The State of Karnataka v. The State of Karnataka

Order dated

23.12.2017 passed by respondent No.1 as per Annexure-G, declining to grant sanction to prosecute respondent No.2 herein for the offences punishable under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act, 1988 for brevity).

¶2Brief facts of the case are that;

2.1 Upon receipt of credible information, that officers in Excise Office, Mysore, were demanding illegal gratification for renewal of licence, the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, obtained a search warrant on

27.06.2012 and conducted raid in the Excise Office Range -1 and Range-4 of Nazarabad, Mysore. That during the said raid, he seized a sum of Rs.82,000/- from Excise Office Range-4 and Rs.1,64,000/- from Excise Office

Range-1. He also purportedly seized true copies of the documents.

2.2. That during the course of the said raid, one Chandrasekhar had produced a CD containing voice recording of demand of illegal gratification by respondent No.2 which was also seized. That he recorded statement of owners of the liquor shops and obtained explanation offered by accused Nos.1 to 7, who are the officials of Excise department. That said accused Nos.1 to 7 had stated that they were directed by respondent No. 2 herein to collect the amount for the purpose of renewal of each license. Thereafter, case was registered in FIR No.11/2012 for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) (e) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988.

2.3 That the Investigation Officer had obtained Expert's opinion to ascertain the voice of the perpetrators. That the report obtained therefrom revealed that the disputed conversation tallied with the voice samples of respondent No.2. Investigation was completed. Charge sheet was prepared. Sanction to prosecute respondent No.2 was

sought from respondent No.1 by furnishing charge sheet materials.

2.4 The respondent No.1-Excise Department granted sanction to prosecution accused Nos.1 to 7 by Order dated

18.02.2017 and 15.04.2017 under Section 19(1)(c) of the PC Act, 1988 as per Annexure-F and F1 respectively. However, refused to grant sanction to prosecution respondent No.2 by the impugned order dated

23.12.2017 as per Annexure-G. That there was delay in filing the writ petition as the matter was under consultation. Eventually COVID-19 pandemic setting resulting in delaying filing the writ petition.

¶3Sri. B.S.Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner reiterating the averments and the grounds urged in the memorandum of petition submitted;

3.1. That the respondent No.1-sanctioning authority has

declined to grant sanction without appreciating the charge

sheet material furnished by the petitioner and without

applying mind to the same.

3.2. That the respondent No.1-sanctioning authority has

apparently sat on appeal over the materials furnished by

the petitioner and has undertaken the task of

appreciating the admissibility or otherwise of the material

evidence which is impermissible.

3.3. The respondent No.1-sanctioning authority which has

granted sanction to prosecute accused Nos. 1 to 7 on the

very same allegations of they receiving the gratification at

the instance of respondent No.2, has however refused to

grant the sanction to prosecute respondent No.2 on the

very same material.

3.4. That the owners of the liquor shops have clearly given the

statement to the petitioner regarding demand made by

respondent No.2 and the amount paid in

furtherance to the said demand.

3.5. That the CD containing the conversation between

respondent No.2 and the liquor shops owners establishes

the factum of demand and payment of illegal gratification.

3.6. That amount seized from the Office of Excise Range-1 and

Range-4 under mahazar is the further strong evidence

and the circumstance of proof of demand and acceptance.

3.7. That non-production of certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act, 1872 at the stage of considering case for sanction, cannot be the reason to decline grant of sanction as the said certificate can be produced at any stage during the trial.

3.8. That the petitioner had made out a prima facie case by

investigating and collecting the material information

which is sufficient enough for the respondent No.1-

sanctioning authority to grant the sanction. Instead, the

respondent No.1-sanctioning authority has gone on to

give its finding on the merits or otherwise of the material

collected by the petitioner during the investigation.

3.9. On the question of limitation, he relies upon the

judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of STATE OF

NAGALAND V. LIPOK AO AND OTHERS1 and

COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG AND

1 (2005) 3 SCC 752

ANOTHER V MRS. KATJI AND OTHERS2 and submits

that when substantial justice and the technical

consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of

substantial justice deserves to be preferred. And that in

the instant case, prosecution has collected the material

during investigation, prima facie establishing the guilt of

the respondent No.2, who shall not be allowed to go

scot-free merely on the technicalities.

3.10. He relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case

of SITA SOREN V. UNION OF INDIA passed in

CRL.A.No.451/2019 to contend that mere proof of

demand is sufficient to proceed against the accused and

proof of acceptance can be inferred from the

circumstances. That the FIR was registered after

conducting of raid, as the information received was

credible, which process is permissible and recognized

under law. He also submits that the petitioner-Lokayukta

police had made entries in the General Diary which was to

be treated as First Information Report.

2 (1987) 2 SCC 107

3.11. He also relied upon the judgment in Apex Court in the

case of LALITHA KUMARI V. GOVERNMENT OF UTTAR

PRADESH AND OTHERS3 to point out the circumstances

under which registration of FIR was mandatory and the

cases where non-registration of FIR was not fatal.

3.12. That in instant case, reliable information was received by

the petitioner and not to waste any time, Investigation

officer had to rush, which is also recognized as held by

this Court in the case of YUNUS ZIA V. STATE OF

KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER passed in

Crl.A.No.594/2015.

3.13. He relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of

SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CBI & OTHERS V.

TAPAN KUMAR SINGH4, as well as order dated

14.03.2017 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court

in the case of SRI CHANDRASHEKHAR ELIGAR V

STATE BY LOKAYUKTA passed in

W.P.No.108338/2015. Hence, seeks for allowing of the petition.

3 (2014) 2 SCC 1 4 (2003) 6 SCC 175

¶4In response, Sri. Sandesh J Chouta, learned Senior

counsel appearing for Sri. Raghavendra K, for respondent

No.2 submits;

4.1. That the impugned order was passed on 23.12.2017 and

the writ petition has been filed on 16.03.2021, which is

after lapse of more than 4 years. He refers to paragraph

6 of the writ petition to submit that no explanation

whatsoever let alone sufficient cause is pleaded in the

writ petition for the delay. The delay cannot be condoned

for administrative lapses. And in support of the same,

he relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the

cases of SHEORAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS V. UNION

OF INDIA5, STATE V. YOGESH AND ANOTHER6,

STATE OF ODISHA V. MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF

NAMATARA GIRLS HOSTEL7.

4.2. That admittedly FIR was not registered. Any investigation

undertaken by the petitioner without registering the FIR

is impermissible, more particularly, in the cases involving

5 (2023) 10 SCC 531 6 2025 SCC ONLINE DEL.4718 7 2026 SCC ONLINE SC 191

allegation of demand and payment of bribe. That the

Petitioner-Lokayukta cannot claim and conduct a raid

merely on receiving the credible information, without

registering an FIR. To support this contention he relies

upon the judgment of this Court in the case of DR. M. K.

PUSHPITHA V. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND

ANOTHER passed in W.P.No.10241/2021 dated

04.08.2021 and in the case of K. T. GURUPRAKASH v.

STATE OF KARNATAKA passed in

Crl.P.No.6845/ 2017 dated 27.03.2024 and judgment

of the Apex Court in the case of SOMASHEKHRAPPA

V. KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA8. <

4.3. That no trap was conducted which is essential to prove

the factum of demand and payment in the cases falling

under the provisions of PC Act, 1988. He relies upon the

judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of MIR.

MUSTAFA ALI HASMI V. STATE OF ANDRA

PRADESH9, C.M. SHARMA V. STATE OF ANDRA

PRADESH10, B JAYARAJ V. STATE OF ANDRA

8 2013 SCC ONLINE KAR. 1305 9 (2024) 10 SCC 489 10 (2010) 15 SCC 1

PRADESH11, N. VIJAYAKUMAR V. STATE OF TAMIL

NADU12 and STATE OF LOKAYUKTA POLICE,

DAVANAGERE V. C.B. NAGARAJ13.

4.4. That mere recovery of the cash even if accepted on the

face value is insufficient, inasmuch as, element of

demand and acceptance has to be proved as a matter of

fact. He relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in

the cases of BANARSI DASS V. STATE OF HARYANA14,

SOMARAJU V. STATE OF ANDRA PRADESH15.

4.5. That since accused Nos.1 to 7 who alleged to have

received the bribe amount upon purported instruction of

respondent No.2 herein who is accused No.8 have been

exonerated of the offences, the petitioner-Lokayukta

cannot possibly prove the factum of demand and

acceptance.

4.6. That there are no claimants in this case. If the

prosecution had received the CD during investigation as

claimed, prosecution ought to have registered the first

11 (2014) 13 SCC 5 12 (2021) 3 SCC 687 13 2025 SCC ONLINE SC 1175 14 (2010) 4 SCC 450 15 SCC Online SC 2291.

information report and proceeded to conduct trap

mahazar thereof. That in the instant case, raid was

conducted at the Excise Office Range-1 and Range-4 and

not at the office of respondent No.2. Thus, even at the

time when the raid was conducted, respondent No.2 was

not present at the spot and no amount or any material

whatsoever has been recovered from him.

4.7. That the petitioner prosecution after conducting the

purported raid at Excise Office Range-1 and Range-4 had

proceeded to the office of the respondent No.2, even

there, respondent No.2 was not present. Eventually, they

had allegedly recovered sum of Rs.6,160/- from the

security guard and sum of Rs.1,49,000/- during search of

house of the respondent No.2 and thereafter they had

filed an FIR in Crime No.12/2012 against respondent

No.2. Respondent No.2 had filed a quash petition

challenging the said FIR which has been allowed.

4.8. That once granting of sanction is declined, there is no

provision under law for review of said order on the very

same material.

4.9. He also refers to a communication dated 19.07.2019

issued by the Karnataka Lokayukta and the order dated

11.08.2020 and submits that after passing of the

impugned order on 23.12.2017 by the respondent No.1-

sanctioning authority, petitioner Lokayukta had issued the

said communication on 19.07.2019 seeking review of the

order which has also been declined by another order

dated

11.08.2020. This subsequent Order dated

11.08.2020 has neither been brought to the notice of the

Court nor the same has been challenged by the

petitioner-Lokayukta. Thus, he submits that petitioner is

guilty of suppression of facts.

4.10. That the petition filed by accused Nos.1 to 7 has been quashed by order dated 04.06.2024. The Special Leave Petition in SLP (Criminal) Diary No.42612/2025 filed by the petitioner-Lokayukta challenged the said order has been rejected on 16.09.2025. As such, even if sanction is accorded, the prosecution cannot proceed to conduct trial in the absence of accused Nos.1 to 7 who according to the prosecution are the persons who have received the bribe amount for and on behalf of the respondent No.2.

That there is no possibility of arraigning accused Nos.1 to 7 as accused in this matter particularly the case of this nature. Hence, seeks for dismissal of the petition.

¶5In response, counsel for the petitioner relies upon

judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION OF DELHI V. RAM KISHAN ROHTAGI

AND OTHERS16 as well as in the case of

RAJENDRA SINGH V. STATE OF U.P. AND

ANOTHER17 .

5.1. Referring to paragraph 17 of the judgment in the case of

RAJENDRA SINGH (supra) which refers to judgment in

the case of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION DELHI

(supra), he submits that there is no bar to initiate action

or arraigning accused Nos.1 to 7 as accused in exercise of

power under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 even if cases against them had been

quashed.

5.2. He also relies upon another judgment of the Apex Court

in the case of ARTI MEHTA AND OTHERS V. THE

16 (1983) 1 SCC 1 17 (2007) 7 SCC 378

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER passed

in SLP(Criminal) No.18345/2024 to contend that

quashing of the proceedings in exercise of power under

Section 482 of Cr.PC is not equal to acquittal after trial.

Therefore, there is every legally recognized possibility to

re-array accused Nos.1 to 7 as parties during the trial

and the same would not amount to double jeopardy.

5.3. That the principle of bar to review the order declining

sanction is not a universal rule. If this Court sets aside

the order declined to grant sanction, the matter can be

remitted to the respondent No.1-sanctioning authority to

reconsider the same, inasmuch as, the order declined to

re-grant has been passed without appreciating the

material evidence placed by the petitioner-Lokayukta.

¶6Heard. Perused the records.

¶7The point that arises for consideration is; "Whether petitioner-Lokayukta has made out a case for setting aside the impugned order passed by respondent No.1 declined to grant the sanction to prosecute to respondent No.2 and for reconsideration of the said matter?"

¶8Purpose of granting sanction to prosecute the

Government Official and the scope of the same has been

dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of CENTRAL

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION V. ASHOK KUMAR

AGGARWAL18 wherein at paragraphs 13 and 16, the

Apex Court has held as under; "13. The prosecution has to satisfy the court that at the time of sending the matter for grant of sanction by the competent authority, adequate material for such grant was made available to the said authority. This may also be evident from the sanction order, in case it is extremely comprehensive, as all the facts and circumstances of the case may be spelt out in the sanction order. However, in every individual case, the court has to find out whether there has been an application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority concerned on the material placed before it. It is so necessary for the reason that there is an obligation on the sanctioning authority to discharge its duty to give or withhold sanction only after having full knowledge of the material facts of the case. Grant of sanction is not a mere formality. Therefore, the provisions in regard to the sanction must be observed with complete strictness keeping in mind the public interest and the protection available to the accused against whom the sanction is sought.

¶16In view of the above, the legal propositions can be summarised as under:

16.1. The prosecution must send the entire relevant record to the sanctioning authority including the FIR, disclosure statements, statements of witnesses, recovery memos, draft charge-sheet and all other relevant material. The record so sent should also contain the material/document, if any, which may tilt the balance in favour of the accused and on the basis

18 (2014) 14 SCC 295

of which, the competent authority may refuse sanction.

16.2. The authority itself has to do complete and conscious scrutiny of the whole record so produced by the prosecution independently applying its mind and taking into consideration all the relevant facts before grant of sanction while discharging its duty to give or withhold the sanction.

16.3. The power to grant sanction is to be exercised strictly keeping in mind the public interest and the protection available to the accused against whom the sanction is sought.

16.4. The order of sanction should make it evident that the authority had been aware of all relevant facts/materials and had applied its mind to all the relevant material.

16.5. In every individual case, the prosecution has to establish and satisfy the court by leading evidence that the entire relevant facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority and the authority had applied its mind on the same and that the sanction had been granted in accordance with law".

¶9Similarly, in the case of SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

(CBI) V. DEEPAK CHOWDHARY AND OTHERS19, the

Apex Court in paragraph 5 has held as under; "5. We find force in the contention. The grant of sanction is only an administrative function, though it is true that the accused may be saddled with the liability to be prosecuted in a court of law. What is material at that time is that the necessary facts collected during investigation constituting the offence have to be placed before the sanctioning authority and it has to consider the material. Prima facie, the authority is required to reach the satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction. The grant of sanction, therefore, being administrative act the need to provide an opportunity of

19 (1995) 6 SCC 225

hearing to the accused before according sanction does not arise. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the order of sanction is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice."

¶10Thus, the process of grant of sanction is a matter of

serious nature, which if granted, would enable the

prosecution to proceed against a Government servant.

The requirement of grant of sanction is to prevent any

frivolous or vexatious prosecution.

¶11In the instant case, admittedly there is no formal

complaint given by any person alleging demand for bribe

by respondent No.2. It is apparently based on certain

credible information, petitioner-Lokayukta police had

obtained search warrant and had proceeded to Excise

Office Range-1 and Range-4 and conducted raid and in

the process they apparently found cash in possession of

accused Nos.1 to 7. Respondent No.2 was not present at

the spot.

¶12It is during the said raid, apparently while recording the statement one of the witnesses, namely, Chandrashekar has presented the CD and authenticity of which is also not brought on record by the petitioner-Lokayukta. It is

during the process of this investigation the prosecution has recovered some of Rs.1,64,000/- in Excise Office Range-1 and Rs.82,000/- in Excise Office Range-4. Mahazar in this regard has been drawn. The accused Nos.1 to 7 had approached this Court challenging the registration of the said FIR, which was allowed by this Court in W.P.No.159/2022 on 04.06.2024 and the crime against them has been quashed. This order has been carried by the appellant -Lokayukta to the Apex Court in SLP (Criminal) No.42612/2025 and the same has also resulted in dismissal.

¶13Similarly, record revealed on the very same day,

petitioner-Lokayukta registered another case in Crime

No.12/2012 against respondent No.2, challenging the

same the respondent No.2 had preferred a criminal

petition in Crl.P.No.4680/2012 which was also allowed by

order dated 15.02.2013. The said order also has attained

finality. Thus, case of the petitioner-Lokayukta as against

accused Nos.1 to 7 stands quashed and the same has

attained finality. Similarly, even as against respondent

No.2 a second case in Crime No.12/2012 has also been

quashed and the same has also attained finality.

¶14The only issue which is now pending is, non-consideration

of granting of sanction by the respondent No.1-

sanctioning authority. Law, as noted above, clearly

indicates granting of sanction is administrative exercise of

power by the authorities, who are required to apply their

mind to the material collected during the investigation by

the prosecution and make out if the same reflect and

make out a prima facie case against respondent No.2.

¶15It is necessary at this juncture to refer to the impugned

sanction order dated 23.12.2017 as per Annexure-G,

which read as under; ಕಾಟಕ ಸಾರ ¸ÀASÉå:DE 109 E¦J¸ï 2012 ಕಾಟಕ ಸಾರದ ಸ

ಾಲಯ,

ಾನೌಧ, ೆಂಗಳರು,

ಾಂಕ:23.12.2017

ಇಂದ: ಸಾರದ ಅಪರ ಮುಖ" ಾಯದ#, ಆ%ಕ ಇ&ಾ'ೆ,

ಇವ)*ೆ: ಅಪರ +,ೕ. ಮ/ಾ01ೇಶಕರು, ಕಾಟಕ &ೋಾಯುಕ4 , ೆಂಗಳರು-560001

5ಾನ"6ೆ,

ಷಯ: 8ಾ| ೈ.ಮಂಜುಾ;, ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರು, >ೖಸೂರು ?&ೆ@ ಇವರ ರುದA 1ಾಖ&ಾBರುವ CಕದD> ಅEFೕಜಾ ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG 0ೕಡುವ ಕು)ತು.

ಉ&ೆ@ೕಖ: ತಮJ ಪತK ಸಂ'ೆ": &ೋL/ಐಎO(?)/ಎಂ-25/PಆQ-11/2012 ªÉÄʸÀÆgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ:01.08.2013, 04.06.2014 2 08.12.2016

>ೕಲRಂಡ ಷಯೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ ಉ&ೆ@ೕUತ ಪತKಗಳತ4 ಗಮನ ೆVೆಯ&ಾB1ೆ. 8ಾ| ೈ.ಮಂಜುಾ;, Wಂ1ೆ >ೖಸೂ)ನ ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ46ಾB ಾಯ0ವWಸುG4ದD ಆವSಯ,@ ಾಂಕ:27.11.2012 ರಂದು ವಲಯ-1 ಮತು4 ವಲಯ-4ರ ಕXೇ)ಗಳ 1ಾY ಮತು4 Zೆ[ೕಧೆ*ೆ ಸಂಬಂSPದ &ೋಾಯುಕ4 CಕದD> ಸಂ'ೆ": 11/2012ೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ ಸ,@ಸ&ಾBರುವ ಅಂGಮ ತ0'ಾ ವರ ಯ,@ ಸದ) ಪKಕರಣದ,@ ಅSಾ)ಯವರು ಭK^ಾ_Xಾರ 06ೋಧ ಅS0ಯಮ 1988ರ ೆ`O-7, 13(1)(a) bೊTೆ*ೆ ಓದ&ಾದ 13(2)ರaಯ,@ ಅಪ6ಾಧ ಎಸBದುD, ಈ ಅಪ6ಾಧಗY*ಾB ಸ`ಮ ಾ"eಾಲಯದ,@ ಅEFೕಜೆ*ೊYಸಲು ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG 0ೕಡುವಂTೆ ೋರ&ಾB1ೆ. CಕದD> ಸಂ'ೆ":11/2012ೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದ ಅಂGಮ ತ0'ಾ ವರ ಮತು4 1ಾಖ&ೆಗಳನುf ವರ ಾB ಪ)#ೕ,ಸ&ಾB1ೆ. ಅEFೕಜೆ ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG*ೆ ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ 0ಣಯ Tೆ*ೆದುೊಳgಲು ಪhರಕ ಾB ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡ ಅಂಶಗಳನುf ಪ)ಗiಸ&ಾB1ೆ:-

(1) CಕದD> ಸಂ'ೆ":12/2012ೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ

ಾಂಕ:27.11.2012ರಂದು >ೖಸೂ)ನ ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರ ಕXೇ)*ೆ 1ಾY ನ8ೆP Zೆ[ೕಧೆ ನ8ೆPದುD ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರ ಬY eಾವj1ೇ ಹಣ 1ೊ6ೆGರುವj ಲ@. ಅವರ ಕXೇ)ಯ ಅಬಾ) ರ`ಕರ ಬY ಕXೇ)ಯ,@ ರೂ.6,160/- ಮತು4 ಮೆ Zೆ[ೕಧೆಯ,@ ರೂ.1,49,000/-ಗಳ ನಗದು ಪTೆ4eಾBರುತ41ೆ. ಈ ಸಂಬಂಧದ,@ 1ಾಖ&ಾBದD CಕದD> ಸಂ'ೆ":12/2012ೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ 8ಾ|

ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾಥರವರು ಎm.ಐ.ಆQ ಮತು4 ಇತ6ೆ ಎ&ಾ@ ನಡವYಗಳನುf ಪK#fP 5ಾನ" ಕಾಟಕ ಉಚo ಾ"eಾಲಯದ ಮುಂ1ೆ pKqನr stಷO ಸಂ'ೆ" :4680/2012 ನುf ಸ,@PದುD ಾಂಕ:15.02.2016ರ Gೕsನ,@ 5ಾನ" ಉಚu ಾ"eಾಲಯವj CಕದD> ಸಂ'ೆ":12/2012ರ,@ >ೖಸೂರು &ೋಾಯುಕ4 +,ೕ. ಸ,@PದD ಎm.ಐ.ಆQ ನುf ರದುD*ೊYP1ೆ. ಅಲ@1ೆ ಈ ಪKಕರಣದ 1ಾYಯ ಸಂದಭದ,@ >ೖಸೂ)ನ ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ46ಾದ 8ಾ| ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ; ರವರ ಬY ಈ ದೂರುಗY*ೆ ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ eಾವj1ೇ ಹಣ ಅಥ ಾ 1ಾಖ&ೆಗಳv 1ೊರpರುವj ಲ@.

(2) >ೖಸೂರು &ೋಾಯುಕ4 +,ೕ. 1ಾಖ,Pರುವ CಕದD> ಸಂ'ೆ": 11/2012ರ,@ ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರ ಾ"s4*ೆ ಬರುವ ವಲಯ-1 ಮತು4 ವಲಯ-4 ರ ಕXೇ)ಗಳ,@ 1ಾY ನ8ೆP 2012-13ೇ ಾ,ನ ಅಬಾ) ಸನfದುಗಳ ಾwಕ ನೕಕರಣೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ ಪ8ೆಯುG4ದD6ೆಂಬ ಆ6ೋಪದ >ೕ&ೆ ವಲಯ ಕXೇ)-4ರ,@ ರೂ.82,000/- ಮತು4 ವಲಯ ಕXೇ)-1ರ,@ ರೂ.1,64,000/- ಗಳನುf ಮತು4 ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ_ 1ಾಖ&ೆಗಳನುf ವಶಪaPೊಳg&ಾB1ೆ. ಈ ಪKಕರಣದ,@ ದೂರು1ಾರ6ಾದ #Kೕ ಚಂದKZೇಖQ ರವರು /ಾಜರು ಪaPದ ಧxti 1ಾಖ&ೆ P.aFಂ *ೆ ಎm.ಐ.ಆQ 1ಾಖ,Pತು4. ಈ ಲಂಚದ ಹಣವನುf ಆ6ೋs-8 8ಾ|

ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ;, ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರ 5ೌUಕ ಸೂಚೆಯಂTೆ ಸಂಗKWಸ&ಾBTೆ4ಂದು ಆ6ೋsಸ&ಾB1ೆ. ಆದ6ೆ, 8ಾ|

ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ;, ರವ6ೊಂ *ೆ ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ eಾವj1ೇ ೇರ ಾದ ಆ6ೋಪ ಇರುವj ಲ@ /ಾಗೂ ಈ ಆ6ೋಪೆR ಪhರಕ ಾB 5ೌUಕ ಾyಗಳನುf zಟ_6ೆ eಾವj1ೇ ಪhರಕ ಾ{ಾ|ಾರಗಳv ಕಂಡುಬರುG4ಲ@.

(3) ಈ ಪKಕರಣದ,@ CಕದD> ಸಂ'ೆ" :11/2012ರ,@ ಒಟು_ 8 ಆ6ೋsಗYದುD 8ಾ| ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ;, ರವರು 8ೇ ಆ6ೋseಾB1ಾD6ೆ. ಉYದ 7 ಆ6ೋsಗಳv 5ೌUಕ /ೇYೆಯಾfಧ)P ಆ6ೋs ೌಕರರ ಸೂಚೆಯಂTೆ ಲಂಚದ ಹಣವನುf ಆದ6ೆ, 7 ಆ6ೋs ೌಕರರ ಸಂಗKWಸ&ಾBTೆ4ಂಬ Gೕ5ಾನೆR ಬರ&ಾB1ೆ. ಾyಗಳನುf ಪ)#ೕ,Pದ,@ 4 ಜನ ಾyಗಳv ಘಟೆ ನ8ೆದ ಸಂದಭದ,@ ಕXೇ)ಯ,@ ಇರ,ಲ@ ೆಂಬುದು ಸ•ಷ_ ಾಗುತ41ೆ. ಅವರ /ೇYೆಗಳv ಸ•ಷ_ ಮತು4 0Sಷ_ ಾBರುವj ಲ@. ಇತರರು ಕಂಡಂTೆ ಮತು4 /ೇYದಂTೆ ಅವರ /ೇYೆಗಳv ಪKGzಂಬತ ಾB1ೆ. ಇತರ ಾyಗಳv ಸಹ ಆ6ೋs-8 ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ ಸಂಗKWಸಲು 0Sಷ_ ಸೂಚೆ 0ೕaದDರು ಎಂಬುದನುf ಾyಗಳ,@ ಸ•ಷ_ ಾB ನುa ರುವj ಲ@. ಆದD)ಂದ ಈ 5ೌUಕ ಾyಗಳನುf ಆಧ)P ಅEFೕಜೆ ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG*ೆ ಪ)ಗiಸುವjದು ಸೂಕ4 ಾಗ&ಾರದು. ಅಲ@1ೆ, 5ೌಖಕ ಾyಗಳನುf 0€ಾಯಕ ಾyಗVೆಂದು ಪ)ಗiಸಲು ಬರುವj ಲ@.

(4) ಆ6ೋs ೌಕರರ ಾ"s4ಯ ವಲಯ-1 ಮತು4 ವಲಯ-4 ಕXೇ)ಗಳ,@ ಆ6ೋs-1 )ಂದ 7 ರವ6ೆBನ ೌಕರರುಗಳv ಅಸ•ಷ_ ಾB ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರ 5ೌUಕ ಸೂಚೆಯಂTೆ ಸನfದುಗಳ ನೕಕರಣ ಸಂಬಂಧದ,@ ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ ಸಂಗKWಸ&ಾಗುG4ತು4 ಎಂದು GYPರುTಾ46ೆ. ಆದ6ೆ, ಕಾಟಕ ಾಗ)ಕ ೇ ಾ(ನಡTೆ) 0ಯಮಗಳv 1966 ರ 0ಯಮ 3 ರನ•ಯ ಪKGF‚ಬ ಸಾ) ೌಕರರು ಸಂಪhಣ 0ೕG 0^ೆƒಯನುf /ೊಂ ರತಕRದುD ಮತು4 ಕತವ" ಶK1ೆAಯನುf /ೊಂ ರತಕRದುD ಎಂದು ಸ•ಷ_ಪaಸ&ಾB1ೆ. ಅಲ@1ೆ ತಮJ W)ಯ ೌಕರರುಗಳv eಾವj1ೇ ಾನೂನುಾWರ ಸೂಚೆಗಳನುf 0ೕaದ,@ ಅದರಂTೆ ಕKಮ ಜರುBಸುವ ಅಗತ"Tೆ ಇರುವj ಲ@. ಮುಂದುವ)ದು W)ಯ ಅSಾ)ಗಳv eಾವj1ೇ 5ೌUಕ

ಸೂಚೆ 0ೕaದ,@ ಅದರಂTೆ ಕKಮ ವWPದ,@ ಆದಷು_ೇಗ ಅದೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ ,Uತ ಾB P")ೕಕರಣ ಪ8ೆಯುವjದು 0ಯಮಗಳನ•ಯ ಅಗತ" ಾB1ೆ. ಆದD)ಂದ, ಈ ಪKಕರಣದ,@ ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರು 5ೌUಕ ಾB ಸೂಚೆ ಾನೂನುಾWರ ಾBದD,@ ಅದರಂTೆ ಕKಮ ಜರುBPದ,@ ವಲಯ-1 ಮತು4 ವಲಯ-4 ಕXೇ)ಯ Pಬ…ಂ ಅಂತಹ ಕKಮವನುf ತಮ*ೆ ಉಂ†ಾಗಬಹು1ಾದ Tೊಂದ6ೆ ಅ)ದDರೂ /ಾಗೂ ತಮJ ಜ ಾಾD)ಯ (their own risk and responsibility) >ೕ&ೆ ೈ*ೊಂaರುTಾ46ೆ.

(5) ಈ ಪKಕರಣದ,@ ಪKಮುಖ ಾದ ಾ`| ೆಂದು ಪ)ಗiಸ&ಾBರುವ ಸನfದು1ಾರ6ಾದ #Kೕ ಚಂದKZೇಖQರವರು ಅಬಾ) ಆಯುಕ4ರು ಲಂಚ ೇaೆ ಸಂ‡ಾಷ€ೆಯನುf ಾಂಕ:17.06.2012 ಮತು4 19.06.2012 ರಂದು Cೈr ನ,@ 6ೆಾˆ 5ಾaೊಂaದುD ನಂತರ ಅದನುf P.a. *ೆ ಾs 5ಾa ತ0'ಾSಾ)ಗY*ೆ ಅಬಾ) ವಲಯ ಕXೇ)ಗಳ 1ಾY ಸಂದಭದ,@ /ಾಜರುಪaPರುTಾ46ೆ. ಈ P.a ಸಂ‡ಾಷ€ೆಗಳನುf ನಂತರದ,@ S‰ಾನ ಪKFೕ*ಾಲಯ ಂದ ಪ)ೕ{ೆ*ೊಳಪaP ವರ ಯನುf ಪ8ೆಯ&ಾBರುತ41ೆ. ಈ ವರ ಯನ•ಯ P.a.ಯ,@ರುವ ಧx0ಗಳv 8ಾ|

ೈ.ಮಂಜುಾ; ಮತು4 ಸನfದು1ಾರ6ಾದ #Kೕ ಚಂದKZೇಖQ ಮತು4 #Kೕ ಗುರುಾ•qಯವರ ಧx0ಗY*ೆ /ೋ,ೆeಾಗುತ4 ೆ ಎಂಬ ವರ ಯನುf 0ೕಡ&ಾBರುತ41ೆ. ಆದ6ೆ, P.a.ಯು 0ಜ ಾದು1ೇ (genuineness) ಎಂಬ ಬ*ೆŠ eಾವj1ೇ ದೃŒೕಕರಣ 0ೕaರುವj ಲ@. ಆದD)ಂದ ಈ ಎ8ೆO•ನುf 0€ಾಯಕ ಾyŽಂದು ಪ)ಗiಸುವjದು ಕಷ_ ಾಗುತ41ೆ.

(6) ಕಾಟಕ ಉಚo ಾ"eಾಲಯವj pKqನr ¦nµÀ£ï ಸಂ'ೆ":3202/2017ರ,@ 0ೕaರುವ Gೕsನನ•ಯ ಎ&ೆಾ•0L ಎ8ೆO•ನುf Indian Evidence Act 1872 ನ ೆ`O 65(z)(2) ರ,@ 0Sಷ_ಪaPರುವ ಷರತು4ಗಳನುf ಪh6ೈಸ ರುವjದ)ಂದ ಈ ಎ&ೆಾ•0L ಎ8ೆO•ನುf ಾ`| ೆಂದು ಪ)ಗiಸಲು ಾಧ" ಾಗುವj ಲ@. ಈ ಪKಕರಣದ,@ ಸಂ‡ಾಷ€ೆಯನುf Cದಲು Cೈr •ೕOನ,@ 1ಾಖ,ಸ&ಾBತು4 ನಂತರ ಸನfದು1ಾರರ ಅದನುf P.a. ಆB ಪ)ವGP 1ಾY ಸಂದಭದ,@ 0ೕaರುವjದು ಕಂಡುಬರುತ41ೆ. ನಂತರದ,@ Cೈr ನ,@ ಸಂ‡ಾಷ€ೆ*ಾB ಲಭ"ಲ@1ೆ ಇದುDದ)ಂದ P.a. ಯ,@ರುವ ಸಂ‡ಾಷ€ೆ ಮೂಲ ಸಂ‡ಾಷ€ೆŽೕ ಅಥ ಾ ಅದನುf eಾವj1ೇ )ೕGಯ,@ ಸಂಕಲನ 5ಾಡ&ಾBTೆ4ೕ JA§ ಬ*ೆŠ ಸ•ಷ_Tೆ ಇರುವj ಲ@. ಈ ಆಂಶಗಳನುf ತ0'ಾSಾ)ಗಳv ಪ)ಗiPರುವjದು ಕಂಡುಬರುವj ಲ@. S ‰ಾನ ಪKFೕ*ಾಲಯದ,@ ೇವಲ ಅSಾ)ಯವರ ಧxti /ೋ,ೆಯ ಅಂಶವನುf ಅ^ೆ_ೕ ಪ)ಗiಸ&ಾBದುD ಉYದ ಅಂಶಗಳ ಬ*ೆŠ eಾವj1ೇ ವರ 0ೕaರುವjದು ಕಂಡುಬರುವj ಲ@. ಅಲ@1ೇ ಈ ಹಂತದ,@ ತ0'ಾSಾ)ಯವರು eಾವj1ೇ ಪK5ಾಣ ಪತK 0ೕಡಲು ಅವಾಶರುವj ಲ@.

>ೕಲRಂಡ Zೆ@ೕಷ€ೆ'ಂದ ವ"ಕ4 ಾಗುವಂTೆ, ಈ ಪKಕರಣದ,@ 8ಾ| ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ;, Wಂ ನ >ೖಸೂರು ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರು ಇವರ ರುದA eಾವj1ೇ ೇರ ಆ6ೋಪಗಳv ಇಲ@ ರುವjದು ಸ•ಷ_ ಾಗುತ41ೆ. ವಲಯ-1 ಮತು4 ವಲಯ-4 ರ,@ನ ೌಕರರುಗಳv ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರ 5ೌUಕ ಸೂಚೆಯ >ೕ6ೆ*ೆ eಾವj1ೇ ಕKಮ ಜರುBPದD,@ ಅದು ಾನೂನುಾWರ ಾBದುD ಆ ೌಕರರುಗಳv ತಮJ ಜ ಾಾD)ಯ >ೕ&ೆ Tೆ*ೆದುೊಂಡ ಕKಮ ಾBರುತ41ೆ. ಅಲ@1ೇ, ಈ ಪKಕರಣದ,@ನ ಆ6ೋs-1 )ಂದ 8 ಇವರ 5ೌUಕ /ೇYೆಗಳv ಆ6ೋs-8 ರವರು 5ೌUಕ ಸೂಚೆ 0ೕaರುವ ಬ*ೆŠ 0Sಷ_ ಾB /ೇYರುವjದು ಕಂಡುಬರುವj ಲ@. ಆ6ೋs-8 ಇವರ ಬY eಾವj1ೇ ಹಣ ಅಥ ಾ 1ಾಖ&ೆಗಳv 1ೊರpಲ@ ಾದD)ಂದ ಅವರ ರುದA eಾವj1ೇ 'ಾKಥqಕ ಾ{ಾ|ಾರಗಳv ಲಭ"ರುವj ಲ@. ಅಲ@1ೆ, P.a. ಯನುf ಾ{ಾ|ಾರ ೆಂದು ಪ)ಗiಸುವ ಷಯದ,@ >ೕ&ೆ ಉ&ೆ@ೕUPರುವ 5ಾನ" ಉಚo ಾ"eಾಲಯದ Gೕsನನ•ಯ ಎ&ೆಾ•0L ಎ8ೆO•ನನುf Indian Evidence Act 1872 ನ ೆ`O 65(z)(2) ರ,@ 0Sಷ_ಪaPರುವ ಷರತು4ಗಳನುf ಪh6ೈಸ ರುವjದ)ಂದ ಈ ಎ&ೆಾ•0L ಎ8ೆO• ನುf ಾ`| ೆಂದು ಪ)ಗiಸಲು ಾಧ" ಾಗುವj ಲ@.

ಆದD)ಂದ ವಲಯ-1 ಮತು4 ವಲಯ-4 ಕXೇ)ಯ,@ ನ8ೆ ರುವ &ೋಾಯುಕ4 1ಾY ಸಂದಭದ,@ 1ೊರpರುವ ಹಣ ಮತು4 ನ8ೆ ರುವ ಘಟೆಗY*ೆ ಆ6ೋs-8ನುf ೇರ ಾB /ೊ€ೆ*ಾರರಾfB 5ಾಡಲು ¸ÁzsÀåªÁUÀĪÀÅ¢®è. vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è w½¹gÀĪÀAvÉ DgÉÆæ-8 F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è ¨sÀæµÀÖZÁgÀ ¤gÉÆÃzsÀ C¢ü¤AiÀĪÀÄ 1988 gÀ ೆ`O 7, 13(1)(r) bೊTೆ*ೆ ಓದ&ಾದ 13(2)ರaಯ,@ ಅಪ6ಾಧ ಎಸBರುವjದು >ೕ&ೊfೕಟೆR ಕಂಡುಬರುವj ಲ@. ಆದ6ೆ, ವಲಯ-1 ಮತು4 ವಲಯ-4 ಕXೇ)UÀ¼ÀÄ ಇವರ ಅSಾರ ಾ"s4*ೆ ಬರುವjದ)ಂದ ಸ•ಷ_ ಾB >ೕ,•Xಾರ€ಾ ೈಫಲ"Tೆ ಕಂಡುಬರುತ41ೆ ಮತು4 ಇದು ದುನಡTೆಯ ಾ"s4ಯ,@ ಬರಬಹುದು. ಆದ6ೆ, ಈ ಆ6ೋಪವj eಾವj1ೇ ಅಪ6ಾSಕ ಸ•ರೂಪ /ೊಂ ರುವjದು ಕಂಡುಬರುವj ಲ@. ದುನಡTೆ*ೆ ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ ಈ*ಾಗ&ೇ 8ಾ| ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ; ೇ)ದಂTೆ ಇತರ 7 ೌಕರರ ರುದA ಇ&ಾ'ಾ Xಾರ€ೆ ನ8ೆಸಲು ೆ.P.ಎ.(P.P.ಎ) 0ಯಮಗಳv 1957ರ 0ಯಮ 14(ಎ)ರaಯ,@ 5ಾನ" &ೋಾಯುಕ4ೆR ವWಸ&ಾBದುD ಅದರ,@ /ೊರಬರಬಹು1ಾದ 0ಣಯವನುf 0)ೕyಸಬಹು1ಾB1ೆ.

>ೕಲRಂಡ Zೆ@ೕಷ€ೆಯ Wೆf&ೆಯ,@, 8ಾ| ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ;, Wಂ ನ >ೖಸೂರು ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರು, ಇವರನುf ಭK^ಾ_Xಾರ 06ೋಧ ಅS0ಯಮ 1988 ರ ೆ`O-7, 13(1)(a) bೊTೆ*ೆ ಓದ&ಾದ 13(2) ರaಯ,@ ಅಪ6ಾಧ

ೆಸBರುವjದು >ೕ&ೊfೕಟೆR ಕಂಡುಬರುG4ಲ@ ಾದD)ಂದ ಸದ) ಅS0ಯಮದ 19(1)(z) ರaಯ,@ ಸ`ಮ ಾ"eಾಲಯದ,@ ಅEFೕಜೆ*ೊYಸಲು

ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG*ೆ ೋ)ರುವ ಪKಾ4ವೆಯನುf GರಸR)ಸ&ಾB1ೆಂದು ತಮ*ೆ GYಸಲು 01ೇ#ತಾB1ೆDೕೆ."

¶16Thus, respondent No.1-sanctioning authority has given 6

reasons declining to grant the sanction. The said 6

reasoning extracted herein above would indicate that the

material furnished by the petitioner-Lokayukta in the

nature of seizure mahazar, witness statements, CD

containing conversation, statement of the accused

persons, all have been taken into consideration and has

thus come to the conclusion of prosecution not making

out a prima facie case to grant of sanctions.

¶17Another aspect of the matter which was brought to the notice of this Court by Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and about which the petitioner has not whispered anything is, subsequent to the impugned order dated

23.12.2017 at Annexure-G, the petitioner-Lokayukta seemed to have made an application to the respondent No.1-sanctioning authority for reconsideration of its order vide communication dated 19.07.2019, which is also almost 2 years subsequent to the said order passed on 23.12.2017. The said requests seem to have

been rejected by the respondent No.1-sanctioning authority vide order dated 11.08.2020. The said order dated 11.08.2020 reads as under; ಕಾಟಕ ಸಾರ ಸಂ'ೆ":ಆಇ 109 ಇsಎ. 2012 ಕಾಟಕ ಸಾರದ ಸ

ಾಲಯ,

ಾನ ೌಧ,

¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ, ¢£ÁAPÀ:11-08-2020 ಇವ)ಂದ: ಸಾರದ ಅಪರ ಮುಖ" ಾಯದ#, ಆ%ಕ ಇ&ಾ'ೆ,

ಇವ)*ೆ: ಅಪರ +,ೕ. ಮ/ಾ01ೇಶಕರು, ಕಾಟಕ &ೋಾಯುಕ4, ೆಂಗಳರು.

5ಾನ"6ೆ,

ಷಯ: #Kೕ 8ಾ| ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ;, ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರು, >ೖಸೂರು,

ಇವರ ರುದA >ೖಸೂರು &ೋಾಯುಕ4 ಕ•ೇ)ಯ,@ 1ಾಖ&ಾBರುವ 1ಾY ಪKಕರಣದ,@ ಅEFೕಜಾ ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG 0ೕಡುವ ಬ*ೆŠ.

ಉ&ೆ@ೕಖ: 1. ಸಾರದ ಸಮಸಂ'ೆ"ಯ ಾಂಕ:23-12-2017.

¶2ಅಪರ +,ೕ. ಮ/ಾ 01ೇಶಕರು, ಕಾಟಕ &ೋಾಯುಕ4 ಇವರ ಪತK ಸಂ'ೆ": &ೋL/ಐಎO(?)/ಎಂ-25/PಆQ-11/2012, ªÉÄʸÀÆgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 01.08.2013, 04.06.2014, 08.12.2016 ಮತು4 19-07-2019.

>ೕಲRಂಡ ಷಯೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ, ಉ&ೆ@ೕUತ ಪತKಗಳತ4 ಗಮನ ೆVೆಯ&ಾB1ೆ. 8ಾ| ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ; ಇವರು >ೖಸೂರು ?&ೆ@ಯ,@ ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ46ಾB ಕತವ" 0ವWಸುG4ದD ಅವSಯ,@ ಾಂಕ:27.11.2012 ರಂದು ವಲಯ-1 ಮತು4 ವಲಯ-4 ರ ಕ•ೇ)ಗಳ 1ಾY ಮತು4 Zೆ[ೕಧೆ*ೆ ಸಂಬಂSPದ &ೋಾಯುಕ4 CಕದD> ಸಂ'ೆ" 11/2012 ೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ ಸ,@ಸ&ಾBರುವ ಅಂGಮ ತ0'ಾ ವರ ಯ,@ ಸದ) ಪKಕರಣದ,@ ಅSಾ)ಯವರು ಭK^ಾ_Xಾರ 06ೋಧ ಅS0ಯಮ 1988 ರ ೆ`O-7,

13(1)(a) bೊTೆ*ೆ ಓದ&ಾದ 13(2) ರaಯ,@ ಅಪ6ಾಧ ಎಸBದುD, ಈ ಅಪ6ಾಧಗY*ಾB ಸ`ಮ ಾ"eಾಲಯದ,@ ಅEFೕಜೆ*ೊYಸಲು ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG 0ೕಡುವಂTೆ ಉ&ೆ@ೕUತ (2)ರ ಪತKಗಳ,@ ೋರ&ಾದ >ೕ6ೆ*ೆ, CಕದD> ಸಂ'ೆ":11/2012ೆR ಸಂಬಂSPದ ಅಂGಮ ತ0'ಾ ವರ ಮತು4 1ಾಖ&ೆಗಳನುf ವರ ಾB ಪ)#ೕ,P ಪhರಕ ಅಂಶಗVೆಂ *ೆ ಉ&ೆ@ೕUತ (1)ರ

ಾಂಕ:23.12.2017ರ ಪತKದ,@ 8ಾ| ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ;, Wಂ ನ >ೖಸೂರು ?&ೆ@ಯ ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರು ಇವರನುf ಭK^ಾ_Xಾರ 06ೋಧ ಅS0ಯಮ 1988 ರ ೆ`O-7, 13(1) (a) bೊTೆ*ೆ ಓದ&ಾದ 13(2) ರaಯ,@ ಅಪ6ಾಧ ಎಸBರುವjದು >ೕ&ೊfೕಟೆR ಕಂಡು ಾರದ Wನf&ೆಯ,@ ಸದ) ಅS0ಯಮದ 19(1)(z) ರaಯ,@ ಸ`ಮ ಾ"eಾಲಯದ,@ ಅEFೕಜೆ*ೊYಸಲು ೋ)ದD ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG ಪKಾ4ವೆಯನುf GರಸR)ಸ&ಾBರುತ41ೆ.

ಉ&ೆ@ೕಖ (2) ರ ಾಂಕ:19.07.2019ರ ಪತKದ,@ ಕಾಟಕ &ೋಾಯುಕ4, ೆಂಗಳರು ಇವರು 8ಾ| ೈ.ಮಂಜುಾ;, Wಂ ನ ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರು, >ೖಸೂರು ?&ೆ@ ಇವರ Gರಸ–ತ ಅEFೕಜಾ ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG*ೆ ಸಂಬಂSPದಂTೆ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 02.07.20196 vÀ¤SÁ¢üPÁjAiÀĪÀgÀ ವರ /ಾಗೂ ಅಡಕಗಳನುf ಪ)#ೕ,P ಆ'ಾ ತರ ರುದA ಸ`ಮ ಾ"eಾಲಯದ,@ ಅEFೕಜಾ ಮಂಜೂ6ಾGಯನುf #ೕಘK ಾB /ೊರaಸುವಂTೆ ಮTೊ4>J ೋ)ರುವjದನುf ಪ)#ೕ,ಸ&ಾ'ತು. 5ಾನ" ಸ—ೕಚo ಾ"eಾಲಯದ Gೕಪjಗಳನ•ಯ ಸದ) ಪKಕರಣದ,@ ಸಾರದ G5ಾನವನುf ಪjನQ ಪ)#ೕ,ಸಲು eಾವj1ೇ /ೊಸ ಅಥ ಾ /ೆಚುoವ) 1ಾಖ&ೆಗಳನುf ಪKಾ4sಸದ Wೆf&ೆಯ,@ 8ಾ| ೈ. ಮಂಜುಾ;, Wಂ ನ >ೖಸೂರು ?&ೆ@ ಅಬಾ) ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ4ರು, ಇವರ ರುದA ಸ`ಮ ಾ"eಾಲಯದ,@ pKqನr CಕದD> ಹೂಡಲು ಅEFೕಜಾ ಮಂಜೂ6ಾG ಪKಾ4ವೆಯನುf ಈ Wಂ1ೆ GರಸR)Pದ ಅಂಶವನುf ಪjನರುಚo)P1ೆ ಎಂದು ತಮ*ೆ GYಸಲು 01ೇ#ತVಾB1ೆDೕೆ."

Thus, there is no challenge to the said order by the petitioner.

¶18As regard to the delay, paragraph 6 of the writ petition

indicating delay in filing the writ petition, which read as

under;

"6. It is submitted that there is some delay in filing the writ due to consultations made within the

office of the petitioner to adopt legal course and COVID-19 situation. However delay if any is not intentional or deliberate. It is submitted that the Respondent No 2 cannot derive any right to resist the petition on the ground of delay against crime of this nature".

¶19Except this general statement nothing is whispered in the

petition. Sufficient cause has to be as provided under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and cannot be

allowed to be assumed and presumed in the absence of

any satisfactory material thereon.

¶20It is not that the petitioner-Lokayukta was not aware of

the proceedings initiated by respondent No.2 as well as

the accused Nos.1 to 7 parallelly by filing criminal

petitions seeking quash of cases in Crime Nos.11/2012

and 12/2012 and petitioner-Lokayukta has been

contesting, opposing the said matters right upto Supreme

Court. It cannot therefore be accepted that there was

consultation being done in their Office to adopt the legal

course for 4 long years. In any event, the impugned order

dated 23.12.2017 extracted hereinabove do not seem to

be one without application of mind. The same refers to

quashing of FIR, witness statement, seizure mahazar,

acceptability of the voice recording CD, which are the

materials being relied upon by the petitioner.

¶21The other contention urged by the counsel of the

petitioner for non-registration of the FIR was purported

sufficiency of entry in the case diary.

¶22Heavy reliance is placed on the judgment of Lalitha

Kumari (supra) for dispensing the requirement of

registration of the FIR by counsel for the petitioner.

Appropriate to refer to paragraph 120 in the case of

Lalitha Kumari, wherein the Apex Court has laid down

the circumstances under which registration of FIR initially

is dispensed or deferred. Paragraph 120 of the said

judgment read as under; "Conclusion/Directions

¶120In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:

120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one

week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.

120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.

120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.

120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.

120.7 [Ed.: This correction is based on para

120.7 as corrected vide order in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2023) 9 SCC 695.] . While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed fifteen days generally and in exceptional cases, by giving adequate reasons, six weeks' time is provided. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.

120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above."

¶23The said principles cannot be applied in the instant case,

inasmuch as, the petitioner-Lokayukta has not treated

any circumstances which had prevented/detained them

from registering the FIR before proceeding to conduct the

raid.

¶24In the case of Dr. M. K. PUSHPITHA V. STATE OF

KARNATAKA, this Court in paragraph Nos.12 and 15 has

held that seizure without registering an FIR is

impermissible. The said paragraphs read as under; "12. On perusal of the Station House Diary where there is an entry regarding credible information received by the Police that vaccinations were given to the public by taking money but even in the Station House Diary, it was not mentioned that he had no time to register the FIR and the nature of the offence committed, but it says, only he has deputed a Police constable for bringing panchas, which means he has proceeded to the spot with panchas for seizure and later searched and seized the articles along with cash and apprehended accused Nos.1 and 2, which is nothing but action taken in pursuance of the information received amounting to investigation commenced without registering the FIR. First of all, even if the Police registers the FIR for the offence punishable under Disaster Management Act, without permission of the Court, he cannot investigate the matter as per Section 155(2) of Cr.PC. which is a non-cognizable offence. Here in this case, no FIR has been registered, but action has been taken which is a clear violation of the provisions of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and also the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalitha Kumari stated supra. It appears that the Police willfully added Sections 380, 403, 409 and 420 of IPC which are all cognizable offences. Therefore, without registering the FIR, taking any action, seizing the articles amounts to investigation prior to registering the FIR, which is violation of the provisions of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and against the guidelines issued in the case Lalitha Kumari stated supra. The authority of the Police to search and seize assumes only after registering the FIR, otherwise the Police have no authority to search and seize or

arrest any person which is nothing but violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd.) stated supra has held that if at all the petitioner is found to have committed any offence under Disaster Management Act, the Police, after making an enquiry and even after seizing the same could have submitted a report to the appropriate authority for taking action as per Rule 3 of the Disaster Management (Notice of Alleged Offence) Rules 2007 (for short 'Rules'). For the sake of convenience, Section 3 of the Rules is extracted as under; "3. Notice of alleged offence and intention to make a complaint. -A notice under clause (b) of section 60 of the Act by a person, of the alleged offence and his intention to make a complaint shall be delivered to, or left at, the office of one of the following-

(a) in the case of the Central Government, except where the complaint relates to a railway, the Secretary incharge of the concerned Ministry or the Department in that Government;

(b) in the case of the Central Government where the complaint relates to a railway, the General Manager of that railway;

(c) in the case of State Government, the Secretary incharge of the concerned Department in that Government;

(d) in the case of the National Authority, the Secretary or, if there is no Secretary, the Additional Secretary, of the National Authority;

(e) in the case of a State Authority, the Chief Executive Officer of the State Authority;

(f) in the case of a District Authority, the Chief Executive Officer of the State Authority."

¶15On the other hand, the act of the Police arresting the petitioner, seizing the articles prior to registering of the FIR is illegal and search and seizure in non-cognizable offences amounts to violation of right of privacy and the liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of Constitution of India. Therefore, registering the FIR after conducting the investigation is bad in law in view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalitha Kumari stated supra. Therefore, the Police shall not be allowed to conduct

investigation, which amounts to abuse of process of law. Hence, the FIR registered against the petitioner requires to be quashed".

¶25The reliance placed on by the counsel for the petitioner

on to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of

Rajendra Singh (supra) to contend that accused Nos. 1

to 7 could be re-arraigned as accused in exercise of the

power under Section 319 of Cr.PC., as rightly pointed by

learned Senior counsel for the respondent No.2, is not

applicable to the instant case. The facts involved in the

said case was with respect to an offence committed under

provisions of Section 302 of IPC. The case at hand is in

respect of offence falling under provisions of Sections 7

and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988.

¶26Prosecution, cannot proceed with or permitted to be

proceeded with on a mere possibility or chance of

discovering the facts during the trial. In the case of this

nature, prosecution has to be clear in its mind as to the

persons who would be examined and responsible to prove

the principle fact of demand and acceptance. Purpose of

the trial is also to place on record entire prosecution

material before undertaking the exercise of trial with prior

furnishing of all the prosecution records/material to the

accused such that accused is in a position to defend his

cause. If the argument of counsel for the petitioner -

Lokayukta is accepted the same would defeat the very

cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence.

¶27Since the allegation against accused Nos. 1 to 7 of they receiving the bribe amount, no longer available in view of quashment of case against them, even assuming during the trial, the prosecution proposes to put forth the said theory, accused Nos. 1 to 7 cannot be re-arraigned as accused as sought to be done by relying upon the judgment in the case of Rajendra Singh (supra).

¶28The very purpose of seeking sanction under Section 19(1)

of the PC Act, 1988 is to prevent frivolous and vexatious

prosecution. Even if the petitioner-Lokayukta assumes

that the respondent No.2 was indeed involved in the

matter, there is no material produced regarding he

having demanded or money being received for and on his

behalf. This aspect of the matter has been taken into

consideration by respondent No.1-sanctioning authority

while declining to grant the sanction in the impugned

order dated 23.12.2017 as extracted herein above. This

Court therefore do not see any reason to show any

indulgence. No case is made out warranting interference.

¶29In that view of the matter, following; ORDER

Petition is dismissed.

SD/- (M.G.S. KAMAL) JUDGE

RU

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S. KAMAL WRIT PETITION NO. 5680 OF 2021 (GM-KLA) BETWEEN: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA POLICE, MYSURU - 570 001. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. B.S. PRASAD, SPECIAL COUNSEL) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY UNDER SECRETARY MINISTRY OF FINANCE (EXCISE) VIDHANA SOUDHA BENGALURU - 560 001. 2. DR. Y. MANJUNATH S/O Y DEVENDRAPPA AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, R/O NO.1056, HAMSA, NEW KANTHARAJU URS ROAD, KUVEMPU ROAD, MYSURU - 570 023 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. M. SRINIVAS KUMAR, HCGP FOR R1 SRI. SANDESH J CHOUTA, SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI. RAGHAVENDRA K., ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED.23.12.2017 IN NO. AA E 109 EPS 2012, VIDE ANEXURE-G ISSUED BY R1. Digitally signed by SUMA B N Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 06.08.2026 FOR ORDER COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THIS COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S. KAMAL CAV JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition is by Karnataka Lokayukta Police being aggrieved by