- Court
- High Court of Delhi
- Decided
- 7 August 2015
- Bench
- Sunil Gaur
- Case no.
- CRL.M.C. 5926/2014
Judgment
JUDGMENT %
(ORAL) Quashing of FIR No.214/2013 under Sections 448/380/451/506 IPC registered at Police Station Ashok Vihar, Delhi is sought on the basis of CompromiseDeed of l?"" November,2014 (AnnexureB) and on the ground that the misunderstanding, which led to registration of the FIR, now stands cleared between the parties. Mr. Vinod Diwakar, Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State submits that respondent No.2, present in the Court, has been identified to be the complainant/first-informant of the FIR in question by his counsel as well as by Inspector Sanjeev Arora on the basis of identity proof produced by him. Page 1 Learnedcounsel for petitionersubmitsthat out of the total settled amountofT2 lac, an amountof?1.7 lac is beingpaid today and balance amountof?30,000/-shall be paid to respondentNo.2 when he withdraws his complaintunderSection138 ofNegotiableInstrumentsAct, 1881. Respondent No.2, present in the Court, submits that the misunderstanding,which led to registrationof the FIR in question,now stands cleared between the parties in terms of aforesaid Compromise Deedand that he has received^1.70 lac by way ofdemanddraftbearing No. 599116 drawn on Indus Ind Bank out of the total settledamount of ?2 lac. RespondentNo.2 submits that he shall withdraw the complaint filed under NegotiableInstrumentsAct. RespondentNo.2 affirms the contentsofaforesaidCompromiseDeedond ofhis affidavitof7^^ August, 2015 supporting this petition and submits that now no dispute with petitionersurvives and so, the proceedingsarising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end. In 'Gian Singh Vs. State ofPunjab' (2012) 10 SCC 303 Apex Courthas recognizedthe need ofamicableresolutionofdisputesin cases likethe instantone, by observingas under;-"61.In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuationof criminalproceedings would tantamount to abuse ofprocess oflaw despite settlementand compromise betweenthe victim andthe wrongdoerandwhetherto secure the ends ofjustice, it is appropriatethat criminalcase is put to an endand ifthe answerto the above question(s)is in the affirmative,the High Courtshallbe wellwithinitsjurisdiction toquashthe criminalproceedings." The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a recentjudgmentin NarinderSingh v. StateofPunjab(2014)6SCC 466. The pertinentobservationsofthe Apex Court in NarinderSingh (Supra) are as under;-
¶29In view oj the aforesaiddiscussion,we sum up and lay down thefollowingprinciplesby which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlementbet^veenthepartiesandexercisingitspowerunder Section 482 of the Code M'hile acceptingthe settlementand quashingthe proceedingsor refusingto acceptthe settlement ^ withdirectionto continuewith the criminalproceedings:
29.1 PowerconferredunderSection482 ofthe Code is to be distinguishedfrom the power which lies in the Court to compoundthe offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherentpower to quash the criminalproceedingseven in those cases which are not compoundable,where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this poweris to be exercisedsparinglyandwith caution.
29.2 When the parties have reached the settlementand on that basis petitionfor quashingthe criminalproceedingsis filed theguidingfactorin suchcaseswouldbe to secure:
(i) ends ofJustice, or ^
(ii) to preventabuseoftheprocessofany court. While exercisingthe power the High Court is to form an opinionon eitherofthe aforesaidt^vo objectives.
¶293Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutionswhich involve heinous and serious offences of mentaldepravityor offenceslike murder, rape, dacoity etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impacton society>. Similarlyfor the offencesallegedto have been committedunder specialstatute like the Preventionof Pages CorruptionAct or the offencescommittedby publicservants while workingin that capacityare not to be quashedmerely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularlythose arisingout ofcommercialtransactionsor arising out of matrimonialrelationshipor family disputes shouldbe quashedwhen thepartieshave resolvedtheirentire disputesamongthemselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examineas to M^hetherthe possibilityofconvictionis remote and bleak and continuationofcriminalcases wouldput the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injusticewouldbe causedto him by not quashingthe criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the categoryofheinousandseriousoffencesandthereforeare to be generally treated as crime against the society and not againstthe individualalone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section307IPC in the FIR or the chargeisframedunderthis provision.It wouldbe open to the High Court to examineas to whetherincorporationofSection307 IPC is thereforthe sake ofit or theprosecutionhas collectedsufficientevidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section^307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature ofinjurysustained, whether such injury^is inflictedon the vital/delegatepartsofthe body nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuriessufferedby the victim can generallybe the guiding factor. On the basis of this primafacie analysis, the High Courtcan examineas to whetherthere is astrongpossibility Page 4 of convictionor the chances of convictionare remote and bleat /" theformercase it can refuseto acceptthe settlement andquashthe criminalproceedingswhereasin the lattercase It wouldbe permissiblefor the High Courtto accepttheplea compounding the offence based on complete settlement bet^veen the parties At this stage, the Court can also be swayedby the fact that the settlementbetyveenthe partiesis goingto resultin harmonybetweenthem whichmay improve theirfliturerelationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section482 ofthe Code or not, timingsofsettlementplaya crucialrole. Those cases where the settlementis arrivedat immediatelyafter the allegedcommissionofoffence and the matter is still under investigation,the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation.It is becauseofthe reason that at this stage the investigationis still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercisingits powersfavourably but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentionedabove. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusionof the evidencethe matteris at the stageofargument,normallythe High Court shouldrefrainfrom exercisingits power under Section482 ofthe Code, as in suchcasesthe trialcourtwould be in apositionto decide the casefinally on merits and to come to a conclusionas to whetherthe offenceunderSection 307 IPC is committedor not. Similarlyin those cases where the convictionis alreadyrecordedby the trialcourtand the matter is at the appellatestage before the High Court, mere compromise bet\veen the parties would not be a ground to Pages acceptthe same resultingin acquittalofthe offenderwho has ah-eady been convictedby the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no questionofspattingaconvictfoundguiltyofsucha crime." In the facts and circumstancesofthis case and in view ofaforesaid affidavit of respondent No.2 and settlement having been arrived at betweenthe parties,Ifind that continuanceofproceedingsarisingout of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility as the misunderstanding,which led to registration of the FIR, now stands clearedbetweenthe parties. Accordingly,thispetitionis allowedsubjectto costof^25,000/-to be depositedby petitionerwith PrimeMinister'sReliefFundWiihintwo weeks from today. Upon placing on record the receipt of cost, FIR No.214/2013under Sections 448/380/451/506IPC registeredat Police Station Ashok Vihar, Delhi and the proceedingsemanatingtherefrom shall standquashedqua petitioner. Thispetitionis accordinglydisposedof AUGUST 07, 2015 vn (SUNIL GAUR) JUDGE Page 6
Case details
Parties and counsel
$-16 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date ofDecision: August 07, 2015 + CRL.M.C. 5926/2014 VIJAY GOEL Petitioner Through: Mr.Sanjeev Kumar, Advocate versus THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR .... Respondents Through; Mr. Vinod Diwakar, Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent- State with Inspector Sanjeev Arora Mr. Narendra Gautam, Advocate with Respondent No.2-in-person CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
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