Sri Codanda M Somanna v. Sri B.L Narayana Rao

Judgment dated

21.10.2014 clearly shows that there is nowhere a whisper by the learned Trial Court of the basis for initiating an enquiry in relation to the Schedule Properties by referring the same to the Tahsildar. The

learned Trial Court does not provide for any reasoning or background as to what persuaded the Hon'ble Court to refer the matter for an enquiry report by the Tahsildar. There is no clarity as to the jurisdiction and competence of the Tahsildar to initiate an enquiry into the Schedule Properties.

 The question before the Trial Court as put forth by the Defendants had nothing to do with tenancy rights but rather was regarding the ambit of Inams Abolition laws over the suit Schedule Properties. However, the Trial Court failed to consider the contradiction between the two and considered the report by the Tahsildar whose opinion was confined to the aspects regarding the tenancy rights over the Schedule Properties which has no bearing on the issue at hand.

 Further, the learned Trial Court Judge, in the entire judgment, has only relied upon one specific paragraph of the Tahsildar report and has arbitrarily decided the dispute in favour of the Plaintiffs. When the Plaintiffs have admitted to having filed an application for grant of tenancy rights under the Inams Abolition Act, the question of initiating an enquiry through reference to the Tahsildar does not arise. However, for reasons best known to the learned Trial Court Judge, the court has ordered for the report of the Tahsildar without recording the reasons for the same. The report dated

15.07.2011 submitted by the Tahsildar is nowhere been brought on record nor has been marked as an exhibit

by the Trial Court Judge thereby clouding the veracity of the Tahsildar report. When the report was not part of the record, the question of considering the same or basing the judgment on the same did not arise. The impugned orders are wholly opposed to law and liable to be set aside.

 Without any basis for initiating an enquiry, without providing the reason for reference of the matter to the local Tahsildar, the learned Trial Court Judge has grossly erred in exercising its jurisdiction in deciding the dispute at hand by relying entirely on the report and arriving at a conclusion that has greatly affected the rights of the Defendant.

 It is respectfully submitted that, the learned Trial Court Judge has failed to the take into account the visibly evident contradiction present in the averments made by the Plaintiffs and the contents of the Tahsildar report.

 It is an admitted fact by the Plaintiffs that they have filed applications (Form No. 1) under Section 4 of the Karnataka Certain Inams Abolition Act, 1977 for registration / declaration of occupancy / tenancy rights with respect to the Schedule Properties before the Land Tribunal. The said applications have also been marked as exhibits before the Trial Court by the Plaintiffs. During the pendency of the dispute before the Trial Court, it was the contention of the Plaintiffs that the said applications were pending adjudication before the

Land Tribunal. In view of the admitted position, the suit was liable to be dismissed.

 While this being the fact, the Trial Court has taken the extract from the report dated 15.07.2011 submitted by the Tahsildar, which clearly mentions that there is no application pending in respect of the suit Schedule Properties under Inams Abolition Act and further that the applications filed by the Plaintiffs does not come within the purview of the Land Tribunal. The finding is contrary to admitted factual position emerging from the pleading of parties. The order impugned ignores admissions which is the best evidence. Such ignoring of vital evidence vitiates the orders and hence liable to be set aside.

 There can be two inferences drawn from the above. Firstly, that there is lack of clarity with respect to the jurisdiction and competence of the Tahsildar in examining into the purview of Inams Abolition laws in relation to the Schedule Properties and submitting a report to that effect and secondly, there is lack of clarity with respect to the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal as well as the Trial Court in entertaining a dispute that clearly stands on the question of the ambit of the Inams Abolition laws in the State of Karnataka and the scope and jurisdiction of the Trial Court and the Land Tribunal in relation to the same.

 When there is contradiction and ambiguity about the jurisdiction of the Trial Court having regard to the nature of the property, the learned Trial Court Judge ought to have dismissed the suit.

 The Trial Court has relied upon a judgment in Manasa Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Marikallappa AIR 2006 Kar 273, wherein the dispute was with regard to the provisions of the Land Reforms Act and the maintainability of the suit of specific performance. The said judgment holds that Section 79B, 82 and 83 of the Land Reforms Act does not create any bar on the Civil Court to decide as to whether the Plaintiff is entitled for a decree of specific performance. The question in the instant case is with regard to Inams Abolition laws and not the aforementioned provisions of the Land Reforms Act, however, the Trial Court has wrongly interpreted the judgment and applied the same to the case at hand and gone ahead to decide the dispute illegally in favour of the Plaintiffs.

 It is further relevant to point out that both before the Trial Court and at the First Appellate Court, the raised the contention about inconsistencies present in the pleadings submitted by the Plaintiffs, the Agreement of Sale dated 15.06.1984 (Ex. P-1) and the legal notice dated 05.11.1994 (Ex. P-2) issued by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant in relation to the boundaries of the suit Schedule Properties. It has been held in a catena of decisions that when the location and identity of the

Schedule Property is doubtful, relief of injunction cannot be granted. Therefore, the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court could not and ought not to have granted the relief of permanent injunction in favour of the Plaintiffs. The impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are liable to be interfered with on this ground as well.

 From the above, it is clear that there is stark contradiction between the Plaintiffs' averments, clear inconsistency in relation to the boundaries of the Schedule Properties, there is a glaring question of jurisdiction of the Trial Court to entertain the suit, there is evident ambiguity of the purview and scope of jurisdiction of the Trial Court and the Land Tribunal, there is a clear question of competence and jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to enquire into the dispute and produce a report to that effect on the Schedule Properties, the settled position of law with respect to time being of essence in a contract and inams lands falling within the ambit of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 have not been taken into account. Ignoring all such patent errors of law made by the learned Trial Court, the First Appellate Court has upheld the Judgment and Decree dated 21.10.2014 passed by the learned Trial Court and thereby severely affected the rights and interests of the Defendant.

 When the suit Schedule Properties no longer vests with the Defendant for the reasons stated supra, when the

Plaintiffs have failed to perform their part of the contract in a time bound manner, the question of execution of the Agreement of Sale dated 11.11.1987 does not arise at all. The impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court dated

21.10.2014 and the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court dated

07.12.2021 has failed to take note of all the aforementioned material irregularities and has grossly erred in deciding the dispute in favour of the Plaintiffs thereby causing grave injury and loss to the Defendant.

 The findings recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are contrary to the settled position of law and are based on impermissible surmises. Even otherwise the impugned judgments suffer from several infirmities and has been passed without considering the contentions raised by the Defendant. Hence, the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court dated 21.10.2014 and the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court dated

07.12.2021 in R.A. No. 29/2014 are liable to be set aside and the suit is liable to be dismissed."

¶15Sri.S.Sriranga, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal memorandum would contend that decreeing of the suit of the plaintiffs by both the Courts is incorrect and even assuming

that appeal is dismissed, decree is incapable of specific enforcement having regard to the fact that the lands are inam lands and application filed by the original defendant is still pending in the proceedings of Inam Abolition Act and sought for admitting the appeal on following substantial questions of law: i. "Whether the suit is maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka Certain Inam Abolitions Act, 1977 read with Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872?

ii. Whether the Trial Court can entertain the suit in question when admittedly the Trial Court has no jurisdiction to decide issues with respect to questions arising under Inam Abolition laws?

iii. Whether the Trial Court has any jurisdiction to refer the dispute to the Land Tribunal and direct the Tahsildar for submission of a report with respect to the suit Schedule Properties?

iv. pWhether the report of the Tahsildar can be relied upon when admittedly the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit concerned with no Inam Abolition laws?

v. Whether the report of the Tahsildar has any evidentiary value?

vi. Whether the Courts can grant the relief of permanent injunction and specific performance when the boundaries of the Schedule Properties mentioned in the Plaint is at variance with the boundaries mentioned in the title document and other records?

vii. Whether, on pleadings and evidence placed on record by the parties, the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court were right in holding that the Plaintiffs-Respondents have proved their contentions with respect to the suit Schedule Properties?

viii. Whether the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court suffers from material irregularity on account of the failure of both the courts in appreciating the established principles of law, oral and documentary evidence on record?"

¶16Per contra, Sri.Vijay Kumar, learned counsel appearing for Sri.S.R.Sreeprasad, learned counsel for the respondents supports the impugned judgments.

¶17He would contend that question of lands being inam lands and permission under the Inam Abolition Act is necessary for concluding the sale transaction is answered by both the

Courts properly by taking into consideration the report filed by the Tahsildar, Virajpet.

¶18He would further emphasize that the report was filed into the Court on 15.07.2011 and there was ample time for the parties to question the report as the suit came to be disposed of on 21.10.2014. In the absence of any effort made by the defendant to question the report or to place any material on record to show that the permission under the Inam Abolition Act was necessary for conclusion of the sale transaction, the present appeal by the legal representatives of the deceased original defendant cannot be admitted on the aforesaid substantial questions of law and sought for dismissal of the appeal.

¶19Having heard the arguments of both sides, this Court perused the material on record meticulously.

¶20On such perusal of the material on record, admittedly, there was a registered agreement entered into by the original defendant with the father of plaintiffs.

¶21In the reply notice, there is no denial to the suit agreement but all that the defendant has pleaded is he must put be given six cart loads of paddy and he would be ready to execute the sale deed.

¶22Admittedly, by then, Lingappaiah was no more. In order to find out whether the claim made by the defendant that the plaintiffs were required to be give six cart loads of paddy to the defendant, this Court bestowed its attention to contents of Ex.P.1 – sale agreement. In the said agreement, no such condition is forthcoming.

¶23In other words, at the time of issuing of reply, defendant did not raise the objection of execution of the sale deed for want of necessary permission. All that the defendant wanted was demand of six cart loads of paddy. But in the written statement, defendant denies the very suit agreement itself.

¶24Having received the sale consideration, there is an endorsement found in Ex.P.1 which is not denied by the defendant. Conveniently, defendant did not enter the box and sent his Power of Attorney who is examined as D.W.1 who did

not have the personal knowledge with regard to endorsement made by the original defendant.

¶25Further, the question of taking permission was subject matter which was considered by the learned Trial Judge and in that regard; report was called for from the Tahsildar, Virajpet to find out whether such permission was necessary.

¶26There was also a suggestion made to P.W.1 that father of the plaintiffs had been declared as tenant. In that regard also, report was called for by the learned Trial Judge to find out if he is already declared as tenant and whether the suit would continue.

¶27Report of the Tahsildar, Virajpet was placed on record on 15.07.2011. In the said report, it is crystal clear that there is no order passed by the Land Tribunal with regard to granting of tenancy rights to the father of the plaintiffs namely Lingappaiah.

¶28Likewise, referring to the circular issued by the Deputy Commissioner, there is a clear report filed by the Tahsildar, Virajpet that in respect of the lands which are not

belonging to the religious institutions no such permission is necessary to alienate jahageer bane lands.

¶29Therefore, contention of the defendant that the contract of agreement to sale is incapable of performance for want of necessary permission is not accepted by the learned Trial Judge and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs.

¶30Learned Judge in the First Appellate Court not only accepted the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Judge while passing the judgment but has also supplemented additional reasons as referred to supra in paragraph No.16 with regard to the permission which is the main plank on which the enforcement of agreement to sale is denied and rightly dismissed the appeal filed by legal representatives of defendant.

¶31In the absence of any contra evidence placed on record, nor pleading any hardship, only on the technical ground, the enforcement of the sale agreement was denied all along by defendant. When defendant failed to establish his case that there was no sale agreement at all, decreeing the suit is just and proper.

¶32Thus, on the factual aspects and legal aspects, both the Courts have rightly taken into consideration the rival contentions of the parties and categorically held that plaintiffs are entitled for enforcement of agreement of sale.

¶33Thus, from the above discussion, this Court does not find any merit in any one of the substantial questions of law referred to supra.

¶34Hence, following: ORDER i. Admission is declined. ii. Appeal is dismissed.

Sd/- (V SRISHANANDA) JUDGE

KAV List No.: 1 Sl No.: 82

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 1515 OF 2022 (SP) BETWEEN: 1. MR. CODANDA M. SOMANNA S/O LATE CODANDA MANDANNA AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, RESIDING AT BALELE VILLAGE AND POST SOUTH KODAGU - 571 219. 2. MRS. CODANDA SHANTHI MANDANNA W/O LATE CODANDA MANDANNA AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS, RESIDING AT BALELE VILLAGE AND POST SOUTH KODAGU - 571 219 REPRESENTED THROUGH HER P.A HOLDER SON, CODANDA M. SOMANNA 3. MRS. KOKKENGADA YESHIKA VASANTHA D/O LATE CODANDA MANDANNA W/O MR. KOKKENGADA S. VASANTHA AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, RESIDING AT SULUGODU VILLAGE AND POST VIA KONANAKATTE, SOUTH KODAGU - 571 216 REPRESENTED THROUGH HER P.A HOLDER BROTHER, CODANDA M SOMANNA 4. MRS. MEKERIRA NIVITHA PARTHA D/O LATE CODANDA MANDANNA Digitally signed by MALATESH K C Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA W/O DR. MEKIRARA PARTHA AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS, RESIDING AT DEVARACADOO ROAD VIRAJPET, SOUTH KODAGU - 571 218 REPRESENTED THROUGH HER P.A HOLDER BROTHER, CODANDA M. SOMANNA. …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. S. SRIRANGA, SR. COUNSEL FOR SMT. SUMANA NAGANAND, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. MR. B.L NARAYAN RAO S/O LATE LINGAPPAIAH AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, 2. MR. B.L. RAMACHANDRA RAO S/O LATE LINGAPPAIAH AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, BOTH RESIDING AT KADANGAMURROR VILLAGE AND POST VIRAJPET TALUK, KODAGU - 571 212. 3. 3(A). MRS. B.L. RUKUMINI W/O JANARDHANA SINCE DEAD BY LR'S MR. B.J. CHIDANANDA JANARDHANA AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS RESIDING AT KADANGAMARUR VILLAGE AND POST VIRAJPET, KODAGU DISTRICT - 571 212. 4. MRS. B.L. SEETHALAKSHMI D/O LATE LINGAPPAIAH AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, BOTH RESIDING AT KADANOOR VILLAGE AND POST, SOUTH KODAGU (DELETED BY ORDER DATED 14.01.2026) …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. VIJAY KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. S.R. SREEPRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R1, R2 AND R3(A); VIDE ORDER DATED 14.01.2026, R4 IS DELETED) THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 07.12.2021 PASSED IN RA.NO.29/2014 ON THE FILE OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JDUGE, VIRAJPET. DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 21.10.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.5/1995 ON THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE, VIRAJPET. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA ORAL JUDGMENT 1. Heard Sri.S.Sriranga, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Smt.Sumana Naganand, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Vijay Kumar, learned counsel appearing for Sri.S.R.Sreeprasad, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3(a). 2. Defendant has suffered the decree in O.S.No.5/1995 whereby he was directed to specifically enforce the agreement to sale dated 15.06.1984 in respect of the following properties (hereinafter referred to as suit properties): a. "The Privilaged Jahageer Bane Lands bearing Sy.No.240 of 2.75 acres out of 4.61 acres with a tiled house consists of 5 rooms bounded by East: the remaining portion of the bane lands Sy.No.240, West: the remaining portion of the bane lands Sy.No.240, North: Wet lands Sy.No.208/1 and South: by the bane lands Sy.No.241. b. The Privilaged Jahageer Bane Lands bearing Sy.No.241 of 1.86 acres out of 4.57 acres bounded by East: the remaining portion of the bane lands Sy.No.241 and 242, West: remaining portion of the bane lands Sy.No.241, North: Sy.No.240 and south: Sy.Nos.243 and 244. In all 4.61 acre sof bane lands cultivated with coffee, orange, cardamom etc., situated at Kadangamaroor village, Virajpet Nad, S. Kodagu. The patta stands in Kula No.18." 3. The said judgment and decree was confirmed by the First Appellate Court in RA No.29/2014. 4. Facts which are utmost necessary for disposal of the appeal are as under: 4.1. Plaintiffs filed a suit for specific enforcement of agreement to sale dated 15.06.1984 (Ex.P.1) by contending that defendant has executed Ex.P.1 in favour of plaintiffs in respect of the suit properties entered into an agreement in respect of the suit land by contending that