Rofiqul Islam Pramanik v. The State of Assam and 5 Ors

ORDER Date : 15.12.2023

Heard Mr. S.I. Akand, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. A. Phukan, learned standing counsel, Elementary Education Department, appearing on behalf of respondents No. 1. Also heard Mr. B. Choudhury, learned standing counsel BTC, appearing for the respondents Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

¶2The petitioner by way of instituting the present proceeding, has raised a grievance against the non-consideration of her case for appointment on compassionate grounds in spite of having submitted her application within the time period prescribed.

¶3The father of the petitioner Late Tomser Ali Pramanik, while working as an Assistant Teacher of 661 No. Bamunigaon L.P. School, had died in harness on 03.05.2012. The petitioner being the eldest son of the said deceased Tomser Ali and being eligible for considered for appointment against a Grade-IV post submitted his application on 13.11.2012 praying for appointment on compassionate ground against any Grade-IV post. The said application not being considered the petitioner again after lapse of 11 years approached the respondent authorities by way of preferring a representation dated 30.03.2023.

¶4Mr. S.I. Akand, learned counsel for the petitioner, by reiterating the facts narrated herein Page No.# 3/8 above has contended that the petitioner having applied for being appointed on compassionate grounds within the time frame prescribed, it was the bounded duty of the respondent authorities to have his case considered for such appointment expeditiously. The respondent authorities having failed to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds immediately after submission of the application of the same by the petitioner, the right of the petitioner for such consideration subsists and accordingly a direction is called for from this Court on the respondent authorities to have his case considered for the said appointment immediately.

¶5I have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and also perused the materials placed on record.

¶6It is seen from the records of the case that the petitioner's father had died in harness on

03.05.2012 and thereafter, it was contended that the petitioner on 13.11.2012 had submitted his application before the Deputy Inspector of Schools, Gossaigaon (respondent No. 3) for appointment on compassionate ground. Thereafter, there is nothing brought on record to show that the family of the petitioner had been pursuing with the authorities with regard to their claim for appointment on compassionate ground and it was all of a sudden, more particularly, on 30.03.2023, that the petitioner again submitted an application before the District Elementary Education Officer, Kokrajhar. The materials on record reveal that the family of the petitioner had sustained for the last about 11 years and as such, the immediate object behind the grant of appointment on compassionate ground being to mitigate the hardship caused due to death of the bread earner in the family is no longer present in the matter. It is settled law that compassionate appointment which cannot be claimed after long delay pursuant to the death of the government servant. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis occasioning at the time of the death of the deceased the Government servant.

¶7The claim of the petitioner as on date is a stale claim and the same if allowed to be considered at this distant point of time, would amount to treating compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on the line of succession. Page No.# 4/8

¶8In the case in hand, the family having survived for such a long period of time after the death of the father on 03.05.2012, the acceptance of the claim of the petitioner at this distant point of time, would not be in furtherance of the object behind the purport of a scheme for providing appointment on compassionate ground.

¶9The issues arising herein is covered by the recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of State of W.B. v. Debabrata Tiwari & ors.[reported in (2023) SCC Online SC 219], wherein the Hon'ble Court upon considering the earlier decision available in the matter had concluded as follows: "32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge: i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members, together with the income from any other source.

¶33The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to Page No.# 5/8 the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a bread-winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for consideration. 34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities' decision in the matter.

¶35Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee.

¶36Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Page No.# 6/8 Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, [1874] 3 P.C. 221 as under: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."

¶37Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

¶38In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words: "9. … the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, Page No.# 7/8 unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."

¶39While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.

¶40Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following observations were made: "19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time."

¶10Applying the ratio as contained in the decision of the Debabrata Tiwari(supra) to the facts of the present case, it is found that after the purported submission of the application by the petitioner, there is nothing on record to show that the family of the petitioner was diligently pursuing the matter with the authorities and/or had approached this Court on the failure on the part of the authorities to consider his case for appointment on compassionate ground. After a long period of 11 years, another application came to be filed on behalf of the petitioner on 30.03.2023. Accordingly, the case of the petitioner does not merit any consideration for appointment on compassionate ground and the case cannot be now directed to be considered by the respondents.

¶11As noticed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Debabrata Tiwari (supra), the operation of a policy/scheme for compassionate appointment is founded on consideration of immediacy, which on account of long delay occasioning is absent in the matter.

¶12The petitioner and/or his family having not pursued the matter diligently after the death Page No.# 8/8 of the father of the petitioner; the petitioner having been able to eke out a living even though not favoured with an appointment on compassionate ground, I do not think this is a fit case to direct the respondent authorities for consideration of the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground.

¶13Accordingly, the writ petition is without any merit and the same stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. JUDGE Comparing Assistant

PageoNo.#o1/8 GAHC010274152023 ooooooo ooooooooooooooo ooooooooooooooooTHEoGAUHATIoHIGHoCOURTo (HIGHoCOURToOFoASSAM,oNAGALAND,oMIZORAMoANDoARUNACHALoPRADESH)o CaseoNo.o:oWP(C)/7221/2023o ROFIQULoISLAMoPRAMANIKo S/O-oLATEoTOMSERoALIoPRAMANIK,o RESIDENToOFoVILL-oBAMUNIGAON,o P.O.-oKARTIMARI,o P.S.-oGOSSAIGAON,o DIST.-oKOKRAJHAR,oB.T.R.o(ASSAM),o PIN-o783337. VERSUSo THEoSTATEoOFoASSAMoANDo5oORSo REPRESENTEDoBYoTHEoCOMMISSIONERoANDoSECRETARYoTOoTHEo GOVERNMENToOFoASSAM,o EDUCATIONo(ELEMENTARY)oDEPARTMENT,o DISPUR,oGUWAHATI-06. 2:THEoDIRECTORoOFoEDUCATION oKOKRAJHAR oB.T.R. oPIN-o783370. 3:THEoDISTRICToELEMENTARYoEDUCATIONoOFFICERo(DEEO) oBTR oKOKRAJHARoDISTRICT oPIN-o783370 4:THEoBLOCKoELEMENTARYoEDUCATIONoOFFICERo(BEEO) oGOSSAIGAONoBLOCK oDIST.-oKOKRAJHAR oPIN-o783360. 5:THEoPRINCIPALoSECRETARY Page No.# 2/8 B.T.R. KOKRAJHAR DISTRICT PIN- 783370. 6:THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR OF SCHOOL GOSSAIGAON DIST.- KOKRAJHAR B.T.R. (ASSAM) PIN- 783350 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. R Deka Advocate for the Respondent : SC, ELEM. EDU BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR