Reliance General Insurane Company Ltd v. Sathish Kumar

J U D G M E N T [Judgment of the Court was made by M.SUNDAR, J.,] Captioned main 'Civil Miscellaneous Appeal' [hereinafter 'CMA' for the sake of brevity] has been filed in this Court on 22.08.2023.

¶2Captioned CMA is a Statutory Appeal under Section 173 of 'the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988' [hereinafter 'MV Act' for the sake of brevity] and it has been filed assailing an award dated 20.04.2022 made in M.C.O.P.No.1719 of 2019 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Special Court, Tiruppur). This '20.04.2022 award' shall be referred to as 'impugned award' and 'the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Special Court, Tiruppur)' shall be referred to as 'said MACT', both for the sake of convenience and clarity. To be noted, 'MACT' is an abbreviation for 'Motor Accident Claims Tribunal'. Page Nos.2/13

¶3Captioned CMA is in the Admission Board and Mr.P.Suresh Srinivasan, learned counsel on record for the appellant - Insurance Company is before us.

¶4Short facts are that a road accident which resulted in 80% disability for the claimant happened on 26.09.2019 when the claimant was pillion riding a two wheeler (two wheeler bearing registration No.TN 42 U 8932) in Darapuram-Udumalai Road and accident occurred at Thalavaipattinam Kootupuli Bridge, when the claimant's two wheeler was proceeding from South to the North on the left hand side of the road. A truck (lorry) bearing registration No.TN 67 AB 2344 coming in the opposite direction (according to the case file before us was driven in a rash and negligent manner) resulting in collision with the two wheeler, which in turn resulted in 80% disability to the claimant as alluded to supra.

¶5This Court having set out short facts shorn of granularity i.e., short facts imperative for appreciating this Admission Board order, now proceeds Page Nos.3/13 to capture what unfurled in the hearing.

¶6This Court, after hearing Mr.P.Suresh Srinivasan, learned counsel for appellant - Insurance Company and after perusing the case file before us, is of the considered view that the captioned CMA deserves to be dismissed and reasons i.e., dispositive reasoning, will be set out elsewhere infra in this order. To be noted, while setting out the reasons i.e., dispositive reasoning, we shall be capturing the points urged by the learned counsel, our discussions on the same and set out dispositive reasoning.

¶7Two points for determination arise in this appeal and they are:

(a) Whether said MACT fell in error in fixing monthly income of the claimant at 14,500 INR?

(b) Whether said MACT was correct in appreciating Ex.C1 - Disability Certificate as regards 80% disability while (according to learned counsel for appellant - Insurance Company) impugned award talks about 90%? Page Nos.4/13 The above points for determination arise owing to twofold attack qua impugned award which is captured infra in this order in paragraphs to follow.

¶8Notwithstanding very many grounds in the memorandum of grounds of appeal, learned counsel very fairly submitted that the appeal is restricted to quantum (not liability). Learned counsel raised two points. The two points, our discussion and dispositive reasoning on the same are as follows:

(i) Learned counsel submitted that said MACT vide impugned award erred in fixing monthly income of the claimant (to be noted, claimant is a sculptor) at 14,500 INR. Learned counsel submitted that there is no documentary evidence in this regard and it is just a case of approximation by said MACT. We carefully perused the impugned award. We find from paragraph No.13 {captioned 'tUkhdk; ' (Income)} of the impugned award that learned Presiding Officer of said Page Nos.5/13 MACT has arrived at 14,500 INR per month by discussing and appreciating (negativing) oral evidence (deposition) before said MACT. This has been clearly articulated in the impugned award that the evidence of PW1 (claimant) and PW2 (Eye witness) ipse dixit cannot be the basis for fixing the monthly income of the claimant. On the contrary, said MACT has proceeded on the basis of approximation qua the averment of claimant and paragraph No.13 of the impugned award reads as follows: '13/ tUkhdk; kDjhuh; tpgj;jpw;F Kd; rpw;g ntiy bra;J khjk; U:/20.000-? rk;ghjpj;J te;jhh; vd;W kDtpYk;. k/rh/1/ kh/rh/2 rhl;rpaj;jpYk; Twg;gl;Ls;sJ/

Mdhy;.

mjid cWjpa{l;lf;Toa

Mtz';fis

jhf;fy; bra;atpy;iy/ vdnt k/rh/1/ kh/rh/2d; rhl;rpak; kDjhuhpd; tUkhdj;ij epU:gpf;Fk; tifapy; bjhlh;g[ilajhf ,y;iy vd;W jPh;khdpf;fg;gLfpwJ/

rpw;g

ntiy bra;gth;fSf;F

tUkhdj;ij

bka;g;gpf;f Mtz';fs; ,Uf;f tha;g;gpy;iy/ Mtz';fs; ,y;iy vd;gjhnyna xU egh; rk;ghjpf;ftpy;iy Page Nos.6/13 vd;Wk; jPh;khdpf;f ,ayhJ/ kDjhuh; rk;ghjpf;f ,ayhj epiyapy; ,Ue;jhh; vd;W 2k; vjph;kDjhuh;

jug;gpy;

bka;g;gpf;ftpy;iy/ tpgj;J

26/09/2019

Mz;L

ele;Js;sJ/ rhjhuz ntiy bra;gth; Tl khjk; U:/14.500/- rk;ghjpf;f ,aYk; vdnt kDjhuhpd; njhuha khj

tUkhdk;

U:/14.500-?

vd;W jPh;khdpf;fg;gLfpwJ/ khz;g[kpF ,e;jpa cr;r ePjpkd;wk; nec&dy; ,d;Nud;!; fk;bgdp ypkpbll; gpudha; nrj;jp 2017 (2) TN MAC 609 (SC) tH';fpa tHpfhl;L jPh;g;gpd; mog;gilapy njhuhakhj tUkhdj;jpy; 40% (U:/5.800-?)

vjph;fhy

tha;g;gpw;fhf tH';fyhk; vd;Wk; jPh;khdpf;fg;gLfpwJ/' A perusal of the aforementioned paragraph No.13 of the impugned award makes it clear that claim of the claimant that his monthly income is Rs.20,000/- has not been subjected to (wholly) successful disputation or contestation. In this view of the matter, learned Presiding Officer of said MACT applied Pranay Sethi principle [National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and others reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680]. To be noted, said MACT has relied on Pranay Page Nos.7/13 Sethi case as reported in 2017 (2) TN MAC 609 (SC). It is also to be noted, that paragraph No.42 of Sarla Verma case [Sarla Verma (Smt) and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121] has been sustained in Pranay Sethi case though Sarla Verma case has been partly overruled in Pranay Sethi. Therefore, we have no hesitation in saying that said MACT has adopted the correct approach, applied the principles of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court correctly and there is nothing to demonstrate that there is infirmity, much less infirmity that is good enough to interfere or dislodge the impugned award.

(ii) We move on to the next point urged by learned counsel for appellant - Insurance Company. Learned counsel submitted that the Disability Certificate (muR kUj;Jtf; FG tH';fpa Cd rhd;wpjH;) which has been marked as Ex.C1 talks about 80% disability but said MACT has taken 90% disability as the basis for making the impugned award. In this regard, learned counsel drew our attention to a portion of Page Nos.8/13 paragraph No.11 of the impugned award which reads as follows: '11//////////////// vdnt kDjhuUf;F tH';fg;gl;l 80 rjtpfpj epue;ju Cdk; rhpahdJjhd; vd;Wk;. kDjhuUf;F Vw;gl;l fhaj;jpdhy; mtUf;F 90% bray; jpwd; FiwghL Vw;gl;Ls;sJ vd;Wk; ,j;jPh;g;ghak; jPh;khdpf;fpwJ//////////////' A careful perusal of the aforementioned portion as well as the other parts of the impugned award makes it clear that said MACT has correctly noticed that the Disability Certificate talks about 80% disability but the functional shortcoming (only loss of earning capacity owing to disability) only has been fixed at 90%. Disability has not been fixed at 80%. Learned Presiding Officer of said MACT has appreciated Ex.C1 - Disability Certificate evidence and post appreciation of evidence has arrived at the inference that the functional disability (loss of earning capacity owing to 80% disability) is 90%. In this Page Nos.9/13 regard, we remind ourselves of Raj Kumar's case being Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar reported in (2011) 1 SCC 343 as Hon'ble Supreme Court sets out three different facets of disability.

(a) Where a person suffering disability cannot continue to do the work which he was doing until then;

(b) Where a person can continue to work but in a different function and;

(c) Where a person can continue but to a lesser extent.

¶9This Court, having set out discussion and dispositive reasoning qua points urged by learned counsel for appellant - Insurance Company adds that it is noticed that the age of the claimant was 35 on the date of the accident (26.09.2019) which means he would now be 39. The prospects for this (now) 39 year old claimant is bleak i.e., as bleak as one can imagine considering that he was a sculptor. In this view of the matter, we notice that the claimant has claimed Rs.60 Lakhs and said MACT has awarded a little over Rs.49.82 Lakhs (Rs.49,82,170/- to be precise). It may not be necessary Page Nos.10/13 to dilate on the other heads under which the claim has been acceded to as the same are not in the realm of twofold challenge and as the two points (notwithstanding other grounds in the memorandum of grounds of appeal) urged before us fail and we also notice that the appellant-Insurance Company is not on liability and it is only on quantum.

¶10Ergo, the sequitur is, captioned CMA fails and the same is dismissed. Consequently, captioned CMP is also dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. (M.S.,J.) (K.G.T.,J.)

03.01.2024 Index : Yes / No Speaking / Non-speaking mk To

¶1The Presiding Officer Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Special Court) Tiruppur.

¶2The Section Officer Page Nos.11/13 V.R.Section High Court, Madras. M.SUNDAR, J., and K.GOVINDARAJAN THILAKAVADI, J., mk Page Nos.12/13

03.01.2024 Page Nos.13/13

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 03.01.2024 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR and THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE K.GOVINDARAJAN THILAKAVADI and C.M.P.No.29307 of 2023 in Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd., 1st Floor, Dhanam Towers, Binny Road Tiruppur North, Tiruppur - 641 601. ... Appellant Vs. 1. Sathish Kumar S/o.Murugesan 2. Ramanathan S/o.Sundaram .. Respondents Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, praying to set aside the judgment and decree dated 20.04.2022 passed in M.C.O.P.No.1719 of 2019 on the file of MACT (Special Court), Tiruppur. Page Nos.1/13 For Petitioner : Mr.R.Suresh Srinivasan