Naresh Goswami v. Ranjit Singh Ahluwalia

order ^prdingly rejected the contentions of th# petitioner £ihd dismissed the ap^icatipn for leave to defend and passed an eviction order againstthe petitioner.!;

¶7I have heard the learned counsel for the parities. Learned counsel appearingfor the petitionerhas raisedthe followingpleasto substantiatehis contention that the ARC has wrongly dismissed his application for grant of leave to defend the petition and that the application should have been allowed.

(i) It was urged that ' the respondent has an alternate accommodation at 11/96, G'eeta Colony on the first floor and second floor. The Title papers to this property have been filed by the respondent. The colony has a better location and is appropriately suited for residential purposes whereas the tenanted premises are in a clustered commercial area and are not suited for residential purposes.

(ii) The respondent in 2005 bought a property at A-6, New Gobindpura, Delhi. The property was sold in 2010 and the present eviction petition has been filed in 2014. Hence, it is clear that there is RC.REV. 525/2016 & CONNECTED no bonafiderequirementon medical grounds as the respondentcould have shiftedinto this propertyin casehe has genuinereasonsto do so.

(iii) Report has been filed by the engineer/architectthat without demolition of the entire property the same cannot be converted into residence. It was urged that the ARC has not dealt with this submission

(iv) The entire property is commercialand is most unsuitablefor residential purpose. There is no bona fide in the plea of the •respondent. "

(v) The daughteroftWtespondentwas mai^iedon 16.9.2016hence thereis no requirementexistingon her behalfpresently.

8." I may first see the scope of^thepresentpetition.The SupremeCourtin Shiv Samp iSupta vs. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1^99) 6 SCC 222/(MANU/sd(pi32/1999)describedthe revisionalpowers (6fthis courtas follows:- "11 The phraseology of the provision as reproduced hereinbefore provides an interesting reading placed in juxtapositionwiththe phraseologyemployedby the Legislature in draftingSection115 of the CPC. Under the latter provision the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is circumscribedby the subordinatecourt having committedone of the three errors,namely(i) having exercisedjurisdictionnot vestedinitby law, or(ii) havingfailedto exerciseajurisdiction so vested,or(iii)havingexercisedits jurisdictionwith illegality ormaterialirregularity.Underthe provisoto Sub-section(8) of Section25B, the expression governing the exercise of revisionaljurisdictionby the High Court is Tor the purposeof satisfyingif an order made by the Controlleris accordingto ^ law'. The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Section 25B(8) is not so limited as is under Section 115 C.P.C. nor so wide as that of an Appellate Court. The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of "whether it is according to law'. For that limited purpose it may enter into re-appraisal of evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivitycould have reachedthat conclusionon the material available...";:' \

¶9Hence, this court is to test the order of the ARC to see whether it is accordingto law, and whethertheconclusionsarenotwhollyunreasonable.

¶10Section 14(l)(e) of the DRC Act reads as follows: "14.Protection of tenant against eviction.-

(1) Notwithstandinganythingto the contrarycontainedin any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by and court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant: Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribedmanner, make an order for the recovery of possessionof the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:- Xxxxx

(e) that the premises let for residentialpurpose are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himselfor for any memberofhis familydependentonhim, ifhe Page7of13 T) is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premisesare held and the landlordor such personhas no other reasonablysuitableresidentialaccommodation." The above provisionswould in view of thejudgmentof the Supreme Court inSatyawatiSharma(dead)by LRs vs. Union ofIndia &Am., AIR 2008SC 3148 applyto commercialpremisesalso.

¶11The essentialingredientswhich a landlord/respondentis requiredto show for the purposeofgettingan evictionorder for bona fide needs are (i) the respondent is the owner/landlordIpf the suit«premises (ii) the suit premisesare required.bQna.:iideby the-.Jandlordfor himselfand any ofhis family membersdependentupon him. (iii) the landlordor such otherfamily members has no otfer^i-easonablesuitable,accommodation.,

¶12In the prebntcase the trial court declinedto grant leave to defendto the petitioner.The parametersfor grantingleaveto defendare well known.

¶13The Supreme Court in PrecisionSteel &EngineeringWorks and Another V5. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal,AIR 1982 SC 1518'm para 22 held as follows

¶22What then follows. The Controller has to confine himself indisputably to the condition prescribed for exercise of jurisdiction in Sub-section (5) of Section25B. In other words, he must confine himselfto the affidavitfiled by the tenant. If the affidavitdisclosessuch facts-noproof is needed atthe stage,whichwoulddisentitlethe plaintifffrom seeking possession,the mere disclosureof such facts must be held sufficient to grant 'leave because the statute says on disclosureof such facts the Controllershall grant leave'.It is difficult to be exhaustiveas to what such facts could be but ordinarily when an action is brought under Page8of 13 Section14(1)proviso (e) of the Act whereby the landlord seeks to recover possession on the ground of bona fide personalrequirementif the tenant alleges such facts as that the landlord has other accommodation in his possession; that the landlord has in his possession accommodation which is sufficient for him; that the conduct of the landlord discloses avarice for increasingrent by threatening eviction; that the landlord has been letting out some other premises at enhanced rent without any attempt at occupying the same or using it for himself; that the dependentsof the landlordfor whose benefit also possession is sought are not persons to whom in eye of law the laniord was bound to provide accommodation;thatthe past conductof the landlordis such as would disentitlehim to the relief of possession;that the landlordwho claimspossessionfor his personalrequirement has not cared to approach the Court in person though he couldhavewithoutthe slightestinconvenienceapproachedin person and with a view to shielding himself from cross-examinationprosecuteslitigationthrough an agent called a constitutedattorney. These and several other relevant but inexhaustible facts when disclosed should ordinarily be deemed to be sufficient to grant leave."

¶14This court in the case of Sarwan Bass Bange vs. Ram Pmkash, MANU/DE/0204/2010 noted as foliows: - "7. The Controllerhas not discussedas to how the pleas raised by the respondent/tenantin the applicationfor leave to defend are such which if established by adducing evidence would disentitlethe petitioner/landlordof an order of evictionunder Section14(l)(e) of the Act. Ordinarily, when a tenant approaches an advocate for drafting a leave to defend application,the advocate,usinghis legal acumenwould dispute each and every plea of the landlord in the eviction petition. RC.REV. 525/2016 & CONNECTED However, merely because the tenant so disputes and controverts the pleas of the landlord does not imply that the provision of summary procedure introduced in the Act with respect to ground of eviction on the ground of requirement is to be set at naught. The Controller is required to sift/comb through the application for leave to defend and the affidavit filed therewith and to see whether the tenant has given any facts/particulars which require to be established by evidence and which if established would disentitle the landlord from an order of eviction. The test is not of the tenant having controverted/denied the claim of the landlord and thus disputed questionsof fact arising;the test is to examinethe pleas of facts and then to determine the impact thereof."

¶15I will now}|tieal:5withthe-contentionof the le&iedcounsel for the petitioner.As fp aijhe contentionof>the respondentha^angAapropertyat GeetaColonyis?concernedit is clearthat no suchpleahas beenraisedin the applicationfor leaveto defend.Be that asdt may, it is clearthat the property admittedlycompnses the first and second floor. What the respondenthas projected is that ok account of his old age and medicalfrequirementshe wishes to shift to th# ground floor. Hence, the property at Geeta Colony (^] cannotbe saidto be suitablealternativeaccommodation.Even otherwise,the respondentis residingin the same buildingon the second floor and would obviously be comfortableand well-adjustedto the environmentand the surroundingsofthe area and wouldnot like to shiftto a new area in his old age. The plea that the existence of this property is an alternative accommodation available is completely without merit.

¶16The next pleawhich is raisedby the petitionerpertainsto the property at New Gobindpurawhichwas allegedlyboughtin 2005 and sold in 2010 by Page 10 of13 () the respondent. The eviction petition was filed four years later in 2014. As to how this sale transaction has a co-relation with the present petition is not clear. The property was not sold contemporaneously with filing of the eviction petition. It cannot be pleaded that there was any attempt to create an artificial demand for the need of the tenanted premises as the propertywas sold four years ago. The plea is without any basis and has no merit.

¶17The next plea that is raised is about the report of the engineer/architect. It is an admitted fact that no such plea has been raised by the petitioner in his application for leave to defend. The respondent has explained in their pleiadings that the property is built on pillars and demolition would not bp^required: The plea is even otherwise mis-conceived as the respondent is already residing on the second floor of the property. There is no reason as to why he would not be able to make himself comfortable on1the ground floor taking into account the iiature of the building. V •. ^ "L. •< •. v. ••••-• ' 'i: ./,• . •

¶18The next plea of the petitioner that the daughter of the respondent has got married in 2016 is of no consequence. The property was required bona fide for the residence of the respondent, his wife and his daughter. Even if his daughter has got married, then, the requirement of the respondent and his wife will continue to exist. It does not affect the pleas of the respondent regarding bona fide requirement.

¶19The other contentions of the petitioner are absolutely without merit.

¶20In Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T.V. Krishnan,

(1996) 5 SCC 353, it was held that the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement and Courts have no concern to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residentialstandard of their own. The bona fide RC.REV. 525/2016 & CONNECTED ] personal need is a question of fact and should not be normally interfered with. The court held as follows: "2 The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinlcs that because of her age she needs to be looked after. Now, that is a lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which ys^as uncalled for. There is no law which deprives'the ,land|or,dofthe benpficial enjoyment of his property.We ac( ordmglyreversethe findingreachedby the High Court and restore that of the Rent Contfollerthat the appellant had established her bona fide requirement of the demised premises for her personal use and occupation,which finding was based on a proper appreciationofthe evi&nce in the lighto^fthe surroundingcircumstances."

¶21In G.C. kapoor Vs. Nand Kumar Bhasin, AIR 2002 SC 200, the SupremeCourtriotedas follows: "It is settled position of law that bonafide requirementmeans that requirement must be honest and not tainted with any obliquemotive and is not a mere desirepr wish. In Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde and Anr.: T999] 2 SCR 912, this Court while consideringthe bonafide need of the landlord was of the view that when a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation, he has to prove it but there is no warrantfor 'presumingthat his need is not bonafide'. It was also held that while deciding this question. Court would look into the broad aspects and if the Courts feels any doubt about bonafiderequirement,it is for the landlordto clear such doubt." Page 12 of13

¶22In my opinion, the ARC has rightly noted that the respondent is already residing in the same building on the second floor since long. There is no reason for him, for the sake of convenience of the petitioner, to shift to another locality, as has been sought to be argued.

¶23There are no reasons put across to doubt the bona fide of the respondent. He is 68 years old with various ailments. His wife is 58 years old and also suffering from various ailments. Their need to shift to the ground floor cannot be doubted.

¶24The petitionerhas failed to disclose the facts or particularswhich wouldrequireto be establishedby evidenceand which,if established,would disentitle the landlord for an order of eviction.

¶25There is no merit in the present petition. There are no reasons to interferein the impugnedorder.The same is dismissed. JANUARY 13, 2017/n Corrected and signed on June 05,2017 RC.REV. 525/2016 & CONNECTED "-^-1 a (JAY7C5fTNATH) JUDGE

* % + + + + + + IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision: 13.01.2017 RC.REV. 525/2016 SUSfflL KUMAR versus RANJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA RC.REV. 526/2016 SURINDER KUMAR JAIN : -r;:. versus RANJIT SINGHAHLU^AEIA RC.REV. 497/2016 SUNIL KUMAR & ANR versus RANJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA RC.REvi^02/2016 AJAY KUMAR versus RANJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA RC.REV. 503/2016 DWARKA NATH KOCHAR versus RANJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA RC.REV. 505/2016 SUNIL KUMAR versus RANJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA Petitioner Respondent Petitioner Respondent .-r.,..^Petitioners Respondent Petitioner -....• Respondent ... Petitioner Respondent .. Petitioner Respondent RC.REV. 525/2016 & CONNECTED + RC.REV. 506/2016 AMAR NATH & ANR Petitioner versus RANJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA Respondent + RC.REV. 591/2016 NARESH GOSWAMI Petitioner versus RANJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA Respondent Present: Mr.Saurabh Sharnia, AdvoeateJar the petitioner in RC.REV. 525/2016and RC REV.^6/2016 Mr.RajeevVerma,Advocate for the jetijioner in RC.REV. Nos.497/f016/^^02/2016,503/2016, 6, 506/2016 and 591/2016 ^. , "'v' Mr.Prateek Jain, Advocate for the respondent in all cases. CORAM: ' HON'BLEMI^ JUSTICEJAYANTNATH JAYANT NATH, J. (ORAL) 1. The presentpetitionsare filed by the petitioner/Tenantunder Section 25(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereina;fterlefeicedto as the 'DRC Act')seekingto inipugnthe^prderbie^icti^ the AdditionalRent Controller (hereinafterreferred to as the 'ARC') dated 19.7.2016 under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. 2. The respondent/landlordhas filed eightdifferentevictionpetitionsfor eviction of 13 shops excluding tenants of two shops who have given undertakingto vacate the premises. Shop No. 12 has been vacated by the tenantand is said to be underthe possessionof the respondent.The facts in issue raised are identicalin all the eight appeals.Hence the presentappeals are disposedofby a commonorder.For the sake ofconvenience,the facts in RC.REV. 525/2016 & CONNECTED f ) the RC Rev.525/2016 titled Sushil Kumar v. Ranjit Singh Ahluwalia have been narrated in the present order. 3. The respondent/landlord filed an eviction petition for shop No.16 measuring 6'13" x 11' situated on the ground floor, property No. IX/1232, Subhash Nagar Road (Multani Mohalla), Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-31. 4. It was averred by the respondent in the petition that he is a 68 year old and staying in the same premises on the second floor. He is a retired government servant and is a Hypertensiveand is a patient of tensorial Meningioma(BrainTumoi:);:lfwas.furtherurged?tl||this wife is of 58 years and sufferingfrom ac^e y^S|^aand,is regularly^under;medicaltreatment. Hence, it is urgedJi^Me respondentand his wife airg ndt;in a positionto climb the stairsfecauseoftheir old age and so they needt% premisesfor their residence.jJReference is also made to their unmarried^daughter Ms. Bhawna who is said to be permanently;physicallyhandicappedwho is a patient of "SpA" which is said 'to be a pamflil progressivedisease. It is further stated thal^hepetitioneris a |i|iant of three shops;of the adjacent premiseswhich are owned by anotherlandlord.It is urged that the present tenantedpremisesis lyinglockedsinceinceptionoftthe tenancyand theie is no electricityas well. It is pointed the respondent/landlordhas 16 shops on the groundfloor and has filed eightdifferentevictionpetitionsfor evictionof 13 shops excludingthe tenantsoftwo shops who have given an undertakingto vacate the premises. Shop No.12 has been vacated by the tenant and is said to be underthe possessionof the respondent. 5. The petitionerhas filed his applicationseeking leave to defend and raise variouspleas. Some ofthe salientpleas taken before the ARC by the petitionerare as follows;- Page3 of13 (i) The respondent and his family members are of normal health taking walk for about 1 or 2 hours daily. He can easily climb the stairs. It is further stated that his daughter is an advocate by profession and is doing her professional work regularly and that the only object of filing the petition i