Gram Panchayat Manakpur-I v. State of Haryana and Others

In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh Reserved on : 24.4.2024 Date of Decision: 27.5.2024 Gram Panchayat village Manakpur-I ......Petitioner Versus State of Haryana and others .....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE LALIT BATRA Argued by: Mr. Davinder Singh, Advocate and Mr. V.S.Chauhan, Advocate for the petitioners. Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana with Mr. Pardeep Prakash Chahar, Sr. DAG, Haryana and Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana. **** SURESHWAR THAKUR

, J.

¶1Through the instant petition, the petitioner seeks the quashing of the order dated 19.9.2023 (Annexure P-4), passed in a revision petition bearing No. R-90, and, to decide the revision petition (supra) in a time bound manner, as the respondents concerned, are allegedly trying to make illegal constructions over the petition lands. Facts of the case

¶2The petitioner-Gram Panchayat filed a petition under Section 7(2) of the Punjab Village Shamlat Land Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act of 1961') before the Assistant Collector concerned, whereby it claimed the eviction of the respondent concerned, from the disputed land(s). The grounds raised in the said petition, are that, the Gram Panchayat is the sole recorded owner of the petition land, and, the disputed phirni but completely vesting in the Gram Panchayat concerned, besides the same sub-serving the

public/village common purposes. The Gram Panchayat had also got conducted the demarcation of the disputed land by the Local Commissioner, on 16.6.2012, whereins, it was found, that the respondents concerned, had illegaly occupied 6 marlas land out of the total land of the phirni/passage, comprised in khasra No. 61/2 (13-10). The Assistant Collector concerned, through an order made on 30.5.2017 (Annexure P-1), upon the petition (supra), ordered for the eviction of the respondents concerned, from the disputed lands.

¶3Being aggrieved from the order (supra), the respondents concerned, preferred a statutory appeal before the competent statutory authority. However, through an order made thereons, on 3.8.2022 (Annexure P-2), the said statutory appeal became dismissed.

¶4The respondents concerned, being aggrieved from the order (supra), preferred thereagainst a revision petition before the learned Commissioner concerned, who through the impugned order dated 19.9.2023 (Annexure P-4), ordered for the demarcation of the illegal encroachments in the village concerned, by computer at the expenses of the parties.

¶5The making of Annexure P-4 has led the aggrieved therefrom i.e. the Gram Panchayat concerned, to institute the instant writ petition before this Court. Grounds raised in the instant petition

¶6It is averred in the instant petition, that the respondents concerned, never challenged the demarcation report dated 16.6.2012, and, that the revisional Court concerned, without considering the demarcation report (supra), had ordered for the demarcation of the illegal encroachments in the village concerned. It is further averred thereins, that the respondents

concerned, have been constructing their houses over the disputed lands, and, are in the process of selling the same. Therefore, it is prayed, that the impugned order be set aside, and, revision petition (supra) be ordered to be decided in a time bound manner. Issues which arise for determination in the instant writ petition

¶7The prime issue, which requires determination in the instant writ petition, is whether the exercisings of jurisdiction by the learned Commissioner Ambala Division, Ambala, thus on Revision Petition bearing No. R-90 of 7.9.2022, and, whereons the impugned order became rendered, was a validly assumed jurisdiction on the said revision petition.

¶8If this Court concludes, that the entertainment of the revision petition (supra), at the instance of the Commissioner, Ambala Division, Ambala, thus was outside the domain of Section 13-B of the Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act of 1961'), thereupon, this Court would proceed to set aside the impugned order (Annexure P-4). However, before proceeding to adjudicate the above issue, it is also necessary to extract the provisions, as carried in Section 7 of the Act of 1961, provisions whereof become extracted hereinafter. "7. Power to put Panchayat in possession of certain lands.-- [(1) An Assistant Collector of the first grade having jurisdiction in the village may, either suo moto or on an application made to him by a Panchayat or an inhabitant of the village or the Block Development and Panchayat Officer or Social Education and Panchayat Officer, or any other Officer authorised by the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, after making such summary enquiry as he may deem fit and in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed, eject any person who is in wrongful or unauthorised possession of the land or other immovable property in the shamilat deh of that village which vests or is deemed to have

been vested in the panchayat under this Act and put the panchayat in possession thereof and for so doing the Assistant Collector of the first grade may exercise the powers of a revenue court in relation to the execution of a decree for possession of land under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887: Provided that if in any such proceedings the question of title is raised and proved prima facie on the basis of documents that the question of title is really involved, the Assistant Collector of the first grade shall record a finding to that effect and first decide the question of title in the manner laid down hereinafter.

(2) The Assistant Collector of the first grade shall by an order, in writing, require any person to pay a penalty, in respect of the land or other immovable property which was or has been in his wrongful or unauthorised possession, at a rate not less than five thousand rupees and not more than ten thousand rupees per hectare per annum, having regard to the benefit which could be derived from the land or other immovable property. If the penalty is not paid within the period of thirty days from the date of the order, the same shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue.

(3) The procedure for deciding the question of title under proviso to sub-section (1) shall be the same as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

(4) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction passed under sub-section (1), within ten days of the date of such order, the Assistant Collector of the first grade may use such force, including police force, as may be necessary for putting the panchayat in possession.

(5) Any person who is found in wrongful or unauthorised possession of the land or other immovable property in shamilat deh and is ordered to be ejected under sub-section (1), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years."

¶9At the outset, the jurisdictional competence of revisional authority to entertain a revision petition when becomes directed against the orders of eviction passed by the Assistant Collector concerned, or by the

Appellate Authority concerned, especially when the said order of eviction becomes stricto sensu made within the domain of sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961, and, but without within the domain of the proviso thereunders, rather no question of title becoming raised by the respondent in the said eviction petition, thus, also extending to the situation (supra), rather has resulted in diverse verdicts becoming made thereons.

¶10In the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in case titled as Leela Ram versus Gram Panchayat, Jailaf, reported in 1997(4) RCR (Civil) 354, this Court after making an appraisal of the mandate, carried in Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, concluded in paragraph 3 thereof, para whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, that when no question of title, thus within the domain of the proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961, became raised by the respondent in the eviction petition, thereupon, the exercisings of revisional jurisdiction on the relevant revision petition, is clearly barred. "3. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners we are of the view that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners has got force. Section 13-B(2) clearly envisages that Commissioner can entertain the revision petition suo motu or on an application filed by the aggrieved party if the case has been decided under the amended proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act. The proviso of Sub-section (1) clearly lays down that if question of title is involved in a case, it should be decided under proviso. In other words if no question of title is involved, the proviso would not apply and in such a situation the jurisdiction of the Commissioner to act Under Section 13-B(2) shall stand excluded whether he was to act suo motu or on the application of an aggrieved party. As a necessary corollary, it can safely be held that in eviction proceedings the order of Collector in appeal would be final whereas the Commissioner would have the power to entertain the revision petition, if question of title is raised and proved prima facie on the

basis of documents and this is the mandate of the proviso. This is the only interpretation which can be placed on combined reading of Section 7 and Section 13-B of the Act. No other interpretation in our view is possible. If the legislature had intended to vest powers in the Commissioner to entertain the revision petition even in cases of eviction of unauthorised occupants, there was no obstacle in its way to either make a specific provision in this regard or manifest its intention by adding another proviso.

¶11The said view became reiterated in a judgment passed by this Court in CWP No. 24188 of 2013, titled as Gram Panchayat Village Badangi versus State of Haryana and others.

¶12However a view contrary to the view adopted in the verdicts (supra) became taken by the Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 2891 of 2014, titled as Rulia Khan versus State of Haryana and others. Moreover, in the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in case titled as Orion Infrastructure Limited versus Commissioner, Gurgaon Division, Gurgaon and others, reported in 2012(3) PLR 128, this Court in para 37 thereof, para whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, has taken the view, that the investment of suo moto revisional jurisdiction under Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, thus in the revisional Court concerned, especially given the occurrence of the statutory coinages thereins "call for the record of any proceedings pending before, or orders passed by, any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings or order", thus therebys, rather the Revisional Court concerned, becomes validly permitted to even without the respondent in the apposite eviction petition recoursing the mandate of the proviso carried in Section 7 of the Act of 1961, rather exercise revisional jurisdiction against such orders passed in any statutory appeal by the Appellate

Authority concerned. "37. An argument has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that under sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, the Commissioner can only entertain the revision either suo motu or on an application made to him by a person aggrieved against the order passed under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7, and not against an order passed by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade under Section 13-A of the Act of 1961. Therefore, the order of the Commissioner setting aside the order of the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, in exercise of suo motu power under Section 13-B(2) of the Act of 1961 is wholly without jurisdiction. This contention of learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. If this contention is accepted, then the words "call for the record of any proceedings pending before, or orders passed by, any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings or order" used in Section 13-B (2) will become redundant. It is fundamental principle of interpretation that every word of the statute is to be given meaning. The Court cannot give interpretation to a provision by rendering certain portion or words of the provision as meaningless or redundant. In Aswini Kumar Ghose Vs. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369, it has been held that "It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute". Similar observation was made in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 that "It is incumbent on the court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application". In J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1170, it was observed that "the courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect". The Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. In the present case, we do not find any

reason to give construction to the provision of Section 13-B(2) of the Act of 1961, by rendering some portion or words of the provision as meaningless or redundant. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961 deals with two types of revisions, firstly on the application made by a person aggrieved against an order passed under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7, and secondly, the Commissioner has been given suo motu power to revise or modify any order passed by any authority subordinate to him. The Commissioner has been given wide suo motu power to pass any order in relation to any proceedings or order passed by any authority subordinate to him, as he may deem fit."

¶13The reason which has been portrayed in the above extracted paragraph, rather for the Division Bench taking the above view, arose from its concluding, that in the legislature employing the said coinages in the above extracted provision, is therebys thus deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature, except for compelling reasons rather will not be accepted. Therefore, to avoid the assigning of redundancy to the employment of the statutory coinage (supra), in the provisions cast under Section 7 of the Act of 1961, thus the Division Bench of this Court concluded, that the expanse of the said statutory coinages, spreads even to a situation, whereby the respondent in the eviction petition, who despite not rearing, thus within the domain of the proviso, as occurs thereins, hence any question of title, whereby he/she resists the assertion of title, as made to the disputed lands by the petitioner/Gram Panchayat in the eviction petition, rather becoming empowered to avail the revisional remedies (supra). The judgment (supra) also became concurred by a verdict rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in case titled as Sudesh Kumar and others versus State of Haryana and others, reported in 2019(4) PLR 204.

¶14Though, the principles of judicial propriety ordain, that the verdicts rendered by a Bench strength of this Court, thus co-equal to the Bench strength of this Court, are required to be adhered to, unless distinguished or unless per incuriam the statutory provisions. However, when divergent views in respect of the issue at hand, are taken by the Division Benches of this Court, which are thus naturally co-equal in strength to the quorum of this Court, thereby though normally a reference to a Bench strength larger in size to the Bench strengths, which delivered contra views over the subject at hand, rather is required to be made.

¶15However, for the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, this Court refrains from despite contra views becoming taken by the Division Benches of this Court, to make a reference vis-a-vis the subject at hand, to a Bench strength larger in size to the Bench strength(s) of the Division Benches of this Court, each of whom, as stated (supra), but have taken divergent views over the subject at hand.

¶16This Court for the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, becomes empowered to adopt the view taken by one of the Division Bench of this Court, and, also becomes empowered to refrain from concurring with the contra view taken by another Division Bench of this Court, thus on employment of the rules relating to the interpretation of the "coinages", which occur in Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, provisions whereof become extracted hereinafter. Resultantly, therebys this Court concludes, that the view adopted in Rulia Khan's case (supra), and, in Orion Infrastructure Limited's case (supra) is but per incuriam the statutory coinage, as occur in Section 13-B of the Act of 1961. Moreover, therebys this Court would become inclined to uphold the view adopted by a Division Bench of this

Court in Gram Panchayat village Badangi's case (supra), and, also therebys becomes coaxed to disconcur with the contra thereto view taken by the Division Benches of this Court in Rulia Khan's case (supra), and, in Orion Infrastructure Limited's case (supra). Conspicuously, for the reasons that the view taken in Rulia Khan's case (supra), and, in Orion Infrastructure Limited's case (supra), thus on a plain and literal construction of statutory coinages (supra), which occur in Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, rather is per incuriam the underlined statutory coinages (supra). "13-B. Appeal and revision-(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Collector of the first grade may, within a period of thirty days from the date of order passed under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 7 prefer an appeal to the Collector in such form and manner, as may be prescribed . and the Collector may after hearing the appeal, confirm, vary or reverse the order as he deems fit: Provided that no such appeal shall lie unless the amount of penalty, if any, imposed under sub-section (2) of section 7, is deposited with the Collector.]

(2) The Commissioner may, suo motu [or on an application made to him by any person aggrieved by an order passed under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7 at any time] call for the record of any proceedings pending before, or order passed by, any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings or order and pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit-: Provided that no order adversely affecting any person shall be passed unless he has been afforded an opportunity of being heard."

¶17First, and, foremost a circumspect, and, incisive reading of the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, especially of the mandate borne in sub-Section (1) thereof, but clearly, and, forthrightly makes speakings, that the right of appealability to an aggrieved from an order passed by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, is thus, before the Appellate

Authority concerned. Nonetheless, beneath the said sub-Section (1), a proviso occurs wherebys, the said appeal has been declared to be well constituted only subject to the amount of penalty, as becomes imposed under sub-Section (2) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961, rather being deposited with the Collector.

¶18Be that as it may, the legal conundrum at hand relates to the expanse of revisional jurisdiction conferred, upon the Commissioner concerned, through the mandate which occurs in sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961. Tritely on employing the rule of plain readings or on employing the rule of making literal construction of the said sub-Section

(2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, the inference which is but naturally marshable therefrom, is that, though the Commissioner becomes empowered to suo motu exercise the revisional jurisdiction, but the said exercising of revisional jurisdiction, is also so exerciseable, rather though an application becoming made before him by any person, who becomes aggrieved from an order passed under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act of 1961. The initial segment, as becomes carried in sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act, is but in the first component of sub-Section (2), and, the subsequent thereto statutory coinage(s), inasmuch as, "call for the record of any proceedings pending before, or order passed by, any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings or order and pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit" but naturally are the second component or the second segment of the said statutory provision. Therefore, on employing the interpretative tool of making literal interpretation, vis-a-vis, the opening or of the first segment of sub-Section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961,

unless the second component (supra), is earmarkedly or pointedly carved, as an exception thereto, therebys the second component is to be read in alignment with the first component. In other words, the rules of ejusdem generis, thus also require, that the first and the second component of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, require theirs being harmonized or being aligned with each other, for therebys both becoming made workable, and/or therebys the able functionality of both the components becomes fully enabled.

¶19On employing the above interpretative tools, since the revisional jurisdiction conferred through sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, upon the Commissioner, rather in the first component of the said sub-Section, has to be exercised by the Commissioner, thus vis-a-vis an order passed under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961. Therefore, when the second component of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, thus is not explicitly expressed to function as a rider or as an exception thereto, nor functions as a proviso to the first component. Resultantly, the statutory expressions carried thereins, inasmuch as "call for the record of any proceedings pending before, or order passed by, any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings or order and pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit" are to be aligned or are to be read with in conjunction with the first segment, as therebys both would be conjointly workable, and, whereupon both would not become rendered redundant. In sequel, when there is a specific legislative intent, thus in the first segment of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, wherebys an explicitly expressed revisional jurisdiction becomes conferred,

upon the Commissioner concerned, only vis-a-vis an order passed under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961. Resultantly, the subsequent thereto statutory coinages "call for the record of any proceedings pending before, or order passed by, any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings or order and pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit" but are to be read in alignment with the said first segment (supra), besides the first, and, the second components, are not to be segregated, especially when neither the second segment, is candidly spoken to be an exception to the first segment, nor the second component is expressedly stated to be serving as a proviso to the first segment.

¶20Therefore, the statutory expressions (supra), are such explicit statutory expressions, which relate to the Commissioner concerned, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, becomes enjoined to do so only vis-a-vis an order passed under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961, besides also becomes enjoined to call for the records of proceedings but relating to the passing of the said order. Moreover, the revisional empowerment, to call for the records of any proceedings pending before, or the order passed by any authority subordinate to the revisional authority, are also statutory expressions, which relate to the proceedings appertaining to the drawings of an ultimate order by the Assistant Collector concerned, upon, the respondent in the eviction petition, who but employs the mandate of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act of 1961. In addition, the said revisional empowerment extends also to the subjudice appellate proceedings, as become drawn therefroms, and, as such are pending before the Appellate Authority. Moreover, the ultimate orders passed on the

statutory appeal, by the authority subordinate to the revisional authority, and, which arise from the orders passed by the Assistant Collector concerned, under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act of 1961, rather are but the orders or the proceedings, pending before, or the orders passed by any authority subordinate to the revisional authority in terms of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act.

¶21In consequence, the second component of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, thus only speaks about the power invested in the revisional authority concerned, to call for the records of any proceedings, which are but pending before, or the orders passed by an authority subordinate to the revisional Court, which is thus the Appellate Court concerned. The said pending proceedings or the orders passed by the Appellate Court concerned, in respect whereof, the empowerment becomes vested in the revisional authority, thus to summon the records thereof, rather is an empowerment vested in the revisional authority concerned, which does imperatively relate to the proceedings as become embarked upon, in an appeal reared before the appellate authority, and, which generates from the orders passed under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961, thus by the Assistant Collector concerned.

¶22It appears, that the above manner of making literal conjoint interpretation of the relevant statutory provision (supra), besides on employing the rule of ejusdem generis, thus to the considered mind of this Court, but imparts a wholesome, and, combined signification qua both the components of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, wherebys the entirety of the provisions, carried thereins becomes fully functional. Reiteratedly, the said manner of interpretation is also made, on employing

the rule relating to literal interpretations being made to both the components, as occur in sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, wherebys the purposeful declared therein legislative intent, rather is not required to be deviated from. Moreover, therebys both the segments become harmonized, as such, there would be no redundancy either to the first, and/or, to the second component. The effect of the above, is that, the view adopted by the Division Bench of this Court in Leela Ram's case (supra), is made on a correct interpretation of the mandate, as occurs in sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961, besides to the consequent thereto mandate, as occurs in Section 13-B of the Act of 1961 whereas, the view taken in Rulia Khan 's case (supra) is contrary to the legislative intent.

¶23In nutshell, this Court concludes, that only when before the Assistant Collector concerned, but within the domain of the proviso of Section 7(2) of the Act of 1961, the respondent in the eviction petition, rather has raised a disputed question of title, wherebys, he negates the assertion of the Gram Panchayat concerned, to seek his eviction from the disputed lands, and, leading to an order of eviction being passed, qua thereupon alone against such a rendered order of eviction, rather a revision petition is maintainable to the aggrieved therefrom, before the revisional Court concerned. However, no revision petition is maintainable before the revisional authority concerned, thus in the event if no question of title, rather within the domain of the proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961, becoming raised by the respondent, in the eviction petition, as in respect of the above, a specific remedy of appeal in sub-Section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act,

¶24If so, when in the proviso underneath sub-Section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, there is an encumbrance of deposit of penalty amount, upon the respondent, in the eviction petition, thus as a pre-condition for maintaining the statutory appeal, whereas, the said proviso does not occur underneath sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, thereupon too, there are but separate statutory empowerments which become vested in the aggrieved from an order of eviction passed in a simpliciter petition cast under Section 7 of the Act of 1961, and, qua the respondent therein taking to rely upon the apposite proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act of 1961. Conspicuously, only in the latter situation, the remedy if any to the aggrieved from the order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority concerned, is through a revision being preferred in terms of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961.

¶25Now this Court is required to delineate the manner of objective satisfaction being drawn by the Assistant Collector concerned, on the respondent, in the eviction petition, raising a dispute with respect to the entitlement of the Gram Panchayat, to seek the eviction of the respondent concerned, from the disputed lands. On a plain reading of the proviso, as occurs underneath sub-Section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, it is manifestly clear, that when in a response filed to the eviction petition, the respondent raises a claim qua title inhering in him vis-a-vis the disputed lands, but with a further statutory condition, that yet he is required to be prima facie proving the said assertion, thus on the basis of the apposite prima facie credible documents. Resultantly therefrom alone the Assistant Collector concerned, is required to draw an objective speaking order, that whether a substantial question of title is really involved, and, resultantly

therebys, he is required to decide the said question of title, in the manner as declared in sub-Section (3) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961, provisions whereof become extracted hereinabove.

¶26Therefore, the apposite procedural mandate appertaining to the employments of the regulatory procedural mechanisms, as relates to trial of the civil suits by the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, are also required to be thus employed by the Assistant Collector concerned, when he proceeds to, after making a finding that a question of title is really involved, thus try the said question of title. Resultantly, but naturally when in the mandate enclosed in sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, speakings (supra) are made in the second segment thereof, segment whereof, is not expressed to be a statutory exception to the prior thereto first segment. Resultantly, the statutory coinages (supra), as become borne in the second segment relate to the testings being made by the revisional authority vis-a-vis the well adoption of the said regulatory procedural mechanisms, thus by the Assistant Collector concerned, while his proceeding to decide the question of title, as becomes raised by the respondent in the eviction petition.

¶27In sequel, the underlined expressions (supra) which occur in the second segment of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, when reiteratedly, do imminently relate to the adoptions of the apposite statutory regulatory mechanism, even by the Assistant Collector concerned, while his proceeding to decide the question of title, as becomes raised in terms of proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961. In sequel, when during the course of the apposite undertaken proceedings in respect theretos, thus there is a purported clear departure from the employment of the above said procedural mechanisms, which are required to be thus recoursed by the Assistant

Collector concerned, in his proceeding to engage himself in deciding the question of title, as becomes raised in terms of proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961, that therebys the proceedings relating to such made departures, are the ones which become expressed in the underlined statutory coinages, thus to invest in the revisional Court concerned, the jurisdiction to test the propriety or otherwise of the making of such purported departures.

¶28Conspicuously, there is a difference between the exercising of appeal, and, of revisional jurisdiction. The statutes investing appellate, and, revisional jurisdiction, do so through separate statutory provisions, which in the instant case, occur respectively in sub-Section (1) and sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, as also in the CPC, there are certain appealable orders, and, there are also reviseable orders. Since only in respect of non-appealable orders, the High Court exercises revisional jurisdiction conferred under Section 115 of the CPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, when the exercisings of the said vested jurisdiction, results in the calling for the record of the proceedings, as become embarked upon in respect of the relevant lis, rather by the Civil Courts or by the quasi judicial authorities. Resultantly, on a similar analogy, the statutory coinages "call for the record of any proceedings pending before, or order passed by, any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings or order and pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit" do also relate to the revisional authority becoming conferred with jurisdiction to call for records of the proceedings as generate from the lis, whereins, in terms of the proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961, a disputed question of title is raised

by the respondent in the eviction petition. However, if the said analogy is departed, thereupon the fine distinction created in Section 13-B of the Act of 1961 inter se the appealable orders and the revisional orders, but necessarily would be lost, besides the fine distinction created in the CPC in respect of appealable orders and reviseable orders, and, the consequent thereto empowerment respectively in the Appellate Courts and the Revisional Courts, but would also become completely ill-effaced. In sequel, the above fine distinction is required to be maintained, but has not been maintained in the verdicts recorded in Rulia Khan's case (supra), and, in Orion Infrastructure Limited's case (supra).

¶29Be that as it may, in the instant case in the response filed by the respondent to the eviction petition, he merely pleaded qua his acquiring title qua the disputed land through adverse possession, and, the said assertion was not rested, upon a decree of the Civil Court. Therefore, when the proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961 requires the respondent to, when he employs the mandate thereof, to rest his claim qua title inhering in him vis-a-vis the disputed lands, upon, the apposite documents. Contrarily when apart from the said bald plea, no document, inasmuch as, neither a copy of the jamabandi carrying in the relevant column thereof, an entry, that he was in unauthorized possession over the subject lands, thus became placed before the learned Assistant Collector concerned, for therebys a presumption of truth being attachable thereto, and, it being amenable for being rebutted by the Gram Panchayat concerned, on an issue in that respect becoming cast, nor when he placed the Civil Court decree before the Assistant Collector concerned, to support his assertion of title over the disputed land. Resultantly, when no document, as such to support the said bald assertion

became adduced before the Assistant Collector concerned. Therefore, the Assistant Collector concerned was not required to either make any objective order, that as a matter of fact, on the basis of documents, a disputed question of title was really involved, nor he was required to be initially settling the said disputed question of title in the manner declared in sub-Section (3) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961, before his proceeding to subsequently record findings of eviction on the eviction petition.

¶30In consequence, even if no proceedings, as such, on the said raised question of title became drawn, there was no breach caused to the proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961, especially when, as such the said assertion of title over the disputed lands, rather was most surmisingly raised, therefore, in the said situation, to the considered mind of this Court, there is no exerciseable revisional jurisdiction invested in the Commissioner concerned, to thus in terms of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961 exercise revisional jurisdiction thereovers. The said revisional jurisdiction is exerciseable, only when despite the documents to support the assertion of title, becoming produced along with the apposite response made to the eviction petition, thus by the respondent, yet the said documents becoming untenably discarded, both by the Assistant Collector concerned, and, by the Appellate Authority concerned.

¶31Nonetheless, the dispute at hand relates to the makings of alleged encroachments upon the subject lands, by the respondent concerned, thereupon there was a dire necessity cast upon the petitioner-Gram Panchayat, to ensure that not only a validly prepared demarcation report becomes prepared but also the same becomes lawfully proven through its author stepping into the witness box. However, there is no evidence existing

on record, thus displaying, that either the said demarcation report was validly prepared nor there is any evidence, that it became lawfully proven through its author stepping into the witness box. Therefore, the order passed by the Assistant Collector concerned (Annexure P-1), the order passed by the Appellate Authority concerned, (Annxure P-2), and, the order passed by the Commissioner concerned, (Annexure P-4) are required to be quashed, and, set aside. Conspicuously the annexures (supra) are required to be quashed, and, set aside, as therebys the revisional authority apart from the reasons (supra), ill-exercising revisional jurisdiction, upon the relevant lis has also ill-extended the domain of the lis to lands other than the one which were involved in the subject lis. Final order

¶32Consequently, the orders Annexure P-1, Annexure P-2, and, Annexuxre P-4 are quashed and set aside, and, the lis is remanded to the Assistant Collector concerned, who on receiving the same, shall restore the lis to its original number, and, thereafter shall forthwith appoint a revenue officer to conduct a valid demarcation of the disputed site. The Assistant Collector concerned, is directed to after receiving the demarcation report, shall ensure that the said demarcation report becomes validly proven through the author of the demarcation report stepping into the witness box, whereafter he shall make a valid decision, in accordance with law, on the remanded lis, thus within a period of four months but after hearing all affected persons concerned.

¶33It is clarified, that on the remanded lis, the Assistant Collector concerned, may not enter into deciding a question of title, which for reasons (supra), is baldly raised before him, nor he shall make an objective decision

whether a disputed question of title is in fact involved in the remanded lis.

¶34The Registry of this Court is directed to transmit a copy of the verdict to all the quasi judicial authorities concerned, both in the State of Punjab, and, in the State of Haryana for adherence theretos being made by them.

¶35With afore observations, the instant petition stands disposed of.

¶36The pending application(s), if any, is/are also disposed of. (SURESHWAR THAKUR)

JUDGE

(LALIT BATRA)

JUDGE May 27, 2024 Gurpreet :