an expression of anguish by the,court that a cause unworthy of consuming precious judicial time w,as being . unnecessarily litigated for 3 years. Probably, sanity dawned , upon the parties when order dated

19.5.2010, recording compromise was passed. FA0(0&)518/2011 & RFA(OS) ill/2011 T V' f •• • I -i't- , • '•'••'•in V- '-i /; v; VM ' , •• Ev:-?- V /^/

30., We now deal with issue, which - ;arise for . consideration and as noted hereinabove in para 21.

¶31We need not, bother ourselves with various judgments cited by learned counsel for the appellants; being. AIR 1993 SC 1139 Banwari La! Vs. Smt.Chando Devi (through LR.) & Ann, 1997 RLR 199 (DB) Kamla Pevi Vs. Prabhat Chand. AIR 2002 DELHI 223 S.P.Minocha 1/5. Liia /?^/77. 105 (2003) DLT '806'Archies Greetings &GiftsLtd. Vs. Gara Plastic an6 (2005) 4 see 117 K. Venl<atachaia Bhat & Ann Vs. Krishna Navak (D) by LRs. & Ors. in view of the fact, we have before us ah authoritative pronouncement on the issue, by the Supreme Court. It-is the decision reported as 2006 (5) SCC 566 Pushpa •Devi Bhagat Vs. RaienderSingh & Ors.

¶32In Pushpa Devis case (supra) landlords were in litigation With a tenant, which was a partnership firm, partners whereof were also, impleaded as co-defendants. Claiming to have terminated the • tenancy on .31.3.1989, plaintiffs/landlords sought ejectment of the defendants'from ' the .tenanted premises, and also clairried meshe profits^ ' When evidence was being recorded, counsel for the parties made statements to the effect that a compromise had been arrived at between the parties and as per the.compromise the defendants would vacate the subject premises latest b,y

22.1.2002 and tjll then would pay damages @ ^4,800/- per month. Statements of counsei for.the parties were thereafter recorded. Counsel signed the' same. Suit was decreed in terms of the connpromise which required a decree to be passed that the defendants would vacate the suit prernisesby FAO(OS)518/2011 &RFA(OS) 111/2011 'y0'. ./ ., 1.1,"LI,^<,', u,;.,, /j

22.1.2002 and till, then, would pay. damages for use and , occupation '@^4,800/- per nnorith. ' . It was realized that counsel for the defendants, Shri Dinesh, Garg, had not filed a vakalatnama on behalf .of defendants' No.3 and ,4. An application • was thereafter filed and along therewith , a vakalatnama was filed by Shri Dinesh Garg as per which defendants No.3 and 4 had also authorized him tp.appear on their behalf. Noting that the counsel, stood by the settlement between the parties, taking note of the fact that now Shri Dinesh' Garg Advocate had the^ necessary authority, fresh decree in the same terms came to be passed, as was passed in terms of the earlier order. On. 21.8.2001, defendant N0i2 filed an application stating that she had never instructed Shri Dinesh Garg Advocate to enter into any compromise and she . further pleaded that there was ho written .compromise between |;he parties duly signed by them and therefore there was no lawful compromise. Notice of the application being issued to the parties as also to Shri Dinesh Garg Advocate, learned Trial Judge .noted that Shri Dinesh Garg Advocate had been representing defendant No.2 for about 12 years and, he . made a statement in Court on 7.12.2001 that all throughout he had been receiving instructions on behalf of. the defendants either from Ms.Sadhna Rai, daughter of defendant: No.2 or her son-in-law, Vinay Rai or Dr.M.C.Gupta the Group Head of law department of companies :of defendants. '

¶33Holding that the counsel could lawfully compromise - dispute between the parties and belrevihg the counsel that he FAO(OS)518/20n & RFA(OS) 111/2011 Vv was diily authorized on being instructed by Dr.M.C.Guptato enter into a settlement, the application filed by defendant No.2 to recall consent decree was dismissed by the learned Trial Judge.

¶34The Appellate Court set aside.the decision, holdingthat there being no written agreement duly signed by the parties, the compromise decree on the basis of the statement mads by counsel for the defendants could not bind defendant No.2. The consent decree was set aside in appeal. ,

¶35Further, challenge by way of appeal to this Court resulted in the appellate decision being set aside and consent decree being restored.

¶36Matter ultimately reached the lap,of the Supreme Court, and we have before us the decision reported as 2006 (5) SCC 566 Pushoa DeviBhaaat Vs.'Raiender Sinah & Ors.

¶37The Supreme Court noted Rule 3 of Order'XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as under:- "3. Compromise of suit. - Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful " agreement or compromise Jn writing and signed by .the parties, or. where the defendant , satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or. any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such' agreennent, compromise or satisfaction to be. recorded, •. and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit."

¶38The Supreme Court noted the proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXIll, as per which the court concerned, where settlement or FAO(OS)518/2011&RFA(OS)111/2011 . Page 13of22 I -:;- ;v •• ^ !y.y.' ./ Ji adjustment had been arrived at as the one which had to decide all issues relatable thereto. In para 18 of the decision, the Supreme Court noted that Rule 3 of Order XXIII is clearly in two parts. The first part provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall pass .a decree in accordance therewith. The second part provides that where a defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall order such satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith.

¶39The Supreme Court thereafter noted that the huie makes it clear that the compromise or agreement may relate to issues or disputes which are not the subject matter of the suit and that such compromise or.agreement may be entered,not only amongst the parties to the s.uit, but also others.'

¶40The Court then., posed a question; "What is difference between first and the second, part of Ruie 37'

¶41Answering the question in para 19, the Supreme Court held:-"xxxxx The first part refers to situations where an agreement or compromise is entered into in writing and signed by the parties. The said agreement or compromise is placed before the court. When the court is satisfied that the suit has been adjusted either wholly or in part by such agreernent or compromise in writing and signed by the parties and that it is lawful, a decree follows in terms of what is agreed FA0(OS)518/2011& RFA{0S) 111/2011 .'-t i. " t •' v'l-• . . •.i ' ^ : h : i < between parties. The agreement/compromisespells out the agreed terms by which the claim, is admitted, or adjusted by mutual concessions or promis'^s,. so that the parties thereto can be held to their promise(s) in future and perforrtiance can be enforced by the execution of the decree to be passed in terms of it. On the other hand, the second . part refers to cases where defendant has satisfied the plaintiff about the claim. This may be by satisfying the plaintiff that his claim cannot be or, need not be met or performed. It can also be by discharging or performingthe required obligation. Wherethe defendant so "satisfies" the plaintiff in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, nothing further remains to be done or enforced and there is no question of any "enforcement" or •"execution" of' the decree to be passed, in terms of it. -Let us illustrate with reference to •a money suit filed for recovery of say a sum of rupees one lakh. Parties may enter into a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by them, agreeing that defendant will pay the sum of rupees one lakh within a specified period or specified manner or may agree that only a sum of ?75,000 shall be paid by the defendant ,in full and final settlement W the claim. Such agreement or compromise will fall under the first part and, if the defendant does not fulfil the promise, plaintiff (tan enforce it by levying execution. On the other, hand, the parties may submit to the court that the defendant has already paid a sum of rupees one lakh or ^75,000 in full and final satisfaction or that suit, claim has been fully settled,, by the defendant out' of court (either by mentioning the amount paid or not mentioning it) or that the plaintiff will not press the claim. Here the obligation is already performed by the defendant or .the • plaintiff agrees that he will not enforce FAO(OS)518/2011 & RFA(OS) 111/2011 a r . • • -r V • rv. • : 'i n v . performance and nothing, remains to ' be performed by the defendant. As the order that follows merely records the. extinguishment or satisfaction of the claim or non-existence of the claim, it is hot capable of being "enforced" by levy of execution, as there is no obligation to be performed by defendant in pursuance of the decree. Such "satisfaction" need not be expressed by an agreement or compromise in^ writing and, signed by parties. It can be by a unilateral submission by , the plaintiff or his counsel. Such satisfaction will fall under,the second part. Of course even when'there is such satisfaction of the claim or subject-rpatter of the suit by the defendant and ^matter falls under second part, nothing prevents the parties from reducing such satisfaction of . claim/subject-matter, into writing and signing the same. The difference between the two parts is this: where tl^e matter falls under the second part, what is reported is a completed action or settlement out of court putting .an end to the dispute, and the resultant decree recording the satisfaction, is not capable ,of being enforced by levying execution. Where, the matter falls under the first part, there is a promise or promises agreed to be performed or executed, and that can be enforced by levying execution. While agreements or compromises falling: under the first part can only be . by an instrument or other form of . writing signed by the parties'; there is no sUch requirement in regard to settlements or satisfaction falling under second part.. Where the matter falls under the second part, it. is sufficient if the plaintiff or the plaintiffs', counsel appears before the court and informs the court that the subject-matter of the suit has already been settled or satisfied." W FAO(OS)518/20il &RFA(OS) 111/2011 , .• ; ) -r . P{ . ' I*-, , / #K' • ;iK 0^ ' 42, . From a perusal of the observations made, by the Supreme Court in para 19 of the decision, which observations we have quoted hereinabove, it is apparent that the Supreme Court underlined the. distinction in a matter being settled-requiring a decree to be drawn, which decreei required to be executed and a settlement where the cause stood satisfied and decree passed recorded the satisfaction, requiring no enforcement thereof. -

¶43The Supreme Court held that the first part of Rule 3 of Order XXIII referred to a situation whe're court was satisfied that the suit, has been adjusted either wholly or in part by an agreement or a compromise,in writing an'd that.the agreement spells out the. adjustment by. way of mutual consensus or promise to which the parties would be bound in future for performance thereof i.e. enforcement by the execution of the decree to be passed in terms. ,44. It was' only such settlements which were opined to be requiring the mandate of being in writing and signed by the parties or signed on behalf of parties by a duly ..authorized person.

¶45The second part of Rule 3 of Order XXIII referred to by the Supreme Court, pertained to cases where'the defendant satisfied the plaintiff about,the claim or satisfied the plaintiff that his claim cannot be or need not be made or performed. It-could also be met by the defendant discharging or .performing the required obligation. These situations clearly would result, upon satisfaction being shown, that nothing .remained to be done or enforced and thus there was no scope FAO(OS)518/2011 & RFA(OS) 111/2011 ^ 'Trr-^TTT^Tntj:' 'I • • ^r: • I-i for an executable decree being, passed. The Supreme Court clearly,held that such kind ofsettlement or satisfaction\need not be expressed by an agreement or compromisein writing and signed by the parties.'

¶46The Supreme Court noted that such kinds of agreements,^ and settlements could be by a unilateral submission by the plaintiffor his counsel or by the defendant and his counsel.

¶47The Supreme Court highiightedthe difference between the two parts and .we once again highlight the-expiressioh used. In the concluding part of para 19 the Supreme Court observed as under:- .. "xxxxxxxxx where the matter falls under the second part, • what is reported is a completed action or settlement out of court putting an end to the dispute, and the resultant decree recording satisfaction, is not capable of being enforced by levying execution. Where the • matter falls under the first part, there is a promise or promises agreed to be performed or executed, and that can be enforced,,by levying execution. While agreements or compromises falling under the first part can only be by an instrument or' other form of writing signed by the parties, there is no such • requirement in regard to settlenrients or satisfaction falling under second p.art. Where the matter falls under the second part, . it is sufficient if the plaintiff or the plaintiffs cbunsel appears before the court and informs the court that-the subiect-matter of the suit ^ has already been settled or satisfied." • (Underlined emphasized) • • • . . . • ^

¶48We need not note the remainder judgment, inasnfiuchas the,Supreme Court considered the decree passed therein and •fAO(OS) 518/2011& RFA(OS) 111/2011 • • '' it!, ' '•H' •ii't I' i:. (.•, A ,SK, T-rr-'—: the effect,of the statement made ,by'counsel for the parties i.e. the statement recorded by the Court, which was signed by counsel for the parties, the Supreme Court held that since the counsel concerned had the requisite authority inasmuch as the counsel were authorized to act and' plead oh behalf of parties, statemient recorded in Court would be a written document and • since same evidenced a compromise in writing, there was. compliance with the first part of Rule 3 of Order XXIII. •

¶49The compromise decree which we have before us is a non-executable decree. It recognizes that plaintiffs admit valid membership of defendants No.2 to 4. It recognizes that in'the ensuing elections, said persons could participate, as members of plaintiff Nq.l. The decree is declaratory in nature.

¶50We need to note that the Review Application .filed was placed before the same Judge who had recorded the order dated 19.5.2010, but the learned Judge had to recuse from the matter in view of the fact that personal allegations were made against the learned Judge, by pleading in para 5 of the Review Application, that the judge forced the compromise down the throat of the parties.

51.. Why should a Judge do so? Why would a Judge do so? There was no answer froni learned Senior Counsel for the appellants-.

52., We regretfully note a. tendency which,is emerging in. current .litigations. Motives .are being ihiputed in, the pleadingsto Judges. The,practiceand the tendency has to be FAO(OS)518/2011 & RFA(OS) 111/2011 ,——— ; •• : V .• ''v':':| ' 11 •' ' >' 'si, - . Vfy:. • : j:'' ^ V : - ''"y" j., > • ; . / depreciated for the reason, if encouraged, it would; shake the very foundation of the justice admimstration system. Judges have no personal stake in a litigation. Judges have a stake i.h integrity of the institution which they serve, judges realize that it is their duty to adjudicate disputes brought before them'. Judges realize that the adjudications have to be' as per procedures established; by law. But, With,.docket explosion in courts, it is not uncommon that when a matter is I' • . j brought before a court, after th,e legal issues which arise for \ consideration are looked into, suggestions emanate in court, which are helpful in resolving a dispute. Parties rightly grab such opportune moments. It would be most unfortunate, if when things go wrong in the future, motives are alleged, to the judge concerned, while challenging settlements which have taken, place in court. ^ ,

¶53In the instant case, we would highlight, that'an election . held in the year 2007 was the subject matter of dispjute. Even .the election on which plaintiffs were relying was-held in the year 2007. It was.not, in dispute that fresh elections had become due in April 2010. Membership of 3 persons i.e/ defendants No;2 to 4 was questioned by plaintiffs No.2 to 4. That defendant' No.2 had stood a personal guarantee, for a loan taken by plaintiff No.l society and that husband ;of defendant No.3 had likewise stood personal guarantee for the loan in question, was a fact, staring the parties as also the learned Judge in the face. That said defendants,, having a stake to ensure proper utilization of the loan taken'by plaintiff . No.l, was also a fact staring the parties as also the learned FAO(OS)5i8/2011 &RFA(OS)111/2011 I • .. • l-- Page 20 of'22 . ii'V;; •r V •' I V: ' i. I-mmsii: Judge in the f^ce. It was natural for a suggestion.to ennanate that curtains could be brought down by letting defendants No.2 to 4 be treated as lawful members of plaintiff No.l, so that the ensuing elections could be smoothly h^ld. That counsel , for plaintiffs accepting such a settlement proposal, be it emanating from the court or the defendants, is evidenced by the fact that the order came to be. passed in court and we do not have any affidavit filed by the counsel concerned that whereas he gave concession for a limited settlement i.e. a settlement by' way of an interim arrangement, the learned Judge forced down the settlement as'if the Iis as a whole was settled. The gate, pass issued in the name of plaintiff No.4 is-evidence of .his presence in the court. That plaintiff No.3 has chosen to abide by the settlement is also proof of the settlement having been arrived . •at. That plaintiff No.2 did not protest or question the right of Rekha Jindal, defendant No.3, to file the nomination, paper and his questioning the validity of the nomination paper filed by her, is proof of the knowledge of plaintiff No.2 that order dated 19.5.2010, pursuant to a compromise, was passed.

¶54It is apparent that the expectations of the plaintiffs at the. ensuing elections were belied at the democratic process which was followed and led them to try and turn the clock back.

¶55We have independently reflected on the facts and the reasoning of the learned Single Judge as per order dated

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Date of Decision : October 31. 2011 + RFA(OS) 111/2011 BHAGWAN MAHAVEER EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY & ORS. Appellants Through: Mr.T.K.Tanju, Sr.Advocate with Mr.Neeraj Grover and Mr.Sayad Aqui Ali, Advocates versus W RAJESHJINDAL &ORS. ....Respondents Through: Nenno CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG 1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to Reporter or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? PRADEEP NANDRAIOG. I. . > For orders, see FAO (OS) 518/2011. (PRADEEP NANDKAJOG) JUDGE October 31, 2011 rk .P.GARG) JUDGE Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. V. 'J V * IN TME M^H COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % ' Date of Decision : October 31, 2011 + FA0(05) 518/2011 ^HAGWAN MAHAVEER EDUCATIONAL, • . SOCIETY^ ORS. • Appellants Through: Mr.T.KTanju, SrAdvocate-with Mr.Neeraj Groyer and Mr.Sayad Aqui All, Advocates versus RAJ.ESHJINDAL&'ORS. Through: Nemo RFA(OS) 111/2011 ....Respondents BHAGWAN MAHAVEER EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY &ORS. .....Appellants Through: |vir.T.K.Tanju, Sr.Advocate with MriNeeraj Grover and Mr.Sayad Aqui All, Advocates versus RAJESH J.INDAL & ORS. ; Through: Nemo ....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG 1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to Reporter or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? PRADEEP NANDRAIOG. I. FAO(OS)518/2011 & RFA(OS) 111/2011 ' •. ; Page i of 22 •J, .•1 r- ..1. r { . /- 1. FAO(OS)No.518/2011lays a challengeto the orderdated . 3.2.2011 dismissing . RA.No.9418/2010 as also, two accompanying Civil , .Miscellaneous Applications being lA.No.9419/2010 and lA.No.9.420/2010. '• ,2. RFA(OS)No.111/2011 challenges: the. order dateiEl 19.5.2010 disposing of the suit by recording a compromise between the parties. 3. • Both appealsare being.decided.bya commonjudgment inasmuch as, a common .question of law on the same fact?, between the same parties, arise,for consideration in both .appeals.' . 4. Vide RA.No.9418/2010it was prayed before the learned Single Judge that order dated 19.5.2010 i.e. the order challengedin RFA(OS)No.111/2.011be reviewedand recalled. 5. Sushil KumarJain, SubhashChandJain and Jog! Ram Jain joined as plaintiffsNo.2, 3 and 4 respectively,and under the banner of Bhagwan Mahavir Educational Society (Regd.) w.hich was plaintiffNo.l, filed a suit,seeking declarationthat membership of defendants No.2) 3 and. 4 i.e..Kanak Mb\ Saklecha,Rekha Jindal and MahenderPal jajn respectivelybe'.- declarednull and void. Adeclarationwas soughtthat election! held on 2.4.2007 be declared null and void and the election held on 30.3.2007be declaredas genuineand legal. Further prayer made Was to restrain said defendants as'also other • defendantsfrom interfering in the administrationof plaintiff No.l by the office bearers elected, on 303.200,7 and to ' restrainthe defendantsfrom preventingplaintiffsNo.2 to 4 to enterthe officepremises of plaintiffNo.l. ' FAO(OS)518/2011&RFA(OS)111/2011 i.,.. 6. As CS(OS)No.2366/2007, filed by the: plaintiffs> , proceeded and as tinne lapsed, fresh elections became due when the suit was listed before the learned Single Judge on • 19.5.2010 inasmuch as the terhn of the existing, governing . body, be it ps per the elections held on 30.3.2007 or 2.4.2007 would end Ipy Aprir2010. . , 7. Application seeking interirh injunction, pending disposal of the suit, was listed before learned jingle Judge. Pleadings had been completecl. Probably, stage of framing jssues had reached. It was thus the date of the first hearing, of the suit as conventionally understood. 8.. The plaintiffs were represented by Mr.Shiv Charan Garg Advocate and the defendants were represented by Mr.Ravi , Gupta Senior Advocate with Mr.Laliet KU