State v. Shravan Rustagi

SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J. Crl. M.A. I8I2I/2015 / I

¶1This is an applicationunder Seitt#?f of^€;||iiife Act read with Section 482 of Code of Ci^iniinal-PfocedurerseeKing condonation of '-v.. "• ; 100 days delay in filing the present leave petition.

¶2Heard. For the reasons stated in the application and in the interest of justice, delay is condoned.

¶3Application stands disposed of Cri. L.P. 768/2015

¶4The present Criminal Leave Petition has been filed under Section 378

(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the State against the impugned judgment dated 27.05.2015 in Sessions Case No. 73/2012 CRL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 1 of18 •V whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II (North West), RohiniCourts,New Delhi,has acquittedthe accusedof allthecharges levelled against him under Section 498A/304B of the Indian Penal Code and alternatively under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

¶5The brief facts of the case as noted by the learned trial court are as under: "On 15.02.2012, Chhavi tried to commit suicide by hanging and expired on

16.02.2012 (Chhavi is e hereinafter referred to as the^^ "deceased"). On

17.02.2012,.father ofih^ideceased-OmPrakash Gupta made a statement'tothe..SpMtUat oh-. 02 04 2008, the deceased marriedcShr^m^^ (the accused) according:Jo Hindu^Rites-g^ andj^ used to reside along with her husband at 8-121, Flats Phase-IV,Ashok Vihar, Dphi.^They usedto quar^slvery oftm and the accusedjnangerusedto beather daughter an^ also tried to grab llier neck occasiona^. On

15.02.2012, the deceased called him several time and informedabout some dispute had takenplace betweenher and the accused in a party which they attended'together, due to which she was meniallyharasse^mfitherefore, did not wantJo live along with •her0Tu0^ndand had booked a ticket'^ for '^-Bhatinda on '^19.02.2012. On

15.02.2012 at about 10:15 p.m., the accused called him and informed that his daughter had locked herself in a room and she might do something and in the morning, she might befound dead. That night at about 11:00p.m., father in law of the deceased telephoned him and informed that her daughter had committed suicide. In the said complaint, it was stated that the husband/the accused and in laws of her daughter never harassed her for the demand of dowry. However, her daughter could not commit suicide on petty things and therefore, he requested to conduct an inquiry to ascertain the truth. CRL. L.P.768/2015 Page 2 of18 Thereafter, on 18.02.2012, he made another statement to the SDMstating that at the time of making the statement dated 17.02.2012, he was under the influence of Dr. Suresh, father of the accused. When he met his relatives and known persons and visualized the entire incident, he was confident that his daughter was murdered and the accused and her parents are responsiblefor the same. It is stated that once the accused and the deceased were at Bangalore, the accused used to beat her daughter and her medical test was got done and a complaint at Women's CellBangalorewasmade. On one occasion,he deposited e 1,30,000/-in the^^ccounfofthe'accused,but, the accused returnedthe sd{damwmj^i^rf^'W monthsbecauseofher daughter Accusedand his parent"also demanded money from him. Based upon the^statement dated §8.02.2012, FIR was\.registered.-^Duringrfnvestigation,the' accused was^apprehended, arrested^and released on bail. After cornpleting the investigation,'the charge sheet wasifiled in the^ourt." ' ^ \

¶6After investigation,charges im'der Section498A/304Bof the Indian Penal Code, were jfranied,against the .accused. In the alternative, the charge under Section 3G2 of the Indian Penal Code was also framed against the accused. The accused pleaded'not guilty and claimed trial.

¶7In order to bring home the-guiltvof the accused, the prosecution examined 21 witnesses in all. Thereafter, the statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein he pleaded his innocence by denying all the incriminating circumstances and claimed to be falsely implicated. The accused examined 6 defence witnesses to substantiate his defence.

¶8Ms. Anita Abraham, Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, while assailing the judgment of the trial court, contended that CRL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 3 of18 e the acquittalof the respondenton the groundsreliedupon by the trial court were perverse based on surmises and conjectures and on erroneous appreciationof evidenceresulting in flagrant miscarriageof justice and that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law. The learned counsel vehemently argued that the trial court had turned a blind eye to the nature and number of the injuriessustainedby the deceased. She further contended that the discrepancies in the statementsofprosecutionwitnessesra?e|^^minorwhichdo not go to the root of the matterandoccurred'^dueto.lfpsejftime.

¶9On the contrary,Mr. Mohit Mathur learnedseniorcounsel appearing on behalf of the respondentcontends that the trial court has rightly appreciat|jdall^theevidenceon record and the prosecutionhas failed to prove|ts case against the re%)ondent.Further, he submittedthat fi't i I ^ r ts there is no ground for setting aside the said judgmentpassed by the trialcourt '• ' ,, ' , i'

¶10Before delving into the merits^of-thecase,^we deem it appropriateto discussthe relevantpro^is^n^iiwolved,,i^the.presentcase i.e. Section 304B of the Indian PerTalCode whichteads-as under; 304-B - (1) Where the death ofa woman is caused byany burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances withinsevenyears ofher marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called" dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. CRL.L.P. 768/2015 Page 4 of18 % X Explanation - For the purposes of this Sub-section," dowry" shall have the same meaningas in Section 2 of theDowryProhibition Act, 1961 (28of1961).

(2) Whoevercommitsdowrydeath shall bepunished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonmentfor life.

¶11In Raman Kumar Vs. State of Punjab : (2009) 16 SCC 35, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "13. The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise thamufi^er normal circumstances within seven years of her, marriage and^it4s.shown that soon before her deathshe was subjectedtofirueltyor harassmentby her^rusband or any relatives of her husbaf0pfor, or in corinection with any demandfor dowry. In ofder to attract applicationofSection 304B IPC, the e^ential ingredientsare asfollows: ' |

(i) Whe death of a womdn should be caused by bwns or bodily, injury or' otHerwise,_ than under abnormal circumstance.

(ii)Such a death should have occurred withinsevenyears ofher marriage. ^

(Hi) She must-have ^been~ subjected to cruelty or harassment by her hiisljand or any relative of her husband.

(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand ofdowry.

(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. As per the definition of "dowry death" in Section 304B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been "soon before her death" CRL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 5 of18 e subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with the demandfor dowry". Presumption under Section 11SB is a presumption of law. Onproof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumptionshall be raised only onproof of thefollowing essentials:

(1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman, (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being triedfar the offence under Section 304BIPC.) ' (2) Tke^^Won^^ to crueltyor harassment,by her. husbarM of Ms relatives. (3) Such crueltyor harassmentwasfpr, or in connectionwith any demand ofdowry.

(4) Such.fruelty(b.y^ams^^^ soon before her death. -V % • '• ' " '' I 16^ Aconjointreadingo;^.Section113BoftheE^dence Act and Section 304B\ TPChshows that there must be material to show that soon 'before her death th§ victim was subjected'to cruelty^op harassment.The prosecution has to rule-out'the possibility of a.riaturaUor accidental death so asyp Bring it within the.purviewofthe "death occurringoihhfwisejhan-informalcircumstances".The expression"sooii-befd^W'^isvery relevantwhere Section 113B of the Evidence -Act and Section 304B IPC are pressed into service. Theprosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. "Soonbefore" is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate anyfixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test bothfor the CRL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 6 of18 proofofan offenceofdowrydeath as wellasfor raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act The expression "soon before her death" used in the substantiveSection 304B IPC and Section 113B of the EvidenceAct ispresent, with the idea ofproximitytest No definiteperiod has been indicatedand the expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to the expression "soon before" used in Section 114 Illustration

(a) of the EvidenceAct is relevant. It lays down that a court maypresumethat a man who is in thepossessionof goods soon after the theft, is either the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he canaccountf&fMs possession/The determinationofthe periodwhich S^n come wjthin the term-"soon before"is left tojbe determined"byJhe:6omts,dep^endinguponfacts and circumstancesof eacli'cdse. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon bef^' would normally imply that '•the,j,intern,alshould not be much betyveen the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There,,must be existence! ^ proximate and live link' between the effect of cruelty based on dowrydemand and the deathsconcerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty, is'remote in time and has become /statenot to -disturb' the mental equilibriumqf^hewomameo^^edf^j0l^uldbe ofno consequence:"

¶12In Amar Singh v. State ofRafasthan : (2010) 9 SCC 64, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "29... What is punishable Under Section 498-A or Section 304-B Indian Penal Code is the act of cruelty or harassment by the husband or the relative ofthe husband on the woman. It will be also clearfrom Section113-Bof the Evidence Act that only when it is shown that soon before her death a woman has been subjected by any person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demandfor dowry, the court shall presume that CRL L.P.768/2015 Page 7of18 such person had caused the dowry death within the meaningof Section304-BIndian Penal Code. The act of subjectinga woman to cruelty or harassmentfor, or in connection with, any demand for dowry by the accused, therefore,must be establishedby theprosecutionfor the court to presume that the accused has caused the dowry death."

¶13The law above discussed cogently states that where the death of a woman is caused by any bums or bodily injury or occurs otherwise thanundernormal circumstancerwifhin7-years of her marriageand it is shown that saon before her deMh%Me was subjectedto cruelty or harassmentby her husband.od,anyrelativefdBor m. connectionwith any demand ofdowry, suchydeag/^^^^^^ punishableunder Section 304B oft|eIndianPenalCode..

¶14To prove,the accusationagainstiiaiperson for the offence of dowry death,the prosecutionis oblige4,tpVpr(3vethat:

(a) the death ofa woni^nwas causedby bums or bodilyinjury or had occurredbtherwisetliah under normal circumstances;

(b) such death should Mve occurred within 7 years of her marriage; *

(c) the deceased was subjected to cmelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband;

(d) such cmelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and

(e) the deceased should have been subjected to such cmelty or harassment soon before her death. CRL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 8 of18

¶15Admittedly, the marriage of the respondent and the deceased was solemnized on 02.04.2008. The deceased was found hanging on

15.02.2012 whereas the death of the deceased took place on

16.02.2012 i.e. within seven years of marriage. Hence, two ingredients of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code are satisfied as it is not in dispute that firstly the death of the deceased was within seven years of y-her marriage and secondly was otherwise than under normal circumstances. - —- e t?

¶16Now, the questionswe needtoponderupon afe asto:

¶1Whether the deceased was subjected to hkassment or cruelty at the instance of her,husband or,any relative of her husband? %

¶2If answer to the first question appears to be in affirmative, whether that harassment ^or cruelty was in connection with the i • f pj..t fciUVi;. , demand of dowry? f j • if

¶3Such cruelty or harassment'shlj|ld"h|v^^^ subjectedto soon before death. , . - 1 "i .

¶17The answerto the firsttwo questionsapi|ears'tbbe inextricablylinked with the third question. Undoubtedly, there is no eye witness to the occurrence. The entire case of the prosecution rests upon the testimonies of PW6 Dr. R. Bhanumurthy (who conducted MLC of the deceased), PWIO Om Prakash Gupta (father of the deceased), PWll Sudha Gupta (maternalaunt of the deceased)and PW12 SumitRustagi (cousin of the deceased). CEL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 9 of18 f3

¶18In order to prove that the deceasedwas subjectedto harassmentand cruelty in connectionwith the demand of dowry "soon before her death" the testimony of PW-10 (father of the deceased) assumes importance.In his initial statementrecordedby a police official on

16.02.2012, he did not level any allegations against the accused. Thereafter, on the morning of 17.02.2012, SDM recorded his y statement wherein, again no allegations were raised against the respondent or his parents..However,,on 18.02.2012, the SDM at the request of PW-10 again recorded his -statement. PW-10 stated that he gavethefirststatementunderthe'influenceof fatheroftherespondent, onthepretextthatthelastritesofherdaughterhad tobeperformedby her husband(respondent),otherwise^-hersoul wouldnotrest in peace. Accordingly, he did not make-any allegations of doww against the I'l ' respondentand his parents..Later,Ihe;came to know thaffatherof the / , ''-i ,1 respondent misled them aboutfthe medical condition of her daughter. PW-10 gave his written statement in his handwriting to the SDM and clarified that the previous statement' was under the influence of Dr. Suresh (father of the respondent).-PW-14-(mother of the deceased) supported the same statement and signed the same.

¶19PWIO Om Prakash Gupta (father of the deceased) in his testimony before the trial court deposed as under: "In the month of March 2011 accused Sharvan demanded Rs Five lacs from me as dowry as demanded earlier. I paid Rs. 1,30,000/- to accused Sharvan. Accused Sharvan again harassed Chhavi but Chhavi told him that I (witness) was going to make complaint against him so he did not makefurther demand. He also returned CRL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 10 of18 c y Rs. 1,32,500/- to me and he demanded Rs.2,500/-from me and I paid the same. AccusedSharvan continuously demandingRs. FiveLacsand carfrom me as dowry."

¶20PW-10 Om Prakash Gupta in his cross-examination stated as under: "It is correct that after the marriage Sharvan and Chhavi had gone to Mauritius for their honeymoon. I do not know whetheraccusedSharvan had taken a package of Rs. 65,000/- each. xxxxx It iscorrectthatChawi^andrShMi^anhadoftentravelled Nationally and Internationally. xxxxx ' - *• ' At the time when the marriage of the accused with my daughtertookplace) w^e told thai accusedSharvanwas droMnngapackageofRs. 18tacs per annum." \. I

¶21PW-10 further admittedthat at the'^time of marriage,tie respondent I I owned a Santro Car but showed .his ignorance whether he had a motorcycl| in Delhi as well,as,inBangalore.He showed?hisignorance whether the respondent.purcli'asedAlto car in the year 2008 for the deceased. He admitted that the respondenV^irrfaseda Beat car. PWIO admitted that despite the fact that the deceased was hospitalized neither he nor his wife ever visited Bangalore.

¶22After perusal of the record, we find it surprising to see the shift in the stand of PW-10 fi-om no demand of any kind at all to the exact opposite without giving any particular proof of the demand of the Honda City car. Further, PWIO showed his ignorance towards the National and International trips after marriage or any expensive gift given by the respondent to the deceased. Hence, we can draw an C5 CRL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 11 of18 ir inferenceby the material placed on record that the respondentwas financiallystable earninga handsome salary and he, along with the deceased,was leadinga lavishlife. They both took many trips within India and abroad and had sufficient number of vehicles.

¶23Furthermore, PW-10 was absolutely silent about the fact that the quarreltook place due to the demand of a Honda City car, he again Y" an improvementin his statementto that effect.Furthermore,the fact that he made four statemenfei.e.on 16.02.2012to the police, on

17.02.2012 to the SDM, on 1-8.02.2012-againto the SDM and on

23.02.2012 another statement-iunder Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, raises seri6us||b]^tsas to thl^reliabilityand credibility' of PW10 as a witness.J t j r**' c

¶24It is in evidencethat in March'201Vthe respondenthad Five lacs as dowryfromthe'pareritsofthe deceased,hov^verhe could only pay Rs 1,30,000/-.Biit.it has been proved that the respondent returned Rs 1,32,500/- after a'few^months. There is no material that r provesthat it was demandedas dowry.Moreover,an extraamountof f ' Rs. 2,500/- was paid along^vilh the principal amount, which appears to be towards interest. Hence, we cannot hold that such amount was paid as dowry to the respondent.

¶25It is also to be noted that PWIO, PWl 1, PW12, PW14 and PW19, all being the near and dear ones of the deceased,in spite of being aware of all the cruelties and atrocities which the deceased went through, never filed a police complaint to that effect. There is no evidence on record to prove that any complaintto the police against the respondent CEL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 12 of18 lemanded Rs. or his parents was ever filed by them. It is highly improbablethat either of the family members did not even bother to disclose the said acts to the police before the death of the deceased but only immediately after the death of the deceased.

¶26Reliance has been placed on the letter dated 25.10.2008 which the deceased had written, which reveals that the attitude of the deceased was rude and non cooperativetowards the respondentand his family members. It also reveals that sherwas hot tempered and admittedthat she would control her adamant and aggressive-nature and would not use vulgar and abusivelanguage'againstthe respondentandhis family members. She statedthat"she would stop consuming'liquorin future. She also stated that she had an affair in the past and promised to mend her wayi^l She specifically.meritMiedthat there was no demand of dowry fir^knthe respondentand his'parentat any stage.JLlthough,it is the case ctPW-lO that signatures'ofthe deceasedwere obtainedby the parents of the respondent, it is hard-to believe that a qualified person like the deceased would sign. a document without going through its contents, that too in the presence of the PW-IO himself and another mediator. There is no material on record which shows that the parent of the deceased protested against the deceased signing the said letter, especially when he was aware of the atrocities faced by the deceased. Hence, we are inclined to infer that the letter was signed voluntarily and in presence of witnesses. €i CRL L.P. 768/2015 Page 13 of18

¶27Further, DW4 Dr. Swam Singhla, a Gynecologist deposed before the court that the deceasedvisited her on many occasionsfor counseling to getjrid of her drinking habit.

¶28Anotherpointto be notedhereis that accordingPW-12 SumitRastogi, one day he received a call from the deceased who informed him that her husband had beaten her and he immediatelytook her to a private medical practitioner for treatment where he saw bruises on her neck and cheek. In his cross-examination, he deposed as under: "/ had also told to the^policethat initiallyI took Chhavi to a private practitioner whose name I do not remember and from there I had taken, her to Women Cell, Bangalore. I had dlsoiold'4o thepolice that Women Cell officiak^daskedus'Jo bryiga.woundcertif^i&Jroma GoverriMentHospital do I 'todlcChhavi to a Gov^nment P . a ho0ital. . ' I ' P xx£cx ' \ ' I i I 1 h%d told to the officialofDelhi Police about the office of %pngalore-where"We:'haddodged, the above said complaint.. . , xxxxx ' ' Chhavi had called on my-mobile phorfe on 07.02.2009. On the next day i.e. on''d8.02.2009I had taken her to a Private Practitioner. We'had visited Women Cell on the same day but we had gone to Government Hospitalon

10.02.2009"

¶29Firstly, no reason has been assigned for getting the treatment done at the Government Hospital after a delay of 3 days, which was only at a distance of 8-10 kms from her residence. Secondly, no record of any complaint to the CAW, Bangalore or notice served upon the Lady Curzon Hospital Bangalore has CRL. L.P. 768/2015 Page 14 of18 been placed on record before this Court. The prosecutionhas not been able to prove that any complaintwas ever made to CAW, Bangalorefor the allegedbeatingon 07.02.2009.Onthe basis of the above, we are, therefore, inclined to draw an adverse inference from the above circumstances.

¶30As far as the medical evidence is concerned, PW6 Dr. R. ^ Bhanumurthy,who preparedMLC ofthe deceasedin his cross-examination stated as under; . ; ''None of the above said exhibited documents were prepared in mypresence. It is correct .that abrasions can be caused by nail;Jt. is\ correct that the injuries elaboratedin the wound certificatewere^notfresh and were old. It is correctthat the multiplenail mqrks^can be earned by self inflictedwounds. It is wrong to 'suggest thd^ I have never worked:with,Dr.S.T. Sridhar or. thatI 4:?. i.e. ham never seen him .while 'writing and signing and therefore I cannot recognized his signatures and handwritingor.thatI am^deposihgfalsely." '

¶31After carefully,examiningthe impugnedjudgment, the testimoniesof materialwitnessesand the documentsplaced^on recordalongwiththe arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties, we are of the view that as per the^estimoniesof PW-10,PW-14(parentsof the deceased) and PW-12 (cousin of the deceased) and their conduct, it is not probable to rely on their statements without any corroboration.The fact that no police complaintwas ever made by any of the person aware of the crueltiesfaced by the deceasedpoints towards conductof the interestedwitnessesand raisesseriousdoubtsasto the genuineness of the case. As per the statementof PW-6 Dr. R. Bhanumurthy,it is CRL L.P.768/2015 Page15of18 )1 made clear that the injuries found on the body of the deceasedcould have also been self inflicted wounds. Furthermore, the letter dated

25.10.2008and the depositionof DW4 Dr. Swam Singhlaestablishes the fact that deceasedwas hot tempered and that her behaviortowards the respondentand his parentswas aggressiveand not appropriate.

¶32In TotaSingh and Am, Vs. State ofPunjab reportedinAIR 1987SC ^ 108,the Hon'bleSupremeCourtmadethe followingobservation: gal Whereare possible on an appraisal of the evidence 'adduced in Jhe case and the Court below has taken 'a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittaleven it isiofthe opiniontliat^Jheview taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence.is erroneous."^ ^ -A

¶33In arecentcase of UpendrqPrddhav Vs. StateofOr^a:(2015)5 SCALE^4, the Apex Courthas observedthat: I "10. We are oftheyiew.that in case there are two views^^ which can be culled-out frorri the perusal of evidenceand application of law, the'-viewwhichfavours the accused should be, taken. It has been recognizedas a human right by this Court In Narendra Singh and Am. V. State of M.P. : (2004) 10 SCC 699, this Court has recognizedpresumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that:

¶30It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place ofa proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'.

¶33We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are ofthe opinion that the cause ofdeath of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but CRL. L.P.768/2015 Page 16 of18 benefit thereof must go to the Appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld. (Emphasis Supplied)"

¶11The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has beenfurther reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram : (2003) 8 SCC180, wherein this Court observed thus: ''Generally the order of acquittal shall,not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the ( accusedisfurtherstrengthenedby acquittal.The golden C threadwhich rmsiKfougjh'the web ofadministrationof justicein criAal ca^^i!§lhatiftwo views arepossible on the evidenceadduced,in the case, onepointingto the guilt of the accused and thesother to his innocence, the view >which is favourable to the accused hpuld be adopted Theparamountconsiderationof the Courtis to ensure that miscarriage 'of justice is prevei^d. A mi^arriageofjustice,^which,imayarisefrom acqikttalof the^guilty is no lesh:thd^.f}j^^^^ the convictior^ofan innocent.In a case where evidenceis ^nored, a duty is castmpon the{appellatecgu^t to rea^eciate the evidence} iin n hnv hppn the evidence, in a 'caie where the ,accused has been acquitted, or. the purpose of ascertaimng;as to whether followed by the appellate,'[courtconsidering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is. to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference. (Emphasis supplied)."

¶34Therefore, it is well settled that where two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the one that favours the accusedmustbe accepted.In any event in a case of acquittal,if the CRL. L.P.768/2015 Page17of18 view of tiie trial court is a possible reasonable view as per the evidence on record, interference by the High Court may not be justified.

¶35Keeping in view the aforesaid settled law as discussed above, we are of the view that in the instant case, the ingredients of Section 304-B/498-A/302 of the Indian Penal Code are not established beyond all reasonable doubts against the respondent. We hold that two views are possibleonappraisaloftl|e.evideneecadducedinthe case and the trial court below has taken a view whi|ih' is a plausible one. Hence, interference with the findings of the trial court is not warranted. r - " , ' .. •% Accordingly,presentleavepetitionstandsdismis§e|[. MAY 4,2016 gr// CRL. L.P.768/2015 'SANGI'^ V VGR/A SEHGAL, J.

G. S. SISTANI, J. Page 18 of18

e $-7 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + CRL.L.P. 768/2015 % Date ofJudsment: 4"^ May,2016 STATE Appellant Through: Ms. Anita Abraham, APP for State. SI Sukhvinder Singh, P.S. Bharat Nagar SHRAVANRUSTAPI / ....Respondent Thn&ghj^ Mr. IsloliilMathurSeniorAdvocate «with Mr. Ashok Soni, Advocate. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G. S^SISTANI HON'BLE MSl JUSTICE SANGITA oifflNGRA SEHGAL n a