Mukesh v. State of Haryana

HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J.

¶1The present appeal is preferred against judgment of conviction dated 29.11.2019 and order of sentence dated 30.11.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind in the case stemming from FIR No. 405 dated

12.12.2017 registered under Sections 363, 366-A, 342, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter 'IPC') and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter 'POCSO Act') at Police Station Sadar Jind. The appellant was sentences as follows: Offence under Sentence Section 6 POCSO Act Rigorous imprisonment of ten years and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of which further rigorous imprisonment of six months. Section 363 IPC Rigorous imprisonment of five years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of which further rigorous imprisonment of five months. Section 366-A IPC Rigorous imprisonment of five years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of which further rigorous imprisonment of five months. Section 342 IPC Rigorous imprisonment of one year Section 506 IPC Rigorous imprisonment two years It was ordered that all sentences shall run concurrently. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶2Succinctly, the facts, as per the prosecution, are that on 11.12.2017, the prosecutrix, a 16 years old girl, went to her school where she is a student of th9   grade, but did not return home. The complainant, the mother of the prosecutrix, registered the FIR(supra) to trace the prosecutrix as she believed that she had been enticed away by some unknown person. On 28.12.2017, the investigating officer was informed by the complainant that the prosecutrix has returned home. The appellant was arrayed as an accused and consequently, arrested.

¶3The prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses to establish its case. Subsequently, the statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded wherein he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In his defence, the appellant examined one witness. On assessing all the material available on the record, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant vide impugned judgment dated 29.11.2019. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant has preferred the present appeal before this Court. CONTENTIONS

¶4Learned counsel for the appellant  inter alia  contends that the learned trial Court has erred in passing a guilty verdict against the appellant as he   was   not   even   named   in   the   FIR(supra).   Even   during   preliminary investigation, only the names of Malkiyat and Sohan came up on the basis of the call records of the complainant. Moreover, material improvements have been made by PW1-prosecutrix and PW2- complainant in their respective testimonies. The prosecutrix and the appellant had gone to visit Shri Bhramri Devi Jan Kalyan Sansthan for solemnization of marriage on 12.12.2017, as corroborated by DW1-Deepak Kaushik. The couple had also appeared before this Court in the case bearing No. CRM-M-47903-2017, seeking protection of their life and liberty. However, the investigating agency failed to verify the factum of marriage. Furthermore, the complainant had filed a written complaint dated 17.11.2018 against uncle (chacha) of the prosecutrix, namely Balbir alleging that he had compelled the prosecutrix to meet the appellant.

¶5Learned State counsel submitted that the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant based on correct appreciation of facts and evidence. As such, no interference is warranted by this Court. OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS

¶6Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the record of the case, it transpires that the appellant and the prosecutrix were thstudent of 9  grade at the time of the alleged incident i.e. 11.12.2017. In order to attract the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, it is of the utmost importance that the victim is proved to be a child in terms of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. The Principal of the Government Senior Secondary School,   namely,   Ram   Rai  issued   a   hand  written   certificate   (Ex.P-9)   in vernacular, stating that the prosecutrix is a student there and her date of birth is

10.12.2001.   The   prosecution   also   examined   Satyapal,   Lecturer,   Political Science at the said school as PW6 who corroborated that the date of birth of the prosecutrix,   as   per   records   of   the   school,   is   10.12.2001.   In   his   cross examination, PW6- Satyapal stated that the said date was entered into the school records based on the School Leaving Certificate from her previous school, however the same has not been made a part of the record. He also stated that the birth certificate of the prosecutrix was not looked at while making the entry with respect to her date of birth as such primary entry remains unproven CRA-S-351-2020 (O&M) -.- as /e$$.

¶9As s c", it cannot 4e said t"at date of 4i&t" of t"e #&osec t&i> /as *ade in t"e sc"oo$ &eco&d afte& $oo!in2 at a c&edi4$e so &ce of info&*ation. A t/o 5 d2e 4enc" of t"e 'on=4$e S #&e*e Co &t in P. Yuvaprakash vs. State rep. by Inspector of Police 2023 AIR SC 3525. S#ea!in2 t"&o 2" 5 stice S. Ra-ind&a ."att t"e fo$$o/in2 /as o4se&-ed: "12. In view of Section 34(1) of the POCSO Act, Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 becomes relevant, and applicable. That provision is extracted below: "94. Presumption and determination of age. –

(1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age.

(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining 5

(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order.

(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person."

¶13It is evident from conjoint reading of the above provisions that wherever the dispute with respect to the age of a person arises in the context of her or him being a victim under the POCSO Act, the courts have to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section   94   of the JJ Act . The three documents in order of which the Juvenile Justice Act requires consideration is that the concerned court has to determine the age by considering the following documents: "(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board".

¶14Section 94(2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW51. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW53, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section  9 4 (2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C51 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence." (e*#"asis added) Re$iance in t"is &e2a&d can a$so 4e #$aced on t"e ) d2*ent &ende&ed 4( a Di-ision .enc" of t"is Co &t in Terry Saroya vs. State of Punjab and another 2023 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 176. ;. :e&tinent$(, t"e 'on=4$e S #&e*e Co &t "as dea$t /it" t"e iss e of dete&*ination of a2e of t"e #&osec t&i> f&o* sc"oo$ &eco&ds in Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit, (1988) Supp SCC 604, /"e&ein it /as o4se&-ed t"at t"e date of 4i&t" in t"e &e2iste& of a sc"oo$ /o $d not "a-e an( e-identia&( -a$ e /it"o t t"e testi*on( of t"e #e&son *a!in2 t"e ent&( o& t"e #e&son /"o gave the date of birth. "14. …The date of birth mentioned in the scholar's register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or in the scholar's register must be shown to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned. If the entry in the scholar's register regarding date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an entry will have no evidentiary value."

9.  In view of the discussion above, it is evident that the minority of the prosecutrix remains unproven. As such, the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act cannot be attracted. Consequently, it is on the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, which it has failed to accomplish. The prosecutrix in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.(Ex.P-1) stated that she was taken into a room by the appellant where he raped her. However, in her cross-examination as PW1, she stated that they also went to Chandigarh. She denied ever seeing the marriage certificate (Ex. D1) and refused the suggestion that they had visited the Shri Brahamari Devi Jan Sansthan,   Panchkula.   However,   subsequently,   she   deposed   that   she   was pressurized to sign the marriage certificate.

¶10A perusal of the marriage certificate (Ex. D-1) states the name of the bride to be 'Reena.' Pertinently, Reena is the name of the elder sister of the prosecutrix, who is already married and has a child out of the said wedlock. DW1-Deepak Kaushik, has admitted in his testimony that he married the prosecutrix and appellant. He stated that the couple had produced their respective Aadhar cards, depicting them to be majors. The Aadhar card of the bride depicted her name to be 'Reena' as well. However, DW1- Deepak Kaushik also took a photograph of the couple (Ex.D4), who also affixed their thumb impressions on the photocopies of their respective Aadhar cards (Ex. D-3). Curiously, the prosecutrix signed her name as 'Reena' on the photocopy of her Aadhar card. Moreover, the prosecutrix and the appellant approached this Court in CRM-M-47903-2017 seeking protection from the family members of the prosecutrix as they had gotten married against their wishes. Pertinently, the said petition was filed by the prosecutrix portraying herself to be Reena.

¶11It is evident that the prosecutrix procured the Aadhar card of her sister and nowhere has it been pleaded that the appellant forced her to do the same. Further, admittedly, the prosecutrix (PW1) had left with the appellant of her own accord as he had promised to perform marriage with her. A perusal of the record shows that the couple performed marriage on 12.12.2007, the very next day of the alleged abduction. As such, logic and reason dictates that the prosecutrix was not kidnapped by the appellant, in fact, she went and resided with him of her own volition.

¶12The prosecutrix and her mother had also alleged that Balbir, her uncle (chacha), had raped the prosecutrix at an earlier occasion. However, they did not mention this factum to the police at any point while moving an application stating that he had introduced the prosecutrix to the appellant. In her testimony as PW1, the prosecutrix categorically mentioned that Balbir visited them regularly at their accommodation in Shiv Colony, Jind. Curiously, she did not mention the same in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, the application moved under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to implead Balbir as an additional accused was dismissed vide order dated 27.09.2019 by the learned trial Court.

¶13C"i$e it is t&ite $a/ t"at con-iction in cases of se> a$ assa $t can 4e *ade so$e$( on t"e 4asis of t"e testi*on( of t"e #&osec t&i>, "o/e-e&, it is of t"e  t*ost i*#o&tance t"at t"e #&osec t&i> is a ste&$in2 /itness. A t/o 5 d2e 4enc" of t"e 'on=4$e S #&e*e Co &t in Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana 2011(3) R.C.R(Criminal) 539, s#ea!in2 t"&o 2" 5 stice Dee#a! %e&*a, *ade t"e fo$$o/in2 o4se&-ations: "31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, have already been projected hereinabove, would go to show that her evidence does not fall in that category and cannot be relied upon to hold the Appellant guilty of the said offences. Indeed there are several significant variations in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section 161 statement (Criminal Procedure Code), FIR and deposition in Court."

¶146 &t"e&, a t/o 5 d2e 4enc" of t"e 'on=4$e S #&e*e Co &t in Rai Sandeep @ Deepu vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2012) 8 SCC 21, s#ea!in2 t"&o 2" 5 stice 6a!!i& Mo"a**ed 74&a"i* +a$if $$a, o#ined as fo$$o/s: "15. In our considered opinion, the 'sterling witness' should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross5examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should have co5relation with each and everyone of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence Neha where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a 'sterling witness' whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged." A t/o 5 d2e 4enc" of t"e 'on=4$e S #&e*e Co &t in Tameezuddin @ Tammu vs. State of (NCT) of Delhi (2009) 15 SCC 566 "as "e$d as fo$$o/s: "7. It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter. CONC USION

¶157n   -ie/   of   t"e   disc ssion   a4o-e,   t"is   Co &t   finds   t"at   t"e #&osec tion "as fai$ed to #&o-e its case 4e(ond &easona4$e do 4t. Acco&din2$(, t"e #&esent a##ea$ is a$$o/ed and t"e a##e$$ant is ac@ itted of t"e c"a&2es f&a*ed a2ainst "i*.

¶16:endin2 *isce$$aneo s a##$ication(s), if an(, s"a$$ a$so stand dis#osed of. (HARPREET SINGH BRAR) JUDGE 0/!11!202. C"et"e& s#ea!in2?&easoned : Ees?8o C"et"e& &e#o&ta4$e : Ees?8o

212 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRA-S-351-2020 (O&M) Date of decision: 06.11.2024 Mukesh ....Appellant Versus State of Haryana ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR Present: Mr. Surajmal Kundu, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Vikas Bharadwaj, AAG Haryana.